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Introduction 
 
In October 2004, DG ECFIN held its first annual research conference. The theme of the 
conference was “Business Cycles and Growth in Europe”. The thirteen papers presented are 
collected here in revised form in two volumes as Economic Paper number 227, 1/2 and 2/2. 
Some of the contributions are followed by comments made by the discussants.  
 
The aim of the conference was to bring together academics and policy-makers interested in 
recent work on the theory and empirics of business cycles and growth with a focus on 
European developments.  
 
The conference took as its starting point the creation and impact of the euro. The common 
currency and the Economic and Monetary Union have changed and continue to change the 
economic landscape of Europe in many ways. A single monetary policy has been in place in 
the euro area for over six years and a framework for economic policy co-ordination is 
evolving. With the recent enlargement of the EU, the whole of Europe is gradually being 
transformed into one large common market.  
 
These historic processes are having far-reaching consequences for business cycles and growth 
in Europe. As a result, policy-makers and academic researchers are facing new and 
challenging issues such as: 
 
1. When, if ever, will one common euro-area business cycle emerge? Has it already emerged? 
How rapidly are the cycles of the Member States converging?  
 
2. What will the relationship between the euro-area business cycle and the world business 
cycle be? 
 
3. To what extent has the introduction of the euro influenced the characteristics of the 
business cycle in Europe? Have the cycles of the Member States become more synchronised 
over time? 
 4. Following the enlargement that took place in the spring of 2004, the EU is now trying to 
integrate the new Member States in the East with the old members of the West. This process 
raises many issues such as: how rapidly will the business cycles of the new Member States 
converge with the cycles of Western Europe? What are the sources of economic volatility in 
the new Member States compared to those in the old Member States? Are the macroeconomic 
disturbances in the new Member States due to specific problems during the transition phase? 
Or are they caused by “normal” business cycle fluctuations?  
 
The conference was subdivided into four main sessions (see the enclosed conference 
programme).  
 
1. Differences and commonalities in business cycles and growth: Evidence from the EU and 
US. 
2. International transmission of business cycles. 
3. Business cycles in Europe. 
4. Business cycles and growth: Theory and evidence from old and new Member States.  
 
The papers presented here are printed in the order of the programme. All sessions covered 
issues relating to business cycles and growth. Some papers have a specific European 
perspective, incorporating empirical and applied analyses, while others have a more 
worldwide perspective. Yet another group of papers are more theoretical or combine theory 
with empirical applications. Of course, there is considerable overlap between the four 
sessions.  
 
The conference was organised by Lars Jonung and Klaus Wälde, both research advisers at DG 
ECFIN, and was designated as the first annual DG ECFIN research conference. It was 
preceded by a conference held in 2003 on “Who will own Europe? The internationalisation of 
asset ownership in the EU today and in the future”. (The proceedings from this conference 
will be published by Cambridge University Press in October 2005 as The Internationalisation 
of Asset Ownership in Europe, edited by Harry Huizinga and Lars Jonung.) The next annual 
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8:50    Klaus  Regling  (ECFIN):  Welcome  Address 
 
Session 1    Differences and commonalities in business cycles and growth:  
Evidence from the EU and US 
Chair: Lars Jonung (ECFIN) 
 
9:00 to 10:00    Michael Bergman (Lund University): How Similar Are European 
Business Cycles? 
   Discussant:  Marianne  Baxter  (Boston  University) 
 
10:00 to 11:00   Thomas F. Helbling (IMF): International Business Cycle 
Synchronization in Historical Perspective 
   Discussant:  Matteo  Ciccarelli  (ECB) 
 
11:00 to 11:15   Coffee break 
 
11:15 to 12:15   Michael Artis (European University Institute): Business Cycle 
Affiliations and Their Determinants: Where Do We Stand? 
   Discussant:  Jesper  Hansson  (National Institute of Economic Research, 
          Stockholm) 
 
12:30 to 14:00   Lunch buffet 
 
 
Session 2    International transmission of business cycles  
Chair: Marianne Baxter (Boston University) 
 
14:00 to 15:00   Ian Babetskii (Czech National Bank): EU Enlargement and 
Endogeneity of some OCA Criteria: Evidence from the CEECs 
      Discussant: Zsolt Darvas (Magyar Nemzeti Bank - Central Bank of Hungary) 
 
15:00 to 16:00   Maria Olivero (Duke): Trade, Non-Competitive 
Banking and the International Transmission of Business Cycles 
Discussant: Patrick Francois (University of British Columbia) 
 
 
16:00 to 16:15   Coffee break 
 
16:15 to 17:15   Pedro Cerqueira (European University Institute and 
Coimbra University): How Pervasive is the World Business Cycle? 
   Discussant:  Sandra  Eickmeier  (Bundesbank) 17:15 to 18:15   Marianne Baxter (Boston University): Determinants of Business Cycle  
Comovement: A Robust Analysis 
   Discussant:  Patrick  Fève (University of Toulouse I) 
 





Session 3    Business cycles in Europe 
Chair: Lucrezia Reichlin (Free University of Brussels) 
 
9:00 to 10:00    Apostolis Philippopoulos (Athens University of Economics and 
Business): Electoral Uncertainty, Fiscal Policies and Growth:  
Theory and Evidence from Germany, the UK and the US 
   Discussant:  Diego  Comin (New York University) 
 
10:00 to 11:00   Gabriel Perez-Quiros (Banco de España): Are European  
Business Cycles Close Enough to be Just One? 
   Discussant:  Michael  Bergman  (Lund  University) 
 
11:00 to 11:15   Coffee break 
 
11:15 to 12:15   Lucrezia Reichlin (Free University of Brussels): Dating the Euro 
Area Business Cyle 
   Discussant:  Michael  Binder (University of Frankfurt) 
 
12:30 to 14:00   Lunch buffet 
 
 
Session 4    Business cycles and growth: Theory and evidence for old  
and new member states  
Chair: Patrick Francois (University of British Columbia) 
 
14:00 to 15:00   Francesco Caselli (Harvard University): Is Poland Next Spain? 
   Discussant:  Werner  Roeger  (ECFIN) 
 
15:00 to 16:00   Klaus Wälde (ECFIN and University of Würzburg):  
Volatility, Welfare and Taxation 
   Discussant:  Romain  Ranciere (Universitat Pompeu Fabra) 
 
16:00 to 16:15   Coffee break 
 
16:15 to 17:15   Patrick Francois (University of British Columbia): Investment Cycles 
   Discussant:  Raouf  Boucekkine  (Louvain-La-Neuve) 
 
17:30    Concluding  remarks 
 
 
18:00    Informal  get-together How Similar Are European Business Cycles?¤
U. Michael Bergman
Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen, Studiestr½de 6,
DK{1455 Copenhagen K, Denmark
March, 2005
Abstract
In this paper, we focus on how European economic integration has a®ected the
synchronization and the magnitude of business cycles among participating coun-
tries. We measure, based on bandpass ¯ltered data, the characteristics of European
business cycles analyzing to what extent they have become more similar over time.
We also consider the role of other factors such as di®erences in ¯scal and mone-
tary policy, border e®ects, and trade intensity. Our main ¯nding is that European
business cycles are highly synchronized, although we also ¯nd that synchronization
was higher during periods with highly °exible exchange rates. In addition we ¯nd
a positive tradeo® between timing and magnitude such that more synchronization
coincides with larger relative magnitude. These results raise concern about the
consequences of a common monetary policy within EMU.
JEL Classification: E32, F15
Keywords: Business cycles; symmetry and co{movement of cycles, magnitude of
cycles, economic integration, monetary union.
1 Introduction
Linkages between European countries have become more prevalent in the postwar period
as a result of the e®orts of integrating national markets. These e®orts include the removal
¤I have received valuable comments from Marianne Baxter, Lars Jonung, Katarina Juselius, Finn
Âstrup, Clas Wihlborg, seminar participants at Lund University, University of Copenhagen and confer-
ence participants at the 4
th Eurostat and DG ECFIN Colloquium on Modern Tools for Business Cycle
Analysis, the 6
th Swedish Network for European Studies in Economics and Business conference on Euro-
pean Economic Integration in Swedish Research and the ECFIN Research Conference \Business Cycles
and Growth in Europe". Financial support from the Swedish Research Council is gratefully acknowledged.
{ 1 {of trade barriers, the implementation of the Single European Act in 1986, the Maastricht
Treaty in 1992, the introduction of the Single European Market in 1993, the Stability
and Growth Pact in 1997, and the creation of the Economic and Monetary Union with a
common currency and monetary policy. An important question is whether these e®orts of
economic and monetary integration have led to a higher degree of similarity of European
business cycles in recent years.
Such a development is also desirable since the loss of the option of using an inde-
pendent monetary policy and giving up the value of changing the exchange rate when
desired would otherwise constitute a major cost for the EMU countries. These options
are especially important if countries are facing asymmetric shocks, in which case exchange
rate adjustments and separate monetary policies could help to stabilize nation{speci¯c
aggregate °uctuations. A common monetary policy therefore requires that the timing of
business cycles is similar among the members of the monetary union. However, even if the
timing of business cycles is similar, the magnitude may di®er, in which case the intensity
of policies may have to be di®erent. Therefore, a common monetary policy requires that
business cycles in member states are highly synchronized and have small di®erences in
the magnitude.
There are theoretical reasons for both the view that economic integration will lead
to more synchronized business cycles and the opposite view that increased economic in-
tegration will lead to less synchronized business cycles. Kalemli{Ozcan, S¿rensen and
Yosha (2001) argue that increased economic integration leads to better income insurance
through greater capital integration which in turn will lead to a more specialized produc-
tion structure and an increase in trade and therefore less synchronized business cycles. A
similar argument, although using di®erent mechanisms, has also been proposed by Krug-
man (1993). Alternatively, it could be argued, as Coe and Helpman (1995) and Frankel
and Rose (1998) suggest, that the removal of trade barriers will lead to more trade such
that demand shocks are more easily transmitted across national borders. Economic and
monetary integration, will according to this view, lead to more symmetry of structural
shocks and knowledge and technology spillovers which will lead to a higher degree of
synchronization of national business cycles.
Given these theoretical ambiguities over the e®ects of economic and monetary inte-
gration on the behavior of business cycles, empirical evidence must be brought to bear
on the issue. Indeed, there are several papers suggesting that business cycles are more
synchronized when exchange rate variability is low (Fat¶ as (1997), Artis and Zhang (1997,
1999), Dickerson, Gibson and Tsakalotos (1998) and Rose and Engel (2002)). However,
there are also papers suggesting the opposite, that business cycles are more synchronized
during periods with higher exchange rate volatility (Gerlach (1988), Inklaar and De Haan
(2001) and De Haan, Inklaar and Sleijpen (2002)). A few authors report evidence sug-
gesting no relationship between exchange rate regime and business cycle synchronization
{ 2 {(Baxter and Stockman (1989), Sopraseuth (2003), Baxter and Kouparitsas (2004)).1 In
addition, there seems to be at most only weak evidence supporting the view that increased
economic integration leads to a higher degree of synchronization. Indeed, Doyle and Faust
(2002) and Kose, Prasad and Terrones (2003) ¯nd no strong evidence supporting this idea
whereas Imbs (2003) supports the view that ¯nancial liberalization is signi¯cantly related
to a higher degree of synchronization.
One approach in the literature is to distinguish between core and periphery European
countries, where the core countries have highly synchronized business cycles. Countries
identi¯ed as core EU have closer links and are expected to bene¯t from the common
monetary policy and the common currency without sacri¯cing national macroeconomic
stabilization objectives. On the other hand, countries identi¯ed as in the periphery are
not expected to gain from being members of a monetary union. There is a large literature
attempting to classify European countries into a core and a periphery, see, e.g., Artis
and Zhang (1997,1999), Artis, Kontolemis and Osborn (1997), Christodoulakis, Dimelis
and Kollintzas (1995), and Dickerson, Gibson and Tsakalotos (1998). These studies vary
in their classi¯cation but a general result is that the long{standing members of the EU
often are classi¯ed as being in the core with Germany as an attractor. Camacho, Quir¶ os
and Saiz (2004), however, cannot ¯nd strong evidence supporting the core/periphery
distinction and suggest that there is no distinct euro economy attractor. They also show
that European business cycles have become less synchronized after the establishment of
the EMU, a result that raises concern about the future of EMU.
With few exceptions, earlier papers focus on the relationship between exchange rate
regimes and the timing of European business cycles disregarding any e®ects of the mag-
nitude of cycles.2 This is in part surprising since there is a direct relationship between
the correlation and the variance. For example, holding everything else constant, a lower
variance would imply a higher correlation coe±cient. Dickerson, Gibson and Tsakalotos
(1998) ¯nd that the magnitude of business cycles in general is lower for core EU countries
but they provide no analysis of the relationship between magnitude and exchange rate
regimes. Sopraseuth (2003), however, found that the magnitude of European business
cycles was unrelated to membership of the EMS.
The purpose of this paper is to shed light on the question whether European busi-
1Baxter and Stockman (1989) found that synchronization and monetary regimes were unrelated for
linear trend adjusted data but not for ¯rst log di®erence data where synchronization was higher when
exchange rate volatility was low. Sopraseuth (2003) also found that even though membership of the
EMS did not result in a higher degree of synchronization, business cycles in EMS countries became more
synchronized to the German cycle and less synchronized to the US cycle.
2The literature usually focuses on the G{7 countries documenting shifts in the volatility and in the
synchronization of cycles, see e.g. Doyle and Faust (2002), van Dijk, Osborn and Sensier (2002) and Stock
and Watson (2003). The consensus from this literature is that the business cycle has been dampened
recently but there is disagreement on the number of shifts, the dates of the breaks and the magnitude of
these breaks.
{ 3 {ness cycles have become more similar as a result of economic and monetary integration.
We measure, based on bandpass ¯ltered data, the characteristics of European business
cycles analyzing to what extent they have become more synchronized over time and test
whether, for example, EU membership and the Single Market program can account for
a higher degree of synchronization. We then consider the role of other factors that have
received considerable attention in the literature such as di®erences in ¯scal and mone-
tary policy, border e®ects, and trade intensity. Can these factors explain the lack of full
synchronization among European business cycles?
Next, we turn our attention to the relative magnitude of national business cycles
and the question whether the amplitude of business cycles across Europe has become
more similar over time. Finally, we consider the linkage between synchronization and the
relative magnitude of business cycles.
The paper extends the earlier literature in at least two di®erent directions. First, we
consider the role of exchange rate °uctuations in two ways, by decomposing the sample
into sub{samples re°ecting di®erent exchange rate regimes and by considering the direct
role of exchange rate volatility on the degree of synchronization. Second, we analyze
the tradeo® between synchronization or the timing of business cycles and the relative
magnitude of business cycles. This is particularly important from a European perspective
since the success of the common monetary policy and the common currency in Europe
rests on the similarity of both the timing and the magnitude of business cycles in member
states.
The paper is organized in the following manner. In section 2 we describe the method
used to extract the business cycle component from the data and perform a ¯rst preliminary




The data set consists of quarterly observations on industrial production for the EU{
14 countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom) and ¯ve non{EU
countries (Canada, Japan, Norway, Switzerland and the US) for the sample 1961:1 to
2001:4.3 The data are taken from IFS CD{Rom except for industrial production for
Ireland and Portugal that have been taken from OECD Main Economic Indicators, see
Appendix A.
3We use industrial production as our business cycle indicator rather than GDP since quarterly GDP
data for all these countries is only available for a shorter sample period making it di±cult to study
changes in business cycle behavior over time.
{ 4 {2.2 Measuring domestic business cycles
Prior to our empirical analysis we must extract the cyclical component from the macro-
economic time series, i.e., the natural logarithm of industrial production. Recently, Baxter
and King (1999) have developed a bandpass ¯lter that isolates cyclical components of eco-
nomic time series. This ¯lter can be designed to isolate cyclical components of economic
time series conforming to a certain de¯nition of business cycles.4 In particular, we isolate
cyclical components of the data with durations conforming to the Burns{Mitchell de¯ni-
tion of the business cycle.5 We use a 12{order two{sided ¯lter following Baxter and King
(1999) to extract all °uctuations at frequencies between 6 and 32 quarters (1.5 year and
eight years) from the logarithm of industrial production in each country.6 When applying
this ¯lter, we lose observations at both ends of our sample. We use forecasts and backcasts
based on a twelfth order univariate autoregressive model to add these observations to the
sample prior to applying the bandpass ¯lter. This same method is used by Stock and
Watson (1999) and Bergman, Bordo and Jonung (1998) amongst others.
In Appendix B, we show plots of the extracted business cycles as well as plots of
the raw data and the implied trend, i.e., the di®erence between the actual data and the
cyclical component. A striking feature of these graphs is the regularity of national business
cycles and the co{movements of downturns and upturns, in particular between the EU{14
countries. The overall impression is that cyclical °uctuations in industrial production in
this sample of countries display a relatively high degree of synchronization. It is also
interesting to note that the severity of business cycles has declined in the latter part of
our sample for some countries (Denmark, France and Greece) while the amplitude seems
to be relatively unchanged over time for other countries. The e®ects of the oil price shock
during the second half of the 1970's and in the beginning of the 1980's are also evident




In Figure 1 we study the co{movements between EU{14 and non{EU countries and the
co{movements between EU{14 countries before and after the particular country became
4Baxter and King (1999) compare the properties of cyclical components of US GNP generated by
di®erent detrending techniques and ¯nd that the bandpass ¯lter usually is superior to other ¯lters in
isolating cyclical variation within certain frequency bands.
5They de¯ne business cycles as recurrent, but not strictly periodic, °uctuations in economic activity
with a duration usually between one and ten years, the average length varying over time.
6The results below are essentially una®ected when using the Hodrick{Prescott ¯lter to extract the
business cycle component of industrial production instead of the Baxter{King ¯lter.
{ 5 {a member of the EU. To construct the graph in the upper panel we use the full sample
and compute the average of bilateral contemporaneous cross{correlation between EU{14
and non{EU countries for each country in our sample, i.e., the average of the cross{
correlations between, say, Germany and each European country and between Germany
and the ¯ve non{EU countries. On the vertical axis we measure cross{correlations with
non{EU countries whereas we measure cross{correlations with EU{14 countries on the
horizontal axis. As can be seen in this graph, there is a tendency that business cycles
in non{EU countries are more correlated to business cycles in non{EU countries than to
business cycles in the EU{14 countries with the exception of Austria and Switzerland.
The EU{14 countries seem to be more correlated to other EU{14 countries. However, the
di®erences are not substantial according to this plot.
The lower graph in Figure 1 shows the average of contemporaneous cross{correlations
between EU member states excluding the six original members prior to (vertical axis) and
after (horizontal axis) the particular country became a member of the EU. There is no
clear{cut pattern evident in this graph. Some countries have become more correlated to
other EU{countries after entering the EU (Ireland and the UK) while business cycles in
other countries were more synchronized prior to their EU{membership (Austria, Greece
and Portugal). Again there is no uniform evidence pointing in any particular direction for
these nine countries. The graphs in Figure 1 suggest that business cycles in the EU{14
countries are somewhat more synchronized to business cycles in other EU{14 countries
than with non{EU countries whereas EU membership seems to have had only marginal
e®ects on the degree of synchronization for most European countries.
3.2 Has the degree of synchronization changed over time?
It may well be the case that the degree of synchronization has changed over time and
that these changes are related to other developments than the timing of EU{membership,
for example, the exchange rate regime. Therefore we now divide our sample into ¯ve
sub{samples re°ecting di®erent monetary regimes and di®erent degrees of economic in-
tegration: the Bretton{Woods period 1961:1{1973:1, the °exible exchange rate regime
1973:2{1978:4, the EMS period 1979:1{1987:2, the implementation of the Single Euro-
pean Act and the hard ERM period 1987:3{1992:4, and the implementation of the com-
mon market and preparations for monetary union 1993:1{2001:4.7 In addition, we will
from now on focus on the general pattern, i.e., we distinguish between groups of coun-
tries instead of di®erences between countries. This allows us to distinguish between EU
member states, non{EU member states and the role played by the monetary regime and
7It would have been interesting to divide the last period into two sub{periods allowing us to also study
the e®ects of EMU. This is, unfortunately, not possible since our estimates of co{movements would be
highly uncertain given the few available observations on industrial production and other variables used
in the analysis below for the EMU{period. The sub{samples we use roughly correspond to the ones used
in the earlier literature.
{ 6 {Figure 1: Cross{correlations.
(a) Average cross{correlation with EU and non{EU countries.
(b) Average cross{correlation with EU countries before and after EU
membership.
Note: The average cross{correlations for non{EU countries shown in sub¯gure 1(a) are computed using
the full sample whereas the cross{correlations for EU countries are computed using data when they are
members of the EU. In sub¯gure 1(b) we show the average cross{correlation between a EU country and
other EU member states before and after the particular country entered the EU.
{ 7 {the degree of economic integration.
In Table 1 we present the average cross{correlations between all countries, between
EU{14 countries, between non{EU countries and ¯nally between EU{14 and non{EU
countries for the full sample and the ¯ve sub{samples. To measure these averages, we ¯rst
compute the bilateral cross{correlations between country i and j (½ij) for each sub{sample
and stack the unique cross{correlations in the vector ½. This leads to a vector with 855
unique cross{correlations for the 19 countries (for each sample we have 19(19¡1)=2 unique
cross{correlations). The average of cross{correlations between, say, the EU{14 countries
over the full sample is then a linear combination of these unique cross{correlations of the
form ½ = ±0½. To measure the standard error of these averages we use the Newey{West
heteroscedastic and autocorrelated corrected variance estimator (HAC).8
Looking ¯rst at the ¯rst row of Table 1 where we report estimates of the average cross{
correlations (½) for all countries. As can be seen from this row, the point estimates of the
degree of synchronization change over time, it is highest during the °exible exchange rate
period and lowest during the Bretton{Woods period. There is also a clear cycle in the
degree of synchronization. It is increasing between the ¯rst two sub{samples, decreasing
during the next two and then ¯nally increasing again.
This pattern is also evident in the next row reporting the average cross{correlations
between EU member states, (½
EUM
EUM). These averages are based on the sample of countries
that were members of the EU during the particular sub{sample, Denmark and Ireland
joined in 1973, Greece in 1981, Portugal and Spain joined in 1986 whereas Austria, Finland
and Sweden joined in 1995.9 The synchronization of business cycles between EU{member
states are highest during the °exible exchange rate period and higher during the most
recent period compared to the earlier two sub{samples.
A di®erent pattern is evident for the sample of non{EU member states. Note that
these cross{correlations (½
NEU
NEU) are computed for all countries that were not members of
the EU during the particular sub{sample. For these countries we observe a downward
trend (according to the point estimates) in the degree of synchronization over time. As
for the earlier two groups of countries, business cycles were strongly synchronized during
the °exible exchange rate period.
In the last row of the upper part of Table 1 we show the estimates of the average
degree of synchronization between EU{member states and non{EU member states (½
NEU
EUM).
8It may be the case that the cross{correlations in ½ are correlated, the cross{correlation between
Sweden and Belgium and between Sweden and Denmark is correlated to the cross{correlation between
Denmark and Belgium. This potential problem gives rise to autocorrelated residuals. Following the
practice in the related literature we estimate the parameters using OLS and the standard errors using a
robust estimator.
9Our ¯ve sub{samples do not fully correspond to the dates when these countries joined the EU. In our
empirical work we, therefore, include Greece in our sample of EU countries in the sub{sample 1978{87,
Portugal and Spain in the sub{sample 1987{1992 and Austria, Finland and Sweden in the last sub{sample
1993{2011. Our empirical results are essentially una®ected by these assumptions.
{ 8 {Table 1: Average cross{correlations in EU and non{EU countries.
Panel A: Average cross{correlations.
1961{2001 1961{1973 1973{1978 1979{1987 1987{1992 1993{2001
½ 0:455 0:327 0:646 0:493 0:333 0:478
(0:018) (0:031) (0:037) (0:033) (0:029) (0:038)
½
EUM
EUM 0:543 0:300 0:824 0:517 0:345 0:567
(0:028) (0:174) (0:026) (0:040) (0:064) (0:030)
½
NEU
NEU 0:409 0:333 0:552 0:464 0:322 0:319
(0:031) (0:029) (0:061) (0:081) (0:084) (0:192)
½
EUM
NEU 0:440 0:323 0:647 0:498 0:332 0:386
(0:024) (0:044) (0:051) (0:039) (0:036) (0:069)





NEU 10:373 0:035 16:559 0:353 0:052 1:620





NEU 8:801 0:022 10:438 0:138 0:028 5:790
0:003 0:882 0:001 0:710 0:868 0:016
Note: In Panel A we report the average of bilateral contemporaneous cross{correlations for all countries
(½), the average of contemporaneous cross{correlation between EU member states (½
EUM
EUM), the average
of contemporaneous cross{correlations between non{EU member states (½
NEU
NEU), and the average of con-
temporaneous cross{correlations between EU member states and non{EU members (½
EUM
NEU). Newey{West
HAC standard errors are shown in parentheses below each cross{correlation. In Panel B we report Wald





NEU) and Wald tests of the null hypothesis that the cross{correlation between EU member





NEU). These tests are Â2 distributed with 1 degree of freedom. The total number of unique
cross{correlations is 855.
{ 9 {The pattern is similar, but not as strong, as for the EU{member states. The degree of
synchronization seems to increase somewhat in the last sub{period 1993{2001 compared
to the earlier period.
Comparing the degrees of synchronization across groups of countries and across time,
we ¯nd an interesting pattern. In Panel B in Table 1 we report Wald tests of the null
hypothesis that the average cross{correlations across EU{members and across non{EU
members are equal during each sample. These tests reveal that the degree of synchroniza-
tion di®ers only during the °exible exchange rate period. This suggests again that the
degree of synchronization has changed in a similar way for these two groups of countries
over time. In the second row of Panel B, we test the null hypothesis that EU{member
states synchronization with other EU{members and non{EU members are equal for each
sample. These tests show that business cycles in EU{member states were more synchro-
nized business during the °exible exchange rate period and the most recent period of
deepening European integration.
The analysis above only shows the main tendencies of the data and cannot be used
to argue that the attempts to bring European countries closer to each other by the im-
plementation of the common market and the establishment of the monetary union have
made business cycles more synchronized in Europe. To answer such questions, we from
now on focus on the sample of EU{countries, that is we focus only on bilateral cross{
correlations between EU{14 countries during each sub{sample testing for an additional
EU membership e®ect and the role played by the monetary regime.
In Table 2 we report tests of the null hypothesis that sub{sample averages of cross{
correlations between EU{member states are equal. A striking feature of these results is
that the second sub{sample, the °exible exchange rate regime, stands out as di®erent.
We strongly reject the null hypothesis that business cycle synchronization during this
sample is equal to the synchronization during all other sub{samples. These results support
our earlier ¯nding that business cycles were more synchronized during this sub{sample
compared to the other four regimes.
It is commonly argued in the literature that °exible exchange rates tend to insulate
the national economy from demand type shocks, i.e., shocks a®ecting the business cycle.10
Our calculations lend support to this idea. Monetary regimes with less °exible exchange
rates tend to be associated with a lower degree of synchronization.
The results in Table 2 also suggest that the degree of synchronization during the most
recent sub{sample is signi¯cantly di®erent from the co{movements during the period
when the Single European Act was implemented. In this regard, it may be argued that a
deepening of European integration has led to a higher degree of synchronization although
business cycles were even more synchronized during the earlier °exible exchange rate
10Within a Mundell{Fleming model it is possible to show that °exible exchange rates insulate the
economy to aggregate demand shocks but not to money demand shocks. For a large open economy with
an in°ation target, a ¯xed exchange rate regime is optimal.
{ 10 {Table 2: Wald tests of EU membership e®ects across di®erent monetary regimes.
1973{1978 1978{1987 1987{1992 1993{2001
1961{73 Wald 9:045 1:512 0:061 2:336
p{value 0:003 0:219 0:805 0:126
1973{78 Wald 43:222 48:604 44:027
p{value 0:000 0:000 0:000




Notes: Wald tests are based on regressions with a constant and sub{sample dependent EU dummy
variables and the HAC covariance matrix estimator. The degree of freedom is 2 for all tests.
period. A Wald test of the null hypothesis that cross{correlations are equal across all ¯ve
subperiods strongly rejects the null, Â2 = 91:978 with p{value = 0:000 further supporting
the conclusion that the degree of synchronization has changed over time. This result is
consistent with the results provided by Massmann and Mitchell (2003) in particular but
also the large body of the literature suggesting changes in the degree of synchronization
across time.
Our analysis above suggests that the synchronization of business cycles among EU
member states is higher than among non{EU member states. In the next subsection we
turn to the question why we observe these changes in the degree of synchronization. What
could explain the apparent changes in synchronization? In particular, we are interested
in explaining why the degree of synchronization was so high during the period when the
European countries had °exible exchange rates. It is also interesting to test whether the
signi¯cantly higher degree of synchronization during the last period is explained by the
increased economic integration or if other factors explain this increase.
3.3 What accounts for the EU membership effect?
In this section we examine whether the EU membership e®ects identi¯ed above can be
explained by other factors a®ecting the European economies or if other developments have
led to an increase in the degree of synchronization. Following Clark and van Wincoop
(2001) who study the border e®ect on the synchronization of business cycles, we consider in
addition to a border e®ect, the role played by trade intensity, distance between countries,
the size of countries, di®erences in monetary and ¯scal policy, exchange rate volatility
and the volatility of oil price changes.
We de¯ne trade intensity (following Frankel and Rose (1998)) as the natural logarithm
of the value of bilateral trade between two countries divided by sum of the value of total
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We then take the average of these trade intensities over the ¯ve sub{samples. The dis-
tance (D) between countries is measured as the great circle between largest cities in each
country according to Fitzpatrick and Modlin (1986).11 The size is measured as the nat-
ural logarithm of the product of real GDP per capita measured in current US$.12 To
account for di®erences in monetary and ¯scal policy, we use the standard deviation of the
money market (or equivalent measures) interest rate di®erential (¾r¡r¤) and the standard
deviation of the budget de¯cit (as a percentage of GDP) di®erential (¾D¡D¤), respectively.
These measures imply that if the monetary policy (or the ¯scal policy) in two countries
di®ers substantially over a certain time period, the standard deviation is high. The larger
discrepancy between monetary (and ¯scal policy), the higher standard deviation. The
exchange rate volatility is measured as the standard deviation of the ¯rst log di®erence of
bilateral exchange rates (¾¢s). Finally, we use the standard deviation of oil price changes
(¾¢oil) as an indicator of large common shocks a®ecting all countries at the same time.
Note that all these measures are bilateral and that we take the average of annual (and
monthly or quarterly) observations for each sub{sample. Data sources and sample ranges
are presented in Appendix A.
In Table 3 we show the role of these factors in explaining the synchronization of
business cycles within the EU{14 countries. All results are based on running the following
regression
½ = ®0 + ®1EUM + X¯ + "
where EUM is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if both countries are members of
the EU at the time we measure the cross{correlation, X includes the various variables
discussed above. When including trade and the policy variables, we estimate the regression
using instrumental variables as discussed below.
In the ¯rst column of Table 3 we report the estimated e®ect of EU membership. As we
already know from our earlier analysis, this parameter is signi¯cant and positive suggesting
that EU member states tend to have more synchronized business cycles compared to EU{
14 countries that were not members of the EU at the point in time we computed the cross{
correlation. The question now is whether this positive e®ect disappears when including
11We have also considered alternative measures of distance such as the distance in radians of the unit
circle between country centroids. The empirical results below are essentially una®ected when using this
measure.
12Another approach to measure size is to use the natural logarithm of the sum of population. In general,
the signi¯cance of the parameters associated to this measure of size was lower (although statistically
signi¯cant at conventional levels) compared to the signi¯cance of the log of the product of real GDP. All
other results were essentially una®ected.
{ 12 {other variables in the regression. In other words, is this EU member e®ect robust or are
there other explanations to the increasing synchronization that we have observed above.
The second column in Table 3 reports the results when including border, distance
and size as additional explanatory variables besides the constant and the EU membership
dummy. As is evident, there is a very strong border e®ect. Bordering EU countries tend
to have more synchronized business cycles compared to non{bordering countries. This
result is consistent with evidence provided by Clark and van Wincoop (2001) who report
very strong border e®ects between France, Germany, Italy and the UK.
The distance between the countries seems to play no role in explaining synchronization,
the parameter is not signi¯cantly di®erent from zero. The size e®ect is highly signi¯cant
suggesting that the size of the countries play an important role for explaining the degree
of business cycle synchronization. The cross{correlation between large countries tends to
be higher compared to cross{correlations between small countries. However, controlling
for border, distance and size has some e®ect on the importance of EU membership. The
coe±cient drops from 0.090 to 0.062 and it is only statistically signi¯cant at the 10
percent level suggesting that border, distance and size explain parts of the co{movements
of business cycles in EU member states. The conclusion is that controlling for a border,
in particular, but also for size reduces the EU membership e®ect somewhat.
Next, we add trade intensity, di®erences in monetary and ¯scal policies, exchange rate
volatility and the volatility of oil price changes to the regression. To avoid multicolinearity
between the regressors, we now exclude both border and distance from our regression.13
Since trade may be endogenous (as argued by Frankel and Rose (1998)) we estimate
the regression using instrumental variables. Countries that border usually trade more
and therefore have more synchronized business cycles. A similar argument holds for
distance, the longer the distance is between two countries, the more likely it is that the
volume of trade is smaller. At the same time, as argued by both Frankel and Rose (1998)
and Clark and van Wincoop (2001), countries with highly synchronized business cycles
are better candidates for currency unions, which in turn could increase trade. We use
instruments that often are used in gravity models: border, distance, linguistic distance,
and an interaction term equal to the product of size and distance.14
To instrument the policy variables and exchange rate volatility, we use the absolute
in°ation di®erential, the sum of interest rates, the absolute di®erence between the ratios of
government spending to GDP and the sum of the ratios of government spending to GDP.
These same instruments were used in a similar context by Clark and van Wincoop (2001).
To test whether trade, the policy variables and exchange rate volatility are endogenous we
apply the Durbin{Wu{Hausman test. The result shown in the last row of Table 3 strongly
13Trade, border and distance are highly correlated, the correlation coe±cients are above 0:6 between
trade and the other two variables.
14The explanatory power for trade in the ¯rst stage regression using these instruments is 0:68.
{ 13 {Table 3: Testing the border e®ect, the role of EU{membership distance, size, trade and
economic policy. EU{14 countries.
Variable OLS IV IV




















Notes: Estimates are based on regressions of the average bilateral cross{correlations on a constant
and the various variables shown in the table where wij is trade intensity, ¾r¡r¤ denotes di®erences in
monetary policy, ¾D¡D¤ is a measure of di®erences in ¯scal policy, ¾¢s is the standard deviation of
bilateral exchange rates and ¾¢oil is the standard deviation of oil price changes. Instruments for trade
are border, distance, language and an interaction term of distance and size. The three policy variables
(¾r¡r¤, ¾D¡D¤ and ¾¢s) are instrumented using the absolute in°ation di®erential, the sum of interest
rates, the absolute di®erence between the ratios of government spending to GDP and the sum of the
ratios of government spending to GDP. HAC standard errors using 4 lags are shown in parentheses below
each parameter estimate. Estimates are based on 182 unique cross{correlations.
{ 14 {suggests a rejection of the null hypothesis that these variables are not endogenous.15
The result when including these explanatory variables in the regression is shown shown
in the third column of Table 3. The parameter associated with the EU dummy is further
reduced and is not statistically di®erent from zero. This suggests that the higher synchro-
nization of business cycles within EU can be explained by the variables we have included
in the regression, not by the fact that these countries are members of the EU.
Trade is positively related to the synchronization of business cycles. The reason why
the business cycle is more synchronized between EU member states is, according to these
estimates, that they trade more. A surprising result, however, is that the two policy vari-
ables (di®erences in monetary and ¯scal policies) exert di®erent in°uences on the degree
of synchronization. It is often assumed that more similar economic policy should to lead
to a higher degree of business cycle synchronization. Looking at the particular estimates
in Table 3, we ¯nd that larger di®erences in monetary policy and smaller di®erences in
¯scal policy implies a higher degree of synchronization. Di®erences in monetary policy is
statistically signi¯cantly di®erent from zero at the 1 percent level whereas ¯scal policy is
statistically di®erent from zero at the 10 percent level. These results are di®erent from
the evidence presented by Clark and van Winccop (2001). In their empirical application,
policy variables were often found to be positively related to the degree of synchronization
but very seldom statistically signi¯cant.
The volatility in exchange rates is not signi¯cant. According to our estimates there
is no additional link between exchange rate volatility and the synchronization of business
cycles that are not already captured by our decomposition into sub{samples. This result
questions some earlier empirical evidence provided by, for example, De Haan, Inklaar and
Sleijpen (2002). They show that there is a positive relationship between exchange rate
volatility and business cycle synchronization. One possible explanation is that we also
include di®erences in both monetary and ¯scal policy and the e®ect from oil price changes
in our regressions.
Experiments with alternative speci¯cations reveal that the inclusion of di®erences in
monetary policy explain why exchange rate volatility is not statistically signi¯cant. In
regression excluding di®erences in monetary policy, exchange rate volatility is always sig-
ni¯cant and the point estimate is positive such that more volatility is associated with
more synchronized cycles. Furthermore, when excluding the volatility of oil prices in our
regressions we also obtain a positive parameter on exchange rate volatility but with a t{
ratio slightly above 1. In a regression excluding di®erences in monetary and ¯scal policy,
15Gruben, Koo and Millis (2002) ¯nd that this endogeneity hypothesis is rejected in regressions similar
to the ones we perform above. They suggest that instrumental variable regressions tend to overestimate
the e®ects from trade on synchronization and suggest that OLS estimates should be used instead. How-
ever, their results based on OLS are consistent with our ¯nding that there is a signi¯cant relationship
between trade intensity and synchronization. Traistaru (2004), also studying the relationship between
synchronization and trade, rejects the null of no endogeneity, the same result as we obtain in our regres-
sions.
{ 15 {exchange rate volatility is signi¯cantly and positively related to business cycle synchro-
nization. To these ¯ndings we may also add that the average exchange rate volatility for
EU member states during the ¯ve sub{samples is 1.032, 1.823, 1.487, 0.997 and 1.482,
respectively. There is, thus, a common pattern of synchronization and exchange rate
volatility, higher exchange rate volatility is associated with a higher degree of business
cycle synchronization for EU member states.
The volatility of oil price changes is negatively related to business cycle synchroniza-
tion. A higher volatility (larger °uctuations in oil prices) lead to less synchronization.
This result is somewhat surprising since oil price changes a®ect all countries at the same
time and represent common shocks. It is often argued that a larger variance in common
shocks relative to idiosyncratic shocks tend to increase the correlation. It may be the
case that more °exible exchange rates during the 1970's compensated for the increased
volatility in oil price changes such that business cycles became more synchronized. This is
also con¯rmed in regressions of business cycle synchronization on the standard deviation
of oil prices allowing the e®ect to vary over sub{samples. In these regressions we ¯nd that
higher oil price volatility is associated with more synchronization, con¯rming the view
that common shocks tend to increase comovements in international business cycles. This
e®ect is also signi¯cant when adding sub{sample dependent exchange rate volatility.
The results shown in Table 3 cannot be used to draw inference about the importance
of economic integration as the parameters are not allowed to vary across di®erent sub{
samples. It may well be the case that EU membership is important during, say, the
last sub{period where the European countries have become more integrated. To examine
whether this is the case, we now allow the EU membership dummy to vary across the
¯ve sub{samples. We still assume, however, that the in°uence from other explanatory
variables is time invariant. The results from these estimates are shown in Table 4.
For comparison we have included in the ¯rst column estimates of sample dependent
EU membership e®ects taken from Table 1. What is immediately evident in this table
is that the parameter associated to EU membership tends to change very little for some
sub{samples whereas it changes considerably for other sub{samples. The e®ect of the EU
membership dummy variable changes considerably for the ¯rst two sub{samples but much
less for the last sub{sample. Controlling for trade, di®erences in economic policy, exchange
rate volatility and oil price volatility leads to a drop in the EU membership dummy
suggesting that synchronization is explained by trade in particular but also di®erences in
economic policy, see the last column of Table 4. Exchange rate and oil price volatility are
not statistically signi¯cant in these regressions.
Similarly to our earlier results presented earlier in Table 3, there is a strong border
e®ect and trade is always signi¯cant. This suggests that bordering countries that also
trade more, will have more synchronized business cycles compared to countries located far
away. The parameter associated with size is signi¯cantly di®erent from zero all regressions.
Di®erences in monetary policy and ¯scal policy are both signi¯cant and have parameters
{ 16 {Table 4: Testing the border e®ect, the role of EU{membership distance, size, trade and
economic policy. EU{14 countries.
Variable OLS IV IV
EUM 1961{73 ¡0:152 ¡0:256 ¡0:329
(0:167) (0:155) (0:158)
EUM 1973{78 0:372 0:314 0:284
(0:037) (0:041) (0:054)
EUM 1979{87 0:065 0:024 0:069
(0:047) (0:047) (0:078)
EUM 1987{92 ¡0:107 ¡0:152 ¡0:203
(0:071) (0:066) (0:072)




















Notes: Estimates are based on regressions of the average bilateral cross{correlations on a constant
and the various variables shown in the table where wij is trade intensity, ¾r¡r¤ denotes di®erences in
monetary policy, ¾D¡D¤ is a measure of di®erences in ¯scal policy, ¾¢s is the standard deviation of
bilateral exchange rates and ¾¢oil is the standard deviation of oil price changes. Instruments for trade
are border, distance, language and an interaction term of distance and size. The policy variables are
instrumented using the absolute in°ation di®erential, the sum of interest rates, the absolute di®erence
between the ratios of government spending to GDP and the sum of the ratios of government spending
to GDP. HAC standard errors using 4 lags are shown in parentheses below each parameter estimate.
Estimates are based on 182 unique cross{correlations.
{ 17 {of approximately the same size regardless of whether we allow the EU membership dummy
to vary across sub-samples or not.
Looking more closely at the results for the °exible exchange rate regime, we ¯nd that
the e®ect of EU membership drops when adding the control variables. This suggests
that the control variables explain parts of the very high synchronization of business cy-
cles for this sub{sample. For the more recent sub{samples, the parameter changes very
little. We can, therefore, conclude that the various control variables cannot explain the
increased synchronization during this period. In this respect, the increased economic in-
tegration may have had a positive in°uence on business cycle synchronization. This result
is consistent with the empirical evidence provided by Imbs (2003). He ¯nds that ¯nancial
integration (no capital account restrictions and a high degree of risk{sharing) has a pos-
itive and signi¯cant e®ect on business cycle synchronization. Even if our measurements
are di®erent from the measurements used by Imbs, our results and interpretations are
consistent.
Even though there is an upward trend in synchronization, we cannot draw any strong
conclusions about the future of European business cycle behavior. The reason is that
synchronization depends also on trade and di®erences in economic policy. The empirical
evidence on the relationship between exchange rate volatility and trade suggest that trade
possibly will increase in the future as a result of monetary union.16 In addition, our
results suggest that common ¯scal policies also increase synchronization, the parameter
associated with the standard deviation of di®erences in budget de¯cits as percentage of
GDP is negative. Convergence of ¯scal policies within the EMU may lead to a higher
degree of synchronization.
We also found a positive and signi¯cant e®ect between di®erences in monetary policy
and synchronization. If this result is robust, then the common monetary policy in Europe
runs the risk of increasing the divergence in business cycles counteracting the positive
e®ects from economic integration. It is, of course, an open question whether the trade
e®ect is stronger or weaker than the e®ect from di®erences in monetary policy. The
common monetary policy will tend to decrease synchronization whereas increased trade
intensity will tend to increase synchronization. If the former e®ect dominates, the common
monetary policy would be too expansive in some countries and too restrictive in others.
These potential problems will not occur to the same extent if the latter e®ect dominates.
In addition, our results that there is a weak positive relationship between exchange rate
volatility and business cycle synchronization. Our estimates cannot reveal how strong
this e®ect is, but periods with more °exible exchange rates coincide with periods with a
high degree of synchronization.
16Running a regression of trade on exchange rate volatility, we ¯nd a very strong and signi¯cant e®ect
implying that lower exchange rate volatility will tend to increase trade. This positive relationship has
also been found by, e.g., Rose and Engel (2002).
{ 18 {3.4 The magnitude of business cycles
The analysis above shed some light on the timing of business cycles in the EU where
the main argument was that the implementation of a common monetary policy and the
synchronization of ¯scal policy within the EU{area is a concern if the timing of business
cycles di®ers considerably. A similar argument holds for the magnitude of business cycles
as a common economic policy could lead to too small e®ects in countries with highly
variable cycles and too large e®ects in countries with less variable cycles. For countries
with similar amplitudes, a common economic policy raises no such concerns. In other
words, the intensity of economic policies has to di®er among countries with di®erent
amplitudes of its business cycles.
An analysis and comparison of the amplitude of business cycles and its consequences
for the common economic policy in Europe require a thorough analysis of each national
business cycle and its relation to business cycles in all other EU countries. In this subsec-
tion, however, we continue to study the average behavior in all EU countries. There are,
of course, many aspects that such analysis cannot capture, but it is nevertheless inter-
esting to study the main tendencies, in particular to establish whether the business cycle
amplitude has changed over time and if so, if these changes are related to the monetary
regime.
In the upper panel of Table 5 we report estimates of the absolute di®erence of the
standard deviation of national business cycles both for all EU{14 countries and for the EU
member states.17 According to these estimates, the amplitude for all EU{14 countries have
increased considerably over the sample from 0.6 to 0.95. This suggests that the magnitude
of business cycles were more similar during the Bretton{Woods period compared to all
other sub{samples we examine. This result does not fully carry over to EU member states.
According to the results shown in Panel A, di®erences in the amplitude for these countries
fell somewhat during the implementation of the Single European Act period compared to
the earlier EMS period.
In Panel B, we report formal tests of the hypothesis that the relative magnitude of
business cycles is equal across sub{samples.18 These results show that we can always
reject the null hypothesis of equal magnitudes when comparing the last sub{sample with
all other sub{samples at the 10% level. Based on this evidence, we conclude that the
bilateral di®erences of the magnitude are larger during the most recent sub{sample. A
test of the hypothesis that the average amplitude is constant over all samples is strongly
rejected, Â2
4 = 18:852 with p{value = 0:001 suggesting that the magnitude is not constant.
17There are other ways to measure the amplitude of business cycles, for example by using the mean
absolute deviation as suggested by Dickerson, Gibson and Tsakalotos (1998). They report, however, that
their results were unchanged when they used the standard deviation as the measure of business cycle
amplitude as we use here.
18We only report results for EU member states in the table. We obtain similar results for the sample
of all EU{14 countries and these results are available upon request from the author.
{ 19 {Table 5: Absolute di®erence between the standard deviation of the business cycle. EU{14
countries.
Panel A: Mean of absolute di®erence of standard deviations.
1961{2001 1961{1972 1973{78 1979{1987 1987{1992 1993{2001
EU{14 0:749 0:595 0:759 0:678 0:767 0:948
(0:031) (0:056) (0:091) (0:062) (0:043) (0:055)
EU members 0:792 0:682 0:717 0:682 0:575 0:948
(0:043) (0:132) (0:118) (0:074) (0:077) (0:055)
Panel B: Wald tests of equal di®erences in magnitude
for EU{members across monetary regimes.
1973{1978 1978{1987 1987{1992 1993{2001
1961{73 Wald 0:040 0:000 0:488 3:484
p{value 0:842 0:999 0:485 0:062
1973{78 Wald 0:065 1:014 3:160
p{value 0:799 0:314 0:075




HAC standard errors using 4 lags are shown in parentheses below each parameter estimate. Wald tests
are based on regressions with a constant and a EU dummy variable where all parameters are allowed
to vary across the sub{samples and the HAC covariance matrix estimator. Degrees of freedom is 2 for
all tests. A Wald test of the null hypothesis that cross{correlations are equal across all ¯ve subperiods
strongly reject the null, Â2 = 18:852 with p{value = 0:001. Estimates are based on 182 observations of
relative magnitudes.
{ 20 {It is surprising that the relative magnitude of European business cycles tends to in-
crease, in particular, towards the end of our sample. Our results are, however, similar
to earlier empirical ¯ndings in the literature for the US and the G{7 countries. There
is a general consensus that the volatility of business cycle in these countries has been
dampened even though there is a debate on the date of the structural break in the ampli-
tude and, of course, whether there has been more than one structural break, see e.g. van
Dijk, Osborn and Sensier (2002), Doyle and Faust (2002) and Stock and Watson (2003).
Indeed, looking at the underlying data we use to compute the relative magnitudes, we
¯nd that the volatility of the bandpass ¯ltered data tends to be lower for the more recent
sub{samples for some countries compared to earlier periods. This can also be seen in the
plots of the bandpass ¯ltered data in Appendix B.
How should we interpret our results that both the cross{correlations and the relative
magnitude have increased during the most recent period. First, we recognize that these
changes are related. Holding everything else constant, an increase in the volatility implies
a reduction in the co{movement of the two time series we examine. But how do increases
in economic integration or a higher degree of asymmetry of nation{speci¯c shocks a®ect
these measures? To answer these questions it is informative to use the following model
that is also used by Doyle and Faust (2002). Assume for simplicity that we only study
two countries, home and foreign, and that the business cycle in each country is driven
by idiosyncratic shocks and common shocks. We also allow for a direct linkage between
the countries such that, say, the nation{speci¯c foreign shocks are transmitted to the
home country. Let y be the measure of the business cycle, "h and "f are the idiosyncratic
shocks (they are assumed to be independent white noise sequences with variance ¾2
h and
¾2
f respectively), "c is the common shock (also white noise with variance ¾2
c) and 0 < ° < 1
is a parameter determining the linkages between the two countries. We can now write the
model in the following way
yh = "h + "c + °yf
yf = "f + "c + °yh.
We have used the simple correlation coe±cient to measure co{movements and the ab-
solute value of the di®erence between the standard deviations of the cycles. Using the
model above to compute the variance of the business cycles in the two countries and the







































































{ 21 {and the relative magnitude is






From these relationships we ¯nd that the correlation coe±cient is increasing in ° the
parameter describing the spillover e®ect from one country to the other and the variance
of the common shock "c. Higher variance of the idiosyncratic shocks tends to reduce the
correlation between the cycles holding everything else constant. It is also evident that the
relative standard deviation of the two cycles is independent of the variance of the common
shock. Unless the idiosyncratic shocks are equal across the two countries, a higher value of
° reduces the di®erence. If the spillover e®ect is stronger, the variance of the two business
cycles tends to be more equal. The only case when both the correlation and the relative
standard deviation increase is when the variance of the foreign idiosyncratic shock (¾2
f)
is falling. This argument is consistent with recent empirical results provided by Stock
and Watson (2003) who showed that the increases in synchronization observed for G{7
countries could be explained by lower volatility in idiosyncratic shocks.
Our empirical analysis raises the question whether there is a tradeo® between co{
movements and the relative magnitude and also if there are di®erences between EU{
member states and European countries that were not members at the time we measure
these indicators. To shed some light on these questions, we run a regression with the
contemporaneous cross{correlations ½ as a function of a constant, the absolute di®erence
between standard deviations of national business cycles and the corresponding measure
for EU member states. It is important to notice that we are not discussing any causal
relationship between these variables, we are only interested in whether synchronization
and the relative magnitudes are correlated and if there is a di®erence between all EU
countries and EU member states. These regression results are shown in Panel A of Table
6. As can be seen from these estimates, we ¯nd a negative point estimate (although
not statistically signi¯cant) of the parameter associated to the absolute di®erence in the
magnitude. What is indeed surprising is that we also obtain a positive and signi¯cant point
estimate for EU members. According to this regression result, a lower absolute di®erence
in the magnitude is associated with a lower degree of business cycle synchronization for
EU members only.19
This result tends to be robust to changes in the speci¯cation of the regressions. The re-
sults do not change when we allow the tradeo® to be sample dependent or when we include
other explanatory variables. In Panel B, we allow the tradeo® to be sample dependent.
In the ¯rst two columns we report the results when allowing the tradeo® for all EU{14
countries to vary across sub{samples. In the second column, we also distinguish between
EU{14 and EU members. From these estimates, we ¯nd that the overall negative and
19Running a regression with cross{correlations on a constant and the relative magnitude, we ¯nd no
signi¯cant relationship. But as soon as we distinguish between EU{14 countries and EU members, we
obtain a positive and signi¯cant parameter.
{ 22 {Table 6: Tradeo® between synchronization and magnitude.
Panel A: Tradeo® between synchronization and magnitude.
Dep.var. const j ¾i ¡ ¾j j j ¾i ¡ ¾j j :¤ EUM
½ 0:489 ¡0:043 0:103
(0:032) (0:033) (0:032)
Panel B: Tradeo® between synchronization and magnitude. Dependent variable: ½.
const 0:509 0:506 const 0:468 0:496
(0:030) (0:030) (0:024) (0:030)
j ¾i ¡ ¾j j : ¤ D1 ¡0:175 ¡0:182 j ¾i ¡ ¾j j : ¤ D1: ¤ EUM ¡0:150 ¡0:130
(0:068) (0:066) (0:196) (0:199)
j ¾i ¡ ¾j j : ¤ D2 0:097 0:080 j ¾i ¡ ¾j j : ¤ D2: ¤ EUM 0:299 0:324
(0:047) (0:048) (0:042) (0:045)
j ¾i ¡ ¾j j : ¤ D3 ¡0:032 ¡0:055 j ¾i ¡ ¾j j : ¤ D3: ¤ EUM 0:054 0:076
(0:034) (0:041) (0:043) (0:045)
j ¾i ¡ ¾j j : ¤ D4 ¡0:110 ¡0:124 j ¾i ¡ ¾j j : ¤ D4: ¤ EUM ¡0:112 ¡0:094
(0:041) (0:043) (0:074) (0:078)
j ¾i ¡ ¾j j : ¤ D5 0:048 ¡0:026 j ¾i ¡ ¾j j : ¤ D5: ¤ EUM 0:079 0:107
(0:030) (0:053) (0:028) (0:034)
j ¾i ¡ ¾j j : ¤ EUM 0:076 j ¾i ¡ ¾j j ¡0:050
(0:043) (0:032)
Panel C: Can policy variables explain the trade{o®? Dependent variable ½.
const j ¾i ¡ ¾j j j ¾i ¡ ¾j j :¤ EUM ¾r¡r¤ ¾D¡D¤ ¾¢s ¾oil
0.494 ¡0:041 0:080 0:091 ¡0:251 0:050 0:008
(0.029) (0:032) (0:031) (0:029) (0:068) (0:027) (0:010)
Note: EUM denotes a EU membership dummy variable, Di denotes a dummy variable for sub{sample i
and j ¾i ¡ ¾j j is the absolute di®erence between the standard deviation of the business cycle in country
i and j. The policy variables and exchange rate volatility are instrumented using the absolute in°ation
di®erential, the sum of interest rates, the absolute di®erence between the ratios of government spending
to GDP and the sum of the ratios of government spending to GDP. HAC standard errors using 4 lags
are shown in parentheses below each parameter estimate. Estimates are based on 182 observations of
relative magnitudes.
{ 23 {signi¯cant relationship holds for two sub{samples, the Bretton{Woods period and dur-
ing the implementation of the Single European Act 1987{1992. For one sub{sample (the
°exible exchange rate period 1973{1978) we ¯nd a positive and signi¯cant relationship.
This result is not dependent on a distinction between EU{14 and EU members as can be
seen in the second column where we add the relative magnitude for EU member states.
The parameter associated to the relative magnitude between EU members is signi¯cant
at the 10% level and positive supporting our earlier result.
In the last two columns of Panel B in Table 6 we allow the tradeo® for EU members
to vary across sub{samples. In the ¯rst of these two columns we ¯nd that there is a
strong positive relationship during the °exible exchange rate period and the most recent
sub{sample. There is no signi¯cant tradeo® during the other three sub{samples according
to these estimates. This conclusion does not change if we include the magnitude for all
EU{14 countries in the regression with one exception. The parameter associated to the
tradeo® between EU members during the EMS period is positive and signi¯cant at the
10% level.
Our conclusion from these estimates is that there seems to be a positive tradeo®
between synchronization and the relative magnitude of business cycles for the EU member
states. A higher degree of synchronization is associated with larger di®erences in the
relative magnitude as the volatility of country{speci¯c business cycles tends to be lower
in recent years for some EU member states and higher for other. A similar tradeo® is not
evident for European countries that are not members of the EU at the time of measurement
except for the second sub{sample with °exible exchange rates where the parameter is
positive and statistically signi¯cant at the 10% level, see the two ¯rst columns in Panel
B. This raises concern over the attempts of using a common monetary policy to stabilize
the European economies since it suggests that it is important to vary the intensity of the
policy.20 It is possible, of course, that national ¯scal policies can be used to compensate
for di®erences in the intensity of the common monetary policy.
To answer the question of whether similarities in economic policy and whether the
exchange rate regime can explain the signi¯cant EU{membership e®ect, we run additional
regressions of the cross{correlations on a constant, the magnitude for all countries and
the magnitude for EU members adding measures of the di®erence in economic policy,
exchange rate volatility and oil price volatility. These results are shown in Panel C in
Table 6. We use the same instruments for the policy variables and exchange rate volatility
as in our earlier regressions. The overall impression from these tests is that the policy
variables cannot explain the positive tradeo® even though three of these control variables
are signi¯cant (di®erences in ¯scal and monetary policy and exchange rate volatility).
20It may be the case that the di®erent magnitudes are the result of di®erences in the transmission
of structural shocks. If that is the case and if the di®erence in the magnitude is solely attributable to
monetary policy shocks, then there is no problem, the European countries would only react di®erently to
the common monetary policy.
{ 24 {The parameter associated with the relative magnitude in EU members do change (from
0.103 to 0.080) but is still signi¯cantly di®erent from zero.
To interpret these empirical results and to be able to speculate about future develop-
ments and the consequences of the common monetary policy in Europe, we have to look
more closely at the exchange rate volatility we have measured for the ¯ve sub{samples.
For the EU member states, exchange rate volatility was highest during the °exible ex-
change rate period and the most recent period. It is also for these two sub{samples we
obtain a positive tradeo® between the relative magnitude and synchronization, the pa-
rameter is statistically signi¯cant at the 10% level. This implies that a higher degree
of exchange rate volatility is associated with more synchronization and larger di®erences
in the magnitude of the business cycle. If these relations are stable over time and over
di®erent monetary regimes, then business cycles in EU member states will become less
synchronized but also display less di®erences in the magnitude which would constitute
a potential problem when implementing a common monetary policy and the common
currency.
4 Conclusions
It is widely argued that the success of the common currency area in Europe rests on
the uniformity of business cycle °uctuations. Our results suggest that European business
cycles are synchronized to a high degree but we also ¯nd that the degree of synchronization
has changed considerably since the early 1960s. In particular, we ¯nd that synchronization
is higher during periods with more °exible exchange rates and lower when exchange
rate volatility is low. These results question earlier ¯ndings that European business
cycles became more synchronized during the EMS period. Our evidence further suggests
that there are several contradicting forces a®ecting the degree of synchronization, smaller
di®erences in monetary policy leading to less synchronized cycles, smaller di®erences in
¯scal policy and increases in trade leading to more synchronization. In addition, there
may be positive relationship between exchange rate volatility and synchronization. As a
major objective of the EU is economic and monetary integration, one would anticipate
that the linkages should strengthen over time, maybe also o®set the negative e®ects from
the common monetary policy (and lower exchange rate volatility).
When adding the analysis of the magnitude of European business cycles, the picture
becomes more complex. Our estimates suggest that di®erences in the magnitude of Euro-
pean business cycles have risen over time and have never been so large for EU members.
This result also raises concern about the common monetary policy as it is likely that the
policy will be too expansive for some member states and too restrictive for others. The
tradeo® between synchronization and di®erences in magnitude is positive such that larger
di®erences coincide with a higher degree of synchronization. If business cycles become
more synchronized and the relative magnitude less similar, then the timing of the common
{ 25 {policy tends to be optimal but the intensity tends to be wrong for some member states.
A major objective of the EU is to foster stronger economic ties between members and
this process will tend to increase the degree of compatibility between the member states.
Whether this also leads to more synchronization and convergence of the amplitude of
the business cycle in member countries is an open question and cannot be answered by
looking at historical relationships. The analysis in this paper supports this view. We ¯nd
that business cycle behavior changes over time in response to new economic environments.
This point, which is a version of the Lucas critique, implies that it is not possible to draw
too strong policy conclusions from our empirical analysis. It may well be the case that
economic integration leads to more similar business cycles within the EMU area even
though our empirical analysis of historical data suggests the opposite.
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{ 28 {Appendix A: Data sources
Industrial production To measure business cycles we use quarterly observations of
industrial production taken from IFS for all countries except for Ireland and Portugal
where the data is extracted from OECD Main Economic Indicators. All data are
seasonally adjusted. Sample range is 1961:1{2001:4 for all countries except Belgium
1961:4{2000:4, Denmark 1968:1{2001:4 and Switzerland 1965:1{2001:4. Estimates
of bilateral cross{correlations use all data available for each pair of countries.
Trade Annual bilateral trade statistics are obtained from IMF Direction of Trade Sta-
tistics. Sample range is 1961{2001.
Interest rates The following interest rates are used to measure di®erences in monetary
policy over the sample 1980{2001: Austria { money market rate; Belgium { call
money rate; Canada { overnight money market rate; Denmark { call money rate;
Finland { average cost of CB debt; France { call money rate; Germany { call money
rate; Greece { central bank rate; Ireland { exchequer bills; Italy { money market
rate; Japan { call money rate; Netherlands { call money rate; Norway { call money
rate; Portugal { up to 5 days interbank deposit; Spain { call money rate; Sweden
{ call money rate; Switzerland { money market rate; United Kingdom { overnight
interbank rate; United States { Federal funds rate. For the period 1961{1979 we
use discount rates taken from IFS except for Greece where we use central bank rate.
All data are quarterly.
Consumer price index We use quarterly observations of the consumer price index
taken from IFS to compute annual in°ation.
Budget de¯cit as a fraction of GDP Annual data on net lending as a fraction of
GDP for the European countries, Japan and the US during the period 1970{2001
are obtained from European Economy Tables 78A linked to data from Table 78B.
Data for the period 1960{69 are obtained from IFS. Data for other non{European
countries are taken from IFS. The sample range is 1961{2001 except Japan and
Portugal 1970{2001.
Exchange rate volatility Monthly nominal exchange rates are obtained from IFS. Sam-
ple range is 1961:1{2001:4. Exchange rate volatility is measured as the average of
log ¯rst di®erence of bilateral exchange rates.
Government expenditure as a fraction of GDP Annual observations of government
expenditure and nominal GDP are obtained from IFS. The sample ranges are: Aus-
tria and Belgium 1961{98, Canada 1961{2000, Denmark 1961{1999, Finland 1961{
1998, France 1972{1997, Germany 1961{1998, Greece 1961{1999, Ireland 1961{1999,
Italy 1961{98, Netherlands 1961{98, Norway 1961{98, Portugal 1970{98, Spain
{ 29 {1962{99, Sweden 1961{2000, Switzerland 1961{2001, United Kingdom 1961{99,
United States 1961{2001.
GDP per capita Real Gross Domestic Product per Capita measured in current US$
taken from Penn World Table 6.1 (CGDP). The sample range is 1960{2000.
Distance Distance between two locations is measured as the great circle between largest
cities in each country according to Fitzpatrick and Modlin (1986).
Linguistic distance This measure ranges from 0 (nobody speaks the same primary lan-
guage in the two countries) to 10000 (everybody speaks the same primary language)
taken from Boisso and Ferrantino (1997). Note that we have updated this series
such that the primary language in the three Nordic countries Denmark, Norway and
Sweden is identical (the language variable is 10000). The reason for this is that the
language spoken in the three Nordic countries essentially is the same. In addition we
let the language variable between Finland and the three Nordic countries be equal
to the measure of identical primary language between Finland and Sweden (600).
{ 30 {Appendix B: Bandpass filtered industrial production
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The increasing worldwide integration of goods, capital and financial markets—globalization 
in short—is widely believed to have led to more interdependence between national business 
cycles.
1 This notion has only been reinforced by the broadly concurrent recent downturns in 
the industrial countries. Paradoxically, however, the empirical evidence for the past three 
decades is so mixed that it remains difficult to make a strong case for the notion of increased 
or increasing business cycle linkages among industrial countries. Depending on the sample 
period, output correlations have even decreased in recent decades, largely on account of a 
remarkable cycle de-synchronization among the major industrial countries in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s (Helbling and Bayoumi, 2003).
2  
 
The troubling recent evidence on patterns in business cycle synchronization may partly 
reflect the short sample period. In the short term, much of the business cycle dynamics 
depends on the shock dynamics, which tends to overshadow the effects of integration. 
Changes in the latter, as a recent essay in the IMF’s World Economic Outlook (2001) has 
pointed out, are often minor over short periods of time. Against this, we review and attempt 
to explain changes in international business cycle synchronization over 120 years, using 
annual data for 16 countries that cover four distinct eras with different international monetary 
                                                 
1 For example, in the recent encyclopedia Business Cycles and Depressions, Dore (1997) considers the 
synchronization of international cycles a stylized fact and argues that “[i]nstitutional changes such as free 
capital mobility, floating exchange rates, and the increase in international arbitrage and speculative activities 
have increased interdependence among the major capitalist nations, which is likely to lead to further 
synchronization of cycles.” 




4 The four eras covered are 1880-1913 when much of the world adhered to the 
classical Gold Standard, the interwar period (1920-1938), the Bretton Woods regime of fixed 
but adjustable exchange rates (1948-1972), and the modern period of managed floating 
among the major currency areas (1973 to 2001). Across the four eras that we examine, the 
variation in cross-border integration in the markets for goods, capital and financial assets has 
been considerably larger than over the last 20 years while the influence of particular shock 
realizations appears arguably to have been somewhat less important. The annual data for 16 
industrial countries that we use in this paper come from Mitchell (1998a, 1998b, and 1998c) 




For the explanation of the changes, we proceed in two steps. First, we examine them from an 
impulse-propagation perspective. In particular, we investigate whether the increased 
synchronization reflects changes in the nature of the impulses (the “shocks”) driving the 
economies, particularly those of global shocks, changes in the transmission channels, or both. 
We then proceed to examine the extent to which changes in business cycle synchronization 
                                                 
3 These references also provide more details on the data. The countries included in our data set are Australia, 
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In some of the tables, we list the countries by their 
geographical proximity rather than in alphabetical order.  
4 This approach follows Bergman, Bordo and Jonung (1998) and Backus and Kehoe (1992). Unlike these 
papers, we focus on international synchronization and devote less attention to the comparison of national 
business cycle properties such as output volatility or output-consumption comovements. 
5 The IMF’s International Financial Statistics was used to update the dataset to 2001.  -  4  - 
 
over the four eras can be related to changes in structure, such as changes in policies or trade 
integration.  
 
From a historical perspective, the evidence in favor of increased business cycle 
synchronization is much more clear-cut than that based on the past several decades only. 
Based on.16 countries’ real GDP over the past century and a quarter, demarcated into four 
exchange rate regimes, we found a secular trend towards increased synchronization that 
occurs across exchange rate regimes (Bordo and Helbling, 2004). This evidence is rather 
puzzling, however, considering the usual explanation for increased synchronization.  While 
there appears to be an almost linear increase in business cycle synchronization over time, the 
level of globalization, that is, the degree of cross-border integration in markets for goods, 
capital, and labor, has followed a U-shaped pattern during the same period (Obstfeld and 
Taylor, 2003, and Bordo, Eichengreen and Irwin, 1999). Starting from a relatively high 
degree of globalization during the period of the classical gold standard, international 
integration decreased sharply during the interwar period before it began to rise again, first 
slowly during the Bretton Woods period and then more rapidly in the current floating rate 
period. Recent studies have documented that the degree of globalization prevailing in the 
1880s was only reached again 100 years later (ibid.).  
 
The difference in the paths of business cycle linkages and changes in globalization may not 
necessarily be surprising from a theoretical perspective since the correlation between 
business cycle synchronization and integration is not necessarily positive. For example, 
Krugman (1993) noted that stronger trade integration may lead to greater regional  -  5  - 
 
specialization, which can lead to less output synchronization with industry-specific shocks. 
Relatedly, Heathcote and Perri (2002) showed how increased financial integration may be an 
endogenous reaction to the regionalization of real sector linkages, as the latter allow for gains 
from the global diversification of asset portfolios. That said, the apparent lack of cycle 
synchronization during the classical gold standard nevertheless remains somewhat of a 
surprise even considering the theoretical ambiguities regarding the correlation between 
business cycle synchronization and integration. 
 
The paper is at this stage largely exploratory given the data that we have been able to collect 
for the entire sample period. Structural data in particular were difficult to find, which is 
problematic given that a fully satisfying structural econometric investigation requires rather 
detailed data on trade and sector structures. In addition, analyzing business cycle features 
with annual data implies that higher frequency features are not captured adequately. 
Nevertheless, we believe that using a much longer data sample provides a much-needed 
broader and complementary perspective on business cycle synchronization despite these 
problems. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses conceptual issues regarding 
international business cycle synchronization and provides the basic stylized facts. The 
subsequent section looks at the role that changes in this structure of shocks may have played 
in the observed changes in the synchronization of cycles. Section IV analyzes how changes 
in trade integration, capital mobility, and policies have contributed to the observed increased 
international synchronization of business cycles. Section V summarizes changes in  -  6  - 
 
globalization over the last 120 years. The following section then examines how the results 
can contribute to resolving the puzzle between the U-shaped pattern in globalization and the 
secular increase in business cycle synchronization.  
 
II.  CROSS-COUNTRY BUSINESS CYCLE YNCHRONIZATION OVER TIME 
 
The notion of business cycles becoming increasingly synchronized across countries captures 
the observation that the timing and magnitudes of major changes in economic activity appear 
increasingly similar. For example, in the most recent slowdown, output growth started to 
weaken at about the same time in the major advanced economies (e.g., Helbling and 
Bayoumi, 2003). Despite frequent use, however, definitions of synchronization vary widely 
in the literature. As noted by Harding and Pagan (2004), most current definitions are not 
capturing business cycle synchronization in the tradition of the National Bureau of Economic 
Research (NBER), which are based on turning points in reference cycles. In their paper, they 
develop a statistical apparatus to test cycle synchronization in the NBER tradition. 
Specifically, they consider national business cycles to be synchronized if turning points in the 
corresponding reference cycles occur roughly at the same points in time. On this basis, they 
have derived a statistical measure, the concordance correlation, that allows one to test 
whether national cycles are significantly synchronized or not. This approach to measuring 
synchronization boils down to national business cycles being in the same phase—expansions 
and recessions—at about the same time.  
  -  7  - 
 
In this paper, we will not follow Harding and Pagan. Analyzing cycles using turning points 
would add an unwarranted layer of complexity to the analysis. Ultimately, as Harding and 
Pagan (op. cit.) have shown, their measure of cycle synchronization depends on the moments 
of output growth. For an analytical understanding of the changes in the synchronization, it is, 
therefore, sufficient to focus on the changes in these moments.
6 Hence, to establish the 
stylized facts, we can use correlations among output growth rates as a measure of the strength 
of cross-country linkages in macroeconomic fluctuations. This is also the most widely used 
measure in the recent academic literature on the international business cycle.  
 
We will, however, follow Harding and Pagan (2003, 2004), Stock and Watson (1999), and 
others by using real gross domestic product—or output in short—as the measure of aggregate 
economic activity or the business cycle rather than synthetic reference cycle series based on a 
number of series (the NBER approach).  
 
 Figure 1 shows the correlation coefficients for log output growth by percentile for the four 
eras. The distribution of the correlation coefficients differs substantially from era to era. In 
particular, there has been a tendency toward higher, positive output correlations. During the 
Gold Standard, about one half of all country pairs were characterized by negative output 
correlations and the average output correlation coefficient is about 0 (Table 1). A first 
important step toward synchronization occurred during the interwar period, when the share of 
                                                 
6 In Bordo and Helbling (2004), measurement issues are discussed in greater depth, and patterns of cycle 
synchronization are established using three different measures.   -  8  - 
 
negative correlations fell below 30 percent while the average correlation increased to about 
0.15. A subsequent reversal during the Bretton Woods era was small, and correlations 
remained, on average, above those found for the Gold Standard era. A second important 
increase then occurred during 1973-2001, when less than 10 percent of all country pairs were 
characterized by negative output correlations and the average correlation was 0.33.  
 
Are these changes over time statistically different? This question is relevant since the 
confidence intervals for the bilateral correlation coefficients are relatively wide given the few 
observations per era.
7 We used both nonparametric and parametric tests to address the issue. 
(Nonparametric) Wilcoxon Rank sum tests suggest that the upward shifts in the distribution 
of the correlation coefficients are significant at the 5 percent level for the interwar period 
(compared to the Gold Standard era) and for the modern floating era (compared to both the 
interwar and the Bretton Woods eras). The downward shift in the distribution of correlation 
coefficients from the interwar to the Bretton Woods eras is only significant at the 10 percent 
level.  
 
The Wilcoxon rank sum test does not require any assumption about the underlying 
distribution of the correlation coefficients. In practice, however, it is typically assumed that 
the correlation coefficients of a vector series of log first differences of outputs reflect an 
                                                 
7 The sampling standard deviation of estimated correlation coefficients depends on the size of the estimated 
coefficient and the number of observations. Given the former, small samples tend to amplify the sampling 
uncertainty greatly. For example, for a correlation coefficient of 0.15—the average for the interwar period—the 
standard deviation for a sample of 20 observations is 0.23. With 50 and 100 sample observations, the standard 
deviations decline to 0.14 and 0.10, respectively.  -  9  - 
 
underlying multivariate normal distribution, at least asymptotically. For this reason, we also 
formally tested for the equality of the covariance and correlation matrices over subsequent 
periods using the tests proposed by Jennrich (1970). In a first step, we tested for the 
significance of the changes in the average correlation coefficients. The changes between the 
Gold Standard and the interwar eras and between the Bretton Woods and the modern floating 
eras, respectively, are statistically significant while the decline between the interwar and the 
Bretton Woods eras is insignificant (Table 2). Given the small number of observations per 
era, these are strong results.  
 
Beyond average correlations, however, the statistical significance of the changes in output 
co-movements in general is more ambiguous. Regarding the six possible pairs of covariance 
matrices for the four eras, all but two are statistically significantly different from each other 
at the 5 percent level (Table 3), which bears on the factor model-based approach to 
measuring synchronization discussed in the next subsection. The pairs that are insignificantly 
different are 1880-1913 vs. 1926-1938 and 1880-1913 vs. 1951-1972, respectively. 
Regarding correlation matrices, only two are statistically different at the 5 percent level 
(1926-1938 vs. 1973-2001 and 1951-1972 vs. 1973-2001, respectively). To some extent, 
insignificance reflects “substitution” among country pairs, as some correlations increased 
while others decreased.  
 
For smaller groups, especially the (old and new) core countries and European countries, the 
changes in the correlation matrices from era to era are generally statistically significantly 
different, except for the pair 1880-1913 vs. 1926-1938. We attribute the fact that the changes   - 10 - 
 
between those two eras are often insignificant to the few number of observations for the 
interwar era, which tends to reduce the sampling precision (as noted in footnote 7). Overall, 
the results of all the tests support the notion of a secular increase in business cycle 
synchronization.     
 
So far, we have looked at business cycle synchronization through a global lens, noting the 
increased synchronization without consideration for other factors. However, one would 
expect that synchronization patterns differ considerably across groups of countries, 
depending on factors such as “gravity” or country size. The evidence clearly illustrates that 
the extent to which gravity has shaped the synchronization trends depends on the region 
(Table 2). For core European countries (the old “EEC”) and Continental European countries, 
the increase in business cycle synchronization was clearly much sharper than the general 
increase. At the other end of gravitas, business cycle synchronization between Japan and the 
other countries in the panel has increased by less. In particular, there is no evidence for an 
increase between the Bretton Woods era and the modern floating rate period.  
 
The fact that the increase for all Continental European countries was smaller than that for the 
Core European countries suggests that the forces of gravity are affected by common policies, 
preferential trading agreements, and specific currency arrangements. The increase in 
correlations among the Anglo-Saxon countries is also remarkable even though it seems more   - 11 - 
 
difficult to attribute this to forces of gravity.
8 While we do not believe that common 
institutions and heritage among the Anglo-Saxon countries account directly for the increased 
synchronization, as Otto et al. (2001) have argued, they likely have fostered similar patterns 




While the regional perspective reinforces the notion of a trend increase, it should be noted 
that stark regional differences have only really emerged during the modern floating rate 
period. Forces of gravity do not appear to have been a factor behind business cycle 
synchronization during the classical Gold Standard, as differences in correlations among 
regions were minor, with the high correlation between Canada and the United States and, to a 
much lesser extent, among the Scandinavian countries, being the main exceptions. During the 
Bretton Woods period, increased regional synchronization began to emerge in the core 
European countries. Interestingly, the increased synchronization during the interwar period 
was primarily on account of an increased synchronization between the cycles in the United 
States and other countries, which in turn seems to reflect the equity boom bust cycle and its 
effects from the mid-1920s to the mid-1930s. 
 
                                                 
8 The emergence of strong business cycle linkages among core European countries and among the Anglo-Saxon 
countries was noted, among others, by Helbling and Bayoumi (2003) and Stock and Watson (2003). 
9 See Bayoumi and Edison (2003) on the distinction between market- and bank-based financial systems.   - 12 - 
 
So far, all the cycle correlations we have studied were based on log first differences of 
output. Does the detrending method matter for our findings? Naturally, high frequency noise 
is not a great concern, given our panels of annual data, but it is possible that the increases in 
cycle correlations from the 19
th to the end of the 20
th century really reflect changes in trend 
co-movements. In Bordo and Helbling (2004), we also examined correlation patterns in 
bandpass-filtered log output data. The results show that the detrending method makes little 
difference and that the same principal changes in the patterns of cycle synchronization are 
found with bandpass-filtered output data.  
 
III. EXPLAINING INCREASED SYNCHRONIZATION: THE ROLE OF SHOCKS 
 
 
Using a standard measure of synchronization, we found evidence of increased cross-country 
business cycle synchronization over time among industrial countries. From an impulse-
propagation perspective, the increased synchronization could reflect changes in the nature of 
the impulses (the “shocks”) driving the economies, changes in the transmission channels and 
mechanisms, resulting inter alia from increased integration, or, most likely, both.  
 
Disentangling the relative contributions of the changes in the correlation of shocks and 
changes in the transmission channels to the changes in output correlations is difficult, 
however, as this would require a comprehensive structural model of the economy that can be 
estimated empirically. Such a model, which would need to allow for factors such as changes 
in trade and financial integration and a multitude of shocks, seems beyond our reach, given   - 13 - 
 
the current state of the art in multi-country modelling. Financial integration, for example, is 
not yet satisfactorily accounted for in any of the leading multi-country models.  
 
Against this background, we will proceed with a more modest research agenda. In this 
section, we will focus on deriving measures of the impulses driving each economy and study 
the changes in their properties over time. On this basis, we will then attempt to assess the 
extent to which changes in the properties of shocks may help to explain the observed changes 
in the synchronization of cycles. In the next section, we will focus on how changes in 
integration and the policy environment may have shaped changes in business cycle 
synchronization.  
 
Is there evidence that global shocks have been driving the increased business cycle 
synchronization? This is a natural hypothesis, given the evidence of increased globalization, 
that is, economic interdependence through trade in goods, services, and assets. To structure 
our discussion, the following canonical, simple model of joint output dynamics in a two-
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10 Canova and Dellas (1993) show how a very stylized two-country real business cycle model implies such a bi-
variate vector autoregressive representation. Doyle and Faust (2002) use a simple error-components structure to 
illustrate similar issues.    - 14 - 
 
where yit denotes the log output growth rate in country i. Following Stock and Watson 















   (3.2) 
 
In this factor VAR (FAVAR) model, ζ is a global shock and ηi is a country-specific 
idiosyncratic shock. G is a vector of factor loadings. According to this model, increased 
output synchronization—as measured by output correlation—between countries 1 and 2 can, 
ceteris paribus, arise for three reasons: 
 
•   Increases in the variance of the global shock relative to the country specific 
idiosyncratic shocks.  
 
•   Increases in the covariance of the idiosyncratic shocks η1 and η2.
12 
 
•   Increases in the “transmission” coefficients a12 and a21, which determine the spillover 
effects that shocks in country 1 have on country 2 and vice versa.
13 In addition, 
                                                 
11 In contrast to the FAVAR model, the coefficient matrix A is usually assumed to be zero in standard dynamic 
factor model where the dynamics arises from those of the factors, which are modelled as autoregressive 
processes. 
12 We mention this for completeness from a general perspective. Typically, idiosyncratic shocks have to be 
uncorrelated in order for the global shock to be identified in the two variable model. With many variables, 
however, limited correlation among idiosyncratic shocks may be allowed, depending on the specification and 
estimator.    - 15 - 
 
increases in the autoregressive parameters also increase correlations, as greater 
persistence in a country’s output fluctuation increases the scope for spillovers. 
 
Extending the simple bivariate model (3.1) and (3.2) to a general model that includes all the 
16 countries in our sample proved to be difficult. First, given few observations for each era, 
very few degrees of freedom would be left if the model were estimated even with one lag. 
For the interwar era, the number of common observations for all 16 countries is even less 
than the number of parameters, so that comparability of the model across eras could not be 
ensured. Second, in our set of annual data, the degree of autocorrelation in output growth is 
generally low in all eras. While there are some intrinsic dynamics in the cross-country output 
dynamics, they are generally insignificant, as the null hypothesis of a11=a12=a21=a22 =0 could 
usually not be rejected in bi-variate VARs. In the circumstances, we used two simplified 
versions of the general factor VAR model for the analysis:  
 
•   The center country model. In this version, the equation for each country’s real GDP 
growth includes lagged own GDP growth and lagged GDP growth in the center 
country (the United Kingdom in the Gold Standard era and the United States in the 
other eras). The rationale behind this model is that idiosyncratic shocks in the center 
country can be transmitted through the traditional channels while idiosyncratic shocks 
elsewhere have only limited effects on other countries.  
                                                                                                                                                       
13 In the simple model of Canova and Dellas (op. cit.), these coefficients follow from the production structure, 
as foreign intermediate goods are needed to produce the final consumption goods.    - 16 - 
 
 
•   The trade linkages model. In this version, the equation for each country’s real GDP 
growth includes lagged GDP growth and lagged GDP growth in important trading 
partner countries (the ones reported in Mitchell (1998a, 1998b, and 1998c, as 
explained below). The rationale behind this model is, of course, straightforward.  
 
We estimated the models with a two-step, semi-parametric procedure. In the first step, we 
used SURE estimators to obtain the coefficients aij and the residual series νit. In a second 
step, we used the static approximate factor model of Ng and Bai (2002) to obtain the global 
shock ζ and the idiosyncratic shocks ηi from the residual series νit. This model allows for 
serial correlation, heteroskedasticity, and some limited cross-correlation in the idiosyncratic 
components. Following standard practice in the literature, we use the first common factor as 
a measure of the common shock driving cross-country business cycle fluctuations.
14 Both 
models turned out to be roughly similar in terms of information criteria for all eras, although 
the restrictions implied by the center model compared to the trade model were rejected by 
standard likelihood ratio tests.  
 
A first set of results concerns the issue of whether the moderation in the volatility of national 
output growth rates over time in the postwar period reflects primarily reductions in the 
                                                 
14 Bai and Ng (2002) proposed to use information criteria to determine the appropriate number of factors. 
However, their Monte Carlo simulations show that for panel datasets where the cross-sectional and time 
dimensions are as low as in ours, the tests are not very reliable and tend to imply too high a number of factors.    - 17 - 
 
volatility of global shocks.
15 Table 4 shows the average standard deviations of the national 
output series (log growth rates) and compares them with the estimated variances of the global 
shock and the average idiosyncratic shock. As was to be expected, the direction of change in 
the standard deviations of both global and idiosyncratic shocks generally follows that of the 
average standard deviation of output growth. However, what matters for the changes in 
output correlations is the relative change in the standard deviations of the two types of 
shocks. While idiosyncratic shocks were clearly more volatile than global shocks during the 
Gold Standard, the magnitudes of their average standard deviations became more similar 
during the other eras in both models. However, from the interwar era, decreases over time in 
the average standard deviation of idiosyncratic shocks relative to the standard deviation of 
the global shocks were minor. This implies that, on average, the contribution of global 
shocks to the increase in the average output correlation has been minor, taking the aij 
coefficients as given.  
 
A second set of results concerns the issue of whether global shocks or spillovers drive the 
observed increases in output synchronization. Table 5 presents averages of 1 to 4-step ahead 
forecast error variance decompositions for the output growth rates during the four eras, 
distinguishing between the shares of total output variance explained by the global shock, the 
idiosyncratic shocks, and transmission. To have a variance decomposition based on 
orthogonal shocks, we used the diagonal of the variance-covariance matrix of the ηi series 
                                                 
15 The general moderation in the amplitude of output fluctuations has been analyzed by Blanchard and Simon 
(2001).   - 18 - 
 
rather than the full matrix, thereby ignoring the limited cross-correlation among idiosyncratic 
shocks allowed for by our nonparametric factor model. Given that the cross-correlation 
among idiosyncratic shocks is minor, the assumption of orthogonal idiosyncratic shocks 
appears to be an acceptable simplification. This set-up implies that the transmission of 
shocks—which can be both due to global shocks and idiosyncratic shocks—occurs with a 
one-year lag.
16 Output synchronization due to a global shock is thus immediate, while that 
due to transmission occurs gradually. To be precise, we note that the columns labeled with 
transmission in Table 9 capture the combined effects of the lagged effects of idiosyncratic 
shocks elsewhere.  
 
The variance decomposition shows the following. First, idiosyncratic shocks have become 
less important in shaping each country’s output dynamics. Second, both global shocks and 
transmission have become more important. Third, the relative importance of the last two 
factors in accounting for the lesser role of idiosyncratic shocks depends on the model. The 
center model suggests that the increases in the variance share of the global shock account for 
most of the reduction in the variance share of the idiosyncratic shocks. The increase 
accounted for by the transmission of idiosyncratic shocks is minor. On the other hand, the 
trade model suggests that both increases in the variance shares of the global factor and the 
transmission account for the reduction in the variance share of idiosyncratic shocks. 
However, it is noteworthy that shock transmission appears more important for peripheral 
                                                 
16 The shares of the global shocks and the idiosyncratic shocks reported in Table 9 are the shares explained by 
each country’s own autoregressive structure in response to each of the two shocks. We do not, therefore, 
distinguish between the transmission of global shocks and idiosyncratic shocks.    - 19 - 
 
countries than for core countries in the trade model. For the core countries, the increase in the 
variance share related to global shocks accounts for most of the decrease in the share 
explained by idiosyncratic shocks. 
 
Our two FAVAR models thus suggest that the increased business cycle linkages among core 
countries, as measured by output correlations, largely reflect the dynamics of common global 
shocks. Remarkably, the increased importance of transmission for peripheral countries only 
arises in the trade model. This suggests that it is not transmission from the center country, a 
channel that operates in both models, that accounts for the increased variance share of 
transmission. It is rather the intra-European transmission that matters in the modern floating 
era, a fact that seems consistent with the above average output synchronization among 
European countries reported in Table 1.  
 
For a further understanding of the role of global shocks, Figure 3 is instructive. Each panel 
shows the global shocks from the trade model (solid lines) for an era, supplemented by dotted 
lines depicting the global shocks from a simple static approximate factor model for output 
growth rates (taken from Bordo and Helbling, 2004) and bars showing time dummies—the 
equivalent of global shocks—from an error components model that are significant at the 5 
percent level.
17 
18 We estimated the latter to obtain a measure for large and important shocks. 
                                                 
17 Naturally, only the product ΛFt is identified in this factor model. We normalized the square of the factor 
loadings, i.e., Λ’Λ/16=1, to identify Ft. We believe this to be the natural normalization, as it allows for 
comparable variances between outputs and factors. The alternative would be to normalize the factor variance  
to 1 (Bai and Ng, 2002).  
18 We estimated the following traditional error component model with our panel dataset: 
(continued)   - 20 - 
 
The global shocks implied by the two factor-based approaches—the trade model and the 
simple factor model—are surprisingly similar except for the interwar period, although the 
shocks from the trade model are generally smaller in magnitude. The latter finding is not that 
surprising since the possibility of transmission implies lower shock variances with equal 
output variances. The general picture emerging from Figure 2 is that global shocks appear 




Overall, our results are broadly consistent with globalization. With increased economic and 
financial interdependence through trade and financial linkages, the scope for global shocks or 
the rapid transmission of shocks in the center countries has clearly increased. In addition, 
with global shocks, floating exchange rates do not provide much scope for insulation, since 
shocks affect all countries in similar ways. At the same time, business cycle amplitudes have 
clearly moderated during the post-World War II period, reflecting, among other factors, 
changes in sectoral structure, automatic stabilizers, the use of lender of last resort operations, 
and the use of discretionary counter-cyclical policies.
20 In this context, it is interesting to note 
that the volatility of idiosyncratic shocks has decreased more than that of global shocks. 
                                                                                                                                                       
  ,, it t it y λη =+ 
where λt denotes a time dummy taking on the value 1 in time t and ηi,t a shock specific to country i.   
19 This corroborates Helbling and Bayoumi (2003), who found a similar result for the G-7 countries during 
1973-2001 using quarterly data and a dynamic factor model to isolate common cycles.  
20 See McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000), Ahmed, Levin and Wilson (2002), Blanchard and Simon (2001), 
IMF (2002), Dalsgaard, Elmeskov, and Park (2002), and Stock and Watson (2002) for recent studies examining 
the volatility of output fluctuations in industrial countries, especially the United States, and the reasons thereof.     - 21 - 
 
Among other factors, this finding is consistent with the notion that the changes in the sectoral 
structure and the use of automatic stabilizers as well as other counter-cyclical policies have 
been fairly similar across the industrial countries.  
 
Nevertheless, some aspects of our results remain puzzling. The much larger standard 
deviations of idiosyncratic shocks during the gold standard may be explained by structural 
factors and the conduct of macroeconomic policies. Clearly, agriculture was much more 
important, rendering economies more susceptible to idiosyncratic shocks as weather 
conditions. Similarly, the general absence of lender of last resort policies (except in the 
United Kingdom?) and macroeconomic stabilization policies could also have contributed to 
relatively larger idiosyncratic shocks. The fact that the transmission of idiosyncratic shocks 
played such little role during the classical gold standard, however, remains puzzling.  
 
IV.  EXPLAINING INCREASED SYNCHRONIZATION II: INTEGRATION AND POLICIES  
 
Changes in the nature of shocks are only one reason for the observed increased in business 
cycle synchronization. In parallel with the factor model-based literature on the sources of 
international business cycle linkages, the role of structural factors such as trade integration 
and exchange rate regimes in determining shock correlations as well as the transmission 
coefficients aij has also been studied. For example, as noted by Canova and Dellas (1993), 
the extent to which two or more countries are linked through trade is an important 
determinant of the aij coefficients and thus of the strength of business cycle linkages. In this   - 22 - 
 
section, we will focus on how changes in integration and the policy environment may have 
shaped changes in business cycle synchronization.  
 
A.   Trade Integration 
 
Starting with Canova and Dellas (1993), the role of trade interdependence in explaining 
international business cycle linkages has received considerable attention in the literature.
21 
Frankel and Rose (1998) found that in the period from 1959-1993, OECD countries with 
closer trade links tended to have more tightly correlated business cycles. In this subsection, 
we follow Frankel and Rose’s methodology and examine the linkages between business cycle 
synchronization and trade links for the four eras that are the subject of our paper. In 
particular, we will try to address the questions of whether and to what extent the observed 
changes in trade linkages can explain the changes in business cycle synchronization. 
 
Using data from Mitchell (1998a,1998b, and 1998c) for the Gold Standard and the interwar 
period and from the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics for the Bretton Woods era and 
modern floating era, we constructed a measure of the trade intensity between countries i and j 
proposed by Frankel and Rose (1998):
22  
                                                 
21 See, for example, Frankel and Rose (1998), Otto, Voss, and Willard (2001), and Imbs (2003). 
22 We also constructed the other measure proposed by Frankel and Rose (1998), where bilateral trade is 
normalized by total trade: 
ijt ijt T
ijt




















+  (4.2) 
where X and M denote exports and imports, respectively, and where a double subscript ij 
stands for bilateral trade values. Y denotes nominal GDP. Unfortunately, based on the limited 
information provided in Mitchell (1998a, 1998b, and 1998c), we could not construct the two 
measures for all the 120 correlation observations that we have for each era. We will thus 
show results for a sample of 59 observations for each of the four eras and for a sample of all 
the 120 country pair combinations for the post-World War II eras. 
 
With these measures, we estimated cross-sectional regressions of the form for each era, τ, of 
the form: 
  ,, , () l n ( )
k
ij ij ij fc o r r w ττ τ α β ε =+ +  (4.3) 
where the bar over the trade intensity measure w
k (k=T, Y) indicates that it is an era average 
and where the function f(·) maps the output correlation coefficient corrij from the interval [-
1,1] to [-∞,∞] so that standard assumptions in the linear regression model are met.
23 As do 
Frankel and Rose, we treat trade intensity as an endogenous variable and use gravity 
variables as instrumental variables. Specifically, the following three instruments are used: the 
                                                                                                                                                       
where simple subscripts i or j indicates aggregate trade values. We found that this measure lacked a clear time 
trend, which suggests that the direction of trade has been quite stable over time.  







+  =  − 
 following Otto, Voss, and Willard (2001). Frankel and Rose (1998) used 
raw correlations.    - 24 - 
 
natural logarithm of the distance between the main business centre in each country, a dummy 
variable for common borders, and a dummy variable for common language.  
 
Table 6 shows the results for both trade intensity measures and for both the smaller and 
larger sample, as discussed earlier. The estimated β coefficients all have the right sign but 
they are not always significant. However, the insignificant coefficients are confined to the 
smaller panel covering all four eras, which may reflect small sample problems, as we are 
missing bilateral trade relations among the smaller European countries in particular. The 
simple regressions suggest the following observations.  
 
•   There is substantial variation in the slope coefficients (and the constant terms) across 
eras. In fact, the assumption of identical slope coefficients and constant terms is 
rejected for both samples.  
•   As do Frankel and Rose, we find that changes in bilateral trade intensities are 
estimated to have large effects on output correlations. For example, a one percentage 
point increase in trade intensity generally raises output correlations by more than 3½ 
percentage points in the case of bilateral trade normalized by GDP.  
•   The difference in the estimated β coefficients for the Gold Standard and interwar eras 
is small. Between the Bretton Woods era and the modern floating rate era, however, 
the synchronization effects of higher trade intensity appear to have increased, which 
may suggest that the synchronization effects of trade intensity depend on other factors 
as well. We will take up this issue below, but note in the meantime that this finding is   - 25 - 
 
consistent with the argument that stronger trade linkages in recent years have 
reflected common policies, including, for example, those related to European 
monetary integration.
24  It is also consistent with our earlier finding of increased 
structural shock correlations, since bilateral output correlations are determined by the 
product of the transmission coefficients, which in turn can be considered to be 
functions of trade intensities, and shock correlations.
25  
•   Finally, similar to Otto, Voss, and Willard (2001), we find that while they are 
significant determinants, trade intensities alone explain relatively little of the overall 
variation in bilateral output correlations, especially for the interwar and the Bretton 
Woods eras. For the Gold Standard era, bilateral trade intensities appear to explain 
about the same share of output correlations as during the modern floating era with the 
first measure. Interestingly, the explanatory power of the gravity variables in the first 
stage regressions appears to increase over time. 
 
So far, the results suggest that bilateral trade intensities explain only a small share of the 
differences found in bilateral output correlations for each era. Can changes in trade intensities 
from era to era explain the increased international business cycle synchronization? In Table 
7, we show the estimated impact of the actual changes in trade intensities between eras on 
bilateral output correlations (the second set of columns in the table corresponds to the larger 
                                                 
24 This argument was advanced by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993).  
25 In the general autoregressive model (3.1), the positive interaction between transmission coefficients and 
shock correlations holds for a wide range of the admissible parameter values.   - 26 - 
 
sample for the postwar eras). Since the restriction of identical slope coefficients between eras 
can generally be rejected, we use both the estimated values for the current and the previous 
era to generate predicted changes.
26  
 
The actual changes in the average bilateral output correlation are generally much larger than 
the changes predicted by changes in trade intensities. The model is successful in explaining 
the increase in output correlations from the interwar to the Bretton Woods eras, where the 
rise in trade intensity explains roughly half of the increase or more, depending on the β 
coefficient used in the calculations. This finding is consistent with the notion that trade 
liberalization after World War II, when the earlier increase in the restrictiveness of trade 
regimes was reversed under the umbrella of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(Irwin, 1995), has played an important role in shaping business cycle synchronization. The 
model is less successful in explaining the strong increase in output correlations from the 
Bretton Woods era to the modern floating rate period. We interpret this as possible evidence 
that the momentum of trade liberalization has slowed down in recent decades, as efforts in 
the most recent GATT/WTO rounds have shifted from tariff reductions on industrial goods 
towards nontariff barriers and trade in agriculture and services (Irwin, op. cit.). It also may be 
that increased financial integration played a bigger role in shaping output synchronization 
than trade integration during recent decades.   
 
                                                 
26 We do not use changes in the constant between eras in the calculation of the predicted changes.    - 27 - 
 
B.   Asset Market Integration  
 
Increasing asset market integration is another channel through which globalization can affect 
international business cycle synchronization. Baxter and Crucini (1995), for example, show 
how asset market integration affects the spillover effects of country-specific shocks and, thus, 
output correlations. Unfortunately, asset market integration remains difficult to measure. 
Bilateral data in (net) asset trade is all but unavailable, especially for a period covering our 
four eras. Measuring asset market integration through the correlation of asset returns may 
suffer from problems of reverse causality. We decided, therefore, to use a very crude 
indicator to measure asset market integration. Based on the annual capital control dummy 
variables for each country prepared by Bordo et al (2001), we derived an indicator, which we 
will refer to as CC, that measures the number of years (as a fraction of the total number of 
years covered by each era) during which capital flows were subject to restrictions.  
 
With this indicator, we first estimated the simple regression equation: 
 
  , ,, () ij ij ij fc o r r C Cτ ττ αδ ε =+ +  (4.4) 
 
where the function f (·) is the same as above for each era but the Gold Standard era. The latter 
is because our dummy variables suggest that none of the countries in our sample imposed 
capital controls. Ordinary least squares was used to estimate the coefficients. Subsequently, 
we also estimated the following equation that combines trade and asset market integration:   - 28 - 
 
 
  , ,,, () l n ( )
Y
ij ij ij ij fc o r r w C Cτ τττ α β δε =+ + +  (4.5) 
 
for both post-World War II eras. By focusing on the postwar period only, we have 120 
observations for the trade intensity measures, which is preferable, given that we suspect 
small sample problems for the data set covering all four eras. As above, we treat the trade 
intensity measure w
Y as an endogenous variable using the gravity variables discussed above 
as instruments (and our capital control indicator CC). 
 
The results are shown in Table 8. The δ coefficients have the right signs for the interwar and 
modern floating rate eras but are insignificant. The conclusion is that adding the capital 
control indicator to the trade equation does not add to the explanatory power of the equation. 
We interpret these results mainly as a reflection of possible shortcomings of our dummy 
variable rather than as a rejection of the hypothesis that financial market integration has been 
a major factor behind international business cycle synchronization.  
  
C.   Policies  
Exchange Rate Policy 
 
One of the main arguments, if not the main argument, in favor of flexible exchange rates has 
been that they allow a country to insulate itself from external shocks through an independent 
monetary policy. With fixed exchange rates, the scope for pro-cyclical spillovers can be   - 29 - 
 
expected to be larger, unless capital controls or other restrictions allow for some monetary 
independence.   
 
To some extent, we have accounted for differences in the exchange rate and external policy 
environment by distinguishing between four eras with different international monetary 
regimes. Nevertheless, there are interesting cross-sectional variations in the exchange rate 
regime in each era. For example, Italy went off the Gold Standard in 1894 and did not return 
to a gold parity until 1928. To the extent that the cross-sectional variation in exchange rate 
regimes has changed over time, this may be a factor that could explain changes in the 
average business cycle synchronization from era to era. To estimate the effects of exchange 
rate regimes, we have constructed a dummy variable, which, again, is based on the annual 
exchange rate regime indicators for each country prepared by Bordo et al (2001). The 
indicator, which we will refer to as Z, measures the number of years (as a fraction of the total 
number of years covered by each era) during which the exchange rate between two countries 
was pegged (disregarding re-alignments in the case of fixed but adjustable rates).  
 
With this indicator, we estimated the simple equation: 
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  , ,, , () ij ij ij ij fc o r r Z C Cτ ττ τ α γ δε =+ + +  (4.6) 
for each era.
27 We would expect the γ coefficient to be positive for the reasons noted above. 
Despite earlier problems, we kept the capital control indicator CC in the equation, since it is 
important to control for these effects. Subsequently, we also added the exchange regime 
indicator to the trade equation but only for the two post-World War II eras for the reason 
explained above.  
 
The results are shown in Table 9. The γ coefficients generally have the right sign and are 
significant at the 10 or 5 percent levels, except for the Gold Standard era. The latter may be 
explained by the fact that only four out of the 16 countries had not pegged their currencies to 
gold (at least during some time) in this era. For the interwar period, the γ coefficient has the 
wrong sign, which may reflect the fact that the countries hanging on to the Gold Standard 
after the United States and other countries went off resorted to exchange controls and 
increased trade restrictions to maintain their peg. The δ coefficients are generally of the right 
sign, except for the Bretton Woods period.  
 
                                                 
27 As explained above, the capital control indicator CC is redundant for the Gold Standard era.    - 31 - 
 
The exchange rate regime effect is not robust to small variations in the specification.
28 For 
example, adding the trade intensity variable reduces the size of the exchange rate regime 
effect considerably. Similarly, the significance also changes once that additional variable is 
included. Finally, we would like to note one interesting aspect for the modern floating rate 
period. If a European country dummy is included, the exchange rate regime indicator 
becomes insignificant, which can be interpreted as evidence that the exchange rate pegging 
within Europe (all bilateral fixed exchange rate regimes in the modern floating rate period are 
confined to that continent for our panel of countries) has been really important or that the 
exchange rate indicator picks up the effects of European integration more generally.  
                                                 
28 Frankel and Rose (1998), who in one specification added a dummy variable for country pairs with fixed 
exchange rates, argued that the exchange rate regime choice is also endogenous and used the same gravity 
variables as instruments to correct for this endogeneity. We remain somewhat skeptical about the relevance of 
these instruments and note the technical problems in using a 1-0 variable as an endogenous variable in a linear 
regression. We have, however, used instrumental variable estimators with the same instruments to check the 
robustness of our results. For the simple equation (0.6), the results are robust. In fact, the size of the exchange 
rate effect increases somewhat, and the standard errors of the γ coefficients decrease. For the interwar period, 
the sign of the γ coefficient changes. If the trade intensity variable is included, the results do not remain robust. 
In particular, as Frankel and Rose, we find that the γ coefficients are negative and insignificant.     - 32 - 
 
 
V.  PATTERNS OF GLOBALIZATION IN RECENT HISTORY  
 
Among economic historians, the consensus points to two phases of rapidly rising 
globalization in recent economic history (e.g., Bordo, Eichengreen, and Irwin, 1999, or the 
papers in Bordo, Taylor, and Williamson, 2003). The first phase occurred between 1860 and 
1914. The second one, which is still on-going, started in the early 1970s. Between these two 
phases, the earlier increases in economic and financial integration were reversed, partly 
reflecting the wars and the ensuing economic difficulties and partly reflecting a backlash 
against integration in commodity and labor markets by groups adversely affected by these 
forces initiating tariff protection and restrictions on migration ( O’Rourke and Williamson 
1998), and partly reflecting the Great Depression. At the end of World War II, the level of 
integration was generally lower than in 1860. There is a broad agreement that the level of 
integration reached at the on-set of World War I was only reached again in the 1980s.  
 
For illustrative purposes, Obstfeld and Taylor (2003) characterized the time path of global 
capital market integration, when described by a single composite measure, as having broadly 
followed a U-shaped pattern (Figure 2). More specific measures also point to the same broad 
pattern. For example, foreign assets and liabilities as a percent of GDP or net capital flows, 
as measured by external current account balances, followed a U-shaped pattern. Other 
measures providing a similar picture of integration patterns over time include real interest 
differentials, covered interest parity measures, and equity and bond return differentials.   
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The U-shaped pattern is more general and also extends to integration in merchandise trade 
(Findlay and O’Rourke, 2003, or Esteordeval, Frantz, and Taylor, 2002) and labor markets 
(Bordo, Eichengreen, and Irwin, 1999). In commodity markets, Findlay and O’Rourke (op. 
cit.) showed that international trade increased distinctly faster than either population or real 
output during the two phases of globalization. Accordingly, trade shares, that is, trade as a 
percent of GDP, increased substantially. Conversely, during the interwar period, trade and 
output rose and fell at roughly similar rates. At the same time, there was also a strong 
commodity price convergence during the first globalization phase, as price differences in 
major commodities across countries decreased substantially.  Interestingly, Findlay and 
O’Rourke argue that in the second globalization phase, pressures for price convergence have 
been more moderate.        
 
VI.  EXPLAINING DIFFERENCES IN THE TIME PATH OF GLOBALIZATION AND BUSINESS 
CYCLE SYNCHRONIZATION  
 
As noted earlier, there is a puzzling disconnect between the time path of globalization and the 
time path of business cycle synchronization. The latter has followed a secular increase over 
time, almost linear if there were not the interwar period hump. In contrast, the level of 
globalization, that is, the degree of cross-border integration in markets for goods, capital, and 
labor, has followed a U-shaped pattern during the same period. What do our results tell us 
about this disconnect? Specifically, we will use the results to explore three hypotheses 
explaining aspects of the disconnect. 
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First, we explore what we call the global shock hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, the 
above-trend degree of business cycle synchronization during the interwar period—when 
integration was lower than during the classical gold standard— is the result of an 
exceptionally large adverse global shock. Given that the interwar period was short, with the 
data only covering the period 1925-38 for all countries, the great depression affect the sample 
statistics more than it would have if the era had lasted longer. We found some evidence in 
favor of this hypothesis. According to both the center country and the trade linkages models 
of international business cycle dynamics, the variance of the global shock increased relative 
to the idiosyncratic shocks during the interwar period. Everything else being equal, this 
explains increased cross-border output co-movements. However, the variance decomposition 
of the same models suggests that increased transmission accounted for most of the increased 
role of external factors in the determination of output variances. This suggests that despite 
the on-going disintegration during the interwar period, the forces of transmission can still be 
large. Clearly, the transmission of large shocks in the largest country, the U.S., was, 
unsurprisingly, a key factor in the worldwide Great Depression.  
 
A second hypothesis is what we call the idiosyncratic shock hypothesis, which postulates that 
changes in economic structure—especially the declining share of the agricultural sector in 
total output and the systematic use of stabilization policies—resulted in a decline in the size 
of idiosyncratic shocks relative to global shocks. Everything else being equal, this can 
contribute to explaining increased cross-border output co-movements. We found evidence in 
favor of this hypothesis for the transition from the classical gold standard to the other eras   - 35 - 
 
during which relative shock variances decreased. For other transitions, the changes in relative 
variances were, on average, very minor. 
 
A third hypothesis postulates that while seemingly similar, the depth and breadth of cross-
border integration before World War I was different from that in the current era. Bordo, 
Eichengreen, and Irwin (1999) argued that global capital market integration today is broader 
and deeper, including a larger set of financial instruments, a larger number of more diverse 
financial intermediaries operating on a global scale, and a wider range of sectors using 
international markets for financial purposes. In addition, there has been a shift from debt to 
equity finance at the global level. Similarly, in international trade, the depth or cross-border 
integration has increased (e.g., Krugman, 1995). The share of trade in tradables production 
has increased with intra-industry trade and the shift toward trade in manufacturing products, 
and producers have been able to break production geographically at a much larger scale. 
While we intend to investigate this hypothesis more systematically, we have been 
constrained by a lack of data. In particular, we believe that with deeper and broader increased 
economic and financial interdependence through trade and financial linkages, the scope for 
global shocks has clearly increased. In addition, with highly integrated capital markets, it 
may be in practice quite difficult to distinguish between true global shocks and what appear 
to be global shocks but are really rapidly transmitted shocks in the center countries. 
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VII.  CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper, we have documented that there is a secular trend towards increased 
synchronization for much of the twentieth century and that it occurs across diverse exchange 
rate regimes. This finding is of interest because it is in marked contrast to much of the recent 
literature, which has focused primarily on the evidence for the past 20 or 30 years and which 
has produced mixed results. 
 
We then considered a number of possible explanations for the observed pattern of increased 
synchronization. We first ascertained the role of shocks demarcated into country-specific 
(idiosyncratic) and global (common). Our key finding here is that global (common) shocks 
are the dominant influence across all regimes, although we note, however, that with reduced 
form models of the kind used in this paper, it remains difficult to distinguish between “true” 
global shocks and major shocks in the center country(ies).  
 
 This finding, coupled with earlier evidence produced by ourselves and others, that business 
cycles since World War II have become less volatile, less frequent and asymmetric with a 
tendency towards recoveries exceeding downturns in duration, has some interesting 
implications. We suggest that what may be occurring is that the weakening in national  
business cycles since World War II coupled with the diminution of idiosyncratic shocks 
reflect the forces discussed by Zarnowitz (1992) and others, such as changes in the 
composition of output, the advent of automatic stabilizers, improvements in discretionary   - 37 - 
 
monetary and fiscal policy, the implementation of effective lenders of last resort and a 
financial safety net, and the proliferation of private risk sharing instruments.
29 
 
At the same time, the increasing importance of global shocks and, to some extent, 
transmission we posit reflects the forces of globalization, especially the integration of goods 
and services through international trade (Findlay and O’Rourke 2003) and the integration of 
financial markets (Obstfeld and Taylor 2003). We present evidence showing a modest role 
for increasing bilateral trade in explaining synchronization, with stronger evidence for 
regional integration in Europe and North America. Evidence for the role of financial 
integration proxied by the removal of capital controls is inconclusive. Given that these 
proxies contain limited information about the actual extent of cross-border financial 
integration, we plan to use other measures in future research. 
 
Finally, we began considering explicitly the role of the policy regime in explaining the 
pattern of synchronization. We find little evidence for the prediction that adhering to fixed 
exchange rates fosters synchronization except in the period since 1973, and these results 
appear driven largely by the process of European Monetary Union.  
 
                                                 
29 We would like to emphasize that the decrease in idiosyncratic shock volatility does not necessarily imply that 
it is the volatility of the underlying “deep structural” shocks (e.g., a widespread drought) that we are measuring. 
Given that we derive the shocks on the basis of GDP series alone, it means that the effects of these deep shocks 
on output have diminished. There is, however, some evidence that shocks that are widely perceived as being 
exogenous may have an endogenous component. Barsky and Kilian (2001), for example, argue that the sharp 
increase in real oil prices in the 1970s was in part a reaction to the earlier massive expansion of the world 
money supply.    - 38 - 
 
Have we succeeded in explaining the disconnect between the time path of globalization and 
the time path of business cycle synchronization? While recognizing the limitations of 
attaching structural explanations based on evidence from a reduced form model, we think 
that shifts in the relative importance of idiosyncratic and global shocks together with the 
notion of the Great Depression being an outlier are important parts of the explanation. We 
have so far been less successful in shedding light on the apparent lack of transmission during 
the classical Gold Standard period despite rapidly increasing globalization, we believe that 
explanations based on differences in the depth and breadth of globalization between the two 
phases of globalization identified in section III are likely to be promising. We intend to 
pursue further research along this line. .  
 
What are the policy lessons to be gleaned from these findings? One lesson from the 
dampening of national cycles and the diminution in idiosyncratic shocks is that to the extent 
that they reflect sound domestic macro policy and the creation of an environment conducive 
to the development of both private and public risk sharing institutions and instruments that 
these policies should continue to be fostered. 
 
A second lesson is that globalization seems to be associated with the creation of a global 
business cycle. Whether policies should be developed at the global level to counter it is 
another matter. Regarding monetary policy, experience suggest that the key to success has 
been that policy makers get their policy objectives right. In addition, for monetary policy to 
be effective, it is also critical that policy makers get the shocks right. In this sense, policy 
coordination is likely to be very important. As Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002) have argued, there   - 39 - 
 
is probably little gain from policy coordination beyond this, provided that central banks have 
the right policy objectives. The generally negative experience with policy coordination in the 
1970s and 1980s supports this view (Frankel, 1990). 
 
A third lesson, to paraphrase Forrest Gump, is that shocks happen! We live in a stochastic 
world and shocks generate business cycles via diffuse propagation mechanisms. Moreover 
productivity shocks occur in a non linear fashion, asset markets overshoot and people are at 
times over optimistic and other times over pessimistic. In this reality the best strategy is to 
encourage the development of private market mechanisms to insure against cyclical risks, in 
the case of incomplete markets related to market failures to provide public insurance, and to 
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Figure 3. Global Shocks, 1887-2001
(Solid Lines: trade model; dotted lines: simple factor model; and bars: significant time dummies)
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Source: Authors' calculcations (see text for details).  - 46 - 
 
Region (Number of obs.) 1880-1913 1920-38 1948-72 1973-2001
All countries (120) 0.01 0.15 0.12 0.33
Core countries (15)
a 0.02 0.13 0.15 0.45
Peripheral countries (45)
a 0.02 0.21 0.11 0.27
One country core, one periphery (60) 0.01 0.12 0.11 0.33
Continental European countries only (55) 0.01 0.08 0.10 0.49
One country Continental European (55) 0.01 0.17 0.13 0.26
Core European countries only (6)
b 0.07 0.10 0.25 0.59
One country Core European (48)
b -0.02 0.09 0.14 0.36
One Country North America 28) 0.00 0.28 0.04 0.38
One country Japan (15) -0.08 0.05 0.16 0.17
Anglo-Saxon Countries (6)
c 0.12 0.29 0.17 0.63
Memorandum items:
USA-Canada 0.55 0.86 0.61 0.77
Scandinavian countries only (6) 0.11 0.48 0.17 0.31
One country Scandinavian (48) 0.00 0.17 0.11 0.25
a Core countries comprise France, Germany, the United Kingdom, the United States, the
Netherlands, and Switzerland during 1880-1913 and 1920-39 and the G-7 countries afterwards.
b Core European countries comprise France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland 
during 1880-1913 and 1920-39 and the EEC countries in the panel 
(France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands) afterwards.
c Comprises Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
Table 1. Average Output Correlations By Region and Era
(Based on first differences of log output)  - 47 - 
 
Region (Number of obs.) 1880-1913 1926-38 1952-72 1880-1913 1880-1913 1926-38
vs.
1926-38 1952-72 1973-2001 1952-72 1973-2001 1973-2001
All countries (120) 0.01 0.85 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.03
Core countries (15)
old 0.30 0.40 0.25 0.02 0.00 0.08
new 0.04 0.85 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.09
Continental European countries (28) 0.26 0.19 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
Core European countries (6)
old 0.92 0.12 0.50 0.06 0.00 0.05
new 0.98 0.15 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.00
Anglo-Saxon Countries (6) 0.49 0.76 0.01 0.68 0.00 0.04
Memorandum items:
USA-Canada 0.18 0.48 0.66 0.34 0.14 0.70
Scandinavian countries only (6) 0.11 0.25 0.57 0.60 0.25 0.51
Note: See Table 1 for definition of regions and country groups and Jennrich (1970) on the computation of the
variance-covariance matrix of the correlation coefficients. 
Table 2. Jennrich Test for Equality of Average Correlation Coefficients 
(Marginal significance levels)
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Region (Number of obs.) 1880-1913 1926-38 1952-72 1880-1913 1880-1913 1926-38
vs.
1926-38 1952-72 1973-2001 1952-72 1973-2001 1973-2001
All countries (120) 0.86 0.01 0.01 0.28 0.00 0.00
Core countries (15)
old 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
new 0.07 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Continental European countries (28) 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Core European countries (6)
old 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
new 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
Anglo-Saxon Countries (6) 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Memorandum items:
USA-Canada 0.36 0.00 0.96 0.00 0.00 0.00
Scandinavian countries only (6) 0.08 0.01 0.53 0.05 0.00 0.02
All countries (120) 0.86 0.01 0.01 0.28 0.00 0.00
Core countries (15)
old 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
new 0.07 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Continental European countries (28) 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Core European countries (6)
old 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
new 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
Anglo-Saxon Countries (6) 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Memorandum items:
USA-Canada 0.36 0.00 0.96 0.00 0.00 0.00
Scandinavian countries only (6) 0.08 0.01 0.53 0.05 0.00 0.02
Note: See Table 1 for definition of regions and country groups and Jennrich (1970) on the computation of the
variance-covariance matrix of the correlation coefficients. 
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Table 4. Output and Shock Standard Deviations By Era 
(Based on first differences of log output) 
Aggregates
1  1880-1913 1920-38  1948-72  1973-2001 
Average output growth  0.047  0.057  0.027  0.023 
Center Model        
   Global factor  0.023  0.028  0.014  0.012 
   Idiosyncratic shocks  0.037  0.040  0.020  0.016 
        
Trade Model        
   Global factor  0.022  0.017  0.013  0.010 
   Idiosyncratic shocks  0.034  0.024  0.018  0.014 
1 Unweighted averages across countries. 
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Table 5. Variance Decomposition of Output Growth  
(Fractions of forecast error variance; based on first differences of log output; simple averages over countries) 
Countries (Number of obs.)  1887-1913  1926-38  1952-72  1973-2001 




























Center  model                       
    All countries (16)                         
       1-step ahead  0.22  0.0  0.78  0.24 0.0 0.76  0.28 0.0 0.72  0.36  0.0 0.64 
       2-step ahead   0.22  0.03  0.75  0.21 0.12  0.67 0.27 0.04  0.69  0.33  0.10  0.57 
       3-step ahead   0.21  0.05  0.74  0.21 0.14  0.65 0.27 0.04  0.69  0.33  0.10  0.57 
       4-step ahead   0.21  0.05  0.74  0.21 0.15  0.64 0.27 0.04  0.69  0.33  0.10  0.57 
   New core countries (7)                         
       1-step ahead  0.19  0.0  0.81  0.31 0.0 0.69  0.24 0.0 0.76  0.45  0.0 0.55 
       2-step ahead   0.19  0.02  0.79  0.29 0.07  0.64 0.23 0.02  0.75  0.42  0.08  0.51 
       3-step ahead   0.19  0.03  0.78  0.29 0.09  0.62 0.23 0.02  0.75  0.42  0.08  0.51 
       4-step ahead   0.19  0.03  0.78  0.28 0.10  0.62 0.23 0.02  0.75  0.42  0.08  0.51 
Trade  model                       
    All countries (16)                         
       1-step ahead  0.23  0.0  0.77  0.24 0.0 0.76  0.32 0.0 0.68  0.31  0.0 0.69 
       2-step ahead   0.20  0.13  0.67  0.17 0.40  0.43 0.28 0.16  0.56  0.25  0.24  0.51 
       3-step ahead   0.19  0.17  0.64  0.16 0.47  0.37 0.27 0.19  0.54  0.24  0.29  0.47 
       4-step ahead   0.19  0.18  0.63  0.15 0.52  0.33 0.27 0.20  0.53  0.23  0.32  0.45 
   New core countries (7)                         
       1-step ahead  0.27  0.0  0.73  0.22 0.0 0.78  0.27 0.0 0.73  0.46  0.0 0.54 
       2-step ahead   0.25  0.12  0.63  0.18 0.26  0.56 0.24 0.11  0.65  0.38  0.17  0.45 
       3-step ahead   0.24  0.16  0.60  0.17 0.33  0.50 0.24 0.12  0.64  0.37  0.19  0.44 
       4-step ahead   0.24  0.16  0.60  0.15 0.40  0.45 0.24 0.13  0.63  0.37  0.19  0.44 
Note: See Table 1 for regions and country groupings.         - 51 - 
 
 
Table 6. Bilateral Trade-Output Regressions
a 
(Standard errors in parenthesis; coefficients significant at the 5% level are bolded) 
  Limited Sample (59 Observations)  Full Sample (120 Observations) 
  1880-1913  1920-38  1950-72  1973-2001 Panel  1950-72  1973-2001 Panel 
             
β
b  0.120 0.134 0.087  0.210 0.138  0.123  0.205  0.168 
  (0.071)  (0.154)  (0.099) (0.088)  (0.057) (0.056) (0.053) (0.042) 
R-square
 c  -0.013  -0.017  0.022 0.071  0.028 0.066  0.16 0.123 
R-square
  
   first-stage regressions 
0.179  0.187  0.398 0.460  0.271 0.431 0.551 0.484 
F-test
d        0.000      0.000 
Number of observations  59  59  59  59  236  120  120  240 
a Constant is not reported. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-consistent.       
b Instrumental  variable  estimate.           
c From an OLS regression of  trade equation 4.3.            
d Marginal significance level from an F-test of the restriction that the panel coefficients are not      
significantly different from those obtained for each period.            
          




Table 7. Actual and Predicted Change in Output Correlations
a 
(All variables in percent or percentage points) 
        
        
  Limited Sample (59 Observations)  Full Sample 
  1880-1913 1920-38 1950-72 1973-2001 1950-72 1973-2001 
        
         
Average trade intensity  0.757  0.491  0.698  0.956  0.460  0.612 
 Change in average trade intensity   -0.266  0.207  0.258    0.152 
         
Average actual change 
   in output correlations 
 13.409  2.332 22.815    21.615 
Predicted  change         
Based on β of previous era    -1.962  1.695  0.992    1.271 
Based on β of current era    -2.198  1.110  2.348    2.093 
Based on β of panel     -2.265  1.744  1.560    1.724 
         
         
a All data including correlation coefficients are reported in percent (percentage points). The β coefficients 
are those shown in Table 15.  
 
 
Table 8. Asset Market Integration, Bilateral Trade and Output Correlations
a 
(Bolded signifies significance at the 5% level and bolded-italicized significance at the 10 percent level) 
   1920-38  1950-72  1973-2001  1950-72  1973-2001 
δ   -0.083  0.066  -0.089  0.034  -0.039 
    ( 0.165)  ( 0.108)  ( 0.110)  ( 0.100)  ( 0.104) 
β
b         0.119  0.191 
          ( 0.059)  ( 0.047) 
R-square
 c    0.002  0.003 0.007 0.059  0.155 
R-square
 first-stage regressions          0.324  0.447 
Number of observations    120  120  120  120  120 
a Constant is not reported. Standard errors in parenthesis are heteroskedasticity-consistent. 
b Instrumental  variable  estimate.          
c From an OLS regression of equations 4.4 and 4.5.        
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Table 9. Exchange Rate Regime, Asset Market Integration, Bilateral Trade and Output Correlations
a 
(Bolded signifies significance at the 5% level and bolded-italicized significance at the 10 percent level) 
 1880-1913  1920-38  1950-72  1973-2001 1950-72  1973-2001 
γ 0.122  -0.417  0.603 0.624  0.42  0.332 
  ( 0.085)  ( 0.233)  ( 0.187)  ( 0.176)  ( 0.231)  ( 0.205) 
δ   -0.132  0.001  -0.183  -0.009 -0.1 
    ( 0.167)  ( 0.114)  ( 0.103)  ( 0.105)  ( 0.114) 
β
b        0.109  0.15 
          ( 0.063)  ( 0.059) 
R-square
 c  0.006 0.012 0.064  0.092  0.09  0.172 
R-square
 first-stage regressions          0.363  0.364 
Number of observations    120  120  120  120  120 
a Constant is not reported. Standard errors in parenthesis are heteroskedasticity-consistent.   
b Instrumental variable estimate.              
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This paper is about cyclical affiliations.  This term is meant to refer to the alleged tendency for some 
countries’ business cycles to cluster together with others.  One affiliation of arresting interest is that of 
the European business cycle”.  There are several papers which discern the existence of such a cycle 
(e.g., Artis et al. 2004; Kaufmann 2003) and there is an obvious reason to be interested in such a 
notion in the context of European Monetary Union.  The European Business Cycle forms the subject 
for analysis of the CEPR’s Business Cycle Dating Committee and its coherence is a positive indicator 
for monetary union. 
 
Some years ago, with my colleague Wenda Zhang, I wrote a paper (Artis and Zhang, 1997) in which 
we employed the OECD’s trade cycle data base and a presentational device first presented by Baxter 
and Stockman (1986) to indicate the possible arrival of an European cycle, associated with the 
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System.   
 
In our paper we took industrial production deviation cycles estimated by the OECD on the basis of a  
modified NBER algorithm and showed the cross plots of the cross correlations of those cyclical 
deviates vis-a-vis the US and vis-a-vis Germany for a sequence of two periods.  The first of these was 
typified as a “pre-ERM period” (1961:1 to 1979:3), the second as the ERM period (1979:4   to 
1993:12).  The interest in the picture was that where the observations for the first period suggested a 
broad “world cycle”, in the second a number of countries could be seen as having moved strongly 
towards a stronger affiliation with Germany, with Germany and the US themselves much less closely 
related to each other.  The UK was a prominent exception, with the European countries that had moved 
towards a stronger identification with Germany being those that were associated with the ERM either 
as full or as “apprentice” (shadowing) members.  It might have been thought that this movement would 
be strengthened in subsequent years.  Figures 1-3 show that this has not been so.  These figures plot 
the cross correlations of the cyclical deviates of industrial production, again as identified by the (now 
revised) OECD trade cycle data base, now for three periods.  The first of these is labelled the pre-ERM 
period (Figure 1), and the world cycle phenomenon seems again a loosely reasonable characterization.  
In the second period (Figure 2), as in the original paper, a number of European countries have moved 
above the line – leaving the UK and the Northern “periphery” below the line.  In the third period 
however (Figure 3) matters look very different.  The US and Germany are now themselves highly 
correlated and it makes no sense to speak of a distinctive German affiliation.      3
 
 
It seems that we have to revisit the notion of a European business cycle, or at least refine what we 
mean by it.  Though important, this is incidental to the main theme of the paper to which there are two 
parts which can be seen as a development of Artis (2003 and 2004).  The first part is devoted to 
looking for evidence of business cycle affiliations employing a multi-country quarterly GDP data set 
and focussing on the notion of the deviation cycle.  To begin with, clustering techniques – both 
hierarchical and fuzzy clustering methods - are used in an attempt to “let the data speak” as to whether 
there are, or not, well-defined business cycle affiliations.  Then a non-parametric technique recently 
employed by Bovi (2003) is used to assist in the same endeavour.  The second part of the paper is then 
devoted to an attempt to motivate a panel data explanation of business cycle affiliation; for an 
empirical example the results established in Artis (2003, 2004) are reassembled. 
 
 
The measurement of cycles 
In order to comment on business cycle affiliation it is necessary in the first instance to have a good 
idea of how to measure the cycle. Economists have made considerable progress in this respect in 
recent decades. 
 
Business “cycles”, as such, are not entirely well-termed, since the term “cycle” suggests a degree of 
regularity which is not found in practice.  Nevertheless the idea is that it is possible to observe broad-
based movements in the economy which have an oscillatory character, even if those oscillations do not 
occur with a strictly uniform periodicity and vary in the total length of time taken to work themselves 
out. Useful ground-clearing was undertaken by Pagan and others (see Harding and Pagan, 2001) in 
resurrecting and clarifying the notions of the classical and the growth (or deviation) business cycles.  
The non-parametric algorithms which have resulted have permitted further refinements: for example, 
Artis, Marcellino and Proietti (2002) base their algorithms on a Markov-Chain approach which 
provides a flexible, yet rigorous framework for the identification of cycles.  In these excursions, a 
dating algorithm identifies (strictly alternating), peaks and troughs and imposes minimum phase 
(expansion and recession) lengths and a minimum length for the cycle as a whole.  They provide the 
opportunity to add amplitude restrictions in addition.  
A cycle-dating algorithm may be applied to an original or to a transformed series describing the 
economy.  The most common transformation (in addition to seasonal adjustment) is that of de-
trending; here too, economists have made significant progress in recent decades.  The suggestion by    4
Baxter and King (1995) to make use of frequency domain analysis has proved highly important in this 
regard.  Their argument is that since we “know” what the typical periodicity of a business cycle is, we 
should use this information to clean the data of periodicities which are greater or lower than those that 
span the cycle. These other periodicities should be thought of as mere blips and bumps (or seasonal 
cycles) in the case of the higher frequency oscillations or, or in the case of the lower frequencies, as 
longer run movements perhaps of the type associated with the adoption of a new technology or 
process. At any rate, this approach has given the profession new confidence in detrending and without 
completely laying all doubts to rest (see for example, Harvey and Trimbur (2003)) has substantially 
qualified the reservations that an earlier generation had entertained in reaction to a series of critical 
papers (e.g., Harvey and Jaeger (1993)) which had shown that existing methods could lead to the 
spurious identification of cycles which were not present and to other damaging mistakes.  For purposes 
of the current paper, the point is that recent work seems to have allowed the efficient identification of 




Commonly, measures of affiliation between business cycles are in fact measures of synchronization 
and a standard means of assessing this is to measure the cross-correlation between the detrended series. 
A standard product would therefore be a cross-correlogram showing the cross-corrrelations of the 
countries analysed in the sample under consideration The cross-correlogram shows all the pair-wise 
cross-correlation coefficients that can be estimated and lends itself to an application of clustering.  
However there are still other characteristics of business cycles that could be taken into account, 
although as soon as more than one characteristic is involved a weighting problem arises.  Clustering 
methods can be applied to multi-dimensional problems of this type (see Artis (2003) for an example) 
although they cannot avoid the need for weighting (albeit this might be of a studiedly “neutral” type). 
Another drawback of the traditional cross-correlogram approach is that it is confined to pair-wise 
comparisons, when often enough a comparison of groups is what is required. Shortly below we take 
advantage of recent papers by Bovi (2003, 2004) to show how this weakness may be redressed.  Table 
1 indicates the data set we are using, the countries involved and the time periods for which the 
(quarterly) GDP series are available. 
 
Cyclical histories 
Using these data we proceed to derive deviation cycles using the H-P band-pass method described in 
Artis, Marcellino and Proietti (2003).  That is, the data are filtered twice through low-pass Hodrick-   5
Prescott band pass filters to isolate those frequencies with periodicities that correspond to the business 
cycle (i.e. 1.25 to 8 years in this case).  The cross-correlogram that results from computing the pair-
wise cross-correlations between all the countries in the sample is shown as Table 2.  Then, the dating 
algorithm described in Artis, Marcellino and Proietti (2002) is applied to identify cycles in the 
detrended output series.  This yields up to ten complete deviation cycles, depending on the country and 
the data available. Table 3 then contains a summary of business cycle “stylized facts”
1 whilst Figure 
4a-d gives a graphic summary of the series showing, the detrended cycles and the peaks and troughs 
located by the dating algorithm.. The number of cycles identified varies across countries partly because 
data availability varies across countries, as reported in Table 1.  The dating algorithm of the deviation 
cycle, roughly described above, also insists that a peak (trough) can never be identified at a point 
which is below (above) trend, even if it should be associated with an inflexion in the rate of change of 
output relative to trend (this distinguishes the deviation from the growth rate cycle – see Artis et al 
(2003), Appendix B).  By construction the deviation cycle should be a stationary series, so that it is not 
surprising that average expansion and recession probabilities (which are the fractions of time that the 
economy is in one or other phase) should be roughly equal at around 0.5.  The average duration, in 
quarters, of the two phases is also roughly equal at 7 –10 quarters, but with a number of outliers – 
Denmark for example has recession durations that average over 11 quarters and Portugal of 17 quarters 
whilst extra-long expansion durations are registered for Switzerland and the Netherlands.  Average 
amplitudes, measured as the proportionate increase from trough to peak for expansions and from peak 
to trough for recessions are not at all symmetrical.  Expansion amplitudes are generally much higher 
than recession amplitudes, though the latter are not often negative.  “Steepness” is measured as the 
quotient of amplitude and duration: the relative symmetry of durations and the asymmetry of 
amplitudes thus reflects in very unequal measures of steepness in expansion as opposed to recessions – 
the former being very much higher than the latter in all countries.  
 
 
.  The cross-correlogram already yields evidence of business cycle affiliations in that it is obvious that 
there are relatively high cross-correlations between particular pairs of countries but clearer pictures 
emerge from the application of cluster analysis to these data. To begin with, hierarchical (“hard”) 
clustering methods are applied, first to the cross-correlation data for the whole period, then to a two-
dimensional measure in which cross-correlation data are combined with pair-wise “distance” 
measures.  The latter are measured as the RMS of the distances between any two countries’ detrended 
                                                           
1  See Harding and Pagan (2001) for a discussion of the stylized facts of the business cycle.  
    6
data.  A clustering algorithm starts with a distance matrix showing some measure of dissimilarity 
between the countries located along the axes; this will be a square matrix with a diagonal of zeroes and 
symmetric above and below the diagonal.  The algorithm then first forms a cluster from the two 
observations which are closest together; replacing these by another value, the algorithm then proceeds 
to find the next smallest difference between any two observations (counting the just completed first 
cluster as one of these) and so on. The initial values entering the distance matrix are in the form of 
dissimilarities between (in our case) countries in respect of some characteristic (possibly several 
characteristics) – so the algorithm will cluster together countries which are similar in respect of that 
characteristic (or set of characteristics). In the case illustrated in Figure 5, the characteristic, xki, is a 
measure of the cyclical synchronicity of the country in question with all the other countries.   
Clustering algorithms are long on alternative measures of distance (the measurement of the difference 
between observations) and on alternative ways to compute the “replacement” value of a cluster after 
one has been identified.  They are short on measures of significance or adequacy (though some appear 
in the context of “fuzzy” clustering).  In the construction of Figure 5, we selected the distance measure 







kj ki x x   ) and the cluster replacement measure as that of 
average linkage.  Experimentation with alternative distance measures did not in general reveal any 
significant difference.    The clustering algorithm reveals, it seems, a cycle cluster based on the US, 
Canada, Great Britain and Australia and a “European cycle” itself based on two clusters, one involving 
Germany, Austria, Switzerland and the Netherlands, and the other involving France, Spain, Belgium, 
Italy, Portugal and Ireland; but at the level at which these two are joined, there is also Japan.  And then 
a number of other European countries – especially, the UK (denoted GBR), Sweden, Norway and 
Denmark are not so close.  This is, if nothing else, a warning not to invest the notion of a “European” 
cycle as such with too much that is idiosyncratically European. 
 
Contemporaneous cross correlation is not the only dimension in which we might want to measure 
similarity of business cycle experience.  Some investigators (e.g., Massman and Mitchell (2002), 
Barrell and Weale (2003)) have suggested as an alternative the distance between cycles, as might be 
measured for example by the RMS of the squared differences over a period of time.   The suggestion 
responds to the idea that whilst (for example) synchronization may not change over time, the 
amplitude of cycles may do so and thus the difference between cycles, for a given degree of 
synchronization, may increase or diminish.  Figure 6 repeats the clustering exercise of  Figure 5 for a 
combination of the cross correlation and distance measures, defined as 
2 2 ) 1 ( ij j i dist r + − , where rij is    7
the cross correlation and distij is the RMS distance between the cycles of countries i and j. .  As in the 
case of the simple cross-correlation this measure is computed over all j for each i.  The picture 
provided by the clustering over this composite measure is however very little different from the picture 
provided when using the cross correlation measure alone.  Figures 7, 8 and 9, however, use the 
composite measure, but in three sub-samples:  1970-79, 1980-92 and 1992-2003.  These should give a 
picture of how cyclical affiliations may have varied over time.  Figure 7 shows that in the first period 
there is no very well-defined European cluster though most European countries cluster away from the 
US and Canada; the UK (GBR) is shown as closer to some European countries than to the US in this 
period.  In the second period a clearer European grouping emerges, albeit with some prominent 
exceptions and with the inclusion of Japan in the Euro group.  In the third, most recent period, two 
European groupings can be seen to emerge – with Sweden, Finland and Norway being exceptional and 
Canada moving to the Euro-group.  The groupings seem less clear and less constant through time than 
might have been expected. 
 
We may now turn to the fuzzy clustering analysis.  In fuzzy clustering less information is wasted than 
in hard clustering: countries may be typified as having “membership coefficients”, belonging (say) as 
x % to one group or cluster and as to (1-x)% the other (in the case that only two clusters are 
distinguished).  More generally the analysis furnishes the possibility of discerning whether there is a 
“distinct” set of groupings or not. To approach this question we use one of the “goodness of fit” 
measures associated with fuzzy clustering, which is the measure of average silhouette width.  
Maximising the average value of the cluster silhouette width is a way to determine the “optimal” 
number of clusters. 
The average silhouette measure is bounded by +/-1, with positive values indicating that the clusters are 
relatively well defined.  In Table 4, which covers the whole period this criterion produces two clusters, 
of which one (cluster 1) is a good deal larger than the other.  It involves most of the advanced 
industrial countries including both (most of) Europe and North America.  Two clusters also are 
detected in the first subperiod (Table 5), more or less even in numbers of members.  The UK is 
clustered with Canada and the USA; most other European countries are clustered separately.  The 
second subperiod (Table 6) finds a larger number (5) of clusters to be optimal, suggesting a higher 
degree of idiosyncrasy in the period.  Table 7, finally, finds 3 clusters to be optimal for the most recent 
decade, one of these being a fairly prominent “European” grouping, including the UK.      
 
The McNemar test  
    8
In this section of the paper we deploy a non-parametric technique to ask questions about the coherence 
of particular groupings.  The procedure involves the “McNemar test” and has been given prominence 
recently by Bovi (2003, 2004). Many of the papers in the stream of literature associated with the 
identification of the European business cycle look outwards, over a period of time, from inside a 
European group to identify a closer union (or otherwise). The important point made by Bovi is that this 
should be complemented by an analysis of whether any such development has proceeded faster or 
slower than similar processes elsewhere.  Bovi himself uses long run data on classical cycles to look at 
this question, focussing in particular on the position of the UK.  Our data sample in this section of the 
paper is much shorter and we shall not ask exactly the same questions of the data.   
How does Bovi’s procedure work?  Bovi himself recognizes a contribution by McNemar, made as long 
ago as 1947 (McNemar 1947).  The key here is a contingency table approach, as in Table 8. This can be 
motivated by reference to the Venn diagrams in Figure 10.  These diagrams show how we can divide 
our observations into four cells (as in Table 8).  When all the countries in Group 1 are in the same 
phase (“in synch.”), based on applying the dating algorithm discussed above to the deviation cycle 
series there will be some periods in which the countries making up Group 2 are also “in synch” – the 
intersection of these two sets gives the cell labelled N11, the number of observations in which both 
groups are “in synch”. Similarly, whilst the members of Group 1 are “out of synch” with each other, 
there will be some periods when the members of Group 2 are also out of synch: the intersection of 
these two sets corresponds to the cell labelled N22 in Table 8. 
 
 
The cells labelled N12 and N21 correspond to the remaining intersections identified in Figure10. 
The information in the contingency table can be used to test whether Group 1 is more (or less) 
coherent than Group 2, in the sense that it is (or not) more often “in synch” than Group 2.  McNemar 
offers the difference (N12-N21)
2/(N12+N21) as a suitable test statistic for which a Chi
2 distribution is 
suggested (provided that numbers are large enough).  Bovi points out that a continuity correction (due 
to Sheskin (2002)) may also be applied (the statistic becomes (│N12 – N21│-1)
2/(N12  + N21)). In 
principle, the test can also be applied, mutatis mutandis to the information in the leading diagonal 
cells, which we have done here as a check on the main results.  Whilst the attraction of the approach is 
that it can  be applied  to groups of countries,  it can also be applied  to individual  countries  or to  
groups that are represented by a single aggregate number – it is just that in this latter case the country 
in question (or the aggregate) can only ever be typified as being “in synch” with itself. If a single 
country or aggregate takes the place of group 1 (2) in the formula, then the cells N22 (N12) and N21 
(N22) are null.    9
 
In the current application we recognize at first pass nine groups, two individual countries and one 
aggregate.  The groups are:  Core EMU (Germany, France and Italy); EMU (all current members of 
EMU except Greece, and Luxembourg for which data are not available); non-EMU (Denmark, UK, 
Sweden), EU 15 (all except Greece and Luxembourg); the G-7; the rest of the world (ROW) – all 
countries listed in Table 1 (i.e OECD) minus the groups already mentioned; the OECD (all countries in 
Table 1 minus the EU countries; “Anglo” – the USA, UK and Canada, EMUUK – the EMU plus the 
UK and NAMU, the US and UK.  Two individual countries are shown – the US and Germany and one 
aggregate - that for the EU 15, denoted EU15*. 
Table 9 gives a first set of results. For their interpretation, bear in mind that in terms of the formulae 
quoted above, the countries reported in the rows are group 1 whilst those reported in the column heads 
are group 2.   This means that a positive and significant value of the test statistic reported would 
indicate that the group defined in the row is more coherent than that reported in the column, whilst a 
significant negative figure would have the opposite implication.  Bearing in mind the critical values 
listed at the foot of the table, it is clear that rather little is significant that does not involve one of the 
individual countries or the EU15 aggregate. The main exception is that some of the figures in the 
OECD column border acceptable levels of significance.  But significance here means that there is a 
difference in the coherence of the groups compared.  On this basis there is little to support the view 
that there is a distinctive coherent European grouping – only the EU15-OECD pairing might suggest 
otherwise (the same can be said at a lower level of significance for Core EMU and non-EMU pairings 
with OECD here. Clearly, though, the pairings that involve an individual country or the EU15 in 
aggregate tell a different story – which seems to suggest that individual countries are more 
idiosyncratically different than any grouping:  but recall that key entries for these entities are null. 
 
An attraction of the Bovi –McNemar methodology is that it allows one to examine the movement of 
the measure of relative coherence over time. Unfortunately, our sample is rather too short to allow this, 
but for what it is worth we tried splitting the sample. In table 10 we concentrate exclusively upon the 
groups (dropping the individual countries and the EU15 aggregate), split the sample into two equal-
sized sub-samples and introduce a continuity correction. Not too surprisingly, as the results show, the 
sub-samples are too small to support much reliable inference, and there is little that can even be tested, 
and of that little that is significant except for some of the comparisons involving the OECD.  But these 
comparisons do not involve EMU or core-EMU. 
    10
The results we have obtained seem to show that whilst some business cycle groupings can be detected 
for periods of time, only a few of these are reasonably persistent through time.  The presence of a 
persistent – or growing – “European” grouping seems particularly hard to detect, especially given the 
implicit acceptance of the contrary view.  Among the possible explanations for this must be counted 
the following: changes in the relative frequency of global versus regional or national-idiosyncratic 
shocks; changes in the interrelationships between economies (to put it loosely, the growth of 
“globalization”), and the habit of examining the European cycle by starting with Europe and looking at 
its development, so to speak from the inside out.  There is a clear risk here of failing to distinguish 
globalization from Europeanization. Something must be added also to account for differences in the 
results that may be obtained, on the one hand by working with industrial production data or by 
working with GDP data.
2 
 
How to explain affiliation? 
The main purpose of this section is to set up a framework for thinking about the determinants of 
business cycle affiliation and to provide an empirical illustration. 















































































Here, outputs of the two countries 1 and 2 are shown as depending ultimately upon idiosyncratic and 
common shocks, the vectors H and G respectively.  Initial inter-country spillovers are contained in the 
hij  (i≠j) parameters, whilst subsequent inter-country interaction is represented, along with the purely 
domestic elements of the propagation mechanism, in the matrix of aij adjustment parameters. Our task 
is to think about the factors that determine the parameters distinguished here. 
 
Before we begin to discuss this, though, there is one important point of clarification to be made (this is 
a point which is very well discussed by Mathias Hoffman (2004) in his discussion of the paper by 
Bordo and Helbling (2004)).  In discussing changes through time in the relative business cycle 
synchronization of countries, the relative frequency (and size) of the shocks H and G may be of key 
importance.  For given values of the aij, hij and gi parameters an increase in the relative frequency 
                                                           
2 A paper that is close to this one, both in its problem set and in its methodology is that by Camacho et al (2004), which 
works entirely with industrial production data.    11
(and/or size ) of G-shocks as opposed to H-shocks will lead to an increase in synchronization.  That is, 
nothing need be happening to the structural parameters for “globalization” to appear to be on the 
increase. The framework also supports some other interesting propositions.  One that represents an 
interesting special case for our purposes is the idea that if all shocks are common shocks (and H is 
null), business cycle synchronization may still differ according to differences between the propagation 
mechanisms, represented in this case by the aij parameters.  The gi may be regarded as simply 
“calibration parameters” that mediate the impact of the common shock on the economy according to 
relevant structural characteristics.
3  (An example of a “g” parameter would be a “share of oil” value of 
some kind). This idea is present in the paper by Adão et al (1999), which discusses the (ir)relevance of 
differing monetary transmission mechanisms to the optimality of a single monetary policy when the 
Central Bank can only respond to common shocks. 
Differences between propagation mechanisms.  Centring ourselves for the moment on the propagation 
mechanisms, we can make a first pass at identifying factors which might be relevant by considering 
that what are normally thought of as the relevant features are the structural characteristics of the labour 
and product markets and those of the financial sector. A good deal of work has gone into identifying 
relevant features of the labour market in the context of the literature on unemployment (e.g.see Nickell 
(1997) and Nickell et al (2005)).  Rather less work has been done on product markets  and in practice it 
may be that those papers which have employed measures of the economic structure (as in “share 
manufacturing” etc – see Traistaru (2004) for example) are capturing the important points. On 
financial structure, the important book by Allen and Gale (2000) has shown how financial structures 
may be described with a particular emphasis on whether the system is dominated by intermediation 
through banks or through more broad-ranging market institutions.  It is easy to suppose that this 
distinction would correspond to a distinction between the speed of transmission of a shock through the 
system; thus, the more “bank-based” systems of (say) Germany and Japan might conduce to a slower 
pass-through and more persistence of a shock than the floating-rate market-based systems of (say) the 
UK and US. Measuring these features is not so straightforward, as they are multi-dimensional and data 
points are often missing. 
Spillover effects 
Spillover effects from one country to another are comprehended by the structural parameters of the 
model.  Traditional inter-country modelling gave pride of place to linkages through trade, as for 
                                                           
3 It has been remarked that “all shocks are idiosyncratic shocks” in the light of the fact that in general g1 ≠ g2, but we prefer 
to take care of this issue by making explicit the g coefficients and allowing for their possible inequality.  Our focus, just the    12
example in the IMF’s Multi-Mod.  Many more recent papers have followed the early lead of Frankel 
and Rose (1997, 1998) in demonstrating a link between business cycle synchronization and some 
measure of trade intensity: Gruben et al (2002) provide a recent study.  Yet there is some confusion 
about the most appropriate measure to use. Keynesian-style analysis would view the trade linkage as a 
channel for the operation of the “trade multiplier”; yet other observers have chosen to emphasize that 
the type of trade ─ whether inter- or intra-trade is important in exposing the country in question to 
shocks of the same type that hit the partner (inter-trade) or not (intra-trade).  This goes back to the 
debate initiated by Krugman (1993) when he pointed out that monetary union might promote more 
specialization in trade (more inter-trade, less intra-trade) and hence lead to less vulnerability to 
common shocks, and more to idiosyncratic ones. Both views on the relevance of trade are correct in 
themselves. A country that does a lot of trade with a particular partner exposes itself to the operation of 
the trade multiplier given a disturbance in the other country (see Kenen (2003)). At the same time, if 
that trade takes the form of the exchange of very different types of goods, the country is exposed to a 
different range of (technological and demand) shocks than its partner.  A high level of intra-trade, on 
the other hand, conduces to a common vulnerability to shocks
4.  These distinctions can be taken 
further, for intra-trade itself can be divided into horizontal and vertical intra-trade – an intra trade in 
components or in qualities
5.  The latter type may open a country to asymmetric demand shocks where 
the former does not.  The recent experience of the 2001 downturn and in particular its widespread 
nature has given rise to speculation about what other channels, in addition to trade, could be 
responsible.  But this is a quest which is due to the idea that the shock was initiated in the US, a 
hypothesis which is explored in some detail in Artis, Galvao and Marcellino (2003).  The results of 
their examination suggest that the shock must have had a greater common dimension than initially 
appreciated, perhaps due to a wealth effect associated with high European holdings of US Dotcom 
shares (see, e.g., Castren et al, 2003 for an instructive working out of such an idea). 
Otherwise, some way of quantifying the financial channels for shock-spillover would be indicated 
since what stands out to most people as a factor that has been leading the integration of recent years is 
the increased mobility of capital:  Imbs (2003) has achieved some success in this direction.  Again, 
some financial variables that assist the transfer of a shock are identified in Artis, Galvao and 
Marcellino (2003) and others are explored in Andreou et al. (2000). However, Hoffmann (2003) has 
pointed out an important qualification to the expectation that more integrated world capital markets 
                                                                                                                                                                                                      
same is on the aij coefficients. 
4 Fidrmuc (2004) using the same database as we have used here and in Artis (2003) has successfully found a role for intra-
trade as opposed to total trade 
5 See Fontagné and Freudenberg (1999)    13
will lead to faster spillovers and therewith a higher degree of business cycle integration round the 
world.  This is the possibility that those same financial channels, by providing an avenue for insurance 
and risk-sharing, will lead to more specialisation in production and an increased vulnerability to 
idiosyncratic shocks – this is the possibility first raised by Kalemli-Ozcan et al (2001).  Thus the net 
effect, and its timing, of increased financial integration on business cycle synchronization is 
ambiguous – and an empirical matter.   
The example 
We can return to the data we described above to illustrate an exercise in attempting to explain business 
cycle affiliation.  In the exercise we describe the aim is to explain the cross-correlations shown in 
Table 2 by reference to the type of variables we have discussed.
6  The framework is a quasi-panel 
estimation framework – “quasi” because the cross-correlations to be explained are only those 
estimated vis-à-vis the US and Germany. The time dimension of the study is relatively weak: averages 
for just three sub-periods (1970-79; 1980-1992 and 1993-2001) are used.  The results shown in Table 
11 are broadly representative of those that can be obtained where various transformations of the 
variables are experimented with.  The explanatory variables used here include trade, labour market 
structure, goods market structure, financial market structure and “share of oil”, together with a 
currency union status dummy.  Trade is represented by trade intensity, instrumented by a gravity 
equation in the manner made standard by the example of Frankel and Rose (1997, 1998).  It can be 
seen that this variable is always highly significant, except in the cases where Canada and Austria are 
omitted from the sample (either jointly or individually).  This might suggest that the trade variable is 
distorted by outlier values when those two countries are included and is a caution on the interpretation 
normally placed on the significant and positive effect of trade on synchronization that is normally 
imputed to this variable. The labour market variables, disappointingly, did not produce any 
significance; measurement problems might be blamed, since as discussed above the relevant 
measurement is not obvious.  In this case, available data lend themselves to the use of the NAWRU but 
the estimates of this variable lean heavily on current unemployment, so that some endogeneity might 
be suspected ( which would be an issue if the results were significant..).
7  Relative financial structure is 
estimated as the difference of the value for the given country from that of the US, Germany of the ratio 
of bank credit to stock market valuation.  (In one of the trials reported the country value of the variable 
was used, but the rationale for the variable points to the relative value as the correct expression:  the 
                                                           
6 In this paper, due to reasons beyond our control, it was not possible to use the latest data set in the estimation and instead 
we have fallen back on the data set used in Artis (2003, 2004). 
7 Meanwhile, Fidrmuc has achieved some success in using the index of employment protection legislation as the labour 
market indicator.     14
more different, the lower the cross-correlation, as indicated by the negative signs).  Industrial structure 
(or its “relative” version) – measured by the ratio of manufacturing to GDP – did not yield any 
significant effects.  Traistaru (2004), employing a richer set of variables measuring economic structure, 
came up with more promising effects.  
Thus one of the most important “new” findings here is that differences between the structure of the 
financial sector in the different countries appear to play an important role.  The sensitivity of trade to 
the inclusion of Canada or Austria in the sample is also noteworthy.  The failure of labour market 
indicators to yield a significant effect is, on the other hand, quite disappointing.  These results are 
interesting enough to prompt further research with an extended sample and some further 
experimentation with appropriate indicators.   15
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Figure 4a. Business cycles – deviation cycles, peaks and troughs 
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Figure 4b. Business cycles – deviation cycles, peaks and troughs 
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Figure 4c. Business cycles – deviation cycles, peaks and troughs 
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Figure 4d. Business cycles – deviation cycles, peaks and troughs 
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Figure 5:  Hierarchical average-linkage cluster tree (dendrogram) using Euclidean dissimilarity measure 
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Figure 6: Hierarchical average-linkage cluster tree (dendrogram) using Euclidean dissimilarity measure 
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Figure 7:  Hierarchical average-linkage cluster tree (dendrogram) using Euclidean dissimilarity measure 
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Figure 8: Hierarchical average-linkage cluster tree (dendrogram) using Euclidean dissimilarity measure 
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Figure 9: Hierarchical average-linkage cluster tree (dendrogram) using Euclidean dissimilarity measure 
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Table 1:  Country sample in business cycle analysis 
 
   Country  ISO-Code  Sample size 
1   Austria  AUT  1970-2003 
2   Finland  FIN  1970-2003 
3   France  FRA  1970-2003 
4   Germany  DEU  1970-2003 
5   Italy  ITA  1970-2003 
6   Spain  ESP  1970-2003 
7   Sweden  SWE  1970-2003 
8   United  Kingdom  GBR  1970-2003 
9   EU15    1970-2003 
10   US  USA  1970-2003 
11   Canada  CAN  1970-2003 
12   Japan  JPN  1970-2003 
13   Switzerland  CHE  1970-2003 
14   Australia  AUS  1970-2003 
15   Korea  KOR  1970-2003 
16   Netherlands  NLD  1977-2003 
17   Portugal  PRT  1977-2003 
18   Norway  NOR  1978-2003 
19   Belgium  BEL  1980-2003 
20   Mexico  MEX  1980-2003 
21   New  Zealand  NZL  1982-2003 
22   Denmark  DNK  1988-2003 
23   Ireland  IRL  1997-2003 
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Table 2:  Cross-correlations, full sample 1970-2003 
 
                         
AUT AUT                       
FIN  0.27 FIN                      
FRA  0.69 0.43 FRA                      
DEU  0.76 0.16 0.65  DEU                     
ITA  0.68 0.44 0.65 0.64 ITA                   
ESP  0.61 0.50 0.68 0.45 0.57 ESP                  
SWE  0.05 0.59 0.09  0.01 0.31 0.02 SWE                 
UK  0.38 0.48 0.59 0.43 0.43 0.44 0.37 UK                 
EU15  0.79 0.49 0.82 0.84 0.81 0.68 0.21 0.68 EU15               
USA  0.33 0.22 0.41 0.56 0.36 0.27 0.06 0.65 0.62 USA              
CAN  0.25 0.49 0.41 0.35 0.48 0.29 0.37 0.50 0.50 0.72 CAN             
JPN  0.28 0.18 0.33 0.50 0.21 0.20 -0.05 0.34 0.45 0.32 0.10 JPN            
CHE  0.69 0.45 0.56 0.67 0.67 0.48 0.11 0.28 0.68 0.44 0.49 0.32 CHE             
AUS  0.09 0.45 0.21 0.16 0.38 0.03 0.34 0.24 0.31 0.49 0.75 0.10 0.43  AUS          
KOR  0.21 -0.07 0.29 0.28 0.21 0.31 -0.02 0.43 0.32 0.24 0.08 0.19 -0.05  -0.21 KOR        
NLD  0.56 0.28 0.43 0.82 0.58 0.31 0.19 0.16 0.66 0.52 0.46 0.27 0.75 0.30 0.78  NLD       
PRT  0.54 0.32 0.56 0.33 0.49 0.59 -0.05 0.01 0.39 -0.27 0.02 0.17 0.31 -0.01 0.56  0.30 PRT      
NOR  -0.22 -0.25 -0.15 -0.25 -0.03 -0.27 -0.02 0.09 -0.19 0.06 0.10 -0.34 -0.28 0.01 -0.24  -0.19 -0.01 NOR     
BEL  0.66 0.32 0.64 0.52 0.52 0.66 0.02 0.25 0.65 0.35 0.44 0.26 0.44 0.19 0.71  0.52 0.55 -0.11 BEL    
MEX  -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 0.16 -0.14 -0.01 -0.23 -0.31 -0.04 0.24 0.21 0.17 0.32 0.30 0.10  0.20 -0.03 -0.20 0.21 MEX   
NZL  -0.26 0.23 -0.08 -0.34 0.03 0.02 0.46 0.59 -0.06 0.27 0.45 -0.23 -0.23 0.31 -0.19  -0.23 -0.15 0.25 0.08 -0.21 NZL  
DNK  -0.47 0.03 -0.21 -0.61 -0.30 -0.39 -0.07 0.15 -0.33 0.55 0.29 -0.47 -0.28 0.42 -0.43  -0.37 -0.38 0.53 -0.21 -0.06 0.11 DNK 
IRE  0.73 0.31 0.71 0.81 0.76 0.65 0.12 0.64 0.61 0.19 0.84 0.09 0.81 -0.15 0.90  0.82 0.75 -0.03 0.67 0.51 0.16 -0.37 
 
Note: start dates of the samples may vary (see Table 1). 
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Table 3:  Business cycles: stylized facts, 1970-2003* 
 
 AUT FIN FRA DEU ITA ESP SWE GBR EU15 USA CAN JPN 
Number of cycles P-P  10 7 7 9 8 8  8 7 9 8 8 10 
Number of cycles T-T  9 8 7 8 8 8  9 7 9 9 8 10 
Average Expansion Probability  0.64 0.40 0.49 0.50 0.49 0.49  0.52 0.50 0.55 0.59 0.66 0.43 
Average Recession Probability  0.36 0.60 0.51 0.50 0.51 0.51 0.48 0.50 0.45 0.41 0.34 0.57 
Average Duration of Expansions  8.70 7.86 9.43 7.56 8.25 9.57 8.88 9.71 7.78 10.00 11.13 5.90 
Average Duration of Recessions  5.44 10.13 10.00 8.50 8.75 9.85  7.22 9.57 6.44 6.22 5.75 7.70 
Average Amplitude of Expansions  0.0912 0.1096 0.0967 0.0724 0.0881 0.0970 0.0909 0.0990 0.0695 0.1156 0.1263 0.1558 
Average Amplitude of Recessions  0.0038 0.0199 0.0238 0.0081 0.0084 0.0467 -0.0177 0.0120 0.0171 0.0124 0.0030 -0.0450 
Steepness of expansions  0.0104 0.0139 0.0103 0.0096 0.0107 0.0101 0.0102 0.0102 0.0089 0.0116 0.0114 0.0264 
Steepness of recessions  0.0007 0.0020 0.0024 0.0009 0.0010 0.0047 -0.0002 0.0012 0.0027 0.0021 0.0005 -0.0058 
 
 CHE AUS KOR NLD PRT NOR BEL MEX NZL DNK IRL
Number of cycles P-P  7 9     9 5 4 10  5 5 5 4 2
Number of cycles T-T  6 10 8 4 4 10  5 4 5 3 2
Average Expansion Probability  0.61 0.59 0.60 0.56 0.37 0.46  0.44 0.55 0.49 0.39 0.46
Average Recession Probability  0.39 0.41 0.40 0.44 0.63 0.54  0.56 0.45 0.51 0.61 0.54
Average Duration of Expansions  11.71 8.89 9.00 12.20 10.00 6.30 8.40 10.60 8.60 5.50 6.50
Average Duration of Recessions  8.83 5.60 6.88 11.75 17.00 7.30  10.80 10.75 8.80 11.33 7.50
Average Amplitude of Expansions  0.0934 0.1053 0.2172 0.1028 0.1282 0.1195 0.0806 0.1687 0.1471 0.0471 0.1884
Average Amplitude of Recessions  -0.0293 0.0121 0.0433 0.0175 0.0541 0.0129 0.0203 -0.0605 -0.0157 0.0264 0.0670
Steepness of expansions  0.0080 0.0119 0.0241 0.0084 0.0128 0.0190 0.0096 0.0159 0.0171 0.0086 0.0290
Steepness of recessions  -0.0033 0.0140 0.0063 0.0015 0.0032 0.0018 0.0019 -0.0056 -0.0153 0.0109 0.0089
 
Note: start dates of the samples may vary (see Table 1).   34











Austria  0.64 0.36  0.79  1 
Finland  0.52 0.48  0.49  1 
France  0.70 0.30  0.81  1 
Germany  0.67 0.33  0.78  1 
Italy  0.72 0.28  0.79  1 
Spain  0.69 0.31  0.76  1 
Sweden  0.38 0.62  0.25  2 
United Kingdom  0.55 0.45  0.50  1 
EU15  0.74 0.26  0.81  1 
United States  0.51 0.49  0.41  1 
Canada  0.51 0.49  0.46  1 
Japan  0.51 0.49  0.45  1 
Switzerland  0.71 0.29  0.77  1 
Australia  0.38 0.62  0.06  2 
Korea  0.45 0.55  -0.11  2 
Netherlands  0.72 0.28  0.75  1 
Portugal  0.55 0.45  0.51  1 
Norway  0.35 0.65  0.61  2 
Belgium  0.76 0.24  0.76  1 
Mexico  0.39 0.61  0.19  2 
New-Zealand  0.32 0.68  0.54  2 
Denmark  0.34 0.66  0.62  2 
Ireland  0.70 0.30  0.72  1 
      
Silhouette width  0.66 0.31   
       
        
Number of clusters  2    
Average silhouette width  0.55    
Dunn's coefficient  0.55    
Normalised Dunn's coefficient  0.10    
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coefficients  silhouette width  belongs to cluster 
 
      
Austria  0.55 0.45  0.55  1 
Finland  0.44 0.56  0.17  2 
France  0.50 0.50  0.40  1 
Germany  0.58 0.42  0.56  1 
Italy  0.53 0.47  0.51  1 
Spain  0.53 0.47  0.49  1 
Sweden  0.45 0.55  0.09  2 
United Kingdom  0.49 0.51  0.00  2 
EU15  0.53 0.47  0.51  1 
United States  0.47 0.53  0.24  2 
Canada  0.45 0.55  0.23  2 
Japan  0.58 0.42  0.50  1 
Switzerland  0.55 0.45  0.50  1 
Australia  0.41 0.59  0.50  2 
Korea  0.54 0.46  0.29  1 
Netherlands  0.60 0.40  0.56  1 
Portugal  0.53 0.47  0.37  1 
Norway  0.49 0.51  0.21  2 
Belgium  0.57 0.43  0.53  1 
Mexico  0.51 0.49  -0.03  1 
New-Zealand  0.45 0.55  0.35  2 
Denmark  0.41 0.59  0.43  2 
Ireland  0.59 0.41  0.57  1 
        
Silhouette width  0.45 0.27     
        
        
Number of clusters  2     
Average silhouette width  0.37     
Dunn's coefficient  0.51     
Normalised Dunn's coefficient  0.01     
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Austria  0.09 0.13 0.16 0.33 0.29  0.25  4 
Finland  0.23 0.06 0.15 0.46 0.10  0.47  4 
France  0.11 0.06 0.10 0.61 0.12  0.66  4 
Germany  0.12 0.14 0.42 0.17 0.15  0.80  3 
Italy  0.13 0.05 0.24 0.49 0.10  0.34  4 
Spain  0.07 0.05 0.08 0.64 0.16  0.62  4 
Sweden  0.10 0.05 0.18 0.55 0.13  0.48  4 
United Kingdom  0.17 0.07 0.13 0.41 0.21  0.51  4 
EU15  0.09 0.04 0.18 0.59 0.10  0.43  4 
United States  0.40 0.07 0.35 0.10 0.08  0.60  1 
Canada  0.58 0.05 0.24 0.08 0.05  0.76  1 
Japan  0.14 0.08 0.25 0.42 0.12  0.26  4 
Switzerland  0.12 0.03 0.73 0.08 0.04  0.68  3 
Australia  0.69 0.04 0.16 0.06 0.04  0.76  1 
Korea  0.03 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.80  0.63  5 
Netherlands  0.10 0.05 0.73 0.08 0.05  0.84  3 
Portugal  0.13 0.24 0.11 0.19 0.33  0.67  5 
Norway  0.13 0.47 0.15 0.09 0.16  0.73  2 
Belgium  0.04 0.79 0.05 0.04 0.08  0.71  2 
Mexico  0.62 0.06 0.13 0.12 0.07  0.68  1 
           
Silhouette width  0.70 0.72 0.78 0.45 0.65     
            
          
Number of clusters    5         
Average silhouette width    0.55         
Dunn's coefficient    0.39         
Normalised Dunn's coefficient    0.24         
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coefficients  silhouette width  belongs to cluster 
 
       
Austria  0.33 0.11 0.56  0.79  3 
Finland  0.57 0.18 0.26  0.43  1 
France  0.23 0.11 0.66  0.82  3 
Germany  0.22 0.13 0.65  0.82  3 
Italy  0.22 0.20 0.58  0.74  3 
Spain  0.34 0.11 0.54  0.71  3 
Sweden  0.32 0.42 0.26  0.12  2 
United Kingdom  0.26 0.11 0.63  0.74  3 
EU15  0.32 0.10 0.58  0.68  3 
United States  0.63 0.17 0.20  0.61  1 
Canada  0.25 0.09 0.67  0.78  3 
Japan  0.26 0.56 0.18  0.54  2 
Switzerland  0.24 0.08 0.68  0.76  3 
Australia  0.42 0.37 0.21  0.52  1 
Korea  0.15 0.71 0.14  0.58  2 
Netherlands  0.37 0.08 0.54  0.65  3 
Portugal  0.38 0.19 0.43  0.50  3 
Norway  0.24 0.61 0.16  0.47  2 
Belgium  0.35 0.10 0.54  0.67  3 
Mexico  0.65 0.16 0.19  0.61  1 
New-Zealand  0.13 0.76 0.10  0.67  2 
Denmark  0.23 0.10 0.67  0.73  3 
Ireland  0.19 0.07 0.74  0.81  3 
         
Silhouette width  0.55 0.48 0.73     
         
          
Number of 
clusters   3.00       
Average 
silhouette width   0.51       
Dunn's coefficient   0.44       
Normalised Dunn's coefficient  0.20       
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 Table 9: Bovi-McNemar test statistics, full sample 1970-2003 
 
 
    GROUP 2 
    Core 
EMU  Non EMU  EU15  EU15*  G7  ROW  OECD  USA  ANGL
O  DEU EMUUK NAMU 
EMU  0.33 0.20  -  92.25  1.29 -1.64  -3.86  100.15  0.17  92.25 -  -1.09 
Core EMU    0.00 0.09 90.27 0.57 -2.46 -5.26  98.15  0.00  85.72  0.09 -1.96 
Non EMU      0.06 95.34 0.53 -2.91 -5.76  96.33  0.00  95.34  0.06 -2.88 
EU15      89.29  0.31  -3.52  -6.55  95.34  -0.05  87.72  -  -2.91 
EU15*          -95.04 -107.04 110.04  0.07  -99.04  -  -89.29 -108.00 
G7        -9.00  -13.24  84.25  -1.33  91.35  -0.31  -6.37 
ROW        -  102.54  4.57  109.00  3.52  0.09 
OECD          105.53  9.31  112.00  6.55  1.60 
USA           -88.17  0.07  -95.34  -98.19 
ANGLO             97.15  0.05  - 
DEU               -87.72  -108.00 









NAMU                 
 
 
Note: critical values Chi
2(1)    at 1% = 2.71 / at 5% = 3.84 / at 10% = 6,63 
Note: Clusters of countries:  
EMU : all EMU countries; coreEMU : FRA,DEU,ITA; nonEMU : GBR,SWE,DNK; EU15 : all EU countries; G7 : USA,CAN,JPN; 
ROW : all non EU countries; OECD : all OECD, not EU; ANGLO : only USA,CAN,GBR; EMUUK : EMU with UK included; NAMU : 
USA and UK,  
Single countries: USA; EU15*; DEU : Germany   40
Table 10: Bovi-McNemar test statistics, sample 1970-1985 (upper side) / 1985-2003 (lower side) 
 
    GROUP 2 
 
Core 
EMU  Non EMU  EU15  EU15*  G7  ROW  OECD  USA  ANGLO  DEU  EMUUK  NAMU 
EMU  -  -  - 44.31  1.33  -  - 48.00  0.40  43.31 -  - 
Core EMU  - - -  41.33  0.09  -1.33  -2.27  43.09  -0.09  37.23  -  -1.33 
Non EMU  0.33  0.69  - 48.00  1.33  -  - 46.08 - 45.08 -  - 
EU15  -  -  -0.09  42.32  0.33  -  - 44.08 - 39.71 -  - 
EU15*  48.02  49.00  47.61  47.03 -44.00 -49.00 -50.00  -  -46.00  -  -42.32 -49.00 
G7  0.25  0.53    0.06  -51.07 -  - 38.72 - 39.34  -0.33 - 
ROW  -1.92  -1.14  -3.27  -2.57  -58.06  -  - 45.30 - 48.00 -  - 
OECD  -3.77  -3.00  -5.40  -4.57  -60.06  -  - 46.30 - 49.00 -  - 
USA  52.27  55.07  50.28  51.27  -  45.56  57.25  59.24 -40.69  -  -44.08 -45.30 
ANGLO    0.08  -0.33  -0.08  -53.07  -  -  -  -47.52 43.09  -  - 
DEU  49.00  48.49  50.28  48.02  -  52.07  61.00  63.00    54.07 -39.71 -48.00 









NAMU  -1.14  -0.69  -3.00  -1.92  -59.00  -3.60  -  -  -52.94  -  -60.00  -1.92 
 
Note: critical values Chi
2(1)    at 1% = 2.71 / at 5% = 3.84 / at 10% = 6,63 
Note: Clusters of countries:  
EMU : all EMU countries; coreEMU : FRA,DEU,ITA; nonEMU : GBR,SWE,DNK; EU15 : all EU countries; G7 : USA,CAN,JPN; 
ROW : all non EU countries; OECD : all OECD, not EU; ANGLO : only USA,CAN,GBR; EMUUK : EMU with UK included; 
NAMU : USA and UK,  
Single countries: USA; EU15*; DEU : Germany  41
 
Table 11:  Business cycle correlation with Germany and the US – pooled panel regressions 
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(1.48)
    




            
Industrial structure      1.36 
(1.04)
           
Relative industrial 
structure  
    0.36 
(0.43)
          
Financial structure          -0.05*** 
(2.60)
 
        
Relative financial 
structure 














Relative share of oil 
imports 











ERM  membership       
   
0.09 
(1.03)
    
R²  overall  0.34 0.35 0.34 0.33 0.41 0.45 0.50 0.45 0.43 0.51  0.52  0.54 
Obs. (countries)  54 (18)  54 (18)  54 (18)  54 (18)  54 (18)  54 (18)  54 (18)  54 (18)  54 (18)  48 (16)  48 (16)  42 (14) 
 
Note: The dependent variable is the correlation between deviation cycles of each country vis-à-vis Germany and the US. Averages over three time periods are considered, 1970-1979, 1980-1992, and 
1993-2001. Relative variables are defined as the absolute value of the difference between corresponding variables of each country and Germany (in the ‘German’ part of the pooled panel data) and 
the US (in the ‘US’ part of the panel). For definitions and sources of the variables, see Table 3. Estimation results from random effects regressions are reported. Time fixed effects for period 2 is 
included showing a significant negative impact (not reported). t-values in brackets. *** (**, *, 
+) = significant at 1 (5, 10, 15)-percent level. 
1) The country sample does not include Austria. 
2) The 
country sample does not include Canada. 
3) The country sample does not include Austria and Canada. 
 
  
Comments on Michael Artis, ”Business cycle affiliations 
and their determinants: Where do we stand?” 
 
The paper presents an overview of the recent results in the field of dating business cycles and 
their coherence among OECD economies. Affiliation is defined as “the alleged tendency for 
some countries’ business cycles to cluster together with others”. The topic is (still) very 
relevant for policy analysis. More specifically, as new EU-members are planning to adopt the 
euro, we need to know more about the degree of synchronization of business cycles. Some of 
the most interesting questions are: 
•   Are the potentially new euro countries more or less “in synch” with the European core 
countries than some of the already existent peripheral euro countries? 
•   Why are countries more or less synchronised? 
•   To what degree do business cycles have to be synchronized in order to have a common 
currency? 
 
First Artis address the problem of measuring the business cycle. Recent studies of business 
cycles have analyzed the level of real GDP (classical cycles) or the detrended level of GDP 
(growth or deviation cycles). There is also a considerable amount of high frequency variation 
due to e.g. seasonality and noise, which may conceal the underlying cyclical development. 
For business cycle analysis it is preferable to remove both long-term growth and short-term 
noise from the observed level of GDP in an efficient way. In the last decades the methods for 
detrending have improved significantly and by now many economists agree on that the 
available filtering techniques provide useful results. The preferred detrending filter is the 
Baxter and King (1999) band-pass filter, which allows the analysts to define the periodicities 
in the data they want to remove from the original data.  
  
The data consists of quarterly GDP, seasonally adjusted, 1970–2003 in 22 OECD countries 
and one synthetic “country”, the EU-15. Detrending and noise-cleaning is achieved by first 
removing the trend with an HP-filter and then removing the high-frequency noise from the 
resulting cycle by another HP-filter, described in Artis, Marcelliano and Proietti (2003). This 
is an approximation of the Baxter-King band-pass filter technique. Then a modified version of the cycle-dating algorithm due to Harding and Pagan (2001) is applied to detrended GDP. The 
algorithm categorises the economy as being either in an expansion, i.e. moving from through 
to peak, or in a contraction, i.e. moving from peak to through. Some stylised facts about the 
length of the cycle, amplitude and “steepness” for each county is presented in figure 4 and 
table 3. 
 
Business cycle affiliation is commonly measured by the cross-correlation between detrended 
GDP in different countries. The traditional cross-correlogram approach is, however, confined 
to pairwise comparisions, even though comparisons of groups are often of most interest. A 
clearer picture emerges when clustering analysis is applied. Clustering analysis is used to 
describe the coherence between business cycles in the 23 countries described above. 
Hierarchical and fussy clustering methods are used first on cross correlations and then on a 
combination of cross-correlations and distance measures. The “distance” between countries i 
and j is measured by the root mean square difference between the cycles of countries i and j. 
Business cycle affiliation is defined as the groupings of pair-wise correlations and distances 
according to the cluster analysis. There seems not to be any strong evidence of a European 
cluster with especially high degree of coherence. Furthermore, the coherence among 
European countries does not seem to increase over time. Cluster analysis is a way of “letting 
the data speak itself” on weather there exists some well-defined country grouping with highly 
synchronized business cycles. Not surprisingly, when the data speak some curious groupings 
arise, eg. Japan and central Europe, but this approach is still very useful in order sort out 
what’s going on. 
 
Next, the paper address the crucial question whether some group of countries have converged 
more over time than other groups of countries. Following Bovi (2003, 2004) the McNemar 
test is applied to investigate whether one group is more often “in synch” than other groups. A 
group of countries are defined as being “in synch” when they are all in an expansion or in a 
contraction. The short time series of data available do not support much reliable inference, but 
it is hard to detect a European grouping of countries which tend to co-move stronger than 
other groups. There is, for instance, only weak evidence that the coherence between European 
countries is stronger than the coherence among all other OECD countries. The conclusion 
from this exercise confirms earlier results that “whilst some business cycle groupings can be 
detected for periods of time, only few of these are reasonably persistent through time”. 
 Finally the paper tries to address the question of what determines business cycle affiliation. 
This section is only preliminary, but gives some hints in which directions future research 
could evolve. In principle un-synchronized business cycles may arise from either: 
(1) country specific shocks or 
(2) differences between propagation mechanisms to common shocks or 
(3) spillover effects 
Differences between the propagation mechanisms may arise from e.g. varying degree of 
labour market flexibility, differing size of the government sector, monetary regime and fiscal 
policy response. Spillover effects may arise from both foreign trade and integrated financial 
markets. In the earlier literature the focus was on trade, but in recent literature the financial 
channels have been put forward as at least equally important, see e.g. Artis, Galvao and 
Marcellino (2003).  
 
Artis run a panel regression with cross-correlations vis-à-vis Germany and the US as the 
dependent variable and different measures of distance, policy and propagation mechanism as 
the explanatory variables. The (preliminary) results indicate that the financial channel seems 
to be important. Differences between the structures of the financial sector in different 
countries appear to play a significant role. On the contrary, labour market variables do not 
seem to be important. The measures of labour market flexibility is, however rather crude. The 
importance of relative labour market flexibility in explaining differences in propagation 
mechanisms may very well increase with a somewhat more detailed specification.  
 
Specific comments: 
•   A synchronized business cycle is sometimes viewed as a prerequisite for having a 
common monetary policy. This is often the motivation for studying affiliation. But it 
would also be interesting to study the degree of policy coordination. If various kinds 
of policy measures, i.e. short term interest rates and budget deficits, show a high 
degree of coherence then the cost is low of joining a monetary union even though the 
degree of coherence of business cycles is low. Policy was already synchronized 
anyway. Have there been any studies using the methods in the paper on policy 
measures or on measures of the propagation mechanism? 
•   I am very sympathetic to the use of detrended GDP-data and focus the analysis on 
growth cycles instead of classical cycles. It is of course ridiculous to claim that a country with a fast growing population never has recessions! Is it possible (fruitful) to 
use GDP per capita or GDP per economically active population instead of just GDP 
when analyzing business cycles? Maybe the detrending issue is not that import in this 
case. 
•   Using a double HP-filter instead of the Baxter-King filter in order to save observations 
at the end of the sample (and the beginning) is not always safe. The HP-filter also has 
end-points problems. It is probably best to make forecasts (and backcasts) in order to 
prolong the sample so that the Baxter-King filter can be applied. One could also use 
the so called “optimal filters” which already incorporate linear forecast, see e.g. van 
Norden (2002). 
•   The section describing cyclical histories is very brief and there are several more 
aspects of the results which could have been commented on. The length of the sample 
varies between the countries, which makes comparisons difficult. The samples for 
Ireland and Denmark for instance are much shorter than for most other countries, 
which of course affect the number of cycles and the average duration of the cycle. 
•   It would be interesting to know the proportions of times when the economy stays in 
the same phase, i.e. N22 and N11, in the McNemar test in order to get a feeling of the 
data. 
•   Using deviation of actual unemployment from a crude measure of NAWRU as the 
only labour market variable explaining similarity of the propagation mechanism is not 
satisfactory. It should be possible to find more relevant measures of the similarity 
(dissimilarity) of the propagation mechanism. 
•   It could be worthwhile to control for “policy chocks” in the panel regression by 
introducing some measure of the synchronization of monetary and fiscal policy. I 
guess that it would be possible to introduce the correlation between changes in 
structural fiscal balance as an explanatory variable. Maybe one could also introduce 
the correlation of the (real) interest rates of the central banks, but this measure is of 
course endogenous and has to be treated very carefully econometrically. 
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There are two opposite points of view on the link between economic integration and business 
cycle synchronization. De Grauwe (1997) classifies these competing views as “The European 
Commission View” and “The Krugman View”. According to the European Commission (1990), 
closer integration leads to less frequent asymmetric shocks and to more synchronized business 
cycles between countries. On the other hand, for Krugman (1993) closer integration implies 
higher specialization and, thus, higher risks of idiosyncratic shocks. Drawing on the evidence 
from a group of transition countries which have experienced a notable increase in trade 
openness and economic integration with the European Union during the past decade, this paper 
tries to determine whose argument is supported by the data.  
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Nontechnical Summary 
There is a large debate in economics on the link between economic integration and business cycle 
co-movement. According to one viewpoint, closer trade links could lead to business cycle 
synchronization or, equivalently, increase the symmetry of shocks (European Commission, 1990). 
This argument is often referred to as the “endogeneity hypothesis” of Frankel and Rose (1998). 
From the alternative point of view (e.g. Krugman, 1993) the opposite effect should prevail: 
international trade increases specialization, making shocks more asymmetric. The overall impact 
of trade integration on shock symmetry could thus be ambiguous, at least theoretically. Modern 
formal models do not seem to offer a unique answer either.  
Focusing on the business cycle criteria of the optimal currency area (OCA), this paper analyzes 
the effects of trade integration on synchronization of supply and demand shocks between the 
European Union (EU) and ten candidate Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) over 
the past decade. Since the trade of the CEECs with the EU has significantly increased over the 
transition period, and since several transition countries have pegged their currencies to the 
Deutschmark, subsequently replaced by the euro, we face a sort of “natural experiment” for 
testing the impact of trade integration on the correlation of shocks.   
Our empirical approach contains two steps. First, using the Kalman-filtering estimation technique 
in a way advocated by Boone (1997), we obtain the time-varying correlation coefficient of supply 
and demand shocks between the CEECs and the EU/Germany as alternative benchmarks. Second, 
we assess whether the estimated shock asymmetry can be explained by trade and exchange rate 
indicators. The results indicate that higher trade intensity and lower exchange rate volatility 
contribute to the convergence of demand shocks, thus supporting the European Commission 
(1990) point of view. Therefore, one policy interpretation is that that joining the European 
Monetary Union (EMU) would not increase the costs for the candidate countries, in terms of the 
costs associated with demand shock asymmetry. On the other hand, given the ambiguous results 
for supply shocks and the limitations of the technique, the overall implications should be 
mentioned with caution.  
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Over the long run everything is 
endogenous and we are all dead  
 




1. Introduction  
According to recent European Union (EU) decisions at the summits in Brussels and Copenhagen
1, 
EU enlargement is scheduled for 1 May 2004. Ten countries – Cyprus, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia – have been invited to 
enter the European Union
2. The question of sharing a common monetary policy will then emerge. 
Would it be beneficial for the candidate countries to join the European Monetary Union (EMU) 
immediately upon entering the EU, or to postpone adoption of the euro for a number of years? A 
comprehensive assessment of this challenging issue is beyond the scope of our study. In this paper 
we concentrate on some cost aspects of joining the eurozone, namely on the degree of shock 
asymmetry between the EU and the candidate countries, with the objective of identifying the 
effects of economic integration on synchronization of shocks.  
The issue of shock asymmetry has received particular attention due to the development of the 
optimal currency area (OCA) theory, which originates in the work of Mundell (1961), McKinnon 
(1963) and Kenen (1969). According to the classical OCA criteria, two countries or regions would 
benefit from forming a monetary union if they are characterized by high similarity of business 
cycles, have strong trade links, and if they possess an efficient adjustment mechanism
3 that can 
mitigate the adverse effects of asymmetric shocks
4. The first criterion is often considered the key 
one. Indeed, if the business cycles of two countries are highly synchronized, or in other words if 
countries are exposed to symmetric shocks and exhibit similar responses to these shocks, a 
common monetary policy response does not introduce imbalances between them. In other words, 
higher symmetry of shocks between countries, inter alia, implies a lower cost of sharing a 
common monetary policy. Much interest, therefore, has been focused on estimating the degree of 
shock asymmetry between countries or regions. As far as the EU candidate countries are 
concerned, empirical studies have only recently begun to appear as longer time series become 
available. The still scarce evidence suggests that selected Central and Eastern European countries 
(CEECs) have achieved some synchronization of their business cycles with the EU, at least on the 
demand side
5. It is commonly stressed, however, that the period of transition is too short to draw 
robust conclusions. For this reason, we re-estimate our previous results (2002 and 2004) focusing 
                                            
1 On 18 November and 12–13 December 2002 respectively. 
2 The accession of Bulgaria and Romania has been set for 2007. 
3 E.g. labor mobility, flexibility of factor prices, and a system of fiscal transfers. 
4 There is a tendency in the literature to use the terms “shocks” and “business cycles” as synonyms. However, 
the term “business cycle” has a broader meaning than “shock”: business cycles usually refer to the de-trended 
components of macroeconomic aggregates such as GDP, industrial production, employment, etc. Hence, the 
business cycle represents a mixture of shocks (e.g. export, wage, oil, climatic, etc.) and the responses to them. 
5 See Boone and Maurel (1998, 1999a, 1999b), Horvath (2002a), and Babetskii, Boone and Maurel (2002, 2004). 4   Ian Babetskii  
 
on sensitivity analysis with respect to the choice of countries, time span, and identification 
approach.   
Along with the measurement issue, another question concerns the link between economic 
integration and shock asymmetry. It is here where the endogeneity issue arises. The endogeneity 
of the OCA criteria is formulated in the sense of the Lucas critique: currency union affects the 
underlying OCA criteria in such a way that they are more likely to be satisfied ex post, as both 
monetary and trade integration deepen
6. Putting it in practical terms, the endogeneity argument 
means that a policy change (e.g. steps towards forming a monetary union) influences shock 
asymmetry. There are two opposite views on this subject, classified by De Grauwe (1997) as “The 
European Commission View” and the “Krugman View”. According to the European Commission 
(1990), closer integration leads to less frequent asymmetric shocks and to more synchronized 
business cycles between countries. On the other hand, for Krugman (1993) closer integration 
implies higher specialization and, thus, higher risks of idiosyncratic shocks. Drawing on the 
evidence from a group of ten transition countries which have experienced an impressive increase 
in trade openness and economic integration with the European Union during the past decade, this 
paper tries to find out whose argument is supported by the data. Since the trade of the CEECs with 
the EU has significantly increased over the transition period, and since several accession countries 
have pegged their currencies to the Deutschmark, subsequently replaced by the euro, we face a 
sort of natural experiment for testing the endogeneity argument. 
Methodologically, we apply a bi-variate vector autoregressive procedure proposed by Blanchard 
and Quah (1989), theoretically anchored in the sticky price paradigm for open economies, in order 
to identify supply and demand shocks for the candidate countries, with Germany and the 
aggregate EU-15 as alternative benchmarks. Then, using the Kalman filtering technique in a way 
advocated by Boone (1997), we construct the time-varying correlation of shocks between the 
candidate countries and the aggregate EU-15 and Germany as alternative benchmarks. The new 
results are in line with our previous estimates (2002 and 2003) and show more clear-cut patterns. 
In particular, the results demonstrate that the demand shocks have converged (to levels 
comparable to present EU member countries such as Ireland, Portugal and Spain), while 
asymmetries of the supply shocks prevail. Next, we confront the time-varying estimates of supply 
and demand shock convergence with indicators of trade and exchange rates. We find that (i) an 
increase in trade intensity leads to higher symmetry of demand shocks; the result for supply 
shocks is ambiguous; (ii) a decrease in exchange rate volatility has a positive effect on demand 
shock convergence and no significant impact on supply shocks. The results for demand shocks 
can be interpreted in favor of “The European Commission View”, also referred to as the 
endogeneity argument by Frankel and Rose (1998) in the OCA criteria discussion, according to 
which trade links and monetary integration reduce asymmetries between countries. Overall, our 
results support Kenen’s (2001) argument that the impact of trade integration on shock asymmetry 
depends on the type of shock. 
                                            
6 The term “endogeneity of the OCA criteria” was introduced by Frankel and Rose (1997, 1998). See also 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997) and Rose (2000) for a discussion.  EU Enlargement and Endogeneity of some OCA Criteria: Evidence from the CEECs   5 
 
The paper is structured as follows. After this brief introduction, the second section presents a 
literature review on the subject of shocks and trade integration and illustrates some stylized facts 
from the CEECs. The third section describes the data and empirical methodology. The fourth 
section starts with an illustration of the methodology for the Czech Republic case and then 
presents a comparative analysis for a group of ten transition countries. The last section concludes 
and draws policy implications.  
2. Shock asymmetry and integration: What do we expect?  
2.1 Measuring shock asymmetry    
A number of studies focus on measuring the degree of shock asymmetry across countries. In 
earlier research, the judgment about shocks was based on cross-country correlation of real output, 
industrial production, or real exchange rate cycles
7. Such an approach, however, does not allow 
one to distinguish between the shocks themselves and the reactions to them. Since both 
components are present in the actual series, similar results in terms of correlation coefficients 
might be observed in the presence of various combinations of shocks and responses to shocks, for 
example, in the case of a symmetric reaction to asymmetric shocks or an asymmetric reaction to 
symmetric shocks.    
Blanchard and Quah (1989) propose a bi-variate vector autoregressive (VAR) procedure in order 
to separate shocks from responses. Moreover, this method makes it possible to identify the origins 
of shocks, for example, supply and demand. Blanchard and Quah (1989) define shocks as linear 
combinations of the residuals from a bi-variate VAR representation of real output growth and 
inflation. By construction, one type of shock (labeled as “demand”) has only a transitory impact 
on the level of output, while another type of shock (labeled as “supply”) might have a long-term 
impact on the level of output.  
More precisely, if real output and prices are used as inputs to the VAR model, then “demand” 
shocks are defined so that they do not have a long-term impact on output, while “supply” shocks 
might have a long-term effect on output. VAR decomposition has become an especially popular 
tool in identifying shocks since it was applied by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993, 1996) to 
assess the similarities of economic cycles in the case of European monetary integration. One 
should, however, be aware of the limitations of the VAR technique. In particular, the 
methodology does not distinguish whether the corresponding supply and demand disturbances are 
due to domestic or foreign shocks. VAR decomposition is performed on a country-by-country 
basis; hence, a country’s fluctuations in output and prices may be affected by domestic as well as 
foreign shocks. Of course, it is not likely that, say, Czech shocks affect fluctuations in 
macroeconomic fundamentals in Germany or the European Union. However, it seems plausible 
that German or EU shocks may affect the CEECs. As will be illustrated in Section 2.3, Germany 
and the EU are important, if not the major, trade partners for the accession countries. The results, 
                                            
7 See, for example, Cohen and Wyplosz (1989), Weber (1991), De Grauwe and Vanhaverbeke (1993), and Artis 
and Zhang (1995). 6   Ian Babetskii  
 
therefore, should be interpreted with care. The same level of shock symmetry between two 
countries may correspond to various combinations of foreign and domestic shocks and responses.  
Later, co-movements of shocks across countries and regions were used for the assessment of the 
OCA criteria. For example, a high correlation between two countries’ series of shocks indicates 
that the economic structures of the countries under consideration are quite similar. This 
methodology allows Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1996) to identify the “core” European countries, 
for which the cost of a common monetary policy could thus be low.  
Note that the shock-series correlation coefficient is a static measure. Therefore, it is difficult to 
judge whether shocks become more symmetric or not. However, since the degree of economic 
integration changes over time, there are few reasons to believe that shock asymmetry remains 
constant. The dynamics can be partially assessed by splitting up the whole period and calculating 
the correlation coefficient by sub-periods, provided that the sub-intervals are long enough. There 
is, however, a more fundamental critique to this approach. Fontagne and Freudenberg (1999) 
argue that “the central critique to be addressed to studies based on VAR estimates of asymmetric 
shocks refers to the assumption of structural asymmetries. The only way to relax this assumption 
is to use the Kalman filter in order to tackle the issue of a dynamic convergence of shocks
8.” 
Boone (1997) applies the Kalman filter technique in order to obtain time-varying estimates of 
shock symmetry. Her results for Western European countries are consistent with those reported by 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1996) and, notably, give rich information about the dynamics of 
evolving symmetries. The results are generally interpreted in favor of the endogeneity argument: 
the observable increase in supply and demand shock correlation goes along with deepening 
European integration. 
An increasing number of studies focus on the analysis of symmetries between current European 
Union members and accession countries. Frenkel, Nickel and Schmidt (1999), Fidrmuc and 
Korhonen (2001), Horvath (2002a), Frenkel and Nickel (2002), and Babetskii, Boone and Maurel 
(2002, 2004) follow the structural VAR identification methodology developed by Blanchard and 
Quah (1989) and Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1996). Supply and demand shocks are extracted 
from quarterly series of real output and prices. Short time series (less then ten years of quarterly 
observations) complicate the econometric analysis.  
Frenkel, Nickel and Schmidt (1999) and Horvath (2002a) conclude that correlation of neither 
demand nor supply shocks can be interpreted in favor of convergence. Fidrmuc and Korhonen 
(2001) find that the cross-country correlation of supply shocks varies substantially from country 
to country. Correlation of demand shocks between the EU and the CEECs is substantial for 
Hungary and Estonia, while other accession countries show modest results. Compared to the 
earlier studies for Western European countries, current results indicate an increase in 
synchronization between the EU “core” and Italy and Portugal, previously considered 
“peripheral” countries. Frenkel and Nickel (2002) point out that there is high heterogeneity among 
                                            
8 The authors do not explain the meaning of “structural asymmetries”. In the context of their story, this term 
sounds like a synonym for “parameter stability”. It is furthermore unclear why the Kalman filter is the “only” 
tool available to deal with dynamic convergence. We would prefer to replace “the only” with “a useful” tool. EU Enlargement and Endogeneity of some OCA Criteria: Evidence from the CEECs   7 
 
CEECs and EU countries in terms of correlation of supply and demand shocks, and the adjustment 
dynamics of output and prices are far from being similar either. However, “the more advanced 
CEECs are hardly different in the correlation of their shocks vis-à-vis the euro area and the bigger 
EMU countries than the smaller countries of the EU that have already adopted the euro as their 
currency”. By the same token, some accession countries show evidence of similarity of impulse 
responses with either Germany, France, Italy, or the EU as a whole.  
Babetskii, Boone and Maurel (2002, 2004) extend the analysis of supply and demand shocks by 
measuring time-varying correlation in a way advocated by Boone (1997). Their results stress an 
ongoing process of demand shock convergence between the EU and the accession countries. 
Supply shocks tend to diverge, which is interpreted as a due restructuring process at work and the 
Balassa–Samuelson effect. Overall, there seems be a problem with the low robustness of the 
estimated correlation of supply and demand shocks in different studies, despite the fact that they 
use the same (Blanchard and Quah, 1989) methodology. The diversity of the results might be due 
to the sensitivity of the correlation coefficient to the VAR specification, data sources, and sample 
lengths. For example, Frenkel, Nickel and Schmidt (1999) and Babetskii, Boone and Maurel 
(2002, 2004) use data on the CEECs from the early 1990s and thus include the “transformational 
recession” in the sample. Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2001) and Frenkel and Nickel (2002) use later 
data, so the results are believed to be less affected by structural changes. The first objective of the 
present paper, therefore, is to assess the robustness of the time-varying correlation of shocks.   
The debate has been centered so far on the measurement issue, namely, how to identify shocks 
and how to measure cross-country correlation of disturbances. One serious issue has been omitted. 
A natural question concerns the determinants and sources of the observable increases or decreases 
in shock symmetry. To some extent, all the studies mentioned above try to discuss factors that 
drive the cycles’ symmetries or asymmetries. Integration in the various interpretations of this 
broad concept is often said to be the key factor that affects the understanding of business cycle co-
movements. Yet such a potentially important explanatory variable is missing from the analysis. 
This is the subject to which we now turn.  
2.2 Shock asymmetry and integration: Discussing endogeneity 
Frankel and Rose (1998) open a large debate on the endogeneity of OCA criteria fulfillment. In 
the spirit of the European Commission (1990), Frankel and Rose (1998) put forward an argument 
that closer trade links could lead to business cycle synchronization or, equivalently, increase the 
symmetry of shocks. According to the alternative viewpoint, e.g. Krugman (1993), the opposite 
effect should prevail: international trade increases specialization, making shocks more 
asymmetric. The overall impact of trade integration on shock symmetry could thus be ambiguous, 
at least theoretically. Modern formal models of optimum currency areas do not seem to offer a 
unique answer either
9. Frankel and Rose (1998) stress the necessity of further analysis of the role 
of international trade by distinguishing between inter-industry and intra-industry trade. Inter-
industry trade (trade which involves exports and imports of different goods, for example, when 
one country exports cotton and imports wines) reflects specialization, thus potentially causing 
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asymmetries. On the other hand, intra-industry trade (when a country simultaneously exports and 
imports products of the same category, e.g. cars) should lead to business cycle co-movements. 
There is on-going theoretical work in this direction
10. 
The concept of integration can be considered in a broader sense, including monetary integration as 
well. Ricci (1997a) builds a two-country model of optimum currency areas which incorporates 
monetary and real variables. One of the model’s key implications is that “the adoption of fixed 
exchange rates endogenously (i.e. within the model) increases the desirability of this currency 
area by reducing the shock asymmetry
11.” Note that in Ricci’s model exchange rates affect shock 
asymmetry indirectly, through trade: flexible exchange rates favor specialization compared with 
fixed rates. Specialization, in turn, leads to higher asymmetry of shocks. Hence, it follows that 
exchange rate arrangements may matter for business cycle correlation, at least to the extent that 
specialization leads to asymmetric responses. Naturally, other determinants beside bilateral trade, 
its specialization patterns, and exchange rate regimes may influence shock transmission between 
countries. One might think about tariffs and non-tariff barriers, institutional agreements, border 
effects, etc.  
As for empirical evidence, Frankel and Rose (1998) in their influential work argue that “countries 
with closer trade links tend to have more tightly correlated business cycles”. Econometrically, 
Frankel and Rose assess the following relationship between trade intensity and correlation of 
business cycles:  
t ij t ij t j i TI c c Q Q Corr ε + + = ) log( ) , ( 2 1  
where the bars denote period-averaged values of trade intensity  ) log( ijt TI  and of the correlation 
of business cycles  ) , ( jt it Q Q Corr
12. The business cycle  it Q  in country i at time t is defined as the 
detrended component of real economic activity (e.g. GDP, index of industrial production, total 
employment or unemployment). The trade intensity between countries i and j is calculated from 
exports, imports or total bilateral trade according to the following expressions (natural logarithms 
of):  
) /( jt it ijt
EX
ijt EX EX EX TI + =  
) /( jt it ijt
IM
ijt IM IM IM TI + =  
) /( ) ( jt it jt it ijt ijt
T
ijt IM IM EX EX IM EX TI + + + + =  
where  ijt EX  are exports from country i to country j,  it EX  are total exports from country i, and IM 
denotes imports. The estimates are performed on a large cross-section of OECD countries over 
thirty years, and the results seems be very robust as to the choice of indicators of bilateral trade 
and business cycles. Total trade is further confronted with intra-industry trade. Although not 
                                            
10 See, among others, Kose and Yi (2001). 
11 “Endogenously” means “within the model”.  
12 The time dimension is four, since the sample, which covers 1959–1993, is divided into four sub-periods.  EU Enlargement and Endogeneity of some OCA Criteria: Evidence from the CEECs   9 
 
directly tested, it is the latter that is said to be particularly relevant for business cycle convergence. 
Additional inclusion of the exchange rate regime dummy does not qualitatively change the results. 
At least one important question remains, however, after reading this article: are underlying shocks 
becoming more symmetric as well? All the constructed indicators of business cycles belong to the 
same class. Namely, they represent detrended indicators of economic activity. Hence, shocks and 
responses to shocks enter the analysis together. Kenen (2001, p. 15) argues that the results of 
Frankel and Rose (1998) are biased, since trade, a real variable, is not exogenous to fluctuations 
of another real variable such as economic activity. Kenen (2001) sketches a simple Keynesian 
framework where the correlation of output changes between two countries is positively related to 
bilateral trade intensity, not necessarily due to higher symmetry of shocks. Generally, the impact 
of trade integration on shock asymmetry depends on the type of shock.   
Fidrmuc (2001) re-estimates the specification of Frankel and Rose (1998), focusing on a cross-
section of OECD countries over the last ten years and working with different frequencies 
(quarterly data). Aware of Kenen’s (2001) criticism, Fidrmuc (2001) reconfirms the interpretation 
by Frankel and Rose (1998) and bypasses Kenen’s criticism. This is done by direct inclusion of 
intra-industry trade in the regression. Thus, according to the main point of Fidrmuc (2001), it is 
the particular structure of trade that matters for business cycle transmission.  
Using disaggregated trade data, Fontagne and Freudenberg (1999) find evidence that exchange 
rate variability depresses intra-industry trade, and consequently, as they argue, should lead to a 
higher symmetry of shocks. Based on historical data, Flandreau and Maurel (2001) argue that 
there is a positive impact of both monetary arrangements and trade on business cycle correlation.  
This analysis of the literature is far from being complete
13. However, looking at these and other 
studies not discussed here, one can note a surprising segmentation in research interests. Two 
entirely separate classes of studies seem to co-exist: those focusing on measuring correlation of 
shocks, and others concentrating on assessing the link between business cycle fluctuations and 
trade, the exchange rate and other explanatory variables. More specifically, studies of the first 
group illustrate static or dynamic patterns of shock correlation, stressing the importance of 
distinguishing between shocks and responses to shocks. Studies of the second group identify the 
effects of trade and other variables on various business cycle indicators containing both shocks 
and responses to shocks. To our knowledge, there are no direct estimates of the effects of 
integration on shock asymmetry.  
In our work we will try to build a bridge between these two groups of studies by confronting time-
varying estimates of shock asymmetry with trade and exchange rate variables. Bringing the two 
classes of studies together gives us a tool for assessing the long-running debate between the 
proponents of “The European Commission View” and those of “The Krugman View”. Before 
proceeding with the estimates, the following sub-section will briefly clarify our choice of 
countries.  
                                            
13 There are studies on estimations of the “OCA indices” which infer the readiness of countries to join a 
monetary union by predicting exchange rate variability. See Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997) and Horváth and 
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2.3 Some stylized facts from the candidate countries    
In this study we focus on the candidate countries, since they represent a kind of “natural 
experiment” for testing the endogeneity argument of the OCA theory. Indeed, the past decade has 
been characterized by an increase in the trade openness of the CEECs and their trade and 
monetary integration with EU member countries. These three factors together, briefly illustrated 
below, may affect the degree of business cycle co-movement.  
In 2001, the ratios of total bilateral trade to GDP represented more than one hundred percent of 
GDP for eight of the CEECs from our sample. In the remaining two “big” candidate countries, 
Poland (population 39 million) and Romania (22 million), trade accounted for 63% and 75% of 
GDP respectively (see Table 1). Compared to 1993, there has been a significant increase in trade 
openness for the majority of the candidate countries. The two exceptions are Latvia and Lithuania, 
but these countries had already achieved high shares of trade in GDP during the earlier transition 
period.  
Table 1: Size and degree of openness of the CEECs 
Country [Exports+Imports]/GDP
(%) 




 1993  2001  1993  2001  1993  2001 
Bulgaria   84 119  1,190  1,603  8.5  7.9 
Czech Republic  109 145  3,391  5,551  10.3  10.3 
Estonia  144 188 985  3,830 1.5  1.4 
Hungary  61 123  3,790  5,215  10.3  9.9 
Latvia  130 103 813  3,275 2.6  2.4 
Lithuania  173 106 719  3,245 3.7  3.5 
Poland  45 63  2,229  4,561  38.5 38.6 
Romania  51 75  1,157  1,768  22.8 22.4 
Slovak Republic  122 157  2,489  3,794 5.3  5.4 
Slovenia  116 121  6,368  10,605  2.0  2.0 
CEECs average  103 120  2,313  4,345  10.5  10.4 
Germany  45 68  24,120  22,530  81.2 82.4 
United States  21 24  25,742  35,367  258.1  284.8 
Sources:   Trade and population: IMF International Financial Statistics, author’s computations; 
GDP per capita: IMF World Economic Outlook Database. 
 
Table 2 illustrates the shares of trade with the EU and Germany in the total trade of the CEECs. In 
2001, the bilateral trade of the CEECs with the European Union varied from roughly 50% of total 
trade for Lithuania to 70% of total trade for the Czech Republic. For comparison, this is on 
average higher than the share of the trade of Germany with other EU member countries (54%). 
Germany itself is an important trade partner for the majority of the CEECs, accounting in 2001 for 
20–40 percent of total bilateral trade for half of the accession countries. Overall, we observe an 
important increase in trade with the European Union and Germany.  EU Enlargement and Endogeneity of some OCA Criteria: Evidence from the CEECs   11 
 
Table 2: Shares of trade with the EU and Germany in total trade of the CEECs  
(ordered by decreasing shares of trade with the EU in 2001)  
Country European  Union  Germany 
 1993  2001  1993  2001 
Czech Republic  0.52 0.69 0.27 0.38 
Poland  0.67 0.68 0.32 0.31 
Hungary  0.56 0.66 0.23 0.31 
Slovenia  0.62 0.65 0.26 0.23 
Romania  0.44 0.64 0.15 0.18 
Latvia  0.30 0.55 0.08 0.16 
Estonia  0.55 0.55 0.09 0.07 
Slovak Republic  0.29 0.54 0.13 0.27 




CEECs average  0.47 0.60 0.18 0.22 
Germany     0.56 0.54     
Note: 
1) 1994 values. 
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, author’s computations.   
 
Bilateral trade intensity is another indicator which serves to characterize the extent of trade 
between countries. Figure 1 shows the total bilateral trade intensity between ten transition 
countries and EU / Germany over 1993–2001, quarterly. Except for Bulgaria and Slovenia, 
bilateral trade intensity exhibits upward trend patterns with respect to either Germany or the EU. 
In the case of Slovenia, bilateral trade intensity has been relatively high since the early 1990s and 
this indicator has remained practically unchanged over the past decade. For Bulgaria, trade 
intensity has had a rising tendency since 1997.  
Along with trade openness and trade integration, substantial convergence of exchange rates with 
the euro has been visible. As illustrated in Table 3, in many cases the candidate countries peg their 
currencies to the DEM (replaced by the euro at the beginning of 1999). Other monetary authorities 
(e.g. in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, and recently also in Hungary and Poland), who formally 
follow a free float policy, use the euro as the reference currency in formulating their preferred 
exchange rate developments. Thus, the actual exchange rate regimes in these countries can be 
characterized as a managed float with euro-based intervention levels. The actual volatility of 
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Figure 1: Total bilateral trade intensity, 1993–2001  
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Total bilateral trade intensity is defined according to the following formula (natural logarithm of):  
) /( ) ( jt it jt it ijt ijt
T
ijt IM IM EX EX IM EX TI + + + + =  
where i = CEECs, j = Germany/EU,  ijt EX  = exports from country i to country j,  it EX  = total exports 
from country i, and IM denotes imports.  
 
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, author’s computations.EU Enlargement and Endogeneity of some OCA Criteria: Evidence from the CEECs   13 
 
Table 3: Exchange rate regimes in the CEECs over the last decade  
Country Date  Exchange  Rate 
Regime 




Bulgaria   February 1991  Managed Float   
 1 July 1997   Currency Board  DEM  0% 
 1 January 1999   Currency Board  euro  0% 
Czech Republic  3 May 1993  Peg  DEM(65%), USD(35%)  ±0.5% 
 28 February 1996  Peg  DEM(65%), USD(35%)  ±7.5% 
 26 May 1997   Managed Float  Reference currency DEM  
replaced in 1999 by euro 
 
Estonia  June 1992  Currency Board  DEM  0% 
 1 January 1999   Currency Board  euro  0% 
Hungary  22 December 1994  Crawling Band ECU(70%),  USD(30%)  ±2.25% 
 1 January 1997  Crawling Band  DEM(70%), USD(30%)  ±2.25% 
 1 January 1999  Crawling Band  euro(70%), USD(30%)  ±2.25% 
 1 January 2000  Crawling Band  euro  ±2.25% 
  4 May 2001  Crawling Band  euro  ±15% 
Latvia  February 1994  Peg  SDR  ±1% 
Lithuania  October 1992   Independent Float    
 April 1994   Currency Board  USD  0% 
 1 February 2002   Currency Board  euro  0% 
Poland  16 May 1995   Crawling Band  USD(45%), DEM(35%), 
BP(10%), FF(5%), SwF(5%) 
±7% 
 26 February 1998  Crawling Peg  USD(45%), DEM(35%), 
BP(10%), FF(5%), SwF(5%) 
±10% 
 28 October 1998  Crawling Peg  USD(45%), DEM(35%), 
BP(10%), FF(5%), SwF(5%) 
±12.5% 
 1 January 1999   Crawling Peg  euro(55%), USD(45%)  ±12.5% 
 25 March 1999   Crawling Peg  euro(55%), USD(45%)  ±15% 
 12 April 2000   Independent Float    
Romania  August 1992   Managed Float     
Slovak Republic 14 July 1994   Peg  DEM(60%), USD(40%)  ±7% 
 1 January 1996   Peg  DEM(60%), USD(40%)  ± 3% 
 31 July 1996  Peg  DEM(60%), USD(40%)  ± 5% 
 1 January 1997  Peg  DEM(60%), USD(40%)  ± 7% 
 2 October 1998  Managed Float  Reference currency euro 
since 1999 
 
Slovenia  January 1992  Managed Float     
Sources:  Valachy and Kočenda (2003), Schoors (2001), Halpern and Wyplosz  (2001) and Central 
Europe Weekly (2001, January 18). 
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Table 4: Volatility of nominal exchange rates
1 (%) 
   1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Bulgaria  n.a. 24.5  5.5  39.7 20.1 77.0 85.6 15.2  0.4  0.0  0.0 
Czech Rep.  n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.4 1.2 1.0 4.4 4.3 2.9 2.6 2.8 
Hungary  8.0 6.2 4.4 9.6  16.0  10.3  5.8 7.9 4.3 1.8 2.3 
Poland  6.9  17.3  12.6  14.5  9.5 4.9 5.7 4.7 5.4 3.7 5.6 
Romania  94.7 77.5 48.5 41.7 19.2 22.1 36.9 14.8 26.7 13.2 14.8 
Slovakia  n.a. n.a. n.a. 3.9 1.6 0.9 1.5 3.9 6.7 2.8 1.6 
Slovenia  n.a. n.a.  14.4  8.4 2.1 5.6 3.2 2.0 2.4 3.5 3.4 
Estonia  n.a. n.a. 2.1 0.8 1.6 1.3 1.8 0.5 0.5 0.1 1.0 
Latvia  n.a. n.a.  17.1  13.8  2.5 1.3 3.4 2.0 3.8 6.4 2.6 
Lithuania  n.a. n.a. n.a.  10.5  6.4 2.4 6.1 3.4 4.4 8.6 4.6 
CEECs average  36.5 31.4 14.9 14.4  8.0  12.7 15.4  5.9  5.8  4.3  3.9 
USA  5.8 5.8 6.5 3.7 5.9 2.4 6.1 3.4 4.4 8.6 4.6 
Note:
 1 Standard deviations in percent from average nominal exchange rates against ECU/euro over 
preceding two years. 
Source: Author’s computations based on the IMF International Financial Statistics, monthly averages 
 
Figure 2 and Table 5 show convergence of GDP-deflator-based inflation rates. Not only have 
inflation levels decreased, but so has the variability of inflation rates across the CEECs.  
Figure 2: Inflation
1 convergence across the CEECs, 1993–2002 
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CEECs average quarterly inflation rates 
(excluding Bulgaria and Romania) 
  Variability of quarterly inflation rates across 
CEECs (excl. Bulgaria and Romania)  
Note: 
1GDP-deflator based.    
Source: Author’s calculations.     
 EU Enlargement and Endogeneity of some OCA Criteria: Evidence from the CEECs   15 
 
Table 5: Inflation
1 convergence across the CEECs 
 1994–1998  1999–2002 
CEECs average  6.3  2.0 
           CEECs: sigma-convergence  7.7  2.6 
CEECs average. (excl. Bulgaria and Romania)  3.6  1.2 
           CEECs (excl. Bulgaria and Romania): sigma-
convergence 
2.4 1.3 
Germany average  0.3  0.2 
EU-15 average  0.5  0.5 
Euro-area average  0.5  0.4 
Note: 
1GDP-deflator based. 
Source: Author’s computations. 
 
3. Data and methodology  
This section starts with a description of the data set, followed by the empirical methodology, 
which contains three main procedures: (i) identifying supply and demand disturbances, (ii) 
constructing time-varying correlation of shocks, and (iii) confronting shock asymmetry with 
indicators of trade and exchange rate volatility. The last part of the section describes econometric 
specifications for illustrating the endogeneity argument of the OCA theory.  
The sample covers ten accession countries (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia), plus Germany, the EU-15 
aggregate, the United States, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain.  
The series of real output (GDP at 1995 prices, in billions of national currency), prices (GDP 
deflator, rebated to 100 for 1995), and exports and imports (in millions of current US dollars) are 
quarterly, ranging from 1990:Q1 to 2002:Q2. 
The following sources are used: OECD Analytical Database, IMF International Financial 
Statistics, EIU Country Data, IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, and National Statistical 
Committees. The OECD is the main source for the series of real output and prices. These data are 
available in seasonally adjusted form. The remaining output and price series were deseasonalized 
by applying the U.S. Census Bureau’s X11 procedure, the same method as used by the OECD
14. 
Data for some accession countries are unavailable prior to 1994. The trade data cover the period 
up to 2001:Q4.  
3.1 Step 1: Identification of shocks  
In the first step, we decompose the fluctuations in the macroeconomic aggregates into shocks and 
responses to shocks. There is no unique identification strategy. We choose a bi-variate structural 
VAR method proposed by Blanchard and Quah (1989) in their influential American Economic 
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Review paper, in the way that Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) apply this decomposition to 
extract supply and demand shocks from quarterly series of real output and prices. As discussed in 
section 2.2, such an approach is quite popular in studies of business cycle convergence for 
developed countries, and there is recent evidence for accession countries as well.  
The identification strategy is based on a stylized representation of the economy described by 
aggregate supply and demand curves. The aggregate demand (AD) curve is negatively sloped in 
both the short run and the long run, meaning that lower prices increase demanded output. The 
aggregate supply curve is upward-sloping in the short-run and vertical in the long-run. A 
positively sloped short-run aggregate supply (SRAS) reflects the existence of nominal rigidities, 
therefore a nominal variable (prices) has a temporary effect on the real variable (output). Finally, 
a vertical long-run aggregate supply (LRAS) curve implies full-capacity use of the production 
factors.  
Shocks in this simple model correspond to shifts in the aggregate supply and demand curves away 
from equilibrium. Supply shocks, which are associated with a shift in the aggregate supply curve, 
have both short-term and long-term impacts on both output and prices. Demand shocks also have 
short term effects on both variables. However, since the long-term supply curve is vertical, 
demand shocks do not have a long-term effect on the level of output. A structural bi-variate VAR 
decomposition makes it possible to identify supply and demand shocks from the observable 
movements of output and prices.  
Formally, consider stationary variables  t y  and  t p , for example, the first differences of 
logarithmic GDP and logarithmic prices: 1 log log − − = t t t GDP GDP y  and  1 log log − − = t t t P P p . 




































t e  and 
p
t e  are white-noise disturbances,  ijk b are coefficients, and K is the lag length chosen 
so that 
y
t e  and 
p
t e  are serially uncorrelated
15. Disturbances 
y
t e  and 
p
t e  are not structural, they 
simply represent unexplained components in output growth and inflation movements. In order to 
recover structural disturbances, i.e. those having an economic interpretation of supply and demand 
shocks, the following two relationships are proposed: 
                                            
15 We select K in two ways. First, following Blanchard and Quah (1989) and Babetskii, Boone and Maurel 
(2002, 2003) we use eight lags, which is equivalent to two years, and perform estimates starting from 1990. 
Alternatively, we focus on the period since 1993 in order to minimize the impact of “transformational recession” 
and apply the Akaike and Schwarz information criteria, which suggest two, three or four lags. We set uniformly 
two and four lags. Finally, we perform diagnostic checking of the residuals for higher-order serial correlation 
(Ljung-Box test) and normality (Jarque-Bera test). Comparison between the estimates allows us to assess 
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where 
D
t ε and 
S
t ε are demand and supply disturbances respectively. These equations state that the 
unexplainable components in the movements of output growth and inflation are linear 
combinations of supply and demand shocks. In matrix form,  t t C e ε = . The vector of the 
structural disturbances  t ε can be obtained by inverting matrix C:  t t e C
1 − = ε . 
In order to recover the four coefficients of matrix C, four restrictions have to be imposed. 
Knowledge of the variance-covariance matrix of the estimated disturbances 
D
t ε  and 
S
t ε  is 
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p y e e Cov c c c c = +         ( 7 )  
These restrictions on the coefficients of matrix C are directly derived from eq. (3) and eq. (4) 
using normalization conditions:  
(i) the variance of demand and supply shocks is unity: 1 ) ( ) ( = =
S D Var Var ε ε  
(ii) demand and supply shocks are orthogonal:  0 ) , ( =
S D Cov ε ε  
The fourth restriction on coefficients  ij c is that demand shocks 
D
t ε  have no long-term impact on 
the level of output. To put this restriction into a mathematical form, one should substitute 
equations (3) and (4) into the VAR system given by eq. (1) and eq. (2), and then express variables 
t y  and  t p  as the sum of the contemporaneous and past realizations of structural disturbances 
D
t ε  
and 
S


































k t k t c c c p ε ε          (9) 
 
System (8)–(9) is an infinite moving-average representation of the VAR form (1)–(2). 
Coefficients  ijk c  – called impulse response functions – characterize the effect of structural 
disturbances on the left-hand-side variables after k periods ( ijk c  can be expressed in terms of the 
four coefficients of interest  ij c  and the estimated coefficients  ij b , but the algebra is messy). The 
restriction that the cumulative effect of demand disturbances on output growth is zero, for all 







k c . This restriction also implies 
that demand disturbances have no long-term impact on the level of output itself. Indeed,  k c11  18   Ian Babetskii  
 
represents the effect of the demand disturbance 
D
k t− ε on  1 log log − − = t t t GDP GDP y , output 
growth after k periods. Therefore, the sequence  110 c , 111 c , 112 c ,…, 1 11 − k c , k c11  represents the effect 
of 
D
k t− ε  on 
) log (log 1 − − t t GDP GDP , ) log (log 1 t t GDP GDP − + , ) log (log 1 2 + + − t t GDP GDP ,…,







k c states that the effect of  t D, ε  on  ) log (log 1 N t t GDP GDP + − − equals zero, i.e. that the 
level of output does not change in the long run: N t t GDP GDP + − = log log 1 . It can furthermore be 







k c  translates into the parameters of interest  ij c and the 
coefficients  ) (k bij of the unrestricted VAR system (1)–(2) as:  
 






















k b c k b c       (10) 
 
Restrictions (5), (6), (7), (10) serve to identify four coefficients  ij c  which, in turn, are used to 
recover the supply and demand disturbances from the VAR residuals by inverting matrix C: 
t t e C
1 − = ε .  
3.2 Step 2: Calculating “time-varying correlation” of supply and demand disturbances 
Following Boone (1997) we use the Kalman filter to compute the “time-varying correlation 
























t v b b + = − 1          (12b) 
 
 
where X are the supply or demand shocks, error terms µ and vare white noise disturbances, 
index i denotes an accession country, j stands for Germany or the EU, and k is the United States. 
Equation (11) is called the measurement or observation equation. Coefficients 
ijk
t a  and 
ijk
t b  
(denoted as  t a  and  t b  henceforth in order to facilitate reading) are allowed to vary in time 
according to (12a) and (12b), which are called transition or state equations.  
The intuition behind this specification is simple. For example, in the presence of perfect 
correlation of shocks between countries i and j, coefficients  t a  and  t b  both go to zero. The right-
hand side of (11) being equal to zero implies that  i
t X  – shocks for an accession country i – are 
thus explained by 
j
t X  – shocks for a reference country j (Germany or the European Union). If  t b  
diverge from zero, then the United States has a stronger effect on country i shocks than the 
reference country j. The United States is used as a benchmark since it is the major trade partner 
for the EU and an important trade partner for the CEECs. For a convergence process to be at 
work, we expect  t a  to be close to zero and  t b  to decrease over time.  EU Enlargement and Endogeneity of some OCA Criteria: Evidence from the CEECs   19 
 
Technically, the Kalman filter represents a recursive algorithm for computing the optimal 
estimator of unknown parameters  t a  and  t b . This is done by maximizing a likelihood function 
given the information available at time t. The estimator is optimal in the sense that it minimizes 
the mean square error (MSE). Furthermore, if all disturbances are normal, the Kalman filter 
provides the maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) of  t a  and  t b . Period-averages are used as 
initial conditions in the Kalman filter recursions. Details on estimations of the representation 
(11)–(12) are available in Annex A in Boone (1997). For more information, see Harvey (1992).  
The main advantage of the method in hand is that it gives optimal estimations of the time-varying 
coefficients in the presence of structural changes, which is the case with the accession countries. 
As a drawback, the Kalman filter does not explain why the coefficients change over time; the 
filter simply draws the time path of the model’s parameters. It is the objective of the next sub-
section to confront the dynamics of coefficient  t b  – an indicator of shock asymmetry – with such 
potentially important variables as indicators of bilateral trade intensity. 
3.3 Step 3: Shock asymmetry and integration – “The European Commission View” 
versus “The Krugman View” 
The endogeneity argument implies that trade integration affects shock asymmetry. The sign of this 
effect is either positive or negative depending on which view – that of the European Commission 
(1990) or that of Krugman (1993) – is believed to be true. Basically, we need to determine 
whether there is a link between the indicators of shock asymmetry and integration. Thanks to the 
use of the Kalman filter, we are able to determine the degree of shock asymmetry at quarterly 
frequency. Indicators of trade intensity are available on a quarterly basis as well. Hence, as a 
starting point, we look at the correlation between the time-varying coefficients of shock 
asymmetry  t j i b ) , ( ˆ , estimated from (11), and the actual trade intensity  t j i TI ) , ( :  
) ) , ( , ) , ( ˆ ( ) , ( t t j i TI j i b Corr j i = ρ        (13) 
 
where i denotes accession country and j stands for Germany or the EU. To perform sensitivity 
checking, the correlation coefficient  ) , ( j i ρ  is calculated for two types of shocks (supply and 
demand) and three indicators of trade intensity (with respect to exports, imports, and total bilateral 
trade). A positive correlation coefficient ) , ( j i ρ  would be in accordance with “The Krugman 
View” (higher trade intensity goes along with higher shock asymmetry), while a negative 
correlation would support “The European Commission View”.  
The correlation coefficient, however, does not indicate the direction of causality. Although the 
endogeneity argument states that trade integration affects shock asymmetry, in either a positive or 
negative way, the causality can go in the reverse direction, too. For example, a recession in one 
country (a negative real shock) usually decreases the demand for imported products, thus lowering 
the volume of imports. In our group of ten transition countries it seems possible to separate or at 
least to minimize the impact of shocks on trade given the explicit increase in trade integration 
over the past decade observable in all countries except Bulgaria and Slovenia (see Figure 1). This 
long-term increase in trade integration between the CEECs and the EU/Germany, driven by 
structural factors, is not likely to have been caused by shocks. (Yet in the short term, e.g. over the 
horizon up to several quarters, aggregate shocks might affect trade intensity.) Therefore, we 20   Ian Babetskii  
 
assume that trade intensity is exogenous to shock asymmetry in terms of the long-run relationship. 
As an alternative to the simple correlation coefficient, we model the relationship between these 
two variables in a regression framework:  
t t t j i j i TI c c j i b ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( ˆ
2 1 ε + + =          (14) 
 
For a given pair of countries i and j, the error term  t j i ) , ( ε  depends on time only. Here another 
difficulty arises. Note that shock asymmetry  t j i b ) , ( ˆ  is not an observable variable such as trade 
intensity  t j i TI ) , (  but a product of estimation. Strictly speaking, the distribution of  t j i b ) , ( ˆ  is 
unknown and the inclusion of  t j i b ) , ( ˆ  in further regression might be inappropriate; the residuals 
t j i ) , ( ε  are, generally, heteroskedastic and autocorrelated. Therefore, at the very limit, one can 
stop at calculating the correlation between shock asymmetry and trade intensity. Another option is 
to treat shock asymmetry as a classical variable, in the spirit of Frankel and Rose (1998), who link 
fluctuations in real economic activity to trade intensity and other explanatory variables. 
Additional insight into the link between trade intensity and shock asymmetry can be obtained 
from estimating (14) in a panel framework. For a given benchmark country j (the EU or 
Germany), and a group of candidate countries i (i=Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, etc), we 
estimate the following equation (fixed effects): 
 
it i i it i it j D c j TI c c j b ) ( ] ) ( log[ ) ( 3 2 1 ε + + + =
)
     (15) 
 
where  i D  are country dummies. Due to the unknown distribution of b ˆ , the residual terms, again, 
are not expected to exhibit the conventional properties. The reason for estimating equation (15) is, 
nevertheless, to check whether the relationship between trade intensity and shock asymmetry can 
be described by a common slope plus country-specific effects.   
Further sensitivity analysis can be done by including the exchange rate variable in the right-hand 
side of (15). In fact, according to the theoretical model of Ricci (1997a), exchange rate pegs can 
transmit shocks from one country to another. We check, therefore, whether the coefficient of trade 
intensity is affected by augmenting eq. (15) with the exchange rate variable:  
it i i it it i it j D c ERV c j TI c c j b ) ( ] ) ( log[ ) ( ˆ
4 3 2 1 ε + + + + =      (16) 
 
where  it ERV  is the exchange rate volatility, calculated as the standard deviation of the nominal 
exchange rate in candidate country i  against the euro over the past 12 months.  it ERV  is chosen as 
a proxy for exchange rate pegs to the euro
16. 
                                            
16 This measure artificially increases volatility when a country operates under a crawling peg: changes in the 
crawl are interpreted as volatility.  EU Enlargement and Endogeneity of some OCA Criteria: Evidence from the CEECs   21 
 
Equation (16) implies that exchange rate volatility is exogenous to shock asymmetry: lower 
volatility is expected to reduce shock asymmetry. The causality, however, may go in the opposite 
direction. For example, if two countries have similar production structures, which increases the 
probability of common shocks, then the cost of fixing the exchange rate may be lower compared 
to countries with very different economies. Shock asymmetry can, therefore, influence the choice 
of appropriate exchange rate regime. Hence, inclusion of the exchange rate variable as exogenous 
can potentially bias the results.  
To justify the inclusion of exchange rate volatility in eq. (16), we perform Granger causality tests 
for exchange rate volatility and shock asymmetry to determine which variable, if any, is 
exogenous. There is no strong support for causality in any of the directions. On the other hand, we 
have good reasons to believe that using the DEM, and later the euro, as the reference currency in 
the EU candidate countries is driven by other (e.g. political) factors rather than the level of 
symmetry of shocks.  
Besides, exchange rates can affect shock asymmetry indirectly, via trade: fixing an exchange rate 
tends to stimulate trade; trade links, in turn, can make shocks more symmetric. If the effect of 
exchange rates on trade is strong, then the inclusion of the exogenous exchange rate variable 
might cause a multicollinearity problem, altering the coefficient of trade intensity  2 c  or making it 
insignificant. One more reason for including the exchange rate volatility variable is, therefore, to 
assess whether it has an effect on trade intensity.   
So, in order to assess the robustness of the endogeneity argument of the OCA theory we have at 
our disposal (i) two types of shocks, (ii) three indicators of trade intensity with respect to two 
benchmarks (the EU and Germany), and (iii) four empirical specifications (the correlation 
coefficient (13), time series (14), and panel frameworks (15) and (16)).  
4. Results 
This section begins with an illustration of the methodology in the Czech Republic case. Using 
demand shocks as an example, time-varying estimates of shock convergence are derived and then 
confronted with indicators of bilateral trade intensity. The second part covers supply and demand 
shocks and their determinants for a large group of EU candidate countries. Sensitivity analysis is 
performed by considering several estimates of shock asymmetry and indicators of trade 
intensity
17.   
4.1 The Czech Republic case, demand shocks  
Figures 3a) and 3b) plot Czech demand shocks compared to German and EU demand shocks 
respectively.  
                                            
17 Due to space limitations, and to preserve clarity, we report results for the case of supply and demand shocks 
recovered from the eight-lag VAR system over 1990–2002. Besides, it is for this case that time-varying patterns 
of supply and demand shock asymmetries between the CEECs and the EU are illustrated in Babetskii et al. 
(2004). The results based on the estimates over 1993–2002, using two or four lags, do not differ qualitatively and 
are available upon request.  22   Ian Babetskii  
 
























































































































Source: Author’s computations. 
 
One can see some similarities between the Czech and the EU/German patterns of demand shocks, 
at least over certain periods. For example, around the beginning of 1997 there is a noticeable 
negative demand shock observed in the Czech Republic, Germany and the EU. The next question 
is to quantify the degree of similarity of the shock series co-movements.  
Kalman Filter estimates help to draw the “time-varying correlation coefficient” of shock series 
between the Czech Republic on the one hand and Germany/the EU on the other hand. Estimates 
of  t a  and  t b  from (11) over 1994:Q1–2002:Q2 suggest that Czech demand shocks converge to 
the corresponding German and EU shocks: coefficients  t a  decline towards zero, indicating that 
there is no “autonomous” convergence, and coefficients  t b  decrease, meaning that the 
dissimilarities between the Czech and German/EU shock series diminish over time.  EU Enlargement and Endogeneity of some OCA Criteria: Evidence from the CEECs   23 
 
Figure 4: Czech Republic, convergence of demand shocks  
Convergence to Germany as opposed to the US 
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Source: Author’s computations. 
  
 
Note that since eq. (11) is specified in differences, the values of  t b  characterize the relative 
importance of EU/German shocks versus American ones in explaining the Czech shock series. In 
the case of convergence to Germany, for example,  t b  close to zero indicates that Czech shocks 
are more similar to German than to US shocks. Intuitively, the average value of  t b  over 1996–
1997 (0.3) approximately corresponds to the weights of the German and US currencies in the 
basket for the Czech crown (65% DEM and 35% USD) over the same period.  
Next, we confront the indicators of shock asymmetry and trade intensity. Figure 5 illustrates a 
scatter plot of coefficients  t b  (horizontal axis) versus total bilateral trade intensity (in logarithms; 
vertical axis).  
There is a strong negative relationship between the asymmetry of demand shocks and trade 
intensity with Germany, captured by a high correlation coefficient (-0.81) or, alternatively, by a 
significant slope from an OLS regression (-0.46). Almost identical similar results hold for the 
Czech–EU case. These results can be interpreted in favor of the argument that trade intensity 
reduces demand shock asymmetry.  24   Ian Babetskii  
 
Figure 5: Czech Republic case, link between trade intensity and demand shock asymmetry, 
1994–2001, quarterly 
 
Czech Republic versus Germany    Czech Republic versus EU 







































Correlation between shock asymmetry and trade intensity 
81 . 0 _ − = GE CZ ρ     81 . 0 _ − = EU CZ ρ  
OLS regression of shock asymmetry on trade intensity
  
(Standard errors in parentheses) 
D
t b  = – 1.56 – 0.46 TI    D
t b  = – 1.66 – 0.44 TI 
            (0.23)   (0.06)                (0.30)   (0.06) 
    
Number of obs.  32   Number of obs.  32 
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.64   Adjusted R-
squared 
0.66 
S.E. of regression  0.08   S.E. of regression 0.07 
Source: Author’s computations. 
4.2 Asymmetry of shocks, trade intensity, and exchange rate volatility  
Table 6 reports average values of shock asymmetry over 1994–2002 and two sub-periods. The 
decreasing averages and variance of the time-varying coefficients  t b  from eq. (11) mean that the 
asymmetry of the underlying shocks diminishes
18. The results can be interpreted in favor of 
demand shock convergence, while the pattern of the supply shocks (Table 6b) is rather diverging. 
Note that the average values of the supply and demand shock asymmetries for the CEECs do not 
differ much from the corresponding levels for such EU member countries as Ireland, Portugal, and 
Spain
19.  
                                            
18 It is also verified that the constant term  t a  converges to zero for both supply and demand shocks. Results are 
available upon request. 
19 There is a question of whether these selected EU countries represent a good benchmark. On the one hand, they 
already share a common monetary policy. On the other hand, the chosen three countries due to their geographical 
location are said to belong to the EU “periphery”. In the long term, the CEECs may be more correlated with 
Germany/the EU than the “peripheral” countries. EU Enlargement and Endogeneity of some OCA Criteria: Evidence from the CEECs   25 
 
Table 6: Shock asymmetry, 1994–2002
1  (Standard deviations in parentheses) 
(a) Demand shocks  
  Germany European  Union 
  1994–2002 94–98  99–02 1994–2002 94–98  99–02 
Czech Republic  0.34 0.39 0.27  0.49 0.54  0.43 
  (0.13) (0.16) (0.04) (0.11) (0.13)  (0.03) 
Estonia  0.41 0.39 0.43 0.36 0.41  0.29 
  (0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.10) (0.10)  (0.02) 
Hungary  0.50 0.52 0.47  0.35 0.37  0.32 
  (0.07) (0.08) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.02) 
Latvia  0.44 0.49 0.37  0.35 0.45  0.22 
  (0.11) (0.12) (0.05) (0.16) (0.14)  (0.07) 
Poland  0.60 0.61 0.60  0.50 0.63  0.32 
  (0.09) (0.11) (0.06) (0.19) (0.12)  (0.08) 
Romania  0.72 0.84 0.54  0.89 0.93  0.82 
  (0.35) (0.39) (0.16) (0.42) (0.39)  (0.47) 
Slovakia  0.60 0.68 0.52  0.59 0.64  0.53 
  (0.14) (0.17) (0.05) (0.09) (0.09)  (0.02) 
Slovenia  0.58 0.64 0.53  0.78 0.83  0.71 
  (0.08) (0.08) (0.04) (0.09) (0.05)  (0.08) 
CEECs average  0.52 0.57 0.47  0.54 0.60  0.46 
Ireland  0.50 0.50 0.50 0.45 0.44  0.45 
  (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.00) 
Portugal  0.49 0.49 0.49 0.35 0.35  0.35 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) 
Spain  0.61 0.60 0.61 0.49 0.49  0.49 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) 
(b) Supply shocks  
 Germany  European  Union 
  1994–2002 94–98  99–02 1994–2002 94–98  99–02 
Czech Republic  0.29 0.08 0.51 0.01 -0.22 0.26 
  (0.30) (0.26) (0.15) (0.28) (0.15)  (0.16) 
Estonia  0.66 0.66 0.66 0.72 0.76  0.68 
  (0.12) (0.15) (0.07) (0.20) (0.26)  (0.11) 
Hungary  0.46 0.45 0.46 0.39 0.43  0.30 
  (0.09) (0.11) (0.07) (0.14) (0.14)  (0.09) 
Latvia  0.75 0.86 0.66  0.34 0.26  0.48 
  (0.17) (0.19) (0.07) (0.14) (0.10)  (0.07) 
Poland  0.09 0.07 0.13 -0.02  -0.20 0.23 
  (0.11) (0.12) (0.07) (0.26) (0.13)  (0.16) 
Romania  0.25 0.25 0.23  0.13 0.05  0.25 
  (0.11) (0.14) (0.05) (0.13) (0.07)  (0.10) 
Slovakia  0.72 1.00 0.47  0.30 0.10  0.52 
  (0.43) (0.48) (0.11) (0.28) (0.24)  (0.06) 
Slovenia  0.58 0.70 0.47  0.55 0.72  0.37 
  (0.16) (0.15) (0.07) (0.37) (0.45)  (0.12) 
CEECs average  0.48 0.51 0.45  0.30 0.24  0.39 
Ireland  0.36 0.36 0.36 0.42 0.42  0.43 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)  (0.00) 
Portugal  0.43 0.43 0.43 0.45 0.43  0.46 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01)  (0.02) 
Spain   0.46 0.46 0.46 0.50 0.50  0.50 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) 
Note:
 1 Shock asymmetry between CEECs and Germany (EU) is measured by coefficient  t b  from Eq. 
(11 ). Lower coefficients mean higher symmetry. Values in boldface denote diminishing 
asymmetry of shocks.  
Source: Author’s computations. 26   Ian Babetskii  
 
Table 7: Correlation between shock asymmetry and trade integration, 1994–2001  
)) log( , ( ijt ijt ij TI b Corr = ρ  
where i = CEECs, j = Germany/EU, t = quarter 
for two types of shocks
1 and three indicators of trade intensity
2 
 




Total Exports  Imports Total Exports  Imports 
  Germany  Germany  Germany  EU EU EU 
Czech Republic  -0.81 -0.84 -0.76 -0.81 -0.84 -0.74 
Estonia  0.32 0.13 0.35 -0.92  -0.86  -0.85 
Hungary  -0.73 -0.71 -0.72 -0.70 -0.72 -0.66 
Latvia  -0.57 -0.58 -0.54 -0.90 -0.86 -0.88 
Poland  -0.46 -0.31 -0.47 -0.76 -0.75 -0.72 
Romania  -0.10 -0.14 -0.07 -0.09 -0.07 -0.10 
Slovakia  -0.83 -0.76 -0.84 -0.82 -0.79 -0.81 
CEECs average  -0.45 -0.46 -0.44 -0.71 -0.70 -0.68 
 




Total Exports  Imports Total Exports  Imports 
  Germany  Germany  Germany  EU EU EU 
Czech Republic  0.36 0.40 0.30 0.80 0.77 0.76 
Estonia  0.56 0.29 0.58 -0.55  -0.44  -0.60 
Hungary  0.01 0.02 0.00 -0.74  -0.75  -0.71 
Latvia  -0.77  -0.80  -0.70 0.63 0.68 0.56 
Poland  0.30 0.09 0.38 0.67 0.77 0.58 
Romania  -0.29  -0.32  -0.24 0.58 0.60 0.52 
Slovakia  -0.93  -0.86  -0.95 0.51 0.65 0.35 
CEECs average  -0.11  -0.17  -0.09 0.27 0.33 0.21 
 
1Supply or demand shock asymmetry between CEECs and Germany (EU) is measured by coefficient 
t b from Eq. (11).  
 
2Trade intensity is defined with respect to exports, imports, and total bilateral trade according to the 
following expressions (natural logarithms of):  
) /( jt it ijt
EX
ijt EX EX EX TI + =  
) /( jt it ijt
IM
ijt IM IM IM TI + =  
) /( ) ( jt it jt it ijt ijt
T
ijt IM IM EX EX IM EX TI + + + + =  
where i = CEECs, j = Germany/EU,  ijt EX  = exports from country i to country j,  it EX  = total exports 
from country i, and IM denotes imports.   
 
Source: Author’s computations. EU Enlargement and Endogeneity of some OCA Criteria: Evidence from the CEECs   27 
 
Table 8: Effect of trade intensity and exchange rate volatility on shock asymmetry
1 
(standard errors in parentheses) 
a)  Demand shocks  
Germany 
  Total   Exports   Imports Total    Exports Imports 
Trade  intensity  -0.33 -0.34 -0.30 -0.31 -0.32 -0.29 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Exch. rate volatility  –  –  –  4.84  4.55  4.94 
       (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.07) 
Number of obs.  204  204  204  204  204  204 
Adjusted  R-sq.  0.47 0.47 0.43 0.59 0.59 0.57 
S.E. of regression  0.15  0.15  0.16  0.14  0.15  0.14 
 
EU 
  Total   Exports   Imports  Total   Exports  Imports 
Trade  intensity  -0.27 -0.27 -0.25 -0.28 -0.26 0.30 
  (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) 
Exch. rate volatility  –  –  –  5.17  4.83  5.34 
       (0.06)  (0.05)  (0.06) 
Number of obs.  204  204  204  204  204  204 
Adjusted  R-sq.  0.53 0.55 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.55 
S.E. of regression  0.17  0.18  0.18  0.19  0.20  0.20 
 
b) Supply shocks  
Germany 
  Total   Exports   Imports  Total   Exports  Imports 
Trade  intensity  0.05 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.05 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) 
Exch. rate volatility  –  –  –  -1.58  -1.36  -1.61 
       (2.24)  (2.04)  (2.51) 
Number of obs.  196  196  196  196  196  196 
Adjusted  R-sq.  0.67 0.66 0.66 0.65 0.65 0.65 
S.E. of regression  0.16  0.16  0.16  0.17  0.17  0.17 
 
EU 
  Total   Exports   Imports  Total   Exports  Imports 
Trade  intensity  0.18 0.14 0.19 0.15 0.11 0.16 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) 
Exch. rate volatility  –  –  –  1.48  1.71  1.58 
       (2.30)  (2.30)  (2.30) 
Number of obs.  196  196  196  196  196  196 
Adjusted  R-sq.  0.58 0.57 0.58 0.55 0.56 0.56 
S.E. of regression  0.22  0.22  0.22  0.24  0.24  0.25 
1: Estimates of Eq. (15) and (16) (OLS, fixed effects):   
it i i it i it j D c j TI c c j b ) ( ] ) ( log[ ) ( 3 2 1 ε + + + =
)
 
it i i it it i it j D c ERV c j TI c c j b ) ( ] ) ( log[ ) ( ˆ
4 3 2 1 ε + + + + =  
Exchange rate volatility  it ERV  for candidate country i at quarter t is defined as standard deviations in 
percent from average nominal exchange rates against ECU/euro over preceding 12 months   
Source: Author’s computations. 28   Ian Babetskii  
 
Estimates of shock asymmetry are unavailable for Bulgaria and Lithuania, due to their short GDP 
time series. On the other hand, we exclude the series of trade intensity for Slovenia due to a lack 
of variation. Hence, we are left with seven CEECs to analyze the effect of trade on shock 
asymmetry. Table 7 shows that there is strong negative correlation between trade intensity and 
shock asymmetry on the demand side: more trade intensity means lower asymmetry. On the 
supply side, the correlation is close to zero and insignificant (Germany) or positive (EU). A 
similar pattern follows from the country-by-country estimates of equation (14)
20.  
The panel estimates of (15) do not qualitatively change the results. An increase in trade intensity 
is associated with higher symmetry of demand shocks; the link with supply shocks is ambiguous 
(Table 8). The results for demand shocks are robust with respect to the three indicators of trade, 
the two benchmarks (the EU aggregate and Germany), and the estimation method (country-
specific correlation coefficients or a panel framework). Demand shock convergence can be 
interpreted as being due to trade and monetary integration. Since intra-industry trade accounts for 
a large share of trade for the candidate countries, the total effect of trade on demand shock 
symmetry is positive. The link between trade intensity and the correlation of demand shocks is 
similar to the link between trade intensity and output correlation found by Frankel and Rose 
(1998) and Fidrmuc (2001), among others. This is not surprising, given that demand shocks, by 
construction, can have short-term effects on output and prices.  
On the supply side, asymmetries of shocks characterize the process of catching-up at work: 
productivity gains in the candidate countries translate into increases in per capita incomes. Supply 
shocks can be also interpreted in terms of Schumpeterian “innovations”, which are perceived as 
an engine of technological progress
21. Higher trade intensity due to an increase in intra-industry 
trade may be associated with more intensive restructuring, whence might follow the observed 
positive impact of trade on supply shock asymmetry. On the other hand, higher trade intensity is 
accompanied by lower shock asymmetry in a number of cases; the estimates depend on the 
estimation method and on whether Germany or the EU is considered as the benchmark.  
When exchange rate volatility is added, the coefficient of trade intensity does not change 
significantly. A decrease in exchange rate volatility is accompanied by demand shock 
convergence, while no notable effect on supply shocks is observed. The attempts by some 
candidate countries to fix their currencies to the euro contribute to the synchronization of demand 
shocks. To the extent that supply shocks have a long-term impact on output, there is no significant 
impact of nominal exchange rate volatility on supply shock symmetry. 
 
                                            
20 The results are not shown since in the case of two variables the correlation coefficient and OLS regression 
give almost the same information.  
21 Schumpeter (1943). See Hénin (1997) and Hospers (2003) for a review.  EU Enlargement and Endogeneity of some OCA Criteria: Evidence from the CEECs   29 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper supports the view about demand shock convergence and divergence of supply shocks 
between the candidate countries, the EU-15, and Germany as alternative benchmarks. Estimated 
time-varying coefficients of shock asymmetry are then confronted with several indicators of 
bilateral trade intensity and exchange rate volatility. The results for demand shocks support 
Frankel and Rose’s (1998) endogeneity argument, according to which international trade links 
synchronize business cycles. In terms of demand shocks, countries are more likely to satisfy 
criteria for monetary union membership ex post, as economic integration deepens. On the supply 
side, the link between shock asymmetry and trade integration is ambiguous. Higher trade intensity 
may be accompanied by both supply shock symmetry and asymmetry. Nevertheless, there are a 
number of considerations which complicate the interpretation of the results.  
First, there is no consensus in the literature on which shocks, i.e. supply or demand, are more 
relevant for assessing the costs of joining the EMU
22. The optimum currency area theory says that 
the more symmetric are the shocks (implying both supply and demand disturbances) between 
countries, the less costly is forgoing an autonomous monetary policy
23. The empirical studies do 
not make a clear point either. Often there is simply no discussion of the importance of various 
types of shocks. Two different points of view equally exist. For example, for Fidrmuc and 
Korhonen (2001, p. 21) supply shocks are “more relevant in assessing the costs and benefits of 
different exchange rate regimes. Supply shocks have permanent output effects, whereas demand 
shocks have only transitory effects.” On the other hand, according to Babetskii, Boone and 
Maurel (2004), the absence of supply shock convergence is not necessarily bad from the point of 
view of EMU memberships. Emerging countries, by fixing nominal exchange rates, have simply 
to let productivity gains translate into inflation differentials.  
Second, the relationship between business cycle indicators (e.g. the correlation of de-trended 
economic activity) and supply and demand shocks is not straightforward. For example, Fidrmuc 
and Korhonen (2001) mention the puzzling behavior of Slovenia, which has highly correlated 
business cycles with the euro area but poorly correlated both demand and supply shocks. Given 
that business cycles consist of a mixture of shocks and responses, the same level of business cycle 
synchronization can be observed in two opposite cases: similar shocks and similar responses, and 
asymmetric shocks and asymmetric responses. The Slovenian example illustrates the last case. 
Generally, it is also difficult to quantify the impact of policy-induced responses to exogenous 
shocks on the estimation results (see Kenen, 2001).  
Due to the above problems, and given that there is a relatively low robustness of the results among 
different studies, the policy recommendations should be mentioned with caution. One 
interpretation of the results is that that pegging national currencies to the euro or even entering the 
EMU would not be so costly for the candidate countries in terms of the costs associated with 
                                            
22 See Gros and Thygesen (1999, pp. 277–280) for a discussion of the effects of various shocks in the context of 
the OCA theory.  
23 Mundell (1961) and McKinnon (1963) use an example of export demand shocks to illustrate the basic OCA 
principles. Kenen (1969) makes a further distinction between demand and technology disturbances.  30   Ian Babetskii  
 
demand shock asymmetry. Indeed, the EU candidate countries are characterized by levels of 
supply and demand shock asymmetries comparable to those for present EU member countries 
such as Ireland, Portugal, and Spain. However, one should bear in mind that a closed economy 
approach does not allow us to distinguish between domestic and foreign shocks. Therefore, we 
may observe more convergence or more symmetry than in the case of “pure domestic” shocks.  
Furthermore, the importance of the OCA criteria to the analysis of membership in a monetary 
union should not be overemphasized. The degree of symmetry of contemporaneous shocks is only 
one aspect of the costs associated with monetary union membership. There might be other costs of 
EMU accession of at least the same importance as dissimilarity of shocks, for example, the 
incompatibility of the current Maastricht inflation criteria with the catching-up objective
24. The 
still existing substantial asymmetries, in terms of shocks, among the present EMU countries 
suggest that this is probably not the most important criterion. Another way of looking at shock 
asymmetries is to recall the risk-sharing argument proposed by Mundell (1973) and recently 
discussed by McKinnon (2002, p. 344)
25. Asymmetric shocks are not necessarily bad: “asset 
holding for international risk sharing is better served by a common currency spanning a wide area 
– within which countries or regions could be, and perhaps should best be, quite different.” 
 
                                            
24 See Buiter and Grafe (2002). 
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Motivation and methodology of the paper 
Business cycle synchronization is usually regarded as one of the main OCA (Optimum 
Currency Area) properties, because if cycles are synchronized, the cost of foregoing the 
possibility of using counter-cyclical monetary policy is minimized. This issue gets into the 
center of interest with the CEEC countries’ future joining of the EMU. 
 
The paper underlines two opposing views on the effect of integration on business cycle 
synchronization: (1) The ‘EC view’ claims that cycles will become more synchronized as 
integration advances, which hypothesis is generally called as the ‘endogeneity hypothesis’; (2) 
‘Krugman’s view’, who showed in the example of Massachusetts that integration could lead 
to specialization, hence less synchronization. The aims of the paper are (1) to check the 
temporal change in business cycle synchronization for the new EU members in 1990/4-2002, 
(2) to draw conclusions on the possible validity of the two opposing views for these countries, 
(3) to relate business cycle synchronization to some economic variables like trade and 
exchange rate volatility.  
 
To this end, the paper performs econometric analysis in three steps. 
First, the paper estimates, country by country, a bivariate VAR model including GDP growth 
and inflation to recover supply and demand shocks. This methodology is originated from the 
seminal work of Blachard-Quah (1989). 
In the second step the paper estimates time-varying correlation coefficients between EU’s and 
individual country’s shock, using the supply and demand shocks obtained in the first step, 
Finally, the time-varying correlation coefficients are related to trade and exchange rate 
volatility in a panel framework. 
 
Main Results 
The main results of the paper are the following. Demand shocks correlate in most CEECs at a 
similar level to Ireland, Spain, and Portugal and the correlations have increased in most 
CEECs, but not in Ireland, Spain, and Portugal over the pervious years. Supply shock 
correlation is similar (and even on average larger) than demand shock correlation (although 
the paper seems to emphasize that supply shock correlation is smaller), but supply shock 
correlations have not increased over time. Demand shock correlation is well related to trade 
and exchange rate volatility, but supply shock correlation is not related to trade. 
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Comments 
We organize our comments along five main lines. 
 
1. Motivation of the paper 
 
Our first comment is a general comment related to the theoretical background and is relevant 
for all papers studying business cycle correlation for drawing conclusions on optimum 
currency areas, including our paper on synchronization (Darvas-Szapáry 2004). 
 
First, we know that Krugman’s lesson from Massachusetts is a true lesson: the case study 
provides a demonstration when monetary union led to specialization and when a common 
shock affected the US economy, it had a much stronger effect on Massachusetts leading to 
longer and more painful adjustment period. Hence, monetary union led to specialization and 
less synchronization, although no one would have suggested a separate currency for 
Massachusetts.  
In fact, the US economy prospers well with varying regional business cycles, as was shown, 
for example, by the Five Tests study by HM Treasury (2003). This is because financial market 
integration, price and wage flexibility and labor market mobility can help the economy to 
adjust to idiosyncratic shocks. The US experience shows that these traditional OCA criteria 
could be more useful indicators for deciding on possible joining a monetary union than the 
past business cycle correlations.  
One should also ask the question whether analysis of past CEECs data could be informative 
for the future. The author aims to discriminate between two opposing views on the effects of 
integration on business cycle synchronization using data for 1990/94-2002. First of all, the 
two possible processes are not exclusive: a mixture of the two can take place at the same time 
in an economy and by econometric techniques proposed by the author one will only measure 
the ‘net’ effect of the two. In addition, whether conclusions drawn for this period could be 
informative for developments during the future monetary union memberships of these 





The paper relies heavily on  the identification of shocks, all further calculations crucially 
hinge in this first step. In fact, the adopted Blanchard-Quah (1989) shock identification was 
very popular in the literature, for example, Fidrmuc-Korhonen (2004) in a survey article listed 
thirteen papers using this methodology for studying shocks of the CEECs. 
 
The method starts with a reduced form VAR estimation for inflation and output growth and 
imposes one restriction to identify structural shocks: demand shocks have no long-run effect 
on output (but has on prices in contrast to the claim of the paper).  
There are several important general problems with this methodology, already identified in the 
literature. For example, Faust-Leeper (1997) strongly criticized the technique because of three 
main problems:  
1)  Long-run restrictions are imposed to data from finite samples,
2  
2)  Shock aggregation: too few (namely two here) identified shocks might be mixtures of 
the underlying ones, and even if the underlying shocks satisfy the economic criteria 
                                                 
1 This section draws on some preliminary results of our ongoing research, Darvas-Horváth (2004). 
2 A possible solution to this problem could be the recent sign restriction shock identification method popularized 
by, e.g., Uhlig (1999), Canova-De Nicoló (2002), and Peersman (2004).    3
(e.g. underlying demand shocks has no long-run effect on output), both identified 
shocks might be mixtures of all underlying shocks, 
3)  Time aggregation: the technique assumes that the identified shocks are independent; 
although at quarterly frequency policy can respond to supply shocks as well, 
invalidating the independence assumption.  
 
Cooley-Dwyer (1998) added further important critiques of the techniques. First, they showed 
that the so called ‘technical assumptions’ behind the Blanchard-Quah approach could have 
strong effects on the results. Second, they showed that the technique is not robust to model 
specification. This result was achieved by setting up theoretical models satisfying the 
assumptions behind the technique, simulating data from the known data generating process, 
and estimating impulse responses of shocks identified by the BQ-technique for simulated data. 
The results indicated that estimated impulse responses differed in some case markedly from 
the true impulse responses.  
 
Unfortunately these econometric problems are not referred to in the paper, nor in other papers 
surveyed in Fridmuc-Korhonen (2004). 
 
In addition to  the general weaknesses of this type of SVARs, there is a special problem in the 
CEECs. The methodology requires stationary variables, however, at least inflation in the 
analyzed period showed a clear trending behavior (Figure 1).  
 







































Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics
 
 
In order to check the stability of the inference, we performed a simple analysis. We calculated 
the correlation between CEECs and EMU supply and demand shocks in the period 1998-2001 
using different sample periods. That is, we first estimated the VARs for 1995Q1-
2001Q4,identified shocks (both for EMU and for the country under study) and calculated 
correlation between shocks of the EMU and the country under study for 1998Q1-2001Q4. 
Next, we estimated the VAR model for 1995Q1-2002Q1 and calculated correlation of shocks   4
for the same 1998Q1-2001Q4 period. We continued the lengthening of the sample 
observation one-by-one so that finally we estimated a VAR for 1995Q1-2003Q4 and 
calculated correlation coefficients for the same 1998Q1-2001Q4 period. By this procedure we 
obtained nine estimates for the correlation in 1998Q1-2001Q4. The results for four countries 
are shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Correlation of supply and demand shocks of CEECs and the EMU in 1998Q1-
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The figures clearly indicate that lengthening the sample alters inference for the past 
substantially in some cases. 
 
3. Time-varying correlations 
 
The paper estimated the following time-varying coefficient model with maximum likelihood 









t b a µ ε ε ε ε + − + = −
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where 
) (i
t ε is the shock identified, i=EU for EMU, i=AC for the new member under study, and 
i=US for the USA;  t a and  t b are time-varying coefficients and  t µ is the error term.  
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We found this specification disputable. The paper gives no motivation why US data is 
included as part of the regressor. However, many papers indicated the emergence of a ‘world 
business cycle’, in which case the regressor tends to be zero. When the EMU and USA shocks 
are perfectly correlated, then the regressor is zero and model cannot be estimated. In practice, 
it is unlikely that shock identification for the EMU and the USA will lead to exactly the same 
shocks, but when shocks in these two main economic area tend to be similar, the adopted 
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In addition to the specification issue above, this second step relies on the maximum likelihood 
estimation of the state-space representation evaluated with the Kalman-filter. In our 
experience, Kalman-filtering of state space models is very sensitive to initial conditions (for 
the mean and variance of latent variables). However, the author even does not mention the 
issue of such a problem and not at all mentions how initial conditions were selected. 
Maximum likelihood estimation also turned to be sensitive to the starting values of the 
parameters of the model, which are also ignored in the paper. Due to the problems we listed 
above, we think that sensitivity analysis (to initial conditions and starting values) is 
indispensable for gaining proper believe in the results. 
 
Let us highlight a strange result of the paper, which likely reflects the problems with initial 
conditions and starting values. The time-varying parameters for Ireland, Portugal, and Spain 
are constant over time with (close to) zero standard errors (see Table 6 in the original paper) 
both for demand and supply shocks. In our experience these result usually emerge when the 
ML estimate of some variance parameter turne to be zero. A sensitivity analysis could reveal 
whether the zero-variance results are robust to initial conditions and starting values, and the 
author also should perform formal tests for parameter stability before using the time-varying 
technique. 
 
4. Underestimated standard errors 
 
The paper performs econometric analysis in three steps and in the second and third steps 
derived measures (and not observed values) from previous steps are used as the dependent 
variable. However, thee multi-level approach used in the article does not appropriately 
account for the uncertainty in the first and second level parameter estimates when obtaining 
parameter estimates and standard errors in the second or third stage. In finite samples, this 
leads to underestimation of the standard errors in the second and even more in the third stage. 
This problem had been recognized by another presenter at the Conference (Marianne Baxter) 
who proposed to account for the possible measurement errors into the model. 
 
5. Panel approach 
 
In the third stage of analysis fixed effect models are used to relate measures of asymmetry to 
trade and exchange rate volatility in a panel framework. In doing this, slope coefficient 
heterogeneity is not addressed, while in the presence of heterogeneity, FEM estimates may be 
meaningless (Hsiao, 1986, p. 7). F-tests should precede the choice of possible panel models 
that can capture different  level of heterogeneity (Hsiao, 1986, Chapter 2, p. 11-24). Another 
possible tool for the investigation of heterogeneity when the cross-sections are relatively few 
is cross-validation (Beck, 2001). 
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11 Introduction
Which are the channels through which business cycles in one country are
transmitted to other countries? This is a major subject within the literature
on international economics and a signiﬁcant amount of research has been
devoted to it. Unfortunately, there is still no clear answer to the question of
what determines business cycle comovement.
In particular, there are important discrepancies between the data and
what models with complete markets predict regarding the international co-
movement of macroeconomic aggregates. These discrepancies were ﬁrst iden-
tiﬁed by Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992) for the United States and the
OECD countries. They have been labeled ”anomalies” when proved robust
to various changes to parameter values and model structures. The discrep-
ancies are two. First, in the data, correlations of output across countries
are larger than analogous correlations for consumption. With only a few
exceptions, previous work1 obtains consumption cross-country correlations
that signiﬁcantly exceed output correlations. This inconsistency has been la-
beled the consumption / output anomaly or the quantity anomaly. Second,
investment and employment comove across countries in the data, while most
models predict negative values for their cross-country correlation. Many can-
didates have been suggested to propose a solution to these puzzles, but no
consensus has been built on what is the best way to explain them.
To study the international transmission of business cycles among big
countries and to propose a potential solution to the anomalies, in this paper
I introduce two elements into an otherwise standard two-country dynamic
general equilibrium model. First, I expand the standard model by allowing
for trade in two diﬀerent goods. Having two goods and specialization in
production provides both demand and a terms of trade channels to the in-
1See Appendix B for a table summarizing the literature’s results.
2ternational transmission of productivity shocks. When a positive shock hits
one of the countries, the other faces an increased demand for the good it pro-
duces, which is an imperfect substitute for the shocked country’s good, and
some of the beneﬁts spill over to the rest of the world2. Terms of trade change
too and imply a positive wealth eﬀect for the foreign country. My model-
ing is consistent with the recent empirical results in Baxter and Kouparitsas
(2004), who show that while bilateral trade is robust in explaining comove-
ments, other variables typically used by the literature are not. However,
previous work has shown that trade in goods is not enough to account for
the positive correlation of macroeconomic aggregates across countries.
Second, I model ﬁnancial market frictions through the introduction of a
non-competitive banking sector and endogenously countercyclical markups in
the market for loans. Here, I base my modeling on empirical evidence char-
acterizing capital production and the banking sector in the United States
economy, which is documented in Olivero (2004). Using non-competitive
behavior in the ﬁnancial sector to explain the international transmission of
shocks is a novel feature of the model3. It also produces a ﬁnancial accel-
erator coming from the supply side of the loans market that has not been
previously modeled to my knowledge. Investment is ﬁnanced by price setting
banks with market power, that make cheaper loans available in good times.
This has interesting policy implications due to its macroeconomic impacts:
With markups in the market for credit being countercyclical, credit becomes
2Stockman and Tesar (1998) and Heathcote and Perri (2002) show how multiple goods
can generate cross-country output correlations that are more consistent with the data.
3Rotemberg and Woodford (1995) highlight the importance of including imperfect com-
petition in theoretical models, by noticing its impact on the relationship between output,
the labor input and wages. Given that many of the puzzles in macroeconomics relate
to these three variables, they advocate for the incorporation of imperfectly competitive
product markets in models of real business cycles. Here, I model imperfect competition in
credit markets.
3more expensive in bad times; as a result, ﬁrms may delay investment and pro-
duction decisions and the recession may be made even worse and longer. This
should call for stabilization policies to be made more eﬀective in economies
where these markups are more countercyclical.
In models with perfectly functioning credit markets and no exogenous
restrictions to capital mobility, capital would ﬂow from the rest of the world
into the country where productivity is relatively higher. This gives rise to the
negative cross-country correlations of factors of production and to the very
low cross-country output correlations generally obtained in theoretical mod-
els. Conversely, in this economy ﬁnancial imperfections prevent capital from
ﬂowing from the rest of the world into the relatively more productive econ-
omy, and help to get cross-country comovement for investment, employment
and output.
Consistent with empirical evidence, in the model entrepreneurs operate
an increasing returns to scale technology for capital production, they need
outside ﬁnancing to build the capital stock, and these funds are obtained
from an oligopolistic banking sector. This ”global” oligopolistic banking
sector collects deposits from households and lends to entrepreneurs in both
countries. Banks set an interest rate on loans which exceeds the opportunity
cost of funds. I will interchangeably refer to the diﬀerence between the
interest rates on loans and deposits as the spread, price-cost margin or net
interest margin (NIM) in the ﬁnancial sector4.
Increasing returns to scale allow for the elasticity of the demand for credit
to be positively related to investment and for markups in the non-competitive
banking industry to be endogenously countercyclical. With a falling market
power and a lower markup in the economy that has beneﬁted from a positive
productivity shock, the cost of credit falls relative to standard models that
lack this friction. This impacts capital production, employment and the
4I borrow this last term from Saunders and Schumacher (2000).
4marginal utility of consumption in a way such that the rate of return on
domestic deposits ends up being countercyclical. Banks start using local
deposits, which are now cheaper for them, to ﬁnance both domestic and
foreign loans, which makes the foreign rate on deposits fall too. The cost
of credit falls in the foreign country and drives an increase in both their
investment and employment. A strength of the paper is that restrictions
to the international mobility of ﬁnancial capital arise from the endogenous
behavior of real interest rates and its implications for the allocation of the
global supply of credit among countries in a decentralized economy.
The paper relates to earlier work that has used restrictions to interna-
tional capital ﬂows to get increased cross-country correlations of output and
factors of production. For example, Heathcote and Perri (2002) model an
economy where risk-sharing is completely prohibited; Kollman (1996) and
Baxter and Crucini (1995) study economies where risk sharing is restricted
by allowing agents to trade in only one risk-free ﬁnancial asset; Kehoe and
Perri (2002) study enforcement constraints that limit countries to keep the
autarky level of utility below that of ﬁnancially integrated economies; and
Kollman (1996) introduces adjustment costs to investment. My work is also
embedded into the literature that has appealed to imperfectly competitive
product markets as a mechanism for the international transmission of pro-
ductivity shocks (Ubide (1999), Cook (2002) and Head (2002)).
With a few exceptions, the literature has been relatively unsuccessful at
explaining the puzzles. Previous work has been able to only reduce the mag-
nitude in which the cross-country correlation of consumption exceeds that
of income. Regarding the international comovements of investment and em-
ployment, the most successful papers have reproduced at most one of them.
I propose a potential solution to the quantity anomaly in the calibration
exercise, and I obtain positive cross-country correlations of investment and
employment. I do so while still reproducing other stylized facts of the US and
5OECD economies, namely, the countercyclicality of net exports, the real in-
terest rate and NIMs for the banking industry, and the positive cross-country
correlation of bank spreads.
My results are robust to several checks performed on the structure of
the model. First, conclusions hold for a model where non-competitive banks
can get only domestic deposits, while still lending to both countries. Second,
endogenously countercyclical markups can be obtained with constant returns
in the production for capital, and either deviating from the Cobb-Douglas
assumption for goods production or modeling procyclical entry in the banking
industry. Third, the qualitative results stay unchanged for a model with
Cobb-Douglas preferences.
By delivering endogenously countercyclical markups, the paper is related
to the literature that challenges the traditional industrial organization ap-
proach according to which markups are procyclical. This literature is com-
posed by only a few papers that address theoretical ways to deliver this
countercyclicality (Rotemberg and Saloner (1986), Gali (1994), Ravn, Uribe
and Schmitt-Groh´ e (2004)).
I proceed as follows. I show the data’s stylized facts in Section 2. In
Section 3 I present a review of the previous work addressing the anomalies.
I develop the model in Section 4, and analyze the intuition about the key
forces driving the model’s results in Section 5. In Section 6 I show the
calibration and simulation results. I conclude in Section 7. In Appendix A I
discuss two alternative ways to obtain endogenously countercyclical markups
for the banking industry. I also present and solve a slightly diﬀerent model
with a CES production function for goods. There I show how endogenously
countercyclical banking markups can also be obtained just by deviating from
the Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation and the isoelastic demand for credit that
it implies. In Appendix B I present a chart with a detailed review of the
literature.
62 The Data
In Table 1 I report cross-country correlations between the main macroeco-
nomic aggregates for OECD countries and the United States (US), calculated
using OECD Quarterly National Accounts and OECD Main Economic Indi-
cators (MEI) data for the 1960-2002 period5. As it can be seen there, output,
investment, employment and consumption are all positively correlated across
countries. Consumption correlations are lower than output correlations.
Table 1: The Data on International Comovement
ρ(C,C∗) 0.3311
ρ(Y ,Y ∗) 0.4496
ρ(I,I∗) 0.4151
ρ(L,L∗) 0.2167
Notes: Correlations between the United States and Europe for logged and
Hodrick-Prescott ﬁltered data. The sample period is 1960:I - 2002:II.
Source: OECD Quarterly National Accounts and OECD MEI data available
in Fabrizio Perri’s webpage.
Worthy of note is the fact that, as discussed in Heathcote and Perri (2003),
business cycles in the US have become less correlated with those of the other
OECD countries over time6. Correlations calculated for the 1970-1990 period
5Data available in Fabrizio Perri’s web page (http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/ fperri/research.htm).
European data refer to the following 15 countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden and United Kingdom. Data for employment between 1972.1 and 1983.4 is only
for the following subgroup: Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Spain,
Sweden and United Kingdom. Data for employment between 1962.1 and 1971.4 is only
for the following subgroup: Finland, Germany, Italy, Sweden and United Kingdom.
6Heathcote and Perri (2003) can account for this by a combination of changes in the
nature of real shocks and an increase in US ﬁnancial integration. The estimated process for
TFP shocks changes very little. Increased risk-sharing tends to reduce the international
comovement of investment through permitting intertemporal specialization in production.
7by Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992) are 0.51 for private consumption, 0.66
for output, 0.53 for investment and 0.33 for employment.
Figure 1 shows the positive comovements referred to above.
Figure 1: International Comovement
Table 2 shows the cross-country correlations between the macroeconomic
aggregates for the US and some European economies. As shown there, the
consumption/output anomaly and the comovement of investment and em-
ployment across countries are still present when analyzing each country in
particular.
There are also some credit markets stylized facts that I want to reproduce
More integration also leads to decreased cross-country consumption correlations because
of lower substitutability between home and foreign goods, a stronger home-bias in con-
sumption and higher willingness to substitute consumption intertemporally.
8Table 2: The Data on International Comovement
Country ρ(C,CUS) ρ(Y ,Y US) ρ(I,IUS) ρ(L,LUS)
Australia -0.13 0.6 0.21 -0.17
Austria 0.45 0.54 0.57 0.58
Canada 0.46 0.81 0 0.5
France 0.42 0.46 0.22 0.36
Germany 0.64 0.85 0.66 0.6
Italy 0.04 0.49 0.39 0.11
Japan 0.49 0.66 0.59 0.48
Switzerland 0.48 0.48 0.38 0.43
UK 0.42 0.64 0.46 0.68
Source: Baxter (1995).
ρ(C,CUS) ρ(Y ,Y US) ρ(I,IUS) ρ(L,LUS)
France 0.432 0.4901 0.4861 -
Italy 0.2756 0.4911 0.352 0.2743
UK 0.8333 0.913 0.9553 0.7656
Data are on the correlations between the United States and Europe for logged and
Hodrick-Prescott ﬁltered data for 1980-1995.
Source: United Nations Common Database.
by modelling a non-competitive banking sector. Net interest margins (NIMs)
or bank spreads, deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the interest rates on loans
and deposits, are countercyclical in the US. In Europe, the same is true
for Germany and the United Kingdom (see Table 3 for the data and spread
speciﬁcations). The countercyclicality of NIMs is also documented in Olivero
(2004). There I show that a 1% percentage point increase in the growth rate
of GDP per capita lowers bank spreads by 0.24 percentage points in the
United States economy. This is true even when controlling for the impact
on spreads of countercyclical monetary policy, default risk, capital structure
and branching regulations, and changes to market concentration measures
among other factors.
In the American economy additional evidence that the degree of market
9power is inversely related to the level of economic activity can be found by
looking at the number of banking institutions and branches. They are both
procyclical. The correlation of the number of commercial banks branches to
GDP is positive and equal to 0.13. That of the number of banking institutions
to GDP equals 0.24. The evolution of the number of banking institutions and
branches is plotted in Figure 2. My setup will not rely on this procyclicality
though. The number of banks is exogenous in the theoretical model. Given
that interstate branching was completely unrestricted only after June 1997 in
the US, these correlations were calculated also separately for the 1967-1996
and 1997-2000 periods. It can be seen in Table 3 that banking institutions
and branches are both procyclical in these two periods.
Another indicator is given by the inverse relationship between measures of
market concentration and GDP. Using the Report of Condition and Income
data7, I calculated the Herﬁndahl-Hirschman index (HHI)8 for the deposits
and loans markets. As shown in Table 3, both indexes have a slight negative
correlation with detrended GDP.
Thus, for the US economy there is substantial evidence that market power
in the banking industry is inversely related to GDP. Nevertheless, it is impor-
tant to highlight that neither of the last two facts is crucial to the mechanisms
at work in my theoretical model. There the number of banks and the degree
of concentration in the entire industry are ﬁxed at business cycle frequencies.
I only rely on countercyclical markups to get my results. I still interpret coun-
tercyclical markups as evidence of the degree of market power falling with
GDP given that in Olivero (2004) I document that this countercyclicality is
a feature of the US data even after controlling for several other issues that
might make the markup fall with the level of aggregate economic activity.
Moreover, the countercyclicality of price-cost margins could arise from
7These data are available quarterly for US banks from 1976 to present.
8The HHI is given by the sum of squared market shares for individual banks.
10Figure 2: USA Banking Institutions and Branches
costs of collusion increasing with GDP as in Rotemberg and Saloner (1986),
from banks’ costs over the interest rate on deposits falling over the cycle, or
from a procyclical price elasticity of the demand for credit. Although the
driving force of this cyclical behavior is not crucial to my model, I choose the
third in line with my interpretation of the data mentioned in the previous
paragraph. Moreover, in the theoretical model, it is increasing returns to
scale for producers of capital what allow me to obtain a procyclical enough
elasticity. There is substantial evidence of increasing returns in the invest-
ment sector9.
There is also evidence that real interest rates are countercyclical in both
the United States and Europe (Prescott et al (1983), Plosser (1987), Fama
and French (1989), King and Watson (1996) and Seppala (2000)). My model
9This evidence is documented in Antweiler and Treﬂer (2000), Harrison (2003) and
Maioli (2003) among others.
11will be able to match this behavior too.
The last issue that I want to look at in the calibration exercise is the cross-
country correlation of banks spreads. I calculated this statistic for alternative
measures of NIMs in the European banking sector and for particular OECD
countries (Germany and the United Kingdom). As shown on Table 3, except
for the case of Germany, banks price-cost margins comove across countries.
Standard international real business cycle models with only one good
and complete ﬁnancial markets fail to reproduce the comovement refered
to above. They predict negative cross-country correlations for investment
and employment; a very low cross-country correlation for output, driven
mainly by the correlation of the exogenous process assumed for total factor
productivity; and a perfect (or close to perfect) correlation for consumption
levels. That is, predicted consumption correlations are always higher than
those for output, what has been labeled the quantity anomaly.
In this paper I am able to reproduce the positive correlations in the
data, the ranking between consumption and output correlations, and the
countercyclicality of net exports. My results also match the countercyclicality
of real interest rates and of bank spreads and the positive comovement of
bank spreads across countries.
12Table 3: Banking Sector Stylized Facts
Spread Correlation with Output
USA
Spread = (Bank prime − certiﬁcate of deposits rate) -0.41
Spread = (Bank prime − 3 month Treasury Bill rate) -0.21
European Countries
Germany (Current account credit - 3 month deposit rate) -0.29
United Kingdom (Lending rate - deposit rate) -0.13
Interest Rates
USA: ρ(r,GDP)a -0.27
United Kingdom: ρ(r,GDP)b -0.17
USA: Market Concentration
ρ(number of branches, GDP)
1967 − 2000 0.13
1967 − 1996 0.15
1997 − 2000 0.22
σbranches/σGDP 2.14
ρ(number of banking institutions, GDP)
1967 − 2000 0.24
1967 − 1996 0.12
1997 − 2000 0.98
σbankinginstitutions/σGDP 0.32
ρ(HHI, GDP)
HHI for deposits -0.06
HHI for loans -0.02
Cross-Country Correlation of Spreads
With European spread (for up to 3 months deposits and loans rates) 0.4441
With European spread (for up to 1 year deposits and loans rates) 0.1228
With Germany -0.147
With UK 0.1646
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, FDIC and Report of Condition and
Income for US data and International Financial Statistics for European data.
US data on interest rates is quarterly for 1967.I to 2003.I. European data on interest rates
is quarterly for 1996.I to 2003.I. Data on number of institutions and branches is annual for
1966-2000.
a Taken from King and Watson (1996).
b Based on Seppala (2000) for the correlation between the one-year real interest rate
and the cyclical component of real GDP per capita.
133 Background Literature
Several papers have looked at various determinants of the international trans-
mission of business cycles and tried to explain these discrepancies between
the cross-country correlations in the data and what benchmark models with
complete markets predict. They have done this through very diﬀerent mod-
elling strategies, including credit market imperfections, imperfect competi-
tion in input markets, household production, government spending entering
preferences and shocks to beliefs among others.
My paper is most closely related to two diﬀerent strands of this literature:
The work using credit market frictions to explain the puzzles, and the litera-
ture on imperfect competition in goods markets as a source of international
propagation of shocks.
The most inﬂuential papers within the ﬁrst strand are Baxter and Crucini
(1995), Kollman (1996), Heathcote and Perri (2002) and Kehoe and Perri
(2002).
Baxter and Crucini (1995) use a two-country, single-good model of an
economy where only non-contingent bonds can be traded. Their model pre-
dicts high output correlations and low consumption correlations. However,
they ﬁnd that incomplete markets modify the predictions of the standard
RBC model only when productivity in each country follows a random walk
without international spillovers and with correlated innovations. This is not
exactly consistent with empirical estimations of the process followed by total
factor productivity in the US and OECD economies.
Kollman (1996) develops a single good model with adjustment costs to
investment. Market incompleteness is given by the fact that only debt con-
tracts (risk-free bonds) can be traded in asset markets. As a result, agents
are less able to oﬀset the eﬀects of idiosyncratic shocks, and consumption
across countries is less correlated than under complete markets. However, he
14gets negative investment and employment cross-country correlations.
Heathcote and Perri (2002) build a two-country, two-good model, but
one of ﬁnancial autarky where risk sharing is completely prohibited. Au-
tarky helps them get cross-country consumption, output, investment and
employment correlations similar to those in the data.
Kehoe and Perri (2002) endogeneize market incompleteness. They solve
some of the anomalies between theoretical predictions and the data through
the introduction of imperfectly enforceable international loans in a two-
country, one-good model. The credit market imperfection comes from the
requirement that each country prefer the allocation it receives when partic-
ipating in international ﬁnancial markets relative to the autarky one. This
friction helps to account for the discrepancies more than does exogenously
restricting available trade in assets. One of the key mechanisms that work to
get an increased output correlation is given by the severe restrictions that the
enforcement constraints impose on risk-sharing and international investment
ﬂows. As regards consumption, the correlation across countries is reduced
because risk-sharing is not feasible if the enforcement constraints are to be
met. The restrictions that these constraints impose on ﬁnancial capital mo-
bility do not arise from arbitrage arguments in a decentralized economy10.
The strength of this paper lies on the endogeneity of ﬁnancial markets in-
completeness. Risk sharing is not exogenously restricted as in most of the
models.
This paper is also embedded within the literature on imperfectly com-
10Kehoe and Perri (2002) show how to decentralize this economy. Private agents act
competitively in an economy with capital income taxes and take as given the government’s
default decisions on foreign debt. With both such instruments-debt default and capital
income taxes-the constrained eﬃcient allocations can be decentralized. When the capital
income tax is set appropriately, it both aligns the intertemporal marginal rates of substi-
tution of the private agents with those of the planner and makes private agents internalize
the external eﬀect generated by investment (Kehoe and Perri (2002)).
15petitive goods markets as a mechanism for the international transmission
of productivity shocks. Rottemberg and Woodford (1991, 1992 and 1995)
use countercyclical markups as a propagation mechanism, but they do not
speciﬁcally address the international RBC puzzles. Head (2002) explains co-
movements with procyclical product inventions. In a small open economy
model, Schmitt-Grohe (1998) models countercyclical markups to explain the
transmission of US interest rate and trade shocks to the Canadian econ-
omy. Ubide (1999) introduces government spending entering households’
preferences, imperfect competition in the goods markets, indivisible labor
and complete markets in an international business cycle model. Exogenous
shocks aﬀect technology, markups and government spending in his model,
and he concludes that markup ﬂuctuations alone are not able to reproduce
the main stylized facts11, and that government spending shocks are needed
to match the data. Among the several speciﬁcations he estimates, the best
results are obtained for a model with exogenous government spending and
markup shocks. He does not get positive comovements for all variables in a
variable markups model driven just by technology shocks. Ubide argues in
his paper that imperfect competition is key in models of international busi-
ness cycles and that it should be endogenized. This paper will endogenously
model imperfect competition in the ﬁnancial sector, something to my knowl-
edge not previously done in the context of the International RBC literature.
Specially relevant is Cook (2002), with an imperfectly competitive dy-
namic general equilibrium setup. He models procyclical sequential market
entry for ﬁnal goods producers in a market characterized by Cournot compe-
tition with free entry. This acts as an international transmission mechanism
for productivity shocks because, with trade in diﬀerentiated goods, a produc-
tivity increase in one economy leads to additional business formation in the
11They reproduce cross-country correlations, but predict countercyclical consumption
and productivity.
16other country through demand spillovers. Business formation brings coun-
tercyclical markups, what leads to an expansion in employment, investment
and production in both economies. Sequential entry and a ﬁrst-mover ad-
vantage to incumbents are needed to obtain markups that are elastic enough
to cause international comovement. An alternative framework with simul-
taneous entry does not work. Cook (2002) abstracts from ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing
issues and credit market imperfections.
In Table 4 I summarize the results of the papers reviewed here. Boxes
around the numbers indicate that either the consumption / output anomaly is
solved, positive cross-country correlations are obtained for investment and/or
employment or the countercyclicality of net exports is reproduced.
In an extended table in Appendix C I present the literature’s main results.
There I include simulation results for both the papers reviewed here and
some others that try to solve the anomalies with models not directly related
to mine. The goal there is to show the vast work on these puzzles and the
relative lack of success in ﬁnding a solution to them.
I improve over previous work by being able to solve the anomalies while
still reproducing the countercyclicality of net exports, bank NIMs and real
interest rates.
17Table 4: The Literature Results
ρ(C,C*) ρ(Y,Y*) ρ(I,I*) ρ(L,L*) ρ(NX/Y,Y)
Data 0.3311 0.4496 0.4151 0.2167 -0.37
Backus et al model 0.88 -0.21 -0.94 -0.94 0.01
Baxter-Crucini (1995)1a 0.95 0.04 0.02 -0.7 0.658
Baxter-Crucini1b 0.92 0.06 0.12 -0.67 0.658
Baxter-Crucini2a 0.89 -0.41 -0.92 -0.91 −0.188
Baxter-Crucini2b -0.28 0.54 -0.5 -0.56 −0.288
Kollman (1996)3 0.38 0.1 -0.12 -0.12 -0.07
Ubide(1999) 0.73 0.26 -0.15 0.32 −0.558
Ubide (1999)4 0.82 0.91 0.85 0.91 −0.228
13- Lubik (2000)5a -
TFP shocks
0.42 - 0.79 0.61 - 0.77 0.89 - 0.99 - -0.14 - 0.01
13- Lubik (2000)5b -
TFP and money shocks
0.33 - 0.71 0.51 - 0.66 0.78 - 0.96 - -0.15 - -0.01
Heathcote-Perri (2002) 0.85 0.24 0.35 0.14 0
Cook (2002) 0.284 0.521 0.188 0.884 -
Head (2002)6a 0.81 0.485 0.343 0.293 -0.187
Head (2002)6b 0.853 0.486 0.451 0.302 0.085
Kehoe-Perri (2002) 0.29 0.25 0.33 0.23 0.27
Alesandria-Choi(2004)7 0.2 0.43 0.39 0.64 -0.43
This paper - GHH U 0.6657 0.8047 0.8607 0.6132 -0.7592
Cobb-Douglas U 0.708 0.9922 0.8975 0.5862 0.1433
1a- Baxter and Crucini (1995): Complete markets Backus et al parameterization of TFP process. 1b-
Idem with only noncontingent bonds. 2a- Complete markets Unit root in productivity without spillovers.
2b- Idem with only noncontingent bonds.
3- Kollman (1996): Only risk-free debt contracts. Adjustment costs to investment. 4- Ubide (1999): With
exogenous G and markup shocks. 5- Lubik (2000): A two-sector, multiple-good, monetary business cycle
model with price stickiness in the non-traded sector. 6a- Head (2002): Purely country-speciﬁc shocks and
IRS, which operate through changes in the world-wide variety of intermediate goods (trade in varieties-
induced link). 6b- Constant returns to variety and strongly correlated technology shocks, Corr(e1, e2) =
0.7. 7- Alessandria-Choi (2004): A complete markets economy with trade in diﬀerentiated intermediate
goods and ﬁxed costs to exports. Firms subject to idiosyncratic shocks. 8- NX in this case.
184 The Model
I extend a standard two country dynamic, general equilibrium model by
introducing international trade in two imperfectly substitutable goods, and
a credit market friction given by the fact that entrepreneurs need to ﬁnance
capital production with loans, and that these are granted by an oligopolistic
banking sector.
There is a representative household, a representative ﬁrm and a represen-
tative entrepreneur in each country. A ”global” oligopolistic banking sector
collects deposits and lends to both economies.
I present the setup for the home country in this section. Analogous
optimization problems apply to all agents in the foreign country. I use stars
to denote foreign country variables.
4.1 The Households
A continuum of households choose consumption of domestic and imported
goods, labor and bank deposits in each of the N banks (Di for i = 1,...,N)








˜ β0 = 1 (2)
˜ βt+1 = ˜ βt(1 + ˜ Ct − ˜ L
ω
t )
−φ t ≥ 0 (3)
where ˜ βC < 0 and ˜ βL > 0. The fact that the discount factor is endoge-
nous induces stationarity for the asset holdings in this incomplete markets
model where idiosyncratic shocks imply wealth redistributions between the
two countries. I model the discount factor as a function of average consump-
tion ( ˜ C) and labor (˜ L), which the individual household takes as given. In
equilibrium:
19˜ Ct = Ct (4)
˜ Lt = Lt (5)






with σ>1 being the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion that also pins down
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. The speciﬁcation for preferences
implies no wealth eﬀects for labor supply.
C represents the domestic consumption aggregator over goods produced








The foreign aggregator C∗ is represented by an analogous expression
where ε is replaced by (1-ε). These aggregators are of the constant elas-
ticity of substitution (CES) type, so that the elasticity of substitution be-
tween domestic and foreign goods is not restricted to be unitary, which is
consistent with the data. Also, perfect substitutability and a linear aggrega-
tor would imply that agents would consume only the good that is relatively
cheaper. There would be no demand spillovers that increase cross-country
output correlations, and that would prevent the model from reproducing the
consumption patterns of both local and imported goods.
The two-good model provides both a demand and a terms of trade chan-
nel to the international transmission of shocks. Each country exogenously
20specializes in the production of one of the goods12.
Each household’s budget constraint is given by






















where Tt are terms of trade or, equivalently, the relative price of the foreign
good in terms of the domestic good (the numeraire), Di is domestic house-
hold’s deposits in each of the N oligopolistic global banks. Domestic (foreign)
deposits are denominated in units of good 1 (2). Domestic households own
the domestic goods producing ﬁrms and entrepreneurs, and earn dividends
on them. I assume here that households in each country own one half of the
global banks. This fraction is assumed constant at business cycle frequen-
cies. Firms, entrepreneurs and banks proﬁts are all rebated to households in
a lump-sum fashion13.
Households have access to risk-free deposits. The interest rate on deposits
earned by domestic households is denoted by r14.
Each household is subject to a borrowing constraint that at all dates







t+j+1 ≥ 0 (9)







12The pattern of production specialization is not endogenized through neither compar-
ative advantage nor Heckscher-Ohlin theories. This exogenous specialization simplifying
assumption is standard in the literature.
13Firms proﬁts are zero in equilibrium.
14By the risk free assumption, rt−1 is in the information set of period t-1.
214.2 The Final Good Sector
Competitive ﬁrms in the economy produce a ﬁnal good operating a constant
returns to scale Cobb-Douglas technology. They demand labor and hire
capital to maximize proﬁts. Labor is country-speciﬁc and it earns a wage
rate w. Capital is rented at a cost rK from entrepreneurs who produce the





t = Yt − wtLt − r
K
t Kt (11)
subject to a Cobb-Douglas production technology





where total factor productivity (At) follows an AR(1) in logs process





is part of the state vector of the model. Λ is a matrix of coeﬃcients and εt =
(εt, ε∗
t). The oﬀ-diagonal elements of Λ deﬁne the spillovers from one coun-
try to the other. The elements of εt are serially independent, multivariate,
normal random variables with contemporaneous covariance matrix V . TFP
processes are related across countries through the oﬀ-diagonal elements of
both Λ and V .
15An implicit assumption here is that agents cannot own physical capital in the foreign
country.
224.3 The Investment Sector
A continuum of entrepreneurs produce the economy’s capital stock. They
ﬁnance capital production with loans obtained from oligopolistic banks at a
risk-free rate R, and rent their output to producers of ﬁnal goods at a rate
rK.
Based on evidence documented by Antweiler and Treﬂer (2000)16, Harri-
son (2003)17 and Maioli (2003)18 among others, I model an investment process
characterized by increasing returns to scale external to the entrepreneur.
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t+1 ≥ Ωit, (17)
kt+1 = ztit + (1 − δ)kt, (18)
zt = f(It) f
0(It) > 0 (19)
Entrepreneurs use the same discount factor as the households that own
them. k and i stand for capital and investment for each entrepreneur, respec-
tively. λ denotes the shadow value of wealth for the household, dE stands
16Antweiler and Treﬂer (2000) ﬁnd evidence of constant returns to scale for sectors like
apparel, food, ﬁshing and agricultural goods,textiles and electricity, and of increasing re-
turns to scale for other sectors like petroleum and coal products, pharmaceuticals, electric
and electronic machinery, iron and steel basic industries, instruments and non-electrical
machinery.
17Harrison (2003) ﬁnds that returns to scale are increasing in the investment sector.
For consumption, her study indicates decreasing to constant returns, with evidence of a
positive external eﬀect.
18Maioli (2003) estimates returns to scale for 22 French industries and ﬁnds that they are
generally higher for sectors like minerals, gas, metals and electric and mechanical products
than for typical consumption goods.
23for the loans amount. The parameter Ω denotes the fraction of investment
that needs to be externally ﬁnanced. Given that the interest rate on loans is
strictly positive and bigger than the discount rate for the entrepreneur, the
borrowing constraint in (17) binds in equilibrium.
By this condition, I impose the need for banks in the economy19. If
Ω, the debt to investment ratio, was treated as an endogenous variable, it
would optimally be zero. Given that my results do not hinge at all on the
way in which I justify the existence of banks, my results should be robust to
other ways of imposing the existence of banks, like monitoring costs, liquidity
provision, etc20.
In equilibrium
it = It (20)
kt = Kt (21)
This speciﬁcation does not imply increasing returns to the capital pro-
duction process for entrepreneurs. This production process features an ex-
ternality not internalized by entrepreneurs when they take their production
decisions. Therefore, increasing returns apply only at the aggregate level21.
What is key here is that this implies that the price elasticity of the demand
for loans is increasing in the equilibrium amount of credit, and the interest
rate markup charged by the banking sector is countercyclical.
19By doing this I am implicitly assuming that entrepreneurs face an inﬁnite cost of going
directly to the households to ﬁnance that fraction Ω of investment.
20An alternative way to interpret this constraint is the following: If banks provide some
sort of services essential for production together with the loans, a fraction Ω of investment
has to be ﬁnanced externally to get those services, even if entrepreneurs could ﬁnance it
with their own current earnings.
21z is a function of the aggregate level of investment I, not of individual investment by
each entrepreneur in the economy.
244.4 The Banking Sector
There are N ”global” or world oligopolistic banks with branches in each of
the countries, that take deposits from both domestic and foreign households
and lend to both entrepreneurs. As in Cetorelli and Peretto (2000), they are
Cournot oligopolists and they face a downward sloping demand for funds and
aﬀect the price of loans when taking their credit supply decisions.
Banks have market power in the market for loans, but behave competi-
tively when taking deposits from households in the economy, they have no
oligopsonistic power22.
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li (li∗) denotes the loans to the domestic (foreign) country by bank i. dE
(dE∗) is the total volume of loans for the whole domestic (foreign) economy,
so that the second and third constraints are the deﬁnition of the aggregate
22Having banks with market power in the market for deposits also would make my results
stronger and the markup even more countercyclical. In that case, both the demand for
loans by entrepreneurs and the supply of deposits by households become more elastic with
increases in the level of aggregate economic activity, and the markup in the market for
credit falls even more.
23i superscripts are used to denote each of the individual banks.
25demand for loans by the investment sector in each country. The fourth
constraint is the balance sheet equation for each bank.
Banks make their lending decisions and set an interest rate on loans R.
Entrepreneurs face it and set the rental rate on capital rK.
As already discussed, an increase in total factor productivity, which in-
creases the ﬁrm’s demand for capital and hence, the entrepreneur’s demand
for credit, raises the price elasticity of the demand for credit, lowering the
markup and the cost of credit relative to standard models that lack this fric-
tion. As a result, the equilibrium level of capital increases by more than in
standard models. With highly autocorrelated technology shocks, this in turn
implies a countercyclical return on domestic deposits. By the arbitrage per-
formed by global banks, interest rates on foreign deposits start falling too.
This drives down the cost of credit in the foreign country and stimulates their
investment, employment and output.
4.5 Model’s Solution
The ﬁrst order conditions for the representative household’s optimization




−σ = λt (26)
where λt is the shadow value of wealth for the representative household and
it equals the marginal utility of consumption.
The intratemporal condition for the allocation of consumption between











The Euler equations for consumption, which govern the optimal allocation
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t I denote the price of the consumption aggregator in terms
of domestic goods (the numeraire) in the home and foreign country respec-
tively. They are a price index built as a weighted average of the price of the
numeraire and the terms of trade (Tt).








The ﬁrm’s problem gives the standard inverse demand functions for labor
and capital:


































27This equation says that the cost of borrowing has to equal the marginal
revenue obtained by the entrepreneur from the borrowed funds, which is
given by the future marginal productivity of capital. This productivity is in
turn aﬀected by increasing returns to scale in the production of capital.




[(1 + Rt)(1 +
εR,t
N
) − (1 + rt)]] = 0 (37)
where εR is the reciprocal of the elasticity of the demand for loans by en-
trepreneurs. Basically, this condition is equating each bank’s marginal rev-
enue to its marginal cost.










]] = 0 (38)
When the economy becomes more productive, the demand for loans in-
creases and εR falls, such that the markup falls. As a result, bank spreads
behave countercyclically in this model, which is consistent with the empirical
evidence. In a way that will become clearer later this implies a fall in the
return on deposits in both economies, which allows me to obtain positive
cross-country comovements of investment, employment and output.
4.5.1 Market Clearing
The market clearing conditions are deﬁned by the equations below. World
output of each good is devoted to consumption and investment, so that the
market clearing conditions in the goods markets are:
28x1,t + x
∗












In each country households’ labor supply has to equal ﬁrms labor demand.
Capital markets have to clear and capital demand by ﬁrms has to equal the
capital supply implied by the entrepreneur’s Euler equation. Similarly, the
aggregate demand for loans by the investment sector has to equal the supply
by the N banks in the economy.
4.5.2 Equilibrium
The recursive equilibrium in this economy is deﬁned by value functions for the
home and foreign households, for the home and foreign entrepreneurs and for
the each of the global banks; decision rules for consumption, labor supply and
savings for the home and foreign households; decision rules for labor and cap-
ital demand for the home and foreign ﬁrms; decision rules for investment and
borrowing for the home and foreign entrepreneurs; decision rules for the sup-








that satisfy the following conditions:
- The home and foreign households’ FOCs;
- the home and foreign ﬁrms’ FOCs;
- the home and foreign entrepreneurs’ FOCs;
- the banks’ pricing equations;
- the world resource constraints for both goods;
- the market clearing conditions for the labor, capital and loans/deposits
markets; and
- the no-Ponzi constraint on deposits in each country.
295 How Does the Model Work?
The intuition about how the key mechanism in the model works is made
clear by solving analytically for some of the variables in the deterministic
steady state of the model. As I will show with the numerical results, the
main novel force that allows me to get positive cross-country correlations for
employment, investment and output is given by endogenously countercyclical
markups for the oligopolistic banking industry.
In this section I derive an expression for the price elasticity of the de-
mand for credit. I show that it is directly related to the level of investment
demand. Therefore, when a positive productivity shock hits the economy,
both investment and the demand for credit rise. The elasticity of that de-
mand also increases, and implies a lower markup for the oligopolistic banks
that provide investment ﬁnancing, due to a falling degree of market power.













˜ βrK − z
(42)
It can be shown that
∂εR
∂I <0 for the model calibrated to the US economy.
Denoting:
ν =
α(ω + α) − (ω + α − 1)
(ω + α − 1)
< 0 (43)
ϑ = (1 + θ)ν + θ < 0 (44)
µ = I
θ−1(
−(1 − Ω)ν(1 + θ)
˜ β2rKz






˜ βrK − z) − I
θϑµ < 0 (46)
A model with an isoelastic demand for credit is nested in this one. It
corresponds to θ = 0 and Ω = 1, so that the elasticity of demand is constant
and equal to εR =
(1−α)(ω+α)−1
(ω+α−1) . Here banks’ markups are constant over the
cycle. Results for this case show that the key feature in this model that
allows to solve the quantity anomaly and to reproduce the co-movements of
employment and investment, is not the oligopolistic structure of banking per
se, but the endogenously countercyclical NIMs.
When the domestic economy experiences a positive productivity shock,
the demand for loans increases, the markup falls and the banking industry
becomes more competitive. This is consistent with the US banking sector
stylized facts presented in Section 2 and with the empirical evidence docu-
mented in Olivero (2004).
Therefore, the cost of credit falls with respect to standard models that
lack this friction. With highly autocorrelated technology shocks, the degree of
oligopolistic power is lower in the future than currently. Agents know this and
that the cost of investing will be lower in the future. Consequently, the ratio
Ct+1
Ct falls and the ratio
U0(Ct+1)
U0(Ct) increases with respect to standard models.
This, together with the fact that in this model there is a wedge between the
interest rate on deposits and the marginal productivity of capital, implies a
countercyclical rate of return on deposits.
The non weak separability of preferences also plays a role here. With a
decreasing market power, the quantity of capital increases over time relative
to standard models without this friction. The marginal productivity of la-
bor increases and leisure falls over time, again relative to standard models.
The marginal utility of consumption increases over time and works to get a
countercyclical return on households’ savings24.
24Prescott et al (1983), Plosser (1987), Fama and French (1989), King and Watson
31Given that r represents the opportunity cost of funds for banks, coun-
tercyclical r and spreads imply a strongly countercyclical cost of credit. A
fall in r makes banks use local deposits, which are now cheaper for them, to
ﬁnance both domestic and foreign loans. By arbitrage, the interest rate on
foreign deposits r∗ falls too and drives down the cost of credit in the other
country. This encourages higher investment and allows for employment and
output to increase in the foreign country too.
6 Numerical Solution
6.1 Calibration
I calibrate the model to match some of the post-war stylized facts of the USA
and OECD economies. The time period is a quarter. The parameter values
are shown in Table 5.
The parameter ω matches the price elasticities of labor supply in the
US and OECD countries. In the consumption aggregators, ε is chosen to
match the share of imported goods in total consumption. The parameter
ρ governs the elasticity of substitution between local and foreign goods in
consumption. It implies a 0.9 elasticity as in Heathcote and Perri (2002).
In the production function, α represents the constant output share of the
remuneration to capital.




The parameters governing the capital production process Ω and θ , match
a 0.25 investment share of output in the deterministic steady state. Also, the
value chosen for θ is consistent with the evidence for slight increasing returns
in the investment sector found by Harrison (2003).
(1996) and Seppala (2000) provide evidence on the countercyclicality of real returns.
32Table 5: Calibration
Utility function and budget constraint Consumption aggregator
ω = 1.6 ε = 0.85
σ = 2 ρ = -1/9
φ (-elasticity of the discount factor with respect to
its argument) = 0.1
Goods production function
α = 0.36
Production function for capital
N = 2
δ = 0.04
Ω = 0.25 θ = 0.04
TFP Process (Backus et al)
λ11 = λ22 = 0.906
λ12 = λ21 = 0.05
σ2(εt) = σ2(ε∗
t) = (0.0085)2 ρ(ε, ε∗) = 0.25
A * denotes foreign country’s parameters.
6.2 Results
The model has no closed form solution and has to be solved using a numerical
algorithm. The assumption that the shocks to the economy are not signif-
icantly big make log-linearization around a symmetric steady state a valid
method25.
A well-known fact in two country models with incomplete asset mar-
kets is that temporary shocks can have permanent eﬀects because of the
international wealth redistributions that arise with country-speciﬁc shocks.
Here I obtain stationarity by allowing for an endogenous discount factor for
households. However, agents do not internalize their eﬀect on the discount
factor26.
25The model was solved numerically using the log-linearization codes available in Pro-
fessors Stephanie Schmitt-Grohe’s and Martin Uribe’s web pages.
26This is because the discount factor is modelled as a function of the averages, and not
the individual, consumption and employment.
336.3 GHH Preferences
In this section I present the results for the benchmark model with GHH
preferences. Some key features about how the general equilibrium works
arise from the simulations.
A positive technology shock to the home country increases its marginal
productivity of both labor and capital. Therefore, both factors of production
increase on impact. With no wealth eﬀects on labor supply, labor increases
even with the positive wealth eﬀect of the shock implied by market incom-
pleteness. As a result, home output increases as well. There is also a positive
terms of trade eﬀect for the foreign country. From the supply side, goods
produced in the foreign country (which is relatively less productive) become
more expensive. From the demand side, the home country is now wealthier
and it increases the demand for both types of goods, increasing it relatively
more for home goods27, what makes the latter more expensive. In the nu-
merical results, I see the ﬁrst eﬀect dominating over the second.
I present my simulation results in Table 6. The second column shows
results for the model with both the trade channel and oligopolistic banking.
Correlations for employment and investment are positive; consumption and
output also comove. The consumption correlation is lower than for output,
what provides an explanation to the quantity anomaly.
The results also replicate the countercyclicality of net exports, which is
another stylized fact of international real business cycles28. I am also able
27This is because of the way in which I calibrate the consumption aggregator, with a
higher share of domestic goods for any level of consumption.
28There are two opposite forces aﬀecting the capital account after a positive TFP shock
to one of the countries. On the one hand, foreign assets held by domestic households
increase due to the interest rate eﬀect. A lower interest rate in the relatively more pro-
ductive economy makes banks use this economy’s deposits to ﬁnance foreign investment.
On the other hand, foreigners’ holdings of domestic assets increase due to the productivity
eﬀect. The numerical results indicate that the second eﬀect is more powerful, what makes
the capital account procyclical (and the current account, countercyclical)
34Table 6: Simulation Results with GHH Preferences
Data 2 goods 2 goods 1 good
olig. banks comp. banks olig. banks
Cross-country
Correlations
ρ(C,C*) 0.3311 0.6657 -0.7426 0.3922
ρ(L,L*) 0.2167 0.6132 0.7841 -0.0706
ρ(I,I*) 0.4151 0.8607 -0.7528 -0.9543
ρ(Y,Y*) 0.4496 0.8047 -0.2008 -0.0706
ρ(spread,spread*) 0.1228 / 0.4441 0.9224 - -0.2508
Domestic
Correlations
ρ(NX/Y,Y) -0.37 -0.7592 -0.5818 0.2325
ρ(C,Y) 0.8734 0.9872 0.8974 0.9649
ρ(L,Y) 0.5494 0.9901 0.3115 1
ρ(I,Y) 0.9245 0.8637 0.7982 0.1137
ρ(r,Y) −0.27a -0.5621 -0.5884 0.4969
ρ(spread,Y) -0.41 / -0.21 -0.7724 - -0.5011
Standard
Deviations
σ(C)/σ(Y) 0.8 0.8693 1.7815 0.7867
σ(L)/σ(Y) 0.88 0.4995 0.6439 0.6452
σ(I)/σ(Y) 2.61 1.9534 2.6186 5.4553
σ(T)/σ(Y) 2.88 0.5551 2.3833 -
Source: Idem Table 1.
C: consumption, Y: output, I: investment, L: employment, NX: net exports, r: real interest
rate on deposits.
a: Taken from King and Watson (1996).
35to match the countercyclicality of real interest rates and banks’ spreads, and
the positive cross-country correlation of the latter.
There is one dimension in which the model does not perform well. The
standard deviation of the terms of trade is too low with respect to the data.
This is another anomaly identiﬁed by the literature and labelled the ”price
variability” anomaly by Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1994).
Cross-country consumption correlations signiﬁcantly lower than those im-
plied by standard models result from a combination of several key elements
of the model: The imperfect risk sharing implied by incomplete ﬁnancial
markets, a terms of trade eﬀect and non weakly separable preferences.
Sensibilizations performed on the parameter Ω show that it does not sig-
niﬁcantly alter the cross-country correlations of macroeconomic aggregates.
It does aﬀect the contemporaneous correlation of r and the spread with do-
mestic output, though.
A relevant exercise is to show how results change for two alternative sce-
narios. First, for a two-good model with perfectly competitive banks and no
frictions in the capital production process, i.e. assuming constant returns to
scale in the capital production process. Second, for an oligopolistic banking
economy but with only one good, that is, for a case with no trade channel.
I show the results for these experiments on the third and fourth columns of
Table 6, respectively. The purpose is to highlight the importance of both
the trade in goods channel and credit market frictions working together to
explain the anomalies.
In the ﬁrst alternative scenario, for the perfectly competitive banking
model, the cross-country correlations for investment, output and consump-
tion are still negative, even with the trade channel working there. I interpret
these results as suggestive of imperfect competition in the banking sector
being crucial to explain the anomalies. Net exports are still countercyclical
in this case. This is in line with previous research, which has shown that this
36fact can be reproduced in models of incomplete markets only when a terms
of trade eﬀect is present.
Results for the second scenario show that trade in goods is important
in explaining the puzzles. Even with countercyclical bank spreads, with no
trade, the cross-country correlation of investment is negative. Labor and
output are also negatively related across countries in this case. With no
terms of trade eﬀect, net exports are procyclical.
In Figure 3 I show impulse response functions for employment, invest-
ment, capital, output and consumption to a one standard deviation shock to
the home country’s total factor productivity. Home total factor productivity
experiences a 1% increase on impact. Foreign productivity also increases,
given that there are signiﬁcant international spillovers according to the spec-
iﬁcation assumed for the process followed by productivity.
The positive correlation across countries for all the main macroeconomic
aggregates is evident from these plots29. Employment jumps in the domes-
tic economy, but it falls on impact in the foreign one. Foreign productivity
is increasing only slightly and the positive terms of trade eﬀect makes pC∗
increase, so that the foreign real wage falls. With no wealth eﬀects on labor
supply, foreign labor falls on impact. Investment increases in the home coun-
try on impact, while foreign investment rises only with a lag. While foreign
productivity increases and the cost of credit falls, the negative impact on
employment seems to be imposing an oﬀsetting force on the marginal pro-
ductivity of capital in the foreign country, such that investment does not rise
on impact. As a result, both output and consumption increase domestically
and fall in the foreign country. The impulse response for r∗ shows that it in-
creases. This, together with the increase in pC∗ and the falling cost of credit
(R∗) drive the initial decline in C∗.
29The highest Eigenvalue in the system equals 0.97, which drives the high persistence
in the variables observed in the impulse response functions.
37Figure 3: Impulse Response Functions
386.4 Cobb-Douglas Preferences
In this section I develop a robustness check of the benchmark model. I now





where the parameter µ pins down the share of consumption and it is
calibrated to 0.4. The results for this alternative framework are in Table 7.
Conclusions regarding the anomalies stay the same. I still obtain positive
comovement for investment and employment, and the cross-country correla-
tion of consumption falls below that for output.
With these preferences, the model performs a little bit better in terms of
the volatility of the terms of trade, although it cannot match the data yet.




















Source: Idem Table 6.
407 Concluding Remarks
To study the international transmission of business cycles among the USA
and OECD countries, in this paper I extend an otherwise standard two-
country RBC model through the introduction of trade in goods and credit
market frictions. Endogenously countercyclical markups in the market for
credit are the key novel force working in the model. By doing so, I am able
to explain the discrepancies in the International RBC literature identiﬁed by
Backus et al (1992). I obtain positive comovement of consumption, output,
investment and employment across countries, and propose a potential solu-
tion to the quantity anomaly. Simulations for a one-good model and for a
setup with perfectly competitive banking are indicative of the importance of
the trade in goods channel and countercyclical markups working together to
determine the international transmission of business cycles.
A novelty of the paper is to model a ﬁnancial accelerator coming from
the supply side of the loans market, which to my knowledge has not been
previously studied. With countercyclical markups for the oligopolistic bank-
ing sector, the cost of credit increases in bad times. As a result, ﬁrms may
delay investment and production decisions and the recession may be made
even worse and longer. This has interesting policy implications and gives
additional support to stabilization policy in economies where credit spreads
are more countercyclical.
One main direction for further research arises from this paper. It provides
a framework appropriate for the study of the impact of banking sector and
interest rate regulations on the supply of credit and on the cycle. Moreover,
my main modeling structure can be used to study other issues related to
the international transmission of business cycles. Speciﬁcally, the model can
be applied to answer more policy oriented research questions related, for
example, to current account issues and optimal exchange rate regimes.
41Appendix A: Alternative Modeling Ideas
Based on evidence by Harrison (2003) and others, an increasing returns
capital production process is the way I chose in the main body of the paper
to obtain countercyclical markups for the banking sector. In this appendix I
present alternative ways to get that the perceived elasticity for each bank falls
with GDP, even with no special frictions in the capital production process.
First, the number of banks in the economy can be made endogenous.
With ﬁxed costs of production, entry will occur in the banking sector until
the point at which proﬁts for the marginal entrant are zero. Thus, a zero-
proﬁt condition and a pricing equation for each bank together determine the
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where φ denotes a ﬁxed cost of operation for each bank.
An increase in the number of banks lowers proﬁts for each of the banks by
lowering the interest rate on loans and the demand for credit for each bank.
Therefore, an opportunity for additional entry arises in expansions, when
the demand for loans increases. This would predict a procyclical number of
banks, which is consistent with the empirical evidence for the US economy
presented in the data section.
In this model, εR is constant, but εR/N is still countercyclical.
42The Model with CES Goods Production
A second way to get countercyclical markups is through a model in which
the number of banks is still exogenously given, and where goods are produced
using a CES production function.
This model economy has a representative ﬁrm that builds the capital stock
and operates a constant elasticity of substitution technology30 for producing
goods. The ﬁrm borrows from oligopolistic banks at the rate R to ﬁnance
its investment projects.







where θ < 1 and 1/(1 − θ) is the elasticity of substitution between capital
and labor.
The capital accumulation process is particular in the sense that invest-
ment takes no time to build the capital stock and there is full depreciation.
Therefore,
It = Kt (52)
Also, as a shortcut and for simplicity, I assume here that loans equal a
given fraction of investment and that they are paid back in the same period,
such that the price of investment is (1 + R). Therefore,
d
f
t ≥ ΩIt (53)
30CES production technologies imply variable factor shares. However, in the numerical
simulations I calibrate the parameters a and b such that in steady state the labor (capital)
share is 0.64 (0.36). With log-linearization as the numerical method used to solve the
model, results are local and, as a result, shares in the transition do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly
from those assumed in the more standard Cobb-Douglas problems with constant factor
shares.
43where df stands for the loans amount. This constraint will always bind in
equilibrium given that the cost of external ﬁnancing for the ﬁrm is higher
than that of using its own sales income.
The ﬁrm’s problem is then static: it maximizes instantaneous proﬁts in






f = Yt − wtLt − (1 + Rt)d
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t − (1 − Ω)It (54)
















The household’s and the banks’ optimization problems are the same as
in the benchmark economy.

















It can be easily shown that the reciprocal of the price elasticity of the
demand for credit is now






Also, the elasticity of the demand for credit is procyclical in this case too.
To show this, I calculate the derivative of εR with respect to the investment




























= (θ − 1)
θabKθ−1Lθ
(aKθ + bLθ)2 < 0 (61)
Thus, banks’ markups are still countercyclical, with no capital production
frictions and with the number of banks in the economy being exogenously
ﬁxed.
Calibration
I choose a and b to match a 0.64 labor share and a 0.36 capital share in
the steady state. The parameter θ equals 0.3. This implies an elasticity of
substitution between capital and labor of around 1.5, which is in line with
the empirical evidence.
The calibration for the rest of the parameters follows that in the bench-
mark model.
Table 8: Calibration - CES Goods Production
Utility Function and Budget Constraint Consumption Aggregator
ε = 0.85
ω = 2 ρ = ρ* = -1/9
σ = 2
Goods Production Function
a = 0.36 b = 0.64
θ = 0.3
Production Function for Capital N = N* = 2 Ω = 0.3
TFP Process (Backus et al) λ11 = λ22 = 0.906 λ12 = λ21 = 0.088
Std(ε) = Std(ε*) = 0.0085 Corr(ε,ε*)= 0.25
In Table 9 I show simulation results for the model with both trade in goods
and oligopolistic banking, and for alternative formulations where either one
of these two forces does not operate.
45The qualitative results are the same as in the benchmark model. I obtain
positive cross-country comovement for all macroeconomic aggregates and I
propose a potential solution to the quantity anomaly when both eﬀects work
in the model. Importantly, my simulations match the countercyclicality of
real interest rates and the trade balance observed in the data. Also, bank
spreads comove here as in the data.
Regarding the volatility of terms of trade, the benchmark model with
CES production still delivers a standard deviation that falls short of the
value in the data, but the wedge is smaller than that obtained by previous
work including my benchmark model.
As expected, results for a 1-good economy show lower output comovement
and higher consumption comovement. With competitive banking, both con-
sumption and employment are negatively correlated across countries. Also,
the interest rate on deposits is now procyclical. Again, I interpret these
results as evidence of the importance of both trade in goods and endoge-
nous and countercyclical banking sector markups for ﬁnding a solution to
the Backus et al. anomalies and to understand the channels through which
business cycles are transmitted between the US and the OECD countries.
46Table 9: Simulation Results: CES Goods Production









ρ(C,C*) 0.3311 0.2637 -0.6319 0.7574
ρ(L,L*) 0.2167 0.7051 -0.3259 0.1739
ρ(I,I*) 0.4151 0.9707 0.1574 0.2624








ρ(NX/Y,Y) -0.37 -0.1783 -0.3168 0.1788
ρ(C,Y) 0.8734 0.8316 0.9145 -0.6409
ρ(L,Y) 0.5494 0.9845 0.9966 0.9992
ρ(I,Y) 0.9245 0.9849 0.998 1
ρ(r,Y) -0.27 -0.2627 0.7195 0.7845
ρ(spread,Y) -0.21/-0.41 0.649 - 0.4323
Standard
Deviations
σ(C)/σ(Y) 0.8 0.3881 3.0087 0.4133
σ(L)/σ(Y) 0.88 0.4692 2.7481 0.1446
σ(I)/σ(Y) 2.61 3.0887 0.6538 5.0283
σ(T)/σ(Y) 2.88 1.1582 3.4743 -
47Appendix B: Summary of the Literature Re-
sults
In the following table I summarize the literature results.
Table 10: The Literature Results
ρ(C,C*) ρ(Y,Y*) ρ(I,I*) ρ(L,L*) ρ(NX/Y,Y)
Data 0.3311 0.4496 0.4151 0.2167 -0.37
Benchmark
Backus et al
0.88 -0.21 -0.94 -0.94 0.01
BKK with trans-
port costs
0.89 -0.05 -0.48 -0.48 0.23
BKK - no risk
sharing
0.56 0.08 -0.31 -0.31 -
1-Tesar (1993) 0.44 - 0.97 0.48 - 0.7 - - -
2a-Baxter and
Crucini (1995)
0.95 0.04 0.02 -0.7 0.6521
2b-Baxter and
Crucini (1995)
0.92 0.06 0.12 -0.67 0.6521
3a-Baxter and
Crucini (1995)
0.89 -0.41 -0.92 -0.91 −0.1821
3b-Baxter and
Crucini (1995)
-0.28 0.54 -0.5 -0.56 −0.2821
4- Boileau (1996) 0.5 0.52 -0.48 0.6 -
5- Kollman (1996) 0.38 0.1 -0.12 -0.12 -0.07
6- Kollman (1996) 0.51 0.18 - - -
7- Kollman (1996) 0.28 0.14 - - -
8- Roche (1996) 0.78 -0.07 - - -0.34
48Table 11: Table 10 Continued
Table (cont.) ρ(C,C*) ρ(Y,Y*) ρ(I,I*) ρ(L,L*) ρ(NX/Y,Y)
9- Canova and Ubide
(1998)
0.72 0.78 0.27 0.8 −0.3221
10- Guo et al. (1998) 0.44 0.98 - - -0.009
11- Stockman and Tesar
(1998)
0.25 0.52 - - −0.4821
12a- Ubide (1999) 0.73 0.26 -0.15 0.32 −0.5521
12b- Ubide (1999) - G
shocks and imp. comp.
0.82 0.91 0.85 0.91 −0.2221
13- Lubik (2000) - TFP
shocks
0.42 - 0.79 0.61 - 0.77 0.89 - 0.99 - -0.14 - 0.01
13- Lubik (2000) - TFP
and money shocks
0.33 - 0.71 0.51 - 0.66 0.78 - 0.96 - -0.15 - -0.01
14- Heathcote and Perri
(2002)
0.85 0.24 0.35 0.14 0
15- Cook (2002) 0.284 0.521 0.188 0.884 -
16- Hairault (2002) 0.71 0.29 0.08 0.25 −0.4921
17a- Head (2002) 0.81 0.485 0.343 0.293 -0.187
17b- Head (2002) 0.853 0.486 0.451 0.302 0.085
18- Kehoe and
Perri(2002)
0.29 0.25 0.33 0.23 0.27
19- Alesandria and
Choi(2004)
0.2 0.43 0.39 0.64 -0.43
20- Olivero(2003) 0.99 0.32 0.42 0.37 -0.13
49Notes:
1- Tesar (1993): A model with complete ﬁnancial markets and stochastic ﬂuctuations in
the output of non-traded goods. She concentrates on the high correlation between savings
and investment, the low cross-country correlation between consumption growth rates and
the home bias in investment portfolios.
2a- Baxter and Crucini (1995): Complete markets - Backus et al parameterization of
TFP process. 2b- Baxter and Crucini (1995): Only noncontingent bonds - Backus et
al parameterization of TFP process.
3a- Baxter and Crucini (1995): Complete markets - Unit root in productivity without
spillovers. 3b- Baxter and Crucini (1995): Only noncontingent bonds - Unit root in
productivity without spillovers.
4- Boileau (1996): A two-country, single-traded good RBC model with endogenous growth
and a non-market (and non-traded) sector. Financial markets are complete and international
externalities in production are modeled. A positive productivity shock to the home country
induces mobile factors of production to reallocate across sectors and countries. The sectoral
reallocation from household production to market production in each country compensates
for the international reallocation. Employment is positively correlated across countries as
a result. The shocks to non-market production reduce the cross-country correlation of
consumption.
5- Kollman (1996): Only risk-free debt contracts can be traded in asset markets. Adjust-
ment costs to investment. The main purpose is to show how this helps reduce cross-country
consumption correlations.
6- Same as in 5 with ﬁxed hours.
7- Same as in 5 with high risk aversion.
8- Roche (1996): A one-good economy, countries produce a non-specialized traded good
and households derive utility from public goods. Shocks to both productivity and gov-
ernment spending. The latter act as additive exogenous preference shocks. Households
deriving utility from exogenous government purchases has important implications for the
countercyclicality of the trade balance.
9- Canova and Ubide (1998): A model with a non-traded sector and ﬁnancial claims
traded internationally. Disturbances to both market and household technologies. With the
non-market sector using capital, after positive shocks, reallocations of capital from the non-
traded to the traded sector makes the cross-country correlation of market investment less
negative. Autocorrelated shocks with international spillovers. Cross-sector, cross-country
spillovers as well as inter-sector, intra-country spillovers are set to zero.
5010- Guo and Sturzenegger (1998): An increasing returns to scale economy with no
contingent claims markets and shocks to both productivity and ”beliefs”. The latter aﬀect
the consumption Euler equation.
11- Stockman and Tesar (1998): A two-sector model with traded (each country special-
izes in the production of one good) and nontraded goods. There is also trade in ﬁnancial
assets. Shocks to technologies and tastes with particular features for taste shocks. Taste
shocks are needed to explain the anomalies, productivity shocks are not enough. I report
here their results for Case 6 (taste shocks to home-produced goods, correlated across goods),
their best results.
12- Ubide (1999): A model with government spending entering preferences. Imperfect
competition in the goods markets (modeled exogenously), competitive behavior in the factors
market, indivisible labor, and complete asset markets. He models technology, markups
and government spending exogenous shocks. Markup ﬂuctuations alone are not able to
reproduce the main stylized facts ; government spending shocks are needed. They follow
other studies (Ravn (1997) and Rottemberg and Woodford (1995) for the calibration of
the process followed by government spending and markups. They don’t estimate a VAR
for productivity, government spending and markups. Among the several speciﬁcations he
estimates, the best results are gotten for a model with government spending and markup
shocks. He doesn’t get positive comov
13- Lubik (2000): A two-sector (tradeables and non-tradeables), multiple-good, monetary
business cycle model with price stickiness in the non-traded sector. On the one hand, positive
technology shocks in one country lower the terms of trade and stimulate production abroad.
On the other, price stickiness causes the terms of trade (of the country that has undergone a
monetary expansion) to improve, and this leads to a contraction of foreign economic activity.
The model features incomplete asset markets and adjustment costs to investment.
14- Heathcote and Perri (2002): A two-good model with two countries in ﬁnancial
autarky.
15- Cook (2002): A model with risk-free debt, imperfect competition and procyclical
sequential market entry for Cournot ﬁnal goods producers. With trade in diﬀerentiated
goods, a productivity increase in one economy leads to additional business formation in
the other country through demand spillovers. Business formation brings countercyclical
markups, what leads to an expansion in employment, investment and production in both
economies.
5116- Hairault (2002): After the economies are shocked, expected returns to labor market
search change and induce movements in search and recruiting activities. Given the cross-
country correlation of technology shocks, domestic and foreign ﬁrms start searching labor at
the same time. Employment increases in both countries and this helps to partially curtail
the capital outﬂows from the country not beneﬁting from the shock.
17a- Head (2002): Purely country-speciﬁc shocks and increasing returns to scale, which
operate through changes in the world-wide variety of intermediate domestic and foreign
goods that produce a ﬁnal consumption - investment good in each country. An increase
in one country’s variety of producer goods raises TFP for both economies simultaneously.
What works here is a ”trade in varieties-induced link”. 17b- Head (2002): Constant
returns to variety and strongly correlated technology shocks, Corr(ε1,ε2) = 0.7.
18- Kehoe and Perri (2002): They endogeneize market incompleteness through imper-
fectly enforceable international loans in a one-good model. The credit market imperfection
comes from the requirement that each country prefer the allocation it receives when partic-
ipating in international ﬁnancial markets relative to the autarky one.
19- Alessandria and Choi (2004): They develop a model with complete asset markets,
ﬁrm heterogeneity, and ﬁxed entry and continuation costs in export markets. Monopolis-
tically competitive ﬁrms each producing a diﬀerentiated intermediate good are subject to
idiosyncratic technology shocks. In each country ﬁnal goods are produced in a competitive
market using domestic and imported intermediate goods. An increase in home TFP lowers
the fraction of domestic ﬁrms that stop to export due to the fact that with lower produc-
tion costs, they are better willing to pay the ﬁxed costs of shipping goods abroad. Foreign
producers of intermediates, who face a higher demand, start entering export markets ad
deferring exit. So, an increase in domestic productivity triggers an increase in capital ac-
cumulation in the domestic economy and an increase in the absorption of foreign varieties.
Foreign production increases as a result. Home consumption increases initially, while for-
eign consumption falls on impact. That allows for a reduced cross-country correlation of
consumption.
20- Olivero (2003): A model with trade in goods, government expenditure aﬀecting pref-
erences and distortionary taxation.
21- Net exports (NX) in this case.
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The paper tries to establish whether the business-cycle ﬂuctuations
across countries are due to a single world business cycle, to a diversity of
regional business cycles or a combination of both. The methodology used
does not impose any a priori hypothesis about regional composition. If
regional business cycles exist the region composition would be estimated
from the data used. The study was done for two diﬀerent samples: the
ﬁrst comprises 26 OECD countries and the other 59 countries. The results
indicate that for the OECD sample there are two common components
and for the World sample there are three, but none of them speciﬁct oa
geographical region. The only division is between developed and develop-
ing countries.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
This paper looks at the question of whether there is a world business cycle
and/or a number of regional business cycles. This question has, already, been
the issue of several papers and has been under renewed attention. The main
reasons of this new interest are the creation of the EMU and the slowdown at
the beginning of the 21st century.
The creation of the EMU led to an interest in whether the business cycles of
European countries were or not synchronized, and therefore, if a single monetary
policy could ﬁt all. The studies done concluded for existence of a core and a
periphery. However, they raised the question if the national business cycle
synchronization is the reﬂex of a truly European Business Cycle, or just the
reﬂex of a World Business Cycle. That kind of question was the subject of Artis
and Zhang(1997) and Artis(2003).
The slowdown veriﬁed in 2000/2001 was expected to be constrained to the
USA economy, but it spread to most of the developed economies, indicating
that those economies are linked. This raised the question of weather the syn-
chronization observed was a reﬂex of a world business cycle or just a coinci-
dence and if the links between economies have or not increased. To answer
this questions several papers studied the synchronization of the G7 business
cycles: Gregory and Head(1997), Andreano and Savio(2002), Helbling and Bay-
oumi(2003), Bordo and Helbling(2003). Other studies were more ambitious
and tried to include more countries, Lumsdaine and Prasad(2003) included all
OECD countries, Kose et all.(2003) used data from 1960 to 1990 to 60 countries
and Mansour(2003) used the GDP data for 113 countries from 1961 to 1989.
However, the studies that try to cluster the countries into regions do not try
to estimate the world and the regional cycles and their importance on the na-
tional cycles. The ones that try to estimate the world business cycle and its
importance for each country either do not take into account regional cycles, or if
they do, as Kose et all.(ibidem) and Mansour(ibidem), they assume the regions
rather than estimating them from the data.
This paper tries to cluster the countries into regions and, at the same time,
estimate the world and regional cycles as well as the importance of each for each
country studied. To get a truly world picture I used two country samples from
1970 to 2001: 26 OECD countries and a world sample of 59 countries. In order to
perform the study I used a approximate factor model for which the asymptotic
distribution theory was developed by Bai(2003). To the best of my knowledge
2this particular method was not used before to study this question. Other studies
have used factor models, but of a diﬀerent sort: Helbling and Bayoumi (idem)
and Mansour(ibidem) used a dynamic general factor model (DGFM) proposed
by Forni et all..(2002), Kose et all.(ibidem) used a Bayesian method described
in Otrok and Whiteman(1998), Lumsdaine and Prasad(ibidem) used a time-
varying weighting method.
The main advantages of the factor model used in this paper is that the
estimators have an asymptotic distribution, rendering possible to do inference
over them (which is not possible in the DGFM or in the Lumsdaine and Prasad’s
approach), and we do not have to assume region composition before hand.
The structure of the paper is the following: the next section describes the
econometric model used; the following shows the empirical results for the OECD
countries and for a world sample comprising 59 countries and the ﬁnal one
concludes the paper.
2 Econometric Model
To address the problem of existence of a world business cycle and/or regional
business cycles I used the estimated business cycles of real GDP, Consumption
and Investment constructed from the diﬀerence of two HP ﬁlters as is discussed
in Artis et all. (2003). Having estimated those business cycles I used an approx-
imate factor model for which the inferential theory was developed by Bai(2003).
The model is represented by:
Xit = λ
0
iFt + eit = Cit + eit (1)
i =1 ,2,3,...,N
t =1 ,2,3,...,T
where Xit represents the value of the ith series business cycle at time t, λi is
the loading vector r × 1, Ft is a vector r × 1 representing the value of r factors
at time t and eit is the idiosyncratic component of the series at time t.
In this framework and under the assumption A described in Bai (ibidem),
this factor model allows Ft to be dynamic such that A(L)Ft =  t. However the
relationship between Xit and Ft is static1.
1A more general factor model where the relationship between Xit and Ft can be dynamic
3The ﬁrst problem to solve is to decide the number of factors that should
be included in the model. Bai and Ng(2002) have shown that the number of
common factors can be consistently estimated by using one of the following
information criteria2:





























where : CNT =m i n{N,T}











Λ is the matrix of loadings
However, if there is too much cross heteroskedasticity those IC estimate too
many common factors when used in ﬁnite samples, even after the series are
standardized3.
Therefore in order to reduce this problem, instead of using all the individ-
ual business cycles estimated for each series, I constructed for each country a
business cycle index that summarizes the ﬂuctuations observed. That index is










t, instead of using the same procedure of the approximate
factor model, I calculated it from a weighted sum of the estimated cycles of each
series imposing that the idiosyncratic elements of each series to be independent
(corr(εc
i; εc
j)=0 ,i6= j;b e i n gεc







it , t =1 ,2,3,...,T (5)
is the DGFM described by Forni et all.(2002).
2To estimate the number of common components we have to ﬁxt h em a x i m u mn u m b e ro f
common factors we allow. The methodology used was to start at Rmax =2and increase it
until one of the Infomration Criteria (IC) indicates a smaller value than the selected Rmax.
3A small montecarlo simulation presented in appendix C exempliﬁes the problem.
4So the problem is to calculate the weights (wc
i). To do that, I followed the
methodology purposed by Forni and Reichlin(2001). This methodology looks
for the weights that minimize the ”size” of the idiosyncratic components with
respect to the national component. Being Γ t h ec o v a r i a n c em a t r i xo fεc
it and Σ




If we take the logs of equation (6) and minimize in order to w the FOC is:
Γ−1Σw = γw (7)
So the weights are given by the eigenvector of Γ−1Σ associated with the
biggest eigenvalue.
Σ is know but Γ is not known and it has to be estimated. In a ﬁrst step
I equalized the diagonal elements of Γ to the diagonal elements of Σ.Then es-
timated equation (5) by OLS, using the Akaike information criteria to decide
for the optimal number of lags. From the estimated residuals (idiosyncratic
components of each series) I estimated Γ.
Once the indexes Indc
t are obtained, we can use the model described by





cFt + ect (8)
c =1 ,2,3,...,N
t =1 ,2,3,...,T





where : b Λ is the loadings matrix
Ind is the t × c national indexes matrix
F is the t × r factors matrix
4Note that the scale of the loadings and of the factors cannot be obtained independently,
therefore I normalized the variance of the factors such that (F0F)/T = Ir.
5At this point I tested at 90% conﬁdence level if the loadings should be zero5
and reestimated equation (9) setting to zero all the loadings that did not reject
the null.
To check for the importance of each factor we can do the variance decompo-
























where : Indc,F r and ec are t × 1 vectors
and λcr is the loading of factor c associated with the factor r
The last equality results from the estimation procedure of the approximate
factor model. The method imposes that (F0F)/T = Ir,( F is a t × r matrix
and Ir is an identity matrix of order r) the factors are orthogonal, and so the
variance of the sum is equal to the sum of the variances.
Moreover, the factors are standardized, their variance is equal to one, so the







; r =1 ,2,3,...,R (11)
If there is a regional business cycle, how do we decide for it’s existence and
region composition? As said before regions are not assumed, their existence has
to be inferred from the data. The method used is to compare the importance
of a factor for each country using equation (11). If the ratio estimates that the
factor is only important for a limited number of countries than we are in the
presence of a regional factor, and the set of countries is said to be the region
in strictu sensus that commoves together. If the factor is important for a large
subset of countries, then the component is a global one and part of the world
business cycle. As for benchmark I will use the ratio value of 20% to say that
a factor is important for a certain country. To be certain that a region exists
the results have to be stable across time, this is, the estimated factor and it’s
5This testing was done using the asymptotic inferential theory presented by Bai(2003)
6pattern of ratios has to be similar if we consider the whole sample or just a
sub-period.
As e c o n dd e ﬁnition of region will be in latus sensus. In this case even if we
do not ﬁnd a regional factor, the countries may have a diﬀerent dependence
structure from the common components found. To check for the existence of
this kind of regions we will perform a cluster analysis to check how similar are
the countries
3R e s u l t s
This section will present the estimated results. It is divided in three subsections.
The ﬁrst describes the data used and the transformations made. The following
shows the results obtained for the OECD countries and the last presents the
results obtained for a larger sample of 59 countries.
3.1 Data used
The data used were those for Gross Domestic Product (GDP) calculated from
the expenditure view, the Household consumption (HC) and the Gross Fixed
Capital Formation (GFCF), at constant prices ( base year: 1990). All the series
were collected from 1970 to 2001 at annual frequency.
Two points should be justiﬁed: the use of annual data rather than data at
a higher frequency and the choice of household consumption rather than total
consumption or private consumption. The justiﬁcation in both cases is avail-
ability of the series for as many countries and time span as possible. Quarterly
data is not available for all OECD countries since 1970, and even if we would
use a shorter interval some OECD countries only have quarterly data since the
late 80’s, making the time dimension too short. As for the use of household
consumption the justiﬁcation is the same for developing countries: in order to
get as many countries as possible the use of household consumption allow us to
use data of more countries than if we used total consumption or private con-
sumption. For the OECD countries we could use total consumption or private
consumption, however, the use of household consumption allow to perform a
closer comparison between the two groups studied.
For the OECD countries the data were taken from the OECD Main Economic
Indicators 2003 Database, and for the non-OECD countries the data were taken
from the WTI 2003 Database from World Bank, selecting those that we could
7get a complete data set from 1970 to 2001. A complete list of the countries used
i sg i v e ni na p p e n d i xA .
Finally, to estimate the business cycle indexes of each series I choose to
retain the ﬂuctuations from two to eight years. This interval follows the one
that Baxter and King (1999) adopt, between 6 and 32 quarters.
3.2 Results for the OECD countries
This section presents the results for the OECD sample. It is divided into ﬁve
subsections. The ﬁrst one estimates the number of factors to be included in
the model, the next subsection presents the estimated factors and the relative
importance of each for each country. The third subsection discusses stability
issues in order to assess which estimated factors are stable for diﬀerent periods.
The following subsection clusters the countries together to check if they form
well deﬁned regions or not and the ﬁnal one summarizes the results found.
3.2.1 Estimating the number of common factors
When we analyze the estimated business cycle indexes of each country6 we
realize that there are some regularities common to most countries: a trough
around 1973, coinciding with the ﬁrst oil crisis, an other around 1981, and
a third trough at the beginning of the nineties. This coincidences make us
suspect the OECD countries are linked by a world business cycle. However,
those coincidences are not common to all countries, nor the variations are felt
on a equal basis by all countries. Therefore we could also assume that, beyond
to a common factor and idiosyncratic shocks, some countries can be aﬀected by
some regional linkages.
To be certain of our suspicions, we have to perform a closer analysis. To
apply the model of equation (8) we need to know how many factors should be
included in our analysis. The ICs depicted in equations (2) using the procedures
of footnote 2 to select the Rmax give the following results:
6The estimated cycles were not included in the present version of the paper due to space
constraints. The graphics are available from the author.
8Table 1 - Number of Common Factors




As argued before (see appendix C) we realized that if there is too much
cross-heteroskedasticity in the idiosyncratic components the ICs applied to non-
standardized data almost always select the Rmax. As regarding the standard-
ized data, even if the ICs almost always estimate a number of common factors
bigger than the true number, the IC2 is the one closer to the true number7.
Therefore we continued the study using standardized data. Therefore to help
in our selection we can, also, look at the ratio of eigenvalues. That ratio gives
the percentage that each eigenvector of the matrix XX0 is able to explain the
common variation of the series.
Table 2
Eigenvalue 1 2 3 4 5
Ratio 0.3566 0.1480 0.1058 0.0881 0.0647
Eigenvalue 6 7 8 9 10
Ratio 0.0478 0.0358 0.0311 0.0226 0.0213
F r o mt a b l e2w es e et h a tt h eﬁrst eigenvector can explain 35.66% of the
common variation of the series. If we use 5% as a limiting value, we realize that
we should include up to 5 factors in our model. From the two analysis I opted
to perform the study with 5 factors explaining the variations of the business
cycles indexes. The main reason was that the 3 ﬁrst factors only explain 61% of
the ﬂuctuations of the variables, as the ﬁve ﬁrst explain up to 76%8 Second, if
too many factors are included that should be apparent from the importance of
7In appendix B we can see if the estimated idiosyncratic components are in fact cross-
heteroskedastic or not. However, from appendix C we can realize that if we standardize data
whenever the idiosyncratic components are cross-homoskedastic the ICs on standardized data
usually estimate a number bigger than if we use non-standardized data. The results of table
1g i v es o m es u p p o r tt os t a n d a r d i z et h ed a t a .
8These values are smaller than those estimated by Helbling and Bayoumi(2003). Those
authors using the methods of Forni et al.(2002) found that the ﬁrst factor would explain 60%
of the variation and the three ﬁrst factors would explain about 90%. Those results are for
GDP data of the G7 countries. However, when they add other series their values decrease to
44% and 71% respectively.
But, we can expect that the more countries/series are used, smaller are the estimated ratios
as we add more sources of idiosyncratic variation.
9Figure 1: Percentage of the national cycles explained by the ﬁve ﬁrst factors
each factor in the variation of the business cycle of the countries, this is, if the
last factor is only important to one country, being the importance to the others
only marginal than that factor is capturing a country business cycle and not a
common component. At that time the model can be restricted9.
3.2.2 Estimation results
The ﬁrst question is how much the ﬁrst ﬁve factors explain the volatility of
the national business cycles. Figure 1 shows that only Turkey has a small
percentage explained by the common components. Austria, Mexico and Iceland
have a somewhat low percentage, however in any case above 50%.
Figure 2 depicts the estimated factor associated with the biggest eigenvalue.
The dotted lines are the 90% conﬁdence level band for the estimated value. At
this point we should stress that assumptions A-H described in Bai(2003) are
needed to compute the conﬁdence interval of the factors when N,T →∞(this
is the weaker condition imposed). Of importance is assumption H, it imposes
that the residuals of equation(8) are homoskedastic and not serial correlated10.
9At this point we should note that we do not need to reestimate the model, as the estimated
factors are orthogonal, the estimated loadings for the ﬁrst n factors are equal if we use n or
n + m factors . However the same is not true to the estimated variance-covariance matrixes
and, hence,for the conﬁdence intervals. Restricting the model would lead to wider conﬁdence
intervals.
10From those assumptions is clear that cross-section heteroskedasticity and cross-section
correlation are still allowed, thus the model continues to be an approximate factor model.
In this sample I performed a white test to detect heteroskedasticity. With the exception of
10Figure 2: First estimated factor
This is:
E(ect.ecs)=0,i ft 6= s and E(e2
ct)=σ2
c (12)
From table 2 we realized that the ﬁrst factor explains almost 36% of the
variation of the countries indexes. From ﬁgure 211 we realize that this ﬁrst
common component captures most of the stylized facts of the world business
cycle described in the literature. It peaks in 1973, 1980, 1990 and 2000, reaches
a trough in 1975, 1983/6, 1993 and also reﬂects the slowdown at the beginning
of the new millennium.
Kose et all. (2003) using annual data from 1961 to 1990 of 60 countries
found troughs in 1975 and 1982 and a slowdown in the end of the sample.
Gregory et all. (1997) studying the G7 countries with quarterly data from
1970:1 to 1993:4 found recessions in 1975, 1982 and a slowdown in the early
one series all accepted the null of homoskedasticity at 10% signiﬁcance level. All accepted the
null at 5%.
As for autocorrelation, doing a LM test for AR(1), all but one accepted the null at 5%,
all acepted the null at 1%. However some of the series seemed to be AR(2). In this case
the asymptotic distribution of the factors is only valid when
√
N/T → 0.I n o u r s a m p l e
N =2 6→
√
N ≈ 5 which is much smaller than T =3 2 . The use of the asymptotic
distribution is still plausible, as long as assumptions A-G of Bai(idem) are satisﬁed.
11The method is not able to estimate the factors themselves, but a rotation of them
(HFt).Therefore in this study I assumed that the loadings of the factors should be posi-
tive in the majority of the G7 countries, and multiplied the estimated eigenvector by -1 every
time that the estimated loadings would not obey to that assumption. In the case all G7
countries loadings are zero, I kept the estimated factor.
11Figure 3: First factor importance
nineties, upturns in early and late seventies and late eighties. They also found
during the mid-eighties a long period where the cycle was below the zero level.
Helbling and Bayoumi (2003) when estimating the G7 weighted gap using
GDP quarterly data from 1973 to 2000 found troughs in 1974, 1982, 1986 and
1992 and peaks in 1978/1979, 1985, 1990 and 2000. Their sample end also
depicts a slowdown, even if it is much smaller than the one depicted in ﬁgure 2.
It seems that this ﬁrst factor is in line with estimations found in the liter-
ature, however this does not mean that it is the word business cycle. For that
we have to know how important is this ﬁrst factor to the business cycle of each
country. Does it aﬀect all countries (being it a global component) or just some.
Figure 3 depicts the ratio calculated in equation (10) for the ﬁrst component.
From that ﬁgure we can see that the ﬁrst factor is not important for the
variance of the national business cycles of Korea, New-Zealand and Turkey. Its
importance for Mexico and Norway is marginal and for Australia and Denmark
is small (less than 20%).
For some countries its importance is more than 50%. That group includes
Belgium, Switzerland, France, Ireland, Italy and Japan.
So it seems that this ﬁrst factor is important for the majority of the countries
(for 19 out of 26 it accounts for more than 20% of the volatility), moreover all
12Figure 4: Variance decomposition of factors 2 to 5
of them (except for Norway, although its importance is marginal) have positive
loadings12 .However to say that it depicts the world business cycle (and not just
a component of it) we should check what is the importance of other factors.
Figure 4 shows the ratios of the variance decomposition for the other 4 es-
timated factors. We can see that the second factor explains more than 20% of
the national business cycles indexes for Germany, Denmark, Finland, Greece,
Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand and USA. This factor is more important
than the ﬁrst to Denmark, Finland, Norway, New-Zealand, Korea, Mexico and
Turkey. However its importance for the last three countries is still small (be-
tween 10 and 20%). The eﬀects are also very mixed as it has a positive loadings
for Germany,Denmark, Greece, Netherlands, Norway, USA, Austria, Japan and
Korea. For the other countries the loading is zero or negative.
The third factor accounts to more than 20% volatility for Australia, Canada,
United-Kingdom, New-Zealand, Portugal and the USA. And almost 20% to
Iceland. It seems that this factor accounts for some kind of an Anglo-Saxon
region. When compared with the ﬁrst factor its importance is quite smaller
to UK and the USA, but more or less equal to the other countries (with the
12The estimated loadings, as well the 95% and 90% conﬁdence level intervals are available
from the author upon request.
13Figure 5: Estimated Factors for the OECD sample
exception of New Zealand that was not aﬀected by the ﬁrst factor).Moreover
for all Anglo-Saxon countries the loadings of the third factor are positive, as for
Portugal and Iceland they are negative.
The factor 4 is important for Canada, Korea, Mexico, Norway. For all of
them is the most important factor. Only for Korea is the loading negative.
F i n a l l yf o rf a c t o r5 ,i ti so n l yi m p o r t a n tf o rS w e d e n .H o w e v e rf o rA u s t r a l i a
and Norway it explains between 10% and 20% of the variance of the national
business cycles13
After checking for which countries is each factor important we should see
what is the evolution through time of each one of those factors. This analysis
can help us in understanding why those factors aﬀect diﬀerent countries as well
as why some of them have contrary eﬀects on diﬀerent countries. In ﬁgure 5 we
can check the evolution of the second, third, fourth and ﬁfth estimated factors.
As the ﬁrst factor, the second common component also captures the eﬀects of
the ﬁrst and second oil crisis (it reaches troughs in 1974/75 and 1981). Contrary
13Remember that from the number of factors discussion in section 3.1.1 we kept 5 factors
on the basis of the argument that if the 5th factor was only important for one country it could
be dropped.
This 5th factor is important only for Sweden, but it also aﬀects other countries in a non-
negligible way, therefore I opted to keep it in the analysis.
14to the ﬁrst factor it depicts a peak in 1986, a trough in 1989 followed by a peak
in 1992. From 1992 onwards it ﬂuctuates around the zero value.
As for the third factor it peaks in 1979, 1985, 1989 and 1995 and reaches
troughs in 1982 and 1991/1992 So it seems that this factor is only capturing
the second oil the downturn on the beginning of the nineties and the recover
afterwards.
From this analysis it seems that the world business cycle can be depicted by
the ﬁrst and second factor. The ﬁrst factor has an important eﬀect in almost
all countries, we will call it the ﬁrst component of the world business cycle. The
second factor also has worldwide eﬀects, although its eﬀects are not as uniform
or all-encompassing as the eﬀects of the prior one. It seems that is a German-
USA area of inﬂuence, as it makes the countries around Germany (Austria,
Denmark, Netherlands and Norway) and USA to commove together. Anyway
we can say that is a second component of the world business cycle.
The third factor seems a Anglo-Saxon factor, as the fourth and ﬁfth aﬀect
a very restricted number of countries.
However this reading of the results should be complemented with an analysis
of the stability of the factors for diﬀerent time frames and dismiss those that are
not stable (as they are showing some association for some time frames and not
for others,and therefore are not permanent to the world cycle) and try to get a
measure of how countries group. Those issues are dealt in the next sections.
3.2.3 Stability issues
In this kind of model we can think on three kinds of stability issues. The ﬁrst
issue is whether observed factors are the same through time: this is, we can
think that at some point in time a common factor might disappear or a new
common component might appear. A second issue is, even if the common factors
are the same, their relative importances in explaining the common variations
may vary. Finally, even if the factors and their relative importance are the
same, for a particular country the factor loadings may vary and therefore alter
the variance decomposition. The next three subsections will address this three
diﬀerent issues. In order to perform those comparisons we estimated the model
for the sub-period 1970 to 1990 with ﬁve factors and compare with the results
obtained for the complete data set14.
14It should be referred that there is no formal test of this issues in the literature. Therefore
this section is based in comparing the results of both time samples. However, as the loadings
15Are the common factors the same? The next ﬁve graphs compare the ﬁve
estimated factors for the sample from 1970 to 1990 with those estimated for the
whole sample (ﬁgure 6 to ﬁgure 10).
Figure 6: Comparision of the ﬁrst estimated factor
Figure 7: Comparision of the second estimated factor
From ﬁgures 6 and 7, we can see that the ﬁrst and second estimated factors
are more or less equal if we use the whole data or just the data from 1970 to
1990. There is only a deviation in the end of the sample for the ﬁrst factor,
this is, the whole sample estimation reveals a peak on 1990 as the sub-sample
estimates peaks before, while in 1990 we would be already in a recession phase.
However that diﬀerence can be due to estimation problems at the end of the
sample. We should not forget that the factors are obtained from the detrended
and the factors have an asymptotic distribution it should be possible to develop a kind of
stability test for those estimations. This is left for future work.
16Figure 8: Comparision of the third estimated factor
Figure 9: Comparision of the fourth estimated factor
Figure 10: Comparision of the ﬁfth estimated factor
17data using a band-pass ﬁlter, therefore when estimating for the sub-sample 1970-
1990 we are ignoring the future path of the variables, so the estimations at the
end of the sample can be rather volatile. Also, the second factor estimations
at the end of the sample for the restricted period deviates somewhat from the
estimations of the whole period
Nevertheless, we can consider that the estimations of the two ﬁrst factors
are relatively stable.
Ad i ﬀerent picture arises from the estimations of the third, fourth and ﬁfth
factors. The third factor still reﬂects the ﬂuctuations of the beginning of the
eighties, however before and after that period there is no resemblance. As for
the fourth and ﬁfth factor the estimations for diﬀerent periods do not reﬂect
any resemblance15.
It seems that those latter estimated factors, that were reﬂecting regional
linkages, are not captured in the same way. As we will see in the subsection below
the countries more aﬀected by them are also diﬀerent. Therefore we can conclude
that regional linkages importance have changed through time. Therefore the
model is, in both time frames, capturing the three stronger regional linkages of
the period considered.
Is the relative importance of the factors unaltered? A second point is
to know how important is each factor in explaining the common variation. The
next table gives the ratio of importance of each eigenvalue:
Table 3
Eigenvalue 1 2 3 4 5
Ratio - Sample 1970-1990 0.3396 0.2292 0.1144 0.0789 0.0567
Ratio - Sample 1970-2001 0.3566 0.1480 0.1058 0.0881 0.0647
Eigenvalue 6 7 8 9 10
Ratio - Sample 1970-1990 0.0459 0.0388 0.0293 0.0219 0.0165
Ratio - Sample 1970-2001 0.0478 0.0358 0.0311 0.0226 0.0213
From table 3 we can see that after the ﬁfth eigenvalue, the relative impor-
tance of each factor is less than 5%. However from the fourth eigenvalue small
15Remember than in each case we estimate a rotation of the factors. However in these
cases there was no rotation that would allow us to say that they were depicting the same
movements. Cross-regressing the factors of both samples there was only strong associations
between the ﬁrst factor of both samples and between the second factor of both samples.
18variations on their relative importance can easily put them on either side of the
5% decision value. As seen before the fourth and ﬁfth estimated factors have
little resemblance when estimated in diﬀerent time ranges.
The third factor still accounts for 11.5%, a value close to the 10.5% of the
whole sample, and as seen before both estimations reﬂect in this value the
ﬂuctuations of early eighties.
Finally, the ﬁrst factor importance in explaining the common variance is
more or less the same (34% vs. 35.6%), however the second factor has a quite
smaller value on the whole sample (14.8% vs. 22.9% ).
However to take any conclusion we should, also, analyze the importance of
each factor in explaining the volatility of each national business cycle.
Variance decomposition stability. The next ﬁve graphics (ﬁgure 11 to 15)
compare the variance decomposition of the national business cycles for the 1970-
1990 sample (top graphic) with the 1970-2001 sample (bottom graphic).
Figure 11: Comparision of the variance decomposition for the ﬁrst factor
T h ei m p o r t a n c eo ft h eﬁrst factor seems stable across periods, the variance
decomposition ratios are more or less equal on both samples. However there are
two countries for which this factor has varied in importance when comparing
the sample until 1990 with the sample until 2001: for Spain it increased and for
USA it decreased.
For the second factor the ratios are, also, stable. However ﬁve countries have
experienced a reduction on the sensibility to this factor: Finland, Italy, Korea,
Mexico and Turkey. However for Finland the second factor is still important,
which does not happen with the other four countries. The reduction of the
19Figure 12: Comparision of the variance decomposition for the second factor
Figure 13: Comparision of the variance decomposition for the third factor
Figure 14: Comparision of the variance decomposition for the fourth factor
20Figure 15: Comparision of the variance decomposition for the ﬁfth factor
ratios for Korea, Mexico and Turkey are an indicator that these countries are
less correlated with the world business cycle, as the importance of the ﬁrst factor
was still small.
As for the other three other factors it seems that the restrict sample captures
completely diﬀerent linkages across countries, either if we do direct or cross
comparisons across the factors.
Therefore it seems that the regional linkages strength change when we con-
sider diﬀerent time samples.
3.2.4 Clustering analysis
From the previous results it seems that there is no stable regional common
component, however it is not obvious if some countries cluster together or not,
deﬁning regions in latus sensus and, if those regions exist, which countries be-
long to them. That will be the issue of the present point.
From the previous point it seems that there are only two stable factors in
this sample, therefore the clustering will be done using those stable factors.
This study will be divided into two parts. The ﬁrst presents the results for hard
clustering and the second presents the results for fuzzy clustering16
Hard clustering. When considering how to cluster the countries I used two
alternative methods: not considering the country idiosyncratic movement and
considering it. In the ﬁrst method the distance of two countries is measured
16Appendix D shortly describes both methods, a more extensive description can be found
in Kaufman and Rousseeuw(1990)
21only by the importance of each factor on the volatility of each country business
cycle:
dc1,c2 =





















i st h ei m p o r t a n c eo ff a c t o ri to country cj,j = 1 , 2
By not considering the idiosyncratic movement we verify which countries are
more similar in their structure of dependence relative to the common factors.
This does not mean that countries that are similar have an high rate of com-
movement between them, as their dependence form the common factors may be
weak and the idiosyncratic component strong.
To check commovement we should consider the idiosyncratic factor of each
country as two additional variables in deﬁning the distance between countries:
dc1,c2 =





















is the importance of factor i to country cj
(scj)2 is the importance of the idiosyncratic component of country cj
and j =1 ,2
in this way even if the structure dependence from the common factors is
similar but weak, the countries will not appear in the same group but apart.
The next two ﬁgures show the cluster tree for both methods.
From ﬁgure (16) and making the divisions when a clustered group of coun-
tries joins with other group with more than two/three countries we can identify
ﬁve/six groups: the ﬁrst one is composed by France, Ireland, Belgium, Switzer-
land, Japan and Italy (call it the French-Japanese group); a second group com-
prises Australia, Canada, Sweden, Austria, Portugal, Iceland, Spain, Luxem-
bourg and UK (this group can be divided into two subgroups: Spain, Luxem-
bourg and UK in one and the remaining countries in other). A third group
comprises Mexico, Turkey, Korea and Norway. A fourth one includes Germany,
Netherlands, Finland, USA and Greece (a German-USA group). Finally Den-
mark and New Zealand appear as two countries apart from the others. However
22Figure 16: Hard Cluster of OECD countries without idiosyncratic component
Figure 17: Hard Cluster of the OECD countries with idiosyncratic component
23this just illustrates how the countries are similar in their dependence from the
common components.
It is interesting to compare this division with the one obtained from ﬁg-
ure(17). In that tree there are just two surviving groups: the French-Japanese
one (composed by the same countries as before) and the German-American one
(that adds Spain to the previous group). This two groups cluster between them-
selves before any other country. It seems therefore that the OECD commove-
ments can be depicted by two centers: the French-Japanese and the German-
American centers and all other countries are peripherical to those centers, being
that Norway, Turkey, Mexico and Korea (the third group from the previous
ﬁgure) appear as the most distant (and therefore commove less with the re-
maining). In fact those countries have a weak dependence from the two ﬁrst
common factors (see ﬁgures 3 and 4 ).
Fuzzy clustering However the last approach has the limitation that allocates
a country to a certain group, and sometimes the country position may be half
way through two centers, in that case the method allocates it arbitrary to one
of the groups. In order to correct that shortcoming this subsection presents
the results for fuzzy clustering, where countries are not allocated certainly to
a group but will be given a probability measure of belonging to the several
groups. The study was done without the idiosyncratic component, hence, it is
just checking for similar dependence on common factors.
The table (depicted in ﬁgure 18) reports the results for fuzzy clustering with
6 groups17.
From those values seems that the groupings found in ﬁgure (16) are overall
conﬁrmed. Cluster IV comprises the French-Japanese group, however we can see
that Italy and Japan association with this cluster is weaker when compared with
the other members. Cluster VI comprises the USA-Germany group however it
is not as strong deﬁned as the other clusters. Cluster V comprises the Mexico,
Norway, Korea and Turkey group, where appears also New Zealand but with
a weaker association. Finally Clusters I, II and III comprises all the other
countries divided into several sub-groups. When trying with four Clusters, this
three groups appear as forming one single cluster.
As for the groups silhouettes, Clusters I to IV have quite high values, as the
17The choice of the number of groups was based in the maximum value for the normalized
Dunn coeﬃcient, when the number of clusters range from 2 to 8. For six clusters the normalized
Dunn coeﬃcient is 0.3011.
24Figure 18: Fuzzy cluster for the OECD countries
Clusters  I  II  III  IV  V  VI  Country 
Silhouettes 
Australia  0.0852  0.4779 0.1436 0.0399 0.1520 0.1015 0.9999 
Austria  0.1248  0.1019 0.6606 0.0310 0.0320 0.0497 0.8796 
Belgium  0.0753  0.0368 0.0493 0.7784 0.0245 0.0357 0.8752 
Canada  0.0719  0.6187 0.1663 0.0282 0.0557 0.0592 0.9999 
Switzerland  0.1088  0.0468 0.0660 0.7058 0.0298 0.0428 0.8852 
Germany  0.1676  0.1334 0.1507 0.0854 0.0865 0.3764 0.5917 
Denmark  0.1147  0.1739 0.1357 0.0678 0.2213 0.2865 0.3583 
Spain  0.5969  0.0767 0.1444 0.0732 0.0376 0.0712 0.7405 
Finland  0.0529  0.0704 0.0620 0.0251 0.0462 0.7434 0.58 
France  0.0435  0.0214 0.0287 0.8721 0.0142 0.0202 0.8882 
UK  0.3266  0.1359 0.3038 0.0929 0.0606 0.0801 0.6475 
Greece  0.0543  0.0636 0.0594 0.0274 0.0449 0.7505 0.6327 
Ireland  0.0361  0.0173 0.0235 0.8955 0.0114 0.0162 0.8958 
Italy  0.2313  0.0801 0.1192 0.4470 0.0485 0.0739 0.836 
Japan  0.2951  0.0906 0.1404 0.3399 0.0531 0.0808 0.7778 
Korea  0.0655  0.1388 0.0886 0.0387 0.5872 0.0812 0.5813 
Luxembourg  0.6342  0.069 0.1539 0.0598 0.0319 0.0512 0.7991 
Mexico  0.0843  0.2 0.1189 0.0479 0.4502 0.0987 0.3927 
Netherland  0.2154  0.1465 0.1888 0.0807 0.0775 0.2912 0.4955 
Norway  0.033  0.0691 0.0438 0.0191 0.7858 0.0493 0.6513 
N. Zealand  0.1089  0.1724 0.1307 0.068 0.3210 0.199 0.5035 
Portugal  0.1071  0.1168 0.6645 0.0309 0.0343 0.0464 0.8636 
Sweden  0.0534  0.7128 0.1087 0.0216 0.0497 0.0538 0.9999 
Turkey  0.0268  0.0547 0.0354 0.0158 0.8293 0.0381 0.6792 
USA  0.159  0.2004 0.2098 0.0576 0.0837 0.2896 0.2924 
Iceland  0.1412  0.3245 0.2652 0.0638 0.1101 0.0952 0.9999 
Cluster 
Silhouettes 
0.729  0.9999 0.8716 0.8597 0.5616 0.4918  
 
other two have silhouettes around 50% showing that those groups are not as
well deﬁned as the ﬁrst four.
3.2.5 Conclusions for the OECD sample
First it seems that there are only two stable factors on this sample, and the world
business cycle is a mixture of those two components. Only for Korea, Mexico
and Turkey is the importance of the world business cycle small (it accounts for
less than 20% of the national cycles variability). Moreover worldwide there is
evidence of a core of countries that commove around two axis: a German-USA
and a French-Japanese. The other countries seem to be peripherical to this core.
That periphery can be decomposed into two groups with similar structures: one
closer to the center (composed by Australia, Canada, Sweden, Austria, Portugal,
Iceland, Spain, Luxembourg and UK) and other more distant (Mexico, Turkey,
25Korea and Norway). Denmark and New Zealand seem to be half way between
this two peripheries.
This leaves to question what are those factors depicting. From observing
ﬁgure 2 and 5 both factors reﬂect the oil crisis of 73 and 81. They are diﬀerent
from mid-eighties onwards: the ﬁrst factor depicts a long period of recession on
the eighties, a growth period at the end of eighties and a recession on the early
nineties and a period of recovering during the nineties. The second component
depicts a growth period during the mid-eighties and a recession on the end of
eighties. In the nineties it keeps around zero. We could think on the oil price,
the USD exchange-rate volatility, periods of monetary and/or ﬁscal expansion,
etc. Try to identify the shock source that those two components depict can be
the issue of future research. However, as Kose et all.(2003) say: "...it is easier
to say what those components are not than what they are." In their study they
could not identify any single source that could be responsible for the single world
factor that they have estimated.
3.3 Results for the whole sample
In the previous point we have seen that the world business cycle is composed
by two distinct components, that aﬀect the variability of most national cycles.
However that study was done for the OECD countries, and not taking into
account developing countries. This section adds to the OECD countries more
33 developing countries (see appendix A) to try to see if we can identify the
same components of the world business cycle and, if so, if those components are
important for the volatility of national cycles of developing countries.
The structure of this subsection is equal to the previous one.
3.3.1 Estimation of the number of common factors
The estimation of the number of components for the 59 country sample was
more diﬃcult, due to the increased cross-heteroskedasticity of the idiosyncratic
components found in the sample (see appendix B). The information criteria
depicted in equation (2) give the following results (table 4) when Rmax =5:
26Table 4 - Number of Common Factors




Table 5 shows the percentage of the common variance that each eigenvector
is capturing.
Table 5
Eigenvalue 1 2 3 4 5
Ratio 0.2039 0.1383 0.1194 0.0939 0.0675
Eigenvalue 6 7 8 9 10
Ratio 0.0591 0.0558 0.0468 0.0346 0.0296
Analyzing both methods they give conﬂicting results: the IC2 points to four.
If we ﬁx at 5% the percentage from which we ignore the factors, table 5 points
to seven. If we ﬁx at 10% it points to three. The choice was to ﬁxa t4t h e
number of common factors (following the indication of the IC2 for standardized
data).
It might seem strange to estimate less factors for a bigger cross-country
sample, however, as we saw before there was only two factors in the OECD
sample that were stable, indicating that two should be the number of common
components on that sample.
3.3.2 Estimation results
Figure 1918 shows the evolution of the four factors estimated. From that we
can realize that the ﬁrst and second factor are similar to the ones estimated in
the previous section. The third has no resemblance with any of the components
estimated before and the fourth factor behavior during the eighties is similar to
the behavior of the third component estimated in the OECD sample.
18As before, all series of residuals, except three, accepted homoskedasticity at 10% signiﬁ-
cance level, and all accepted it at 5%.
As for AR(1), the picture is slightly diﬀerent: 50 series accepted no AR(1) at 5% level
and 56 accepted no AR(1) at 1% level. However, the problem of some series being AR(2),
also, persists in this sample. Therefore we have to rely on the asymptotic distribution when √
N/T → 0.A sN =5 9→
√
N ∈ (7;8) which continues to be smaller than T =3 2 .
27Figure 19: Factors estimated for the world sample
In Figures 20 to 23 we can see the variance decomposition for the diﬀerent
countries.
Taking 20% as benchmark the ﬁrst two factors (that we considered as the
two world business cycle components in the previous sample) are important for
all European countries with the exception of Turkey and Sweden . In America
they are important to USA, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica and Guatemala. In Asia
to Japan, Hong Kong and Philippines. Finally, in Africa, Gambia and Ghana
are aﬀected by the ﬁrst component,and Côte d’Ivoire, South Africa, Zambia and
Zimbabwe are inﬂuenced by the second component.
The third component is important for Norway, Uruguay (more than 60%),
Peru, Paraguay, Brazil, Korea, China, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand.
With the exception of Norway all countries are non-OECD ones.
As for the forth factor it seemed to have some resemblances with the third
component estimated for the OECD (the Anglo-Saxon component). However,
by analyzing the variance decomposition it is important only for a minority of
countries and is not important for most Anglo-Saxon countries.
As conclusion we can realize that the ﬁrst and second common component
have a analogous behavior as in the OECD sample and its importance for the
OECD countries is similar. As for the third and fourth they seem speciﬁct o
n o n - O E C Dc o u n t r i e s . H o w e v e ra sw es a wi nt h eO E C Ds a m p l eo n l yt h eﬁrst
two components were robust when analyzing their stability through time. That
28Figure 20: Variance decomposition for Europe
Figure 21: Variance decomposition for North and South America
29Figure 22: Variance decomposition for Oceania and Asia
Figure 23: Variance decomposition for Africa
30and a cluster analysis are the issues of the following sections.
3.3.3 Stability issues
As before, we are going to compare the results for the whole sample with the
results for a restricted time frame: 1970-1990.
Are the common factors the same? The ﬁrst question is if the estimated
factors are the same. Figures 24 to 27 compare both estimations.
Figure 24: First factor comparison
Figure 25: Second factor comparison
From these ﬁgures we can realize that the ﬁrst three factors estimations are
stable across time, although the third factor is slightly diﬀerent in the second half
of the seventies. The fourth factor also has some resemblances across samples,
31Figure 26: Third factor comparison
Figure 27: Fourth factor comparison
although the way to the trough on 1982 is quite diﬀerent: on the sample 1970-
2001 the factor peaks around 80 after being growing since 1976. In the sample
1970-1990 it peaks around 1978. However the conﬁdence intervals are close
enough to not dismiss that is the same factor19.
Is the relative importance of the factors the same? If the factors esti-
mated are the same, the next question is to know if their relative importance
in explaining common variations change. Table 6 (on the next page) compares
the ratios.
19I also tried to estimate a model with more factors, but from the ﬁfth factor onwards the
estimate factors have little resemblance across samples. So I kept the model with only four
factors.
32Table 6
Eigenvalue 1 2 3 4 5
Ratio - Sample 1970-1990 0.2537 0.2059 0.1366 0.0873 0.0671
Ratio - Sample 1970-2001 0.2039 0.1383 0.1194 0.0939 0.0675
Eigenvalue 6 7 8 9 10
Ratio - Sample 1970-1990 0.0486 0.0428 0.0393 0.0310 0.0247
Ratio - Sample 1970-2001 0.0591 0.0558 0.0468 0.0346 0.0296
Contrary to the OECD sample where the importance of the ﬁrst factor was
similar, in this enlarged sample the importance of the ﬁrst factor decreases from
25,4% to 20.1%. As in the OECD sample the second factor ratio decreases and
the ratio for the third factor is slightly smaller.
T h ed e c r e a s eo fi m p o r t a n c eo ft h eﬁrst factor can be an indicator that the
business cycles of non-OECD countries are getting less similar to the cycles of
OECD countries. As we saw before the 2nd factor is more or less constant at
zero level after 1990, therefore it is not surprising that it’s importance diminishes
when we consider the whole sample compared with the time restricted sample.
Variance decomposition stability. Finally, if factors are the same in both
samples, are they aﬀecting the same countries in the same way? Figures 28 to
31 compares the variance decomposition for the two periods considered.
From those graphics we can see that despite the importance of factor 1 has
decreased overall only Colombia experienced a huge drop (from more than 60%
to less than 10%). There is no indication that the world got more integrated
around factor 1.
As for the 2nd common component we see that a number of countries saw
their ratios reduced: Zimbabwe, Zambia, Uruguay, Peru, Morocco, Turkey, Mex-
ico and Korea. Only Philippines increased its ratio.
The third factor has seen a overall reduction on the ratios, however the
countries that had the bigger ratios on the longer sample, continue to have the
bigger ratios on the shorter sample.
As for factor four we can realize that for Algeria, Malaysia and Ghana its
importance was reduced to almost zero. For Portugal the ratio decreased but
continue to account for about 10% of the national cycle variability. By other
side Thailand, Zimbabwe and Colombia have an increase on their ratios. This
sharp variations can make us suspicious if the fourth factor is stable, or even if
it is depicting the same factor.
33Figure 28: Comparision of the variance decomposition ratio for factor 1
Figure 29: Comparision of the variance decomposition ratio for factor 2
34Figure 30: Comparision of the variance decomposition ratio for factor 3
Figure 31: Comparision of the variance decomposition ratio for factor 4
353.3.4 Clustering analysis
As for the OECD sample, this subsection tries to see if we can identify countries
belong to the same groups, and thus deﬁning regions in latus sensus.
Hard clustering As for the OECD sample the next two ﬁgures show the
hard clustering trees without the idiosyncratic element (checking similarity of
structure) and with the idiosyncratic element (checking commovement). As
the stability analysis has indicated some instability in the fourth factor the
clustering presented in this and next subsection is made using only the ﬁrst
three estimated factors20.
From ﬁgure 32 we get a rather complex image. However we can realize that
group VI include USA, Germany and Netherlands and the majority of countries
of group III are OECD ones. Is in subgroup IIIB and IIID that we can ﬁnd
the countries of French-Japanese group identiﬁed in the OECD pictures. The
fact that they appear splited in two groups is due to the inclusion of Chile and
Guatemala in subgroup IIIB that by averaging with France and Japan pushes
the values away from the other countries, however, we should note that the
hard-cluster done with the same data but only for the OECD countries gives a
image identical to ﬁgure 1321 .
The hard-clustering taking into account the idiosyncratic component gives
a image similar to the one for the OECD sample. Two groups commoving: the
German-USA (with Netherlands, Greece and Spain) and the French-Japanese
(with Ireland, Belgium, Switzerland, Chile, Guatemala, Italy and Luxembourg).
Those two groups form a center, as they cluster together and all the others
cluster afterwards one by one, or in small groups.
From ﬁgures 32 and 33 we get the same picture as for the OECD sample.
Two groups that have similar structures and commove between themselves (that
we can label German-USA and French-Japanese), and all the other countries
being a periphery to those centers. We should, also, note that in the central
groups there are only two non-OECD countries: Chile and Guatemala and in
the ten countries that commove less with the center, only one is part of the
OECD: Turkey.
20Countries are tagged from 1 to 59. The codes can be found in appendix A.
21In order to not overload this section with more ﬁgures I opted to not transcribe it as it
does not add other information than the one reported in the previous ﬁgures.
36Figure 32: Hard cluster without the idiosyncratic component
37Figure 33: Hard Clustering with idiosyncratic componen
38Fuzzy clustering For the fuzzy cluster analysis, the use of 3 factors produced
always low normalized Dunn-coeﬁcents, the highest was 0.0899 for two clusters.
Always taking into consideration that value, and therefore that the clustering
is very weak, the results for two clusters are the ones in ﬁgure 34.
Figure 34: Fuzzy Cluster with three factors












Australia  0.6506  0.3494  0.4181    Algeria  0.3483  0.6517  0.9997 
Austria  0.5602  0.4398  0.2086    Brazil  0.3320  0.6680  0.9997 
Belgium  0.6763  0.3237  0.6152    Bolivia  0.4750  0.5250  0.9997 
Canada  0.7175  0.2825  0.5731    Chile  0.7036  0.2964  0.5979 
Switzerland  0.6436  0.3564  0.5602    China  0.3642  0.6358  0.9997 
Germany  0.6536  0.3464  0.4796    Colombia  0.3544  0.6456  0.9997 
Denmark  0.4498  0.5502  0.9996    Costa Rica  0.4903  0.5097  0.9997 
Spain  0.6674  0.3326  0.4272    Cote d'Ivoire  0.3907  0.6093  0.9997 
Finland  0.4318  0.5682  0.9997    Dom. 
Republic 
0.3163  0.6837  0.9997 
France  0.6855  0.3145  0.6004    Ecuador  0.3300  0.670  0.9997 
UK  0.7174  0.2826  0.6263    S. Salvador  0.4559  0.5441  0.9994 
Greece  0.4915  0.5085  0.9997    Gambia  0.7131  0.2869  0.6393 
Ireland  0.6737  0.3263  0.6092    Ghana  0.6753  0.3247  0.467 
Italy  0.6795  0.3205  0.6142    Guatemala  0.7191  0.2809  0.6382 
Japan  0.6900  0.3100  0.5953    Honduras  0.5040  0.4960  0.054 
Korea  0.3257  0.6743  0.9997    Hong Kong  0.6508  0.3492  0.4451 
Luxembourg  0.7243  0.2757  0.6226    India  0.3483  0.6517  0.9997 
Mexico  0.2966  0.7034  0.9998    Jamaica  0.3262  0.6738  0.9997 
Netherlands  0.6015  0.3985  0.3592    Malaysia  0.3275  0.6725  0.9997 
Norway  0.3555  0.6445  0.9997    Morocco  0.3174  0.6826  0.9997 
New 
Zealand 
0.3558  0.6442  0.9997    Pakistan  0.3205  0.6795  0.9997 
Portugal  0.6431  0.3569  0.4074    Paraguay  0.4304  0.5696  0.9997 
Sweden  0.3483  0.6517  0.9997    Peru  0.4055  0.5945  0.9996 
Turkey  0.3323  0.6677  0.9997    Philippines  0.3226  0.6774  0.9997 
USA  0.6095  0.3905  0.3903    Rwanda  0.3382  0.6618  0.9997 
Iceland  0.6895  0.3105  0.4982    Senegal  0.4874  0.5126  0.9997 
          Singapore  0.3589  0.6411  0.9997 
          South Africa  0.4557  0.5443  0.9994 
          Thailand  0.3559  0.6441  0.9997 
          Tunisia  0.3927  0.6073  0.9997 
          Uruguay  0.4522  0.5478  0.9994 




    Zambia  0.3577  0.6423  0.9997 
Cluster 
silhouettes 
0.4977  0.9977      Zimbabwe  0.3757  0.6243  0.9997 
 
Although the clustering is very weak, as it can be seen for the number
of countries where the probability of being in either cluster is almost 50%, it
emerges the fact that most non-OECD countries belong to cluster II, and most
of the OECD countries belong to cluster I. These facts emerge from the inclusion
of the third factor.
If we compare with the fuzzy clustering with only two factors the ﬁrst fact
39Figure 35: Fuzzy cluster with two factors
  Cluster I  Cluster II  Cluster III  Cluster IV  Cluster V  Country Silhouettes 
Australia  0.7127  0.0586  0.0634  0.0806  0.0847  0.8514 
Austria  0.5542  0.0971  0.1144  0.1288  0.1055  0.8143 
Belgium  0.1562  0.0820  0.0730  0.1081  0.5807  0.8368 
Canada  0.4645  0.0808  0.0788  0.1137  0.2623  0.7819 
Switzerland  0.1896  0.1109  0.1011  0.1401  0.4584  0.7720 
Germany  0.2467  0.1526  0.1017  0.2670  0.2320  0.5976 
Denmark  0.1315  0.3088  0.1170  0.3423  0.1004  0.0345 
Spain  0.4297  0.1207  0.0946  0.2039  0.1512  0.7284 
Finland  0.1080  0.2585  0.0833  0.4832  0.0670  0.3825 
France  0.1132  0.0503  0.0455  0.0677  0.7233  0.8669 
UK  0.2538  0.0703  0.0663  0.0979  0.5117  0.7925 
Greece  0.1410  0.1955  0.0858  0.4876  0.0900  0.6005 
Ireland  0.1598  0.0830  0.0757  0.1078  0.5736  0.8364 
Italy  0.1604  0.0837  0.0721  0.1131  0.5706  0.8237 
Japan  0.1014  0.0400  0.0369  0.0542  0.7675  0.8669 
Korea  0.0930  0.1494  0.5869  0.1222  0.0486  0.8227 
Luxembourg  0.2993  0.0830  0.0732  0.1217  0.4228  0.7465 
Mexico  0.1411  0.2487  0.3320  0.2105  0.0676  0.6599 
Netherlands  0.2048  0.1813  0.1077  0.3177  0.1885  0.616 
Norway  0.0851  0.5224  0.1326  0.2101  0.0498  0.9998 
New Zealnd  0.0689  0.6022  0.0887  0.1968  0.0435  0.9999 
Portugal  0.4153  0.1268  0.0979  0.2166  0.1433  0.7163 
Sweden  0.0136  0.0165  0.9480  0.0148  0.0072  0.8777 
Turkey  0.1226  0.3503  0.2211  0.2431  0.0628  0.9998 
USA  0.2096  0.1766  0.1096  0.2956  0.2085  0.5970 
Iceland  0.6984  0.0563  0.0577  0.0787  0.1088  0.8446 
Algeria  0.0136  0.0165  0.9480  0.0148  0.0072  0.8777 
Brazil  0.0724  0.5528  0.0820  0.2491  0.0437  0.9999 
Bolivia  0.3961  0.1361  0.1872  0.1694  0.1111  0.7347 
Chile  0.157  0.0511  0.0477  0.0705  0.6736  0.8389 
China  0.0136  0.0165  0.9480  0.0148  0.0072  0.8777 
Colombia  0.1783  0.1767  0.3895  0.1788  0.0766  0.7304 
Costa Rica  0.1315  0.1992  0.0832  0.5039  0.0821  0.5782 
Cote d'Ivoire  0.1020  0.4375  0.1137  0.2756  0.0712  0.9998 
Dom. Republic  0.1144  0.2339  0.4169  0.1743  0.0604  0.7253 
Ecuador  0.0136  0.0165  0.9480  0.0148  0.0072  0.8777 
S. Salvador  0.1585  0.2765  0.1558  0.2752  0.1340  0.9996 
Gambia  0.1268  0.0436  0.0406  0.0599  0.7290  0.8517 
Ghana  0.7334  0.0512  0.0532  0.0714  0.0908  0.8521 
Guatemala  0.1136  0.0405  0.0376  0.0555  0.7529  0.8578 
Honduras  0.1563  0.2020  0.0934  0.4657  0.0826  0.5139 
Hong Kong  0.7423  0.0511  0.0541  0.0708  0.0817  0.8552 
India  0.0136  0.0165  0.9480  0.0148  0.0072  0.8777 
Jamaica  0.0136  0.0165  0.9480  0.0148  0.0072  0.8777 
Malaysia  0.1223  0.3184  0.2751  0.2208  0.0634  0.9998 
Morocco  0.1097  0.2062  0.4674  0.159  0.0576  0.7661 
Pakistan  0.1018  0.1751  0.5301  0.1397  0.0532  0.8011 
Paraguay  0.1922  0.2255  0.1266  0.3707  0.0850  0.3409 
Peru  0.1179  0.2811  0.3421  0.1959  0.0629  0.6327 
Philippines  0.0683  0.6064  0.0907  0.1921  0.0425  0.9999 
Rwanda  0.0475  0.0628  0.8100  0.0548  0.0249  0.8664 
Senegal  0.3356  0.1494  0.2284  0.1787  0.1079  0.6793 
Singapore  0.0809  0.5340  0.1073  0.2318  0.0460  0.9998 
South Africa  0.1577  0.2780  0.1552  0.2762  0.1329  0.9996 
Thailand  0.0136  0.0165  0.9480  0.0148  0.0072  0.8777 
Tunisia  0.1723  0.1486  0.4516  0.1510  0.0764  0.7609 
Uruguay  0.0136  0.0165  0.9480  0.0148  0.0072  0.8777 
Zambia  0.0764  0.5468  0.0873  0.2398  0.0498  0.9999 
Zimbabwe  0.0864  0.5081  0.1011  0.2465  0.0579  0.9999 
Cluster Silhouettes  0.7858  0.9998  0.8110  0.4735  0.8264   
 
40is that the number of clusters increase to 5 (Normalized Dunn coeﬃcient equal
to 0.2837). However most of the non-OECD countries cluster in groups II and
III (see ﬁgure 35), as most OECD countries cluster in the other groups. These
OECD groups have the by now familiar structure: the group V is the French-
Japanese grouping, as the IV is the German-USA one.
3.3.5 Conclusions for the whole sample
As conclusion we can say that factor 1 is mostly important for the developed
countries and some, few, developing countries. Factor 2 is also important for
some developed countries and for a number of developing countries. The third
factor aﬀects more non-OECD countries than OECD countries.
Against this background is diﬃcult to say that a true world business cycle
exists, as it seems more a developed world business cycle (that can be said to
be composed by the two ﬁrst common components). Most developing countries
are little or not aﬀected by the ﬁrst two factors. By other side a number of
them seem to follow the third factor, although for the developing countries the
idiosyncratic components seem to be the important factor of volatility of their
national business cycles.
4C o n c l u s i o n
As main conclusion, we can say that it seems that exists a world business cycle
that is itself composed by two components. This conclusion is similar to the
one found in Bayoumi and Helbling(2003). In their study, using a diﬀerent
approach, they also found that the common variations across the G7 countries
were due to two components. They interpreted the ﬁrst component as reﬂecting
the common global shocks, and the second reﬂecting country shocks that were
transmitted to other countries. In the present study I do not go as far as to give
a formal interpretation of those two components, however the ﬁrst component
has many similarities with the world business cycles estimated in other papers,
as the second seems to be capturing the ﬂuctuations prior to the 90’s. In that
sense seems that from the 90’s onwards the world business cycle has only one
component. To perform a closer study of what those components are and what
they represent is left for future work.
A second conclusion is that most of the developing countries are very weakly
linked to the world business cycle. This world cycle seems more a developed
41world cycle, than a true world cycle. This results are in line with those found
in Kose et all.(2003) and Mansour(2003). Also those studies showed that most
of the developing countries cycles are idiosyncratic.
A third conclusion is the absence of regional cycles, contrary to previous
works which tried to estimate world and regional business cycles by assuming
the existence of regions and regional components. In this sense there was no
evidence for a distinctive European business cycle. The conclusion is, also, not
new as Artis(2003) found if there existed a European region also Japan and
USA would be part of it, rendering it non-European. In terms of regions, the
absence of regional cycles leads to the absence of regions in strictu sensus,o t h e r
than the developed/developing countries division. However in the developed
countries we can group them according to the dependence structure from the
common components, forming regions in latus sensus.
Finally the limitations of the work should be pointed: in ﬁrst place we should
note that the statistical inference was done using the asymptotic distribution.
That raises the question if this distribution is close enough to the ﬁnite sample
distribution to be reliable. To try to answer that question a small Monte-
Carlo is presented in appendix E, where the ﬁnite distribution of the common
component and the asymptotic distribution are compared. Second, the factor
model is static, and does not capture potential dynamics in the transmission
process from the world business cycle to each country. Third, it assumes that the
importance of the factors is constant through time. As we saw from the stability
analysis it seems that for some countries the loadings vary. Therefore, to try to
include some variation across time on the loadings as Stock and Watson(1999)
suggest could help into getting a clear idea of the world synchronization and
how it has evolved. Last, the stability study is not based in any statistical
inference. This is a backdrop of all factor models, however in this case it should
be possible to develop a stability test based on the asymptotic distributions of
the estimated factors and loadings.
This last two issues (variability of loadings and a stability test) and try to
identify what are the common components describing are left for future work.

































43Appendix B - Are the idiosyncratic components cross
heteroskedastic?
The next graphics show the variance of the estimated residuals for the two
models without standardizing the data.
Figure 36:
The world sample has more cross-section heteroskedasticity than the OECD
sample. However, in the OECD case it does not seem too big to cause problems
in the selection on the estimation of the number of factors (however a parame-
terized montecarlo simulation can help to answer that question). In the case
the found cross-heterskodestacity do not cause problems, then them can be due
to other sources: short sample, cross-correlation of the residuals (which would
lead to problems on the inference of the loadings),etc..
44Appendix C- Monte Carlo simulation for detecting the number of
common factors




iFt + eit = Cit + eit
i =1 ,2,3,...,N and t =1 ,2,3,...,T
in which the number of factors was ﬁx e da t2 ,3a n d4 . T h ef a c t o r sa r e
AR(1)processes described by:
Ft =0 .5 ∗ Ft−1 +  t
 t are i.i.d.; randomly generated with variance equal to 1
The loadings λ
0
i were generated randomly.




T =0 .1 for 1




2 of the series
e0
iei
T =1 0for 1




T =1for all the N series
Being T =3 2a n dN equal to 26 or 59.
In both cases they are non-serial and non-cross correlated and homoskedastic
o nt h et i m ed i m e n s i o n .
The number of replications was 5000, and were done for standardized (Std)
and non-Standardized (non-Std) data.
Table C1 - Cross-Heteroskedastic data
2f a c t o r s 3f a c t o r s 4f a c t o r s









































































45Table C2 - Cross-Homoskedastic data
2f a c t o r s 3f a c t o r s 4f a c t o r s









































































46Appendix D - Short description of the clustering method
HARD CLUSTER TREES
The hard-cluster trees are built by applying the following steps:
1. Compute the following distances for all pair of countries:






































is the importance of factor i to country cj;, j =1 ;2and (scj)2
is the idiosyncratic component of country cj national cycle, j =1 ;2 .
2. Find the minimum value,
If the minimum value is between two original countries go to 3A.
If the minimum value is between a clustered group and other country
or clustered group go to 3B
3A Delete those two countries from the sample and add an artiﬁcial country
where the loadings are equal to the average of the clustered countries.
3B Delete the clustered groups and add an artiﬁcial country where the
loadings are equal to the average of all clustered original countries.
4 Go to step one.
FUZZY CLUSTER
For the fuzzy clustering we minimize the following objective function using













where K is the number of clusters and N is the total number of countries;
d(i;j) is the distance between country i and j deﬁned in 1A of the hard cluster
tree algorithm and uiv stands for the membership of country i in cluster v;











22If NDC = 0 complete fuzziness, if NDC = 1 perfect hard-clustering
47Appendix E - Monte Carlo simulation to compare the ﬁnite
distribution with the asymptotic one
This simulation tries to see if the asymptotic distribution used in the esti-
mation and inference of the model can approximate the ﬁnite distribution.
The model used is the same as in appendix C with 4 factors and N equal
to 59. Only two changes were made: the  t series are generated with variance
equal to 0.75 and the number of replications used was 1000.
As the number of factors is four and have equal variance, it makes it diﬃcult
to know which factor estimated (and respective loadings) corresponds to which
true factor (and respective true loadings). Therefore the study was only made for
the asymptotic distribution of the common factor, as is described in Bai(2003).
He showed that:
cit =





d → N(0,1), i =1 ,2,3,...,N and t =1 ,2,...,T
where : Vit and Wit are described in Bai(ibidem)
b Cit is the estimated common component (
4 X
i=1
b λri b Frt)
C0




In the following graphic the histograms depict the distribution of cit using
the estimated b Vit and c Wit, and the plot of the N(0,1) density function.
Figure 37:
As we can see for this sample, the estimated distribution has fatter tails
48than the standard Gaussian distribution. Even if they are not that far from
each other, rendering the use of the asymptotic distribution useful for inference,
seems that a better distribution for a ﬁnite sample would be an improvement
for this kind of studies. As ﬁnal note, it does not seem that standardizing or
not the data modiﬁes the ﬁnite distribution.
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1.  Introduction 
There is longstanding interest in the channels through which business fluctuations in one 
country are transmitted to other countries.  It is often said that “When America sneezes, Europe 
catches a cold.”  But despite the theoretical and empirical analyses to date, it seems fair to say 
that there is no consensus on the important determinants of business-cycle comovement.  The 
difficulty is that there are many potential candidate explanations.   
One leading candidate is trade.  Frankel and Rose (1998) present empirical evidence that 
higher bilateral trade between two countries is associated with more-correlated business cycles.    
Another explanation for business-cycle comovement is similarity in industrial structure.  This 
linkage has been stressed in a series of papers by Jean Imbs (1998,1999, 2003).  A third variable 
studied by Rose and Engel (2002) is currency unions.  Other variables that may be important for 
business-cycle comovement are the following:  (i) the extent of total trade in each country; (ii) 
factor endowments and (iii) gravity variables such as distance between countries, common 
language, adjacency, and so on.
1 
Our paper uses a dataset that includes over 100 countries, both developed and 
developing.  We have collected data for each country on each of the variables described above.  
To say something definite about the important determinants of comovement, we use the 
“robustness” approach advocated by Leamer (1983), and used so effectively by Levine and 
Renelt (1992)  in their analysis of growth regressions.  With this approach, a variable is said to 
be a robust determinant of business-cycle comovement if the variable has a significant 
coefficient in a regression when all other potential explanatory variables have had a chance to 
“knock the variable out of the equation.”  
Our results are as follows.  Nearly all of the variables considered are significant 
determinants of trade when considered in isolation.  However, there are only a few robust 
variables.  Bilateral trade is robust:  countries that trade more with each other have more-
correlated business cycles.  Further, our results indicate that bilateral trade is robust to the 
                                                 
1 See also papers by Calderon, et al. (2002), Fidrmuc (2002), Kose, et al. (2003), Otto, et al. (2003) and  Shin and 
Wang (2003).  These authors study the determinants of business-cycle synchronization using a variety of country 
samples and economic variables.  Recent contributions by Kose and Yi (2001,2004) explore the ability of dynamic, 
stochastic general equilibrium models to explore various theoretical explanations for the finding that stronger trade 
linkages are associated with more-correlated business cycles.     3
inclusion of gravity variables, suggesting an independent role for trade in transmitting business 
cycles.    
Other variables that are robustly, positively related to business-cycle comovement are (i) 
an indicator variable that indicates that both countries are industrialized countries; (ii) an 
indicator variable that indicates that both countries are developing countries;  (iii) a variable 
measuring the distance between the two countries.  Variables that are not robust include (i) 
measures of industrial similarity; (ii) currency union; (iii) total trade undertaken by the two 
countries; (iv) measures of similarity in export and import baskets; and (v) measures of factor 
intensity.   
Our finding that sectoral similarity is not robust stands in contrast to recent research by 
Imbs (1998,1998, 2003) in which he argues that sectoral similarity is strongly positively related 
to business-cycle correlations.  Our finding on currency unions challenges much recent research, 
initiated by the contribution of Rose and Engel (2002), in which currency union is found to be 
related to business cycle comovement.  Our results show that this relationship is not robust.   
 
2.  Econometric Methodology  
This section describes the econometric methodology used in this paper.  Briefly, the 
approach is Leamer’s (1983) “Extreme Bounds Analysis” applied to band-pass-filtered data.  
The band-pass filter is designed to isolate business-cycle components of the data.  We include 
country-specific indicator variables to remedy problems associated with using an estimated 
variable (the business-cycle correlation) as the dependent variable in our regressions.  Readers 
may go directly to section 3 if they prefer to skip the econometric details. 
2.1  Extreme-Bounds Analysis 
Our analysis will involve regressions of a dependent variable, Y, on various sets of 
independent variables.  Specifically, Y is a vector of business-cycle GDP correlations  ij Y  
between a pairs of countries i and j.  We measure the business-cycle component of quarterly real 
GDP using the BP(6,32) filter described by Baxter and King (1999).  Other researchers, such as 
Frankel and Rose (1998) and Rose and Engel (2002), have employed a variety of filters in their   4
related investigations.  Frequently, the filter used does not matter importantly for the results.  We 
confine our attention to just one filter because this filter was designed to measure business cycle 
correlations, which is the focus of this paper.  The other filters, such as the first-difference filter, 
do not provide a good measure of the business-cycle frequencies.  See Baxter and King (1999) 
for more detail.   
The econometric approach that we use is the extreme-bounds analysis (EBA) suggested 
by Leamer (1983).  The general form of the regression used for the EBA is as follows: 
  im z YI M Z u β ββ = ++ +  (1) 
The  independent variables are of three types, as follows.  I denotes a set of “always-
included” variables.  This set may be empty.  The M-variable is the variable which is being 
tested for robustness.  The Z-variables contain other variables that prior studies have suggested 
may be important for business-cycle correlations.  The EBA is performed by varying the set of 
Z-variables included in the regression for a particular M-variable.  From these regressions, the 
EBA determined the highest and lowest values of confidence intervals constructed from the 
estimated m β .  We will say that an M-variable is robust if these highest and lowest values are of 
the same sign (that is:  this range does not include the value zero which would indicate that the 
variable is not significantly related to Y). 
2.2  Econometric Issues 
An important econometric problem results from the fact that the econometrician does not 
observe the true cross-country business cycle correlations ij Y , but instead must use estimated 
correlations l
ij Y , which may contain measurement error.  To make progress on this problem, it is 
necessary to make an assumption about the specific form of the measurement error. 
We follow the approach taken by many cross-section analyses of large samples in 
specifying a fixed-effects model: 










where  i V  is the fixed effect for country i.
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This model can be estimated by OLS where indicator variables are used to capture the country 
fixed effects. 
 
3.  Theory, Measurement and Results 
The goal of this paper is to determine which economic and geographic variables are 
robustly correlated with business-cycle comovement.  In order to interpret the results, it is useful 
to consider the findings in light of existing theory.  At the heart of the issue lie two basic 
questions.  First, why are there business cycles?  Second, why are business cycles correlated 
across countries?   
The generally accepted answer to the first question is that business cycles occur because 
something—random or deliberate--disturbs the steady evolution of an economy along its long-
run path.  The disturbances may be fiscal policies, monetary policies, changes in technological 
‘know-how,’ or even the weather.  Stockman (1988) found that sectoral shocks and national 
shocks were both important impulses to business cycles.  Subsequently, a large literature 
developed seeking to determine the sources of shocks to national business cycles.
3  On the 
theoretical side, there is a large literature of open economy models which study the business-
cycle effects of various shocks.  Many of these are cited in the survey by Baxter (1995).    
                                                 
2 An alternative approach, utilized by Clark and van Wincoop (2001) and Imbs (2003), assumes a random effects 
model. There are two advantages to assuming a fixed effects model. First, unlike the random effects model the fixed 
effects model is robust to measurement error that is correlated with the dependent variables, which is likely to be the 
case in our EBA analysis. Second, given the large sample size of our EBA regressions random effects is 
computationally burdensome and from a time perspective not feasible given the large number of regressions we 
must run.   
3 Contributions include papers by Norrbin and Schlagenhauf (1996), Gregory, Head and Reynauld (1997), Gregory 
and Head (1999), Clark and Shin (2000), Lumsdaine and Prasad (2003), and Kose, Otrok and Whiteman (2003).   6
The second question—what causes cross-country correlation between business cycles—
has also received substantial attention.  The correlation and transmission of business cycles 
depends on the sources of the disturbances:  are the shocks industry-specific or nation-specific?  
Further, the degree of interconnectedness of the two countries matters.  Countries with open 
capital markets will respond similarly to disturbances which change the world interest rate.  
Countries that are willing and able to use monetary and fiscal policies may be able to insulate 
their countries against particular types of shocks, as originally suggested by Mundell (1961). 
At present, however, there is no single model that can be said to successfully explain why 
some countries experience business-cycle comovement while others do not.  Similarly, there is 
no consensus on the predominant sources of shocks to national and international business cycles.  
This is precisely why we are conducting the present, primarily empirical exercise.  Our goal is to 
isolate those factors that appear to be robustly related to business-cycle correlation. 
This section describes in detail the measurement of variables used in our investigation.  
We have grouped these variables into several sub-groups, according to the economic 
phenomenon that the variable is intended to measure.  The details of the data sources and 
variable definitions are presented in Appendix A.  We will consider measures of international 
trade, industrial structure, factor endowments, and currency union.  We will also consider the so-
called “gravity variables”—exogenous characteristics of country pairs that have been shown to 
explain a great deal of bilateral trade.  The results reported in the text of the paper have all been 
estimated with country fixed effects.  For the interested reader, we have reported complete 
results without country fixed effects in Appendix B.  The results are quite insensitive to the 
removal of the country fixed effects. 
Table 1 presents the correlation coefficients among all the variables used in our study.  
The first column of the table contains the correlations between the business-cycle correlation and 
the other variables.  The variables are grouped according to the phenomenon they capture:  
bilateral trade intensity, total trade intensity, etc.  The details of the construction of each variable 
are explained in the subsections below, and we will refer back to this table frequently.  The 
within-group correlations are shaded for ease of reference.  We turn now to a detailed 
consideration of each group of variables.  
3.1  Gravity variables    7
In the existing literature, there is abundant evidence that the gravity variables can explain 
bilateral trade.
4  Further, several recent papers have shown that bilateral trade is trade is related 
to business-cycle comovement.
5  We begin the empirical analysis by studying the relationship 
between business-cycle comovement and the exogenous gravity variables:  adjacency, distance, 
common language, population variables, total land, and indicator variables for two industrialized 
countries and two developing countries.   
Table 2-A presents a regression of the business-cycle correlation on a typical set of 
gravity variables, ignoring country fixed effects. Variables significant at the 10% level include 
adjacency, distance, minimum population, the land variables and dummies indicating both 
industrial and both developing countries.  
For comparison with our later results, Table 2-B presents results that combine the gravity 
variables with country fixed effects.  Including the country fixed effects leads to collinearity 
between pairs of gravity variables that measure maximum and minimum values of a particular 
variable.  Thus Table 2-B includes only one variable from each pair of this type—we choose the 
“minimum” value.  We find that adjacency, common language, distance, minimum population 
and industrial country indicator are all significant.  
In our analysis of the other variables, we use the gravity variables in two ways.  First, we 
allow the gravity variables to act as Z-variables in the EBA regressions.  Second, we use the set 
of gravity variables as I-variables (always-included variables) in the EBA regressions.  The point 
of including gravity variables as I-variables is to control for that part of business-cycle 
comovement that is strictly exogenous to the country pair.  Overall, our results are affected very 
little by whether the gravity variables are Z-variables or I-variables.  
 
3.2 Bilateral trade 
  The relationship between trade and business cycles has received a great deal of attention, 
both in theoretical and empirical work.  At the heart of this lies the question of why countries 
                                                 
4 See Frankel and Rose (1998). 
5 See Frankel and Rose (1998), Imbs (1998, 1999, 2003), and Clark and van Wincoop (2001).   8
trade in the first place.  The secondary question, which cannot be addressed until the first 
question is answered, is “how does trade affect business cycles?” 
Classical Ricardian theory explains trade as resulting from the fact that trade permits 
exploitation of gains from greater specialization.  Modern theories that have a strongly Ricardian 
flavor include those by Baxter (1992), Eaton and Kortum (2002), and Alvarez and Lucas (2004).  
Models in which the gains from trade arise from increasing returns to scale are summarized in 
Helpman and Krugman (1985).  In all these theories, increased trade results in increased sectoral 
specialization.    
What are the implications of increases in trade and specialization for international 
business cycles?  If the primary disturbances are sector-specific, then specialization should lead 
to decreased business-cycle correlation.  On the other hand, trade may act as a conduit for the 
transmission of shocks that affect all industries.  In this case, increased trade would lead to 
increased business cycle correlation.   
The empirical relationship between trade and business cycles has been studied by several 
authors, beginning with work by Canova and Dellas (1993).  Frankel and Rose (1998) found that 
bilateral trade was positively related to business-cycle comovement.  Clark and van Wincoop 
(2001) also find that higher trade is related to more-highly-correlated business cycles.  Gruben, et 
al. (2002) explore alternative econometric procedures and also include variables measuring the 
structure of trade.  All these studies all conclude that trade is strongly, positively correlated with 
business cycle comovement.
6   
We construct four measures of bilateral trade intensity.  The measures differ from one 
another in two ways:  (i) the date at which the measure is calculated; we use both the beginning 
date and the ending date; and (ii) the scale variable used to normalize the bilateral trade measure:  
we use total trade and also aggregate GDP across the two countries. 
The measure BT1 is defined as 
 
 
                                                 
6 Frankel and Rose also study an instrumental-variables version of the regression in which gravity variables are used 
as instruments for bilateral trade.  They find that the coefficient estimates are larger with instrumental-variables 
estimation. 
1










where  ij x is the 1970 (beginning of sample) value of exports from country i to country j,  ij m is the 
1970 value of imports from country i to country j,  i x is the 1970 value of country i’s exports to 
all countries and  i m is the 1970 value of country i’s imports from all countries.  The measure 
BT3 uses the same formula as BT1, except that 1995 (end of sample) values are used.  Measures 
BT1 and BT3 are very similar to the “preferred measure” used by Frankel and Rose (1998). 
   The measures BT2 and BT4 are constructed according to the following formula, where 
BT2 uses 1970 values and BT4 uses 1995 values, and where  i y  is the value of country i’s GDP: 
 
In summary, BT1 and BT3 express bilateral trade as a fraction of total trade, at the beginning and 
end of the sample period, respectively.  The variables BT2 and BT4 express bilateral trade as a 
fraction of aggregate GDP in the two countries, at the beginning and end of the sample period. 
  3.2.1  A First Look 
The measure BT1 is our preferred measure of bilateral trade, for two reasons.  First, it 
measures trade at the beginning of the sample, which we will compare to business-cycle 
correlation over the subsequent sample period.  Thus the direction of causality is clear.  Second, 
we prefer the measure that uses total trade as the scale variable, rather than total GDP. 
Figure 1 is a scatter plot showing the extent of bilateral trade at the beginning of the 
sample (measure BT1) on the horizontal axis, and the corresponding business-cycle correlation 
on the vertical axis.  Each country-pair is a point on this plot.  The univariate regression line of 
the business-cycle correlation, denoted y, on the BT1 measure of bilateral trade, denoted x, is 
indicated by the heavy solid line on the graph.  The details of this univariate regression are also 
given.   The slope is positive and significant, although the R-square is only 0.034.  Some of the 
outliers are labeled..  For the most part, those country pairs that have both high bilateral trade and 
high business-cycle correlation are ones where this relationship might be expected.  For example, 
the US and Canada have the highest bilateral trade measure, and also have highly correlated 
business cycles.  Other country pairs of this type include Singapore/Malaysia, US/Japan and 
2, 4  .









France/Germany.  One might worry that the outliers are responsible for the positive estimated 
slope coefficient.  However, there are over 5000 observations plotted on this graph.  If we 
remove the 20 observations for which BT1 exceeds 0.10, the slope coefficient actually rises and 
is still significant.  Thus the positive relationship is not due to a few extreme observations. 
3.2.2  Testing for Robustness 
Table 3 presents the results of the base regressions for each of the four bilateral trade 
variables, together with the extreme bounds analysis for these variables.  The top panel of the 
table conducts the analysis with no “always-included” variables.  For each bilateral trade 
variable, we report the coefficients ( ' m s β ) with the highest and lowest confidence intervals.  We 
also present the standard error of  m β  in each case, the t-statistic for the null hypothesis that 
0 m β = , the number of observations, and the R-square of the regression.  In the second-to-last 
column we report the other variables (the Z-variables) in the regression that yielded the high/low 
estimates.  The final column reports on the robustness of the M-variable.  The variable is said to 
be robustly correlated with cyclic comovement if the high and low values of all confidence 
intervals for the estimated  ' m s β are of the same sign.   
The bottom panel of the table contains results for which the gravity variables are 
“always-included” I-variables.  The gravity variables are:  adjacency, distance, common 
language, population variables, total land, and indicator variables for two industrialized countries 
and two developing countries.  The purpose of having the gravity variables always-included is to 
control for that part of business-cycle correlation which can be viewed as exogenous.   
The reason for including the gravity variables is as follows. In the existing literature, 
there is abundant evidence that the gravity variables can explain bilateral trade, and that trade is 
related to business-cycle comovement. This raises a natural question of whether there is anything 
left for variables such as bilateral trade, industrial structure, or monetary union to explain, once 
the exogenous gravity variables are included in the regression.   
Looking first at the base regressions with no always-included variables, we find 
that all four measures of bilateral trade intensity have positive coefficients which are   11
statistically significant.
7  These variables continue to be significant in the base 
regressions even when the gravity variables are included (bottom panel of Table 3).  This 
is somewhat surprising, as the gravity variables have long been known to be very good at 
explaining the extent of bilateral trade.  We expected that including the gravity variables 
might eliminate the statistical significance of the bilateral trade variables, but this is not 
the case. 
We turn now to the “robustness” tests—the extreme bounds analysis (EBA).  
Throughout, we use a 10% critical value.  All four measures of bilateral trade intensity 
are robust when there are no always-included variables.  When the gravity variables are 
included, only one of the four measures continues to be robust.  The robust measure is 
BT1, which is our preferred measure for reasons given above.  In all cases, the sign of the 
coefficient on bilateral trade is positive, indicating that higher levels of bilateral trade are 
associated with higher business-cycle correlation.  Comparing the coefficients on the 
trade variables with and without the gravity variables included, we find that including the 
gravity variables reduces the size of the estimated coefficient in all cases, by 
approximately 30-50%.  
 
3.3  Extent of Total Trade 
The next variable we consider is the extent of total trade carried out by the pair of 
countries.  In contrast to the bilateral trade measure, the total trade measure is intended to capture 
the general “openness” of the two countries.
8  Just “openness” may matter; it may not be 
important how much bilateral trade there is, rather, the total amount of trade may be important.  
This variable may capture the flow of technological transmission that occurs through trade in 
general, not with a specific trading partner. Another possibility is that the extent of total trade is a 
good measure of the extent to which the country is exposed to global shocks.  Thus it is possible 
that higher trade, in the aggregate, leads to more-highly-correlated business cycles. 
                                                 
7 The base regressions include country fixed effects, while the regressions in the scatter plots do not.  Thus the 
coefficient estimates differ between the two specifications. 
8 Many empirical investigations that wish to measure the openness of an economy use the amount of total trade as a 
proxy for openness.   12
3.3.1  A first look 
Figure 2 presents a scatter plot of total trade against business-cycle correlation.  The 
specific measure of total trade plotted here is TT1, defined as 
 
 
where  i x and  i m denote total exports and imports, respectively, for country i, measured at the 
beginning of the sample in 1970.  We also construct an end-of-sample measure, TT2, using 1995 
data.   
  Figure 2 shows that there is a positive, significant relationship between total trade and 
business-cycle correlation. For most countries, total trade is a very small fraction of GDP, and 
this is reflected in the “cloud” of observations clustered between 0.00 and 0.25 on the TT1 axis.  
Further, the R-square of 0.0042 is extremely small.   
3.3.2  Testing for robustness 
Table 4 presents the detailed results for the two measures of total trade.  In the base 
regressions, the coefficient is always negative, and also significant.  Considered in isolation, 
higher total trade is associated with lower business-cycle correlation.  It is difficult to think of a 
good economic reason why this ought to be the case.  However, the EBA shows that the total 
trade variables are fragile, whether or not the gravity variables are included.  Once other 
variables are considered, there is no independent role for total trade in explaining business-cycle 
correlation. 
 
3.4  Similarity of Industrial Structure 
If the primary business-cycle shocks are sector-specific, then countries with 
greater similarity in sectoral structure would tend to have more-correlated business 
cycles, other things equal.  Stockman (1988) showed that sectoral shocks were one 











1999, 2003) has presented results showing that similarity of industrial structure is 
significantly, positively related to business-cycle correlations.  In his 1998 paper, using 
quarterly data for 21 OECD countries, Imbs finds that bilateral trade is not important for 
business cycles once country fixed effects are included.   
We will study six measures of industrial similarity.  These measures have been 
chosen for comparability with existing research.  We have also tried to include several 
alternative, reasonable methods for defining industrial similarity.   Our first measure of 
industrial similarity, suggested by Shea (1996) and used by Imbs (1998, 1999), is the 




where ‘sectors’ are defined as one of seven sub-sectors of aggregate GDP 
The variable ISC1 takes on values in the interval [0,1].  Greater similarity in sectoral structure 
leads to larger values of ISC1.  If   in jn s s =  so that sectoral shares of each industry are the same 
across countries, ISC1 is equal to 1.   
Some studies look only at the structure of manufacturing, so we define a comparable 
measure for manufacturing alone.  Our manufacturing index ISC2 uses 3-digit-level 





where the industry subscripts, n, now refer to manufacturing industries. 
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where  in s is the sector-n fraction of GDP of country i.  If   in jn s s =  so that sectoral shares of 
each industry are the same across countries, ISS1 is equal to one.  More generally, higher levels 
of sectoral similarity result in higher values of ISS1.  We also construct ISS2, which is the 
corresponding measure using manufacturing data.   
  Finally, we construct a third pair of measures similar to those used by Clark and van 
Wincoop (2001) and Imbs (2003).  This measure of sectoral similarity uses absolute values of 
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If   in jn s s =  so that sectoral shares of each industry are the same across countries, ISA1 is equal 
to one.  ISA2 uses the same definition applied to manufacturing data.  As with all our measures, 
higher values of ISA1 and ISA2 indicate greater similarity in industrial structure.   
  We refer back to Table 1 to look at the correlations among these variables.  This table 
shows that there is low correlation between a particular measure constructed from GDP data and 
the same measure constructed from manufacturing data.  Specifically, the correlation between 
ISS1 and ISS2 is 0.29; the correlation between ISA1 and ISA2 is 0.30, and the correlation 
between ISC1 and ISC2 is 0.23.  Since these correlations are low, we will allow the 
manufacturing measures as Z-variables in regressions where a corresponding GDP measure is 
the M-variable, and vice-versa (e.g., ISS1 and ISS2; ISA1 and ISA2; and ISC1 and ISC2).  
However, the correlations among all the GDP measures is high (in absolute value), as are the 
correlations among the manufacturing measures.  Thus, if one GDP measure, (e.g., ISC1) is an 
M-variable, then other GDP measures (e.g., ISS1 or ISA1) will not be included as Z-variables.   
3.4.1  A first look 
Figure 3 presents a scatter plot of ISC1 and business-cycle correlation.  There is 
considerable dispersion in the scatter plot.  A glance at the points themselves does not obviously 
imply any relationship between these variables.  The solid line is the estimated regression line 
from a regression of the business-cycle correlation on ISC1.  The details of the estimate are 
shown on the graph.  The estimate of the slope coefficient is 0.17, with a standard error of 0.03.    15
The R-square of the regression is 0.013.  Thus, industrial structure is indeed significantly, 
positively related to business-cycle correlation when considered in isolation.   
  3.4.2  Testing for robustness 
  Table 5 presents the results of the EBA for the industrial similarity variables.  The “base” 
regressions show that each of the six measures of industrial similarity has a positive and 
significant coefficient when considered alone.  This is true whether the gravity variables are 
included or not.  The coefficient estimates in these base regressions range from 0.11 to 0.36.  
Thus, taking the high estimate of 0.36, an increase in sectoral correlation from, say, 0.30 to 0.50 
would be accompanied by an increase in the business-cycle correlation of 0.20*0.36=0.072.  
This is not a large increase, but still of economic interest if it is robust.   
However, the EBA finds that all the industrial structure variables are fragile, independent 
of whether the gravity variables are included as I-variables.  Although most of the point 
estimates of the coefficients are always positive, the confidence intervals for the “low” estimates 
include negative numbers.   
To try to understand what may be leading to the fragility, we look at the “other 
variables”—the Z-variables—included in the “low” regressions.  In the top panel, with no 
always-included variables, we find that bilateral trade variables appear in 5 of the 6 “low” 
regressions in which the industrial structure variable is not statistically significant.  Trade 
similarity variables appear in 3 regressions, while a factor endowment variable (one or more of 
MAXK, MINK, MINED, MAXED, described in detail in the next section) appears in all 6.  The 
indicator for developing countries appears twice, while the indicator for the developed countries 
appears once. 
  When we look at the regressions with the gravity variables always-included, we find that 
the bilateral trade variables do not appear in any of the extreme-value regressions (neither “high” 
nor “low”).   Factor endowment variables measuring labor and capital again appear in all six 
regressions, as do trade similarity measures.  Total trade variables appear in two regressions.  
The developing/industrialized indicators are included in the I-variables and therefore were not 
considered as Z-variables.   
  What can we infer from this pattern of Z-variables in the regressions that lead to the 
result of fragility?  Broadly, it appears that inclusion of factor-endowment variables, especially   16
endowments of labor and capital, reduce the influence of industrial structure to insignificant 
levels.  Traditional Heckscher-Ohlin theory predicts a strong relationship between factor 
endowments and the sectoral structure of production.  Other trade theories, notably modern 
Ricardian theories in which factor accumulation is endogenous, predict a strong relationship 
between the production structure and the relative supplies of factors in the economy.
9  Thus it 
may not be surprising that including factor endowments leads to fragility of the industrial 
structure variables.  Bilateral trade and the structure of trade also appear frequently in regressions 
with insignificant coefficient estimates for industrial structure.  Again, all trade theories predict a 
tight relationship between factor endowments, production, and the extent and type of trade.  
Nevertheless, we found (in Section 3.2 above) that bilateral trade was robustly related to 
business-cycle correlation, even when the Z-variables included industrial structure, factor 
endowments, trade structure, etc.  The results of this section are that industrial structure is not 
similarly robust.   
 
3.5   Similarity in Baskets of Traded Goods 
  We considered similarity in baskets of traded goods as one possible economic variable 
that could be related to business-cycle comovement across countries.  For example, if countries 
export and/or import similar baskets of goods, then they would be affected similarly by shocks to 
the world prices of their import and export goods.  In addition, countries with similar baskets of 
traded goods would be affected similarly in the event of sector-specific shocks hitting their 
export and/or import sectors.   
  For completeness, we define nine measures of trade similarity:  three groups of three 
measures each.  The three groups parallel the three groups used for the industrial similarity 
measures.  The first group uses a correlation coefficient, identified by the mnemonic TSC.  The 
second group uses square of differences in sectoral shares, identified by the mnemonic TSS.  The 
third group uses the absolute values of differences in sectoral shares, identified by the mnemonic 
TSA.  Within each group, we construct a measure comparing (i) total export shares using 2-digit 
SITC data for all country pairs , denoted by “1” as the last digit of the variable name; (ii) total 
import shares using 2-digit SITC data for all country pairs, denoted by “2” as the last digit of the 
variable name;  and (iii) bilateral export shares using 2 digit SITC data for all country pairs, 
                                                 
9 See Baxter (1992).   17
denoted by “3” as the last digit. Thus, TSC3 refers to the correlation coefficient measure of trade 
similarity (TSC), using data bilateral export shares (“3”).   
The correlation matrix reported in Table 1 shows that there is high correlation between  
(i) TSS1, TSA1 and TSC1; (ii) TSS2, TSA2 and TSC2; and (iii) TSS3, TSA3 and TSC3.  
Correlation (in absolute value) is small among other pairs of the trade similarity variables.  To 
avoid multicollinearity we select variables for the regressions as follows.  When the M-variable 
is TSS1 trade similarity variables from the same group are permitted as Z-variables (i.e, TSS2 
and TSS3), while the highly-collinear variables TSA1, TSC1 are excluded from the set of Z-
variables.  A similar rule is used for the other variable groups.   
 
3.5.1  A first look 
  Figure 4 presents a scatter plot of TSC3 and the business-cycle correlation.  A glance at 
the highly dispersed scatter gives a general impression that there is no relationship between these 
variables.  However, there is a weak, but significant, negative relationship between the similarity 
of the structure of bilateral trade (TSC3) and the business-cycle correlation.   
 
  3.5.2  Robustness analysis 
As described above, we constructed nine measures of similarity in traded goods, 
comprising three sets of three different measures.  The three sets are distinguished by the basket 
of goods considered.  The first uses total exports, the second uses total imports, and the third uses 
bilateral exports.  Within each set, there are three measures which are constructed in a manner 
analogous to the three measures of industrial similarity.   
Table 6 presents the robustness analysis for the trade-similarity variables.  Looking first 
at the “base” regressions, we find that most of the trade-similarity variables are not significant, 
even without the addition of Z-variables.   All the coefficients but one are positive, but very 
small.  Less than half are significant. 
The EBA analysis finds that none of the trade-similarity variables is robust.  This finding 
is independent of whether the gravity variables are included as Z-variables.  The Z-variables that 
appear in the “low” regressions include industrial similarity variables and bilateral trade 
variables.  Apparently, given observations on industrial similarity and bilateral trade, there is   18
nothing to be added by including trade similarity as an explanatory variable for business cycle 
correlation.  Given the tight link between these three variables that is implied by trade theory, 
this finding is perhaps not very surprising. 
 
3.6  Factor Endowments 
  Most theories of interacting economies predict a significant relationship among 
factor endowments, trade, and business-cycle comovement.   This would be true of 
standard Heckscher-Ohlin theory, and would also be true of Ricardian theories.  Hybrid 
models that combine elements of monopolistic competition in manufacturing with 
competitive markets in other goods would also imply a relationship among these 
variables.  We consider three factors of production:  human capital (measured as log of 
years of education); log of physical capital per worker, and log of arable land per worker.  
In each case, we consider variables measuring the minimum value of the variable 
between the two countries, as well as the maximum value of the variable.
10 
  3.6.1  A first look 
We begin by taking a closer look at one particular measure of factor endowments:  
a variable measuring the log of the minimum education level between the two countries, 
MINED.  Figure 5 presents a scatter plot of this variable against the business-cycle 
correlation.  The scatter plot reflects the fact that MINED takes on several discrete 
values.  The estimated univariate regression line shows a positive and significant 
relationship.  The higher is the minimum education level between the two countries, the 
higher is the business-cycle correlation between the two countries.  However, the scatter 
is highly dispersed, and the R-square of the regression is only about 0.04.  Clearly, 
                                                 
10 As noted earlier, the inclusion of country fixed effects leads to collinearity between maximum and 
minimum measures of a given economic variable.  For completeness we report the results for all variables.  
However, it will be apparent that the coefficients on the minimum M-variables have equal and opposite 
signs from the corresponding maximum variables.  
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MINED does not explain a great deal of the cross-sectional variance in the business-cycle 
correlation. 
  3.6.2  Robustness analysis 
Table 7 presents the complete results for the factor endowment variables.  We 
begin by looking at the top panel which summarizes results with no Z-variables.  
Education and capital variables are all significant in the base regressions 
The minimum-education variable (MINED) has a positive and significant 
coefficient, while the maximum-education variable (MAXED) has a negative and 
significant coefficient.  Similarly, the minimum-capital variable (MINK) is positive and 
significant, while the maximum-capital variable (MAXK) is negative and significant.  By 
contrast, the land variables are not significant, although they show the same pattern in the 
signs of the coefficients:  positive for minimum-land (MINL) and negative for maximum 
land (MAXL).   
In the bottom panel, showing results for which the gravity variables are Z-
variables, we find the same pattern of signs of the coefficients.  However, the magnitudes 
of the coefficients are reduced by half or more, and the variables are no longer 
significant, except for the two capital variables.   
The EBA reveals that none of the factor-endowment variables is robust, 
independently of the inclusion of Z-variables.  Variables that appear in the “high” and 
“low” regressions include total trade, industrial similarity, other factor intensity variables 
(notably capital and education), bilateral trade, and trade similarity.  There is thus no 
clear pattern that can explain why the factor endowment variables fail to be robust.   
 
3.7  Currency Union 
Since Mundell (1961), economists and policymakers have been interested in the 
economic requirements for, and effects of, currency union.  More recently, the formation of the 
European Monetary Union in 1999 has led to abundant research on the effects that currency   20
unions have on trade and business-cycle characteristics of member countries.  Frankel and Rose 
(1998) point out that countries with more-similar business cycles are more natural candidates for 
membership in a common-currency area.  Further, the currency union itself might change the 
nature of bilateral business cycles.  Theories of the way in which this might happen are 
summarized in more detail in papers by Frankel and Rose (1998, 2002).  Most theories predict 
that a common currency will reduce intra-union barriers to trade and will thereby lead to greater 
intra-union trade in goods and capital. However, the theories differ in their predictions for the 
effect of this increased trade on business-cycle comovement.  Increased trade will lead to 
reduced comovement if the result of increased trade is greater specialization in a setting with 
shocks that are predominantly industry-specific.  Increased trade will lead to increased 
comovement if the main source of shocks are demand shocks that are common across countries.  
One source of shocks might be the common monetary policy.   
Most recent empirical evidence suggests that currency union leads to increased business-
cycle correlation among member countries.  Kim (1995) shows that the industrial structure of the 
50 U.S. states has become much more alike in the 90 years following the formation of the U.S. 
common currency area (U.S. Federal Reserve System), which suggests regions do not specialize 
in the production of goods under a currency union. Rose and Engel (2002) estimate the effect of 
currency unions on between business cycle comovement. They find that the coefficient on the 
currency unions is positive.  However, significance of this coefficient is not robust to the changes 
in the set of additional explanatory variables. 
Table 8 presents the robustness analysis for the currency union variable.  Because the 
currency union variable is a binary (dummy) variable, we do not present a scatter plot of this 
variable against the business-cycle correlation (as we did for all other variables).  Table 8 shows 
that the currency union variable carries a significant coefficient in the base regression when the 
gravity variables are not included.  The estimated coefficient in the base coefficient is 0.08, 
implying that membership in a currency union increases the business-cycle correlation by 0.08.  
The coefficient on the currency union variable is not significant in the base regression that 
includes the gravity variables as Z-variables.  The point estimate has dropped to 0.03, and the 
standard error is also 0.03.   21
Currency union is found to be fragile in the extreme-bounds analysis.  The “high” and 
“low” values of the confidence intervals are similar whether or not the gravity variables are 
included as Z-variables.  The Z-variables that lead to the “high” estimates are industrial 
similarity (ISC1, ISC2); and trade similarity, TSC3.  The Z-variables found in the “low” 
regressions are total trade (TT1), industrial similarity (ISA1), and the minimum-education 
variables (MINED).  
In summary, we find that currency union is not a robust predictor of business-cycle 
correlation.  Currency union is only a significant predictor of business cycle correlation if other 
variables are not included in the regression.   
 
3.8  A Return to the Gravity Variables 
  It is well-known that a large fraction of bilateral trade can be explained, in a statistical 
sense, by a set of  “gravity variables” which include distance between countries, indicator 
variables for common language and adjacency, and variables which measure the difference the 
countries levels of GDP.  To this point, the gravity variables have been included in the analysis 
as a set of “always-included” variables, the results of which are shown in the bottom panel of 
Tables 3-8.  It is notable that the robustness  results obtained for the other variables have been 
largely invariant to whether the gravity variables were included or not.  In this section, we 
investigate whether the any of the gravity variables is a robust explanatory variable for business-
cycle correlation.   
  3.8.1  A first look 
  The distance between two countries is one variable that is routinely included in “gravity 
regressions” for which bilateral trade is the dependent variable.  Many of our gravity variables 
are binary (dummy) variables, but distance is not.  Thus it is a good candidate for graphing in a 
scatter plot.  Figure 6 plots the log of distance against the business-cycle correlation.  As in all of 
our graphs, the scatter is very diffuse.  The estimated regression equation shows that there is a 
significant negative relationship between distance and business-cycle correlation.  Countries that 
are located closer to each other have, other things equal, more-highly-correlated business cycles.   22
There are many reasons to expect that this would be the case.  For example, regional shocks to 
weather would affect countries similarly if they are located near each other.  Countries trade 
more if they are located closer together (this is why the gravity equations work so well in the first 
place), and if shocks are transmitted through trade, then we would expect distance to be related 
to business-cycle comovement.  However, we might also wonder whether there is anything left 
for distance to explain, once bilateral trade is taken into account.  The EBA allows us to answer 
precisely these types of questions. 
  3.8.2  Robustness analysis 
  Table 9 presents the EBA of the gravity variables.  We have included maximum-GDP 
and minimum-GDP variables as potential Z-variables, since these are frequently used in gravity 
regressions.  We have not included them previously as I-variables since they cannot be viewed as 
exogenous with respect to the various M-variables.   
Our findings are as follows.  The log of distance is found to be robustly, negatively 
related to business-cycle correlation.  Since the coefficient on distance is negative, it is the 
“high” regression for which the confidence interval comes closest to including the value of zero.  
In this regression, we find bilateral trade (BT3)  as one of the Z-variables.  This is in line with 
our intuition that distance may affect business-cycle correlation through its effect on bilateral 
trade.  But, we also find that distance is significant even after bilateral trade is taken into account.   
  There are only two other robust gravity variables:  these are the indicator variables for (i) 
two industrialized countries; and (ii) two developing countries.  The coefficient is positive in 
each case.  This means that the business-cycle correlation is higher if the countries are of similar 
“types”—both developing or both industrialized.  The business-cycle correlation is lower if one 
country is developing and one is developed.  To the extent that intra-industry trade drives trade 
between industrialized countries, and to the extent that sectoral shocks predominate, we might 
expect the finding for industrialized countries.  However, we view the finding for developing 
countries as surprising and worth further thought and analysis. 
  The other gravity variables are all fragile.  These include adjacency; common language; 
minimum and maximum log population variables, and minimum and maximum log total land 
variables.  Adjacency and common-language were both significant in the base regressions, but   23
were found to be fragile once Z-variables were considered. The population and total-land 
variables were not significant even in the base regressions. 
 
4.  Conclusion 
  This paper has investigated the robustness of correlations between business-cycle 
comovement and a host of economics variables.  Our key findings are as follows. 
(i)  Higher bilateral trade between two countries is robustly correlated with a higher business-
cycle correlation between the countries.  The finding that trade is robust emerges both with and 
without the gravity variables playing the role of “always-included” I- variables.  The fact that 
bilateral trade is robust even when the gravity variables are included indicates that bilateral trade 
matters for business-cycle comovement separately from the effects on trade occurring through 
the gravity variables. 
(ii)  Greater similarity in industrial structure is not robustly correlated with business-cycle 
correlations.  Although industrial structure variables are significant in the base regressions (with 
no other explanatory variables), the significance disappears when the full set of Z-variables is 
considered.  This finding occurs with and without the gravity variables as I-variables.  This 
finding indicates that the findings of Imbs (1998, 1999, 2003) which stress the importance of 
industrial structure, are fragile.   
(iii)  Countries belonging to a currency union do not have significantly more highly correlated 
business cycles than countries that do not share a common currency.  This finding calls into 
question the prior empirical findings of Rose and Engel (2002). 
(iv)  Two indicator variables were found to be robust.  The first indicates that both countries in 
the pair are industrialized countries; the second indicates that both are developing countries.  In 
both cases, the variables are positively related to business-cycle correlation.   
(v)  Only one “gravity” variable was found to be robust:  this variable is the distance between the 
two countries.  Distance is negatively related to business-cycle correlation, as one would expect.     24
Our other findings are negative, in the sense that we found many variables not to be 
robust.  Specifically, total trade measures are fragile, as are the measures of the similarity of total 
and bilateral trade.  Factor endowment variables, including measures of education, capital, and 
arable land, were all found to be fragile.  All gravity variables except for distance were found to 
be fragile.  
In conclusion, our goal in writing this paper was to clarify the relationship between 
business-cycle comovement and other economic variables.  In doing so, we hope to provide 
guidance for future theoretical and empirical investigations into the sources and propagation 
mechanisms of international business cycles.   25
APPENDIX A:  Data Sources and Definitions 
 
 
Variable   Definition and Source 
Bilateral Trade   
BT1  Ratio of bilateral trade to total trade in 1970 (Source: 
Feenstra, Lipsey and Bowen, 1997, World Trade 
Flows CD-ROM, 1970-1992) 
BT2  Ratio of bilateral trade to GDP in 1970 (Sources: 
Feenstra, Lipsey and Bowen, 1997, World Trade 
Flows CD-ROM, 1970-1992, and Penn World Tables 
version 5.6) 
BT3  Ratio of bilateral trade to total trade in 1995 (Source: 
Feenstra, 2000, World Trade Flows CD-ROM, 1980-
1997) 
BT4  Ratio of bilateral trade to GDP in 1995 (Sources: 
Feenstra, 2000, World Trade Flows CD-ROM, 1980-
1997, and Penn World Tables version 5.6) 
Total Trade   
TT1  Ratio of total trade to GDP in 1970 (Sources: 
Feenstra, Lipsey and Bowen, 1997, World Trade 
Flows CD-ROM, 1970-1992, and Penn World Tables 
version 5.6) 
TT2  Ratio of total trade to GDP in 1995 (Sources: 
Feenstra, 2000, World Trade Flows CD-ROM, 1980-
1997, and Penn World Tables version 5.6) 




ISS1  Broad industry similarity, squared difference in 1980 
(Source: United Nations Statistical Yearbook 46
th 
Issue on CD-ROM) 
ISS2 Manufacturing  sector  similarity, squared difference in 
1980 (Source: United Nations Industrial Development 
Organization, 2000, Industrial Statistics Database on 
CD-ROM) 
ISA1  Broad industry similarity, absolute difference in 1980 
(Source: United Nations Statistical Yearbook 46
th 
Issue on CD-ROM) 
ISA2  Manufacturing sector similarity, absolute difference 
in 1980 (Source: United Nations Industrial 
Development Organization, 2000, Industrial Statistics 
Database on CD-ROM) 
ISC1  Broad industry similarity, sector share correlation in 
1980 (Source: United Nations Statistical Yearbook 
46
th Issue on CD-ROM) 
ISC2  Manufacturing sector similarity, sector share   26
correlation in 1980 (Source: United Nations Industrial 
Development Organization, 2000, Industrial Statistics 
Database on CD-ROM) 
Trade Similarity   
TSS1  Export similarity, squared difference in 1980 
(Sources: Feenstra, 2000, World Trade Flows CD-
ROM, 1980-1997) 
TSS2  Import similarity, squared difference in 1980 
(Sources: Feenstra, 2000, World Trade Flows CD-
ROM, 1980-1997) 
TSS3  Similarity of bilateral trade flows, squared difference 
in 1980 (Sources: Feenstra, 2000, World Trade Flows 
CD-ROM, 1980-1997) 
TSA1  Export similarity, absolute difference in 1980 
(Sources: Feenstra, 2000, World Trade Flows CD-
ROM, 1980-1997) 
TSA2  Import similarity, absolute difference in 1980 
(Sources: Feenstra, 2000, World Trade Flows CD-
ROM, 1980-1997) 
TSA3  Similarity of bilateral trade flows, absolute difference 
in 1980 (Sources: Feenstra, 2000, World Trade Flows 
CD-ROM, 1980-1997) 
TSC1  Export similarity, goods share correlation in 1980 
(Sources: Feenstra, 2000, World Trade Flows CD-
ROM, 1980-1997) 
TSC2  Import similarity, goods share correlation in 1980 
(Sources: Feenstra, 2000, World Trade Flows CD-
ROM, 1980-1997) 
TSC3  Similarity of bilateral trade flows, goods share 
correlation in 1980 (Sources: Feenstra, 2000, World 
Trade Flows CD-ROM, 1980-1997) 
Factor Endowments   
MINED  Log of minimum bilateral average years of schooling 
for total population 15 years and older (Source: Barro 
and Lee, 199?) 
MAXED  Log of maximum bilateral average years of schooling 
for total population 15 years and older (Source: Barro 
and Lee, 199?) 
MINK  Log of minimum bilateral capital per worker using 
aggregate investment in 1980 (Source: Easterly and 
Levine, 2002) 
MAXK  Log of maximum bilateral capital per worker using 
aggregate investment in 1980 (Source: Easterly and 
Levine, 2002) 
MINL  Log of minimum bilateral arable land (1000s of 
hectares) per worker in 1980 (Source: World Bank   27
Development Indicators on CD-ROM) 
MAXL  Log of maximum bilateral arable land (1000s of 
hectares) per worker in 1980 (Source: World Bank 
Development Indicators on CD-ROM) 
Currency Unions   
CU  Dummy variable indicating country pair is in 
currency union (Source: Frankel and Rose, 2002) 
CB  Dummy variable indicating one country maintains a 
currency board with other currency (Source: Frankel 
and Rose, 2002) 
CUB  Dummy variable indicating country pair is part of a 
currency union or currency board (Source: Frankel 
and Rose, 2002) 
Gravity variables   
ADJ(1)  Dummy variable indicating common border (Source: 
Macalester University, International Trade Database) 
LANG (2)  Dummy variable indicating common language 
(Source: Macalester University, International Trade 
Database) 
DIST (3)  Log of distance in kilometers (Source: Macalester 
University, International Trade Database) 
MINPOP(4)  Log of minimum bilateral population (Source: Penn 
World Tables version 5.6) 
MAXPOP(5)  Log of maximum bilateral population (Source: Penn 
World Tables version 5.6) 
MINTL(6)  Log of minimum bilateral total land area (1000s of 
hectares) (Source: United Nations Statistical 
Yearbook 46
th Issue on CR-ROM) 
MAXTL(7)  Log of maximum bilateral total land area (1000s of 
hectares) (Source: United Nations Statistical 
Yearbook 46
th Issue on CR-ROM) 
MINGDP (8)  Log of minimum bilateral GDP (Source: Penn World 
Tables version 5.6) 
MAXGDP (9)  Log of maximum bilateral GDP (Source: Penn World 
Tables version 5.6) 
IND(10)  Dummy variable indicating both countries are 
developed/industrial (Source: IMF World Economic 
Outlook 2002) 
DEV(11)  Dummy variable indicating both countries are 
developing (Source: IMF World Economic Outlook 
2002) 
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Notes: 
 
1.  Bilateral trade intensity:  1, 3








, where  ij x is the value of exports 
from country i to country j,  ij m is the value of imports from country i to country j,  i x is the 
value of country i’s exports to all countries and  i m is the value of country i’s imports from 
all countries; and  2, 4








, where  i y  is the value of country i’s 
GDP. 









, where  i y  is the value of country i’s 
GDP. 
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=− ∑ , where  in s is good n’s share of country i’s total 
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Appendix B:  Estimation without Country Fixed Effects 
 
Tables A-1 and A-2 present results of the EBA without country fixed effects.  The main findings 
of the paper are not changed by removal of the country fixed effects. Bound β
Std. 




BT1 High 3.94 0.29 13.77 4748 0.04 CU LANG MINTL robust
BT1 Base 3.50 0.27 13.20 4948 0.03
BT1 Low 1.69 0.38 4.43 1107 0.14 ISA2 TSA3 IND
BT2 High 16.79 2.01 8.35 2623 0.04 ISC1 MAXL ADJ robust
BT2 Base 13.49 1.07 12.57 4948 0.03
BT2 Low 5.41 1.25 4.33 3736 0.11 MINED ADJ IND
BT3 High 4.13 0.40 10.30 3155 0.05 ISC1 ADJ MINPOP robust
BT3 Base 4.30 0.28 15.37 5884 0.04
BT3 Low 1.76 0.33 5.31 2696 0.14 ISA2 MINED IND
BT4 High 7.78 0.82 9.54 3076 0.04 ISC1 MAXL MINPOP robust
BT4 Base 7.09 0.47 15.05 5884 0.04
BT4 Low 3.71 0.71 5.21 2551 0.11 ISA2 MINED IND
Total Trade
TT1 High 0.18 0.05 3.52 1107 0.08 ISA2 TSA3 MAXGDP fragile
TT1 Base 0.11 0.02 4.58 4948 0.00
TT1 Low -0.06 0.05 -1.07 1687 0.02 TSS3 MAXED MINL
TT2 High 0.13 0.02 7.55 1516 0.10 ISC2 TSC3 MAXGDP fragile
TT2 Base 0.05 0.01 5.68 5884 0.01
TT2 Low -0.03 0.02 -1.40 1989 0.11 TSS3 MINL IND
Industrial Similarity
ISC1 High 0.47 0.05 9.18 1060 0.10 TSC3 MAXED MAXGDP fragile
ISC1 Base 0.17 0.03 6.52 3238 0.01
ISC1 Low -0.01 0.06 -0.24 957 0.16 ISC2 TSC3 MINK
ISC2 High 0.47 0.04 11.77 1516 0.10 TT2 TSC3 MAXGDP fragile
ISC2 Base 0.23 0.02 9.16 3401 0.02
ISC2 Low 0.05 0.05 1.05 1296 0.17 TSC3 MINED IND
ISS1 High 0.06 0.04 1.36 2011 0.11 BT1 ISS2 MINK fragile
ISS1 Base -0.24 0.03 -7.43 3238 0.02
ISS1 Low -0.61 0.06 -9.43 992 0.10 TSS3 MAXED MAXL
ISS2 High -0.05 0.06 -0.96 1296 0.17 TSS3 MINED IND fragile
ISS2 Base -0.30 0.03 -10.47 3401 0.03
ISS2 Low -0.53 0.05 -11.28 1516 0.10 TT2 TSS3 MAXGDP
Z-Variables Variable
Table A-1:  EBA Without Country Fixed Effects
Gravity Variables Not Included as I-variablesBound β
Std. 
Error t # Obs. R-sq
Robust/ 
Fragile Z-Variables Variable
Table A-1:  EBA Without Country Fixed Effects
Gravity Variables Not Included as I-variables
ISA1 High 0.03 0.02 1.13 2011 0.11 BT1 ISA2 MINK fragile
ISA1 Base -0.14 0.02 -7.63 3238 0.02
ISA1 Low -0.34 0.03 -10.20 1060 0.11 TSA2 TSA3 MAXED
ISA2 High -0.05 0.03 -1.55 1296 0.17 TSA3 MINED IND fragile
ISA2 Base -0.18 0.02 -11.35 3401 0.04
ISA2 Low -0.30 0.03 -11.65 1518 0.09 TSA3 MAXGDP MINPOP
Trade Similarity
TSC1 High 0.20 0.02 7.85 1828 0.05 TSC3 MAXED MAXK fragile
TSC1 Base -0.02 0.01 -1.54 3817 0.00
TSC1 Low -0.09 0.02 -4.57 1641 0.06 ISC1 ISC2 MINPOP
TSC2 High 0.17 0.05 3.35 1828 0.03 TSC3 MAXED MAXGDP fragile
TSC2 Base -0.06 0.03 -2.08 3895 0.00
TSC2 Low -0.18 0.05 -3.95 1678 0.05 ISC1 ISC2 MINPOP
TSC3 High 0.04 0.02 1.81 1296 0.12 ISC2 MINED MAXGDP fragile
TSC3 Base -0.06 0.02 -3.55 2174 0.01
TSC3 Low -0.08 0.02 -3.86 1107 0.05 TT1 ISC1 TSC1
TSS1 High 0.13 0.03 4.58 1641 0.07 ISS1 ISS2 MINTL fragile
TSS1 Base 0.00 0.02 0.06 3817 0.00
TSS1 Low -0.20 0.03 -6.00 1828 0.04 TSS3 MAXED MAXGDP
TSS2 High 0.51 0.08 6.48 1678 0.07 ISS1 ISS2 MINPOP fragile
TSS2 Base 0.19 0.05 3.87 3895 0.00
TSS2 Low -0.31 0.09 -3.49 1828 0.03 TSS3 MAXED MAXGDP
TSS3 High 0.07 0.03 2.19 891 0.11 BT2 ISS1 ISS2 fragile
TSS3 Base -0.03 0.02 -1.51 2174 0.00
TSS3 Low -0.06 0.02 -2.61 1769 0.03 TT1 MAXED MAXGDP
TSA1 High 0.09 0.01 6.90 1641 0.09 ISA1 ISA2 MINPOP fragile
TSA1 Base 0.04 0.01 4.66 3817 0.01
TSA1 Low -0.09 0.02 -5.29 1828 0.04 TSA3 MAXED MAXGDP
TSA2 High 0.23 0.03 8.35 1678 0.09 ISA1 ISA2 MINPOP fragile
TSA2 Base 0.14 0.02 7.35 3895 0.01
TSA2 Low -0.10 0.04 -2.63 1828 0.03 TSA3 MAXED MAXGDP
TSA3 High 0.07 0.02 4.08 1038 0.06 TT1 ISA1 MAXL fragile
TSA3 Base 0.06 0.01 4.69 2174 0.01
TSA3 Low -0.02 0.02 -1.06 1296 0.12 ISA2 MINED MAXGDPBound β
Std. 
Error t # Obs. R-sq
Robust/ 
Fragile Z-Variables Variable
Table A-1:  EBA Without Country Fixed Effects
Gravity Variables Not Included as I-variables
Factor Endowments
MINED High 0.17 0.02 7.96 1013 0.12 TT1 ISC1 TSC3 fragile
MINED Base 0.09 0.01 13.02 4093 0.04
MINED Low -0.03 0.02 -1.68 1769 0.13 BT2 TSA3 MINK
MAXED High 0.20 0.03 6.96 1227 0.09 ISA2 TSA3 MAXL fragile
MAXED Base 0.08 0.01 7.55 4093 0.01
MAXED Low -0.02 0.02 -0.96 2551 0.07 ISC1 MINED DEV
MINK High 0.08 0.01 11.62 1296 0.16 ISC2 TSC3 MAXED fragile
MINK Base 0.04 0.00 16.81 5776 0.05
MINK Low 0.01 0.01 1.79 2551 0.10 ISS1 MINED IND
MAXK High 0.05 0.01 3.91 1518 0.08 ISC2 TSC3 DEV fragile
MAXK Base 0.03 0.00 9.76 5776 0.02
MAXK Low -0.01 0.01 -1.32 2163 0.08 TSA3 MINK DEV
MINL High 0.00 0.00 1.08 3155 0.03 TT2 ISC2 MAXL fragile
MINL Base -0.01 0.00 -1.90 5563 0.00
MINL Low -0.02 0.01 -3.01 1985 0.01 TSS3 DIST MINTL
MAXL High 0.00 0.01 0.45 1985 0.01 TSC3 MINL DIST fragile
MAXL Base 0.00 0.00 -0.81 5563 0.00
MAXL Low -0.03 0.01 -4.28 1991 0.12 TSS3 MAXTL IND
Currency Union
CU High 0.15 0.07 2.29 1192 0.11 ISC1 TSC3 MINK fragile
CU Base -0.02 0.03 -0.95 5993 0.00
CU Low -0.28 0.12 -2.37 2273 0.08 TT1 ISA1 MINED
Gravity Variables
ADJ High 0.25 0.04 6.71 1828 0.04 TSA3 MAXED DEV fragile
Base 0.19 0.03 6.98 5776 0.01
Low -0.03 0.05 -0.50 2011 0.06 BT2 ISA1 ISA2
LANG High 0.02 0.02 1.31 1192 0.07 ISS1 TSS3 DEV fragile
Base 0.01 0.01 1.35 5776 0.00
Low -0.05 0.02 -2.90 1439 0.08 BT1 ISC2 TSC3
DIST High 0.00 0.00 0.98 1516 0.10 BT3 ISC2 TSC3 fragile
Base 0.00 0.00 -4.41 5776 0.00
Low 0.00 0.00 -4.48 1060 0.12 ISS1 TSS3 MAXEDBound β
Std. 
Error t # Obs. R-sq
Robust/ 
Fragile Z-Variables Variable
Table A-1:  EBA Without Country Fixed Effects
Gravity Variables Not Included as I-variables
MINPOP High 0.02 0.01 3.32 2036 0.08 TT1 TSC3 MINK fragile
Base 0.01 0.00 2.71 5993 0.00
Low -0.06 0.01 -7.26 1828 0.05 TSA3 MAXED MINGDP
MAXPOP High 0.03 0.01 3.07 1107 0.06 TT1 ISS1 TSS3 fragile
Base 0.00 0.00 1.50 5993 0.00
Low -0.07 0.01 -9.55 1518 0.12 ISC2 TSC3 MAXGDP
MINTL High 0.00 0.01 0.89 1991 0.01 TSA3 MINL MINPOP fragile
Base 0.00 0.00 0.23 5776 0.00
Low -0.02 0.00 -5.98 1464 0.09 ISS2 TSS3 MAXGDP
MAXTL High 0.02 0.01 2.48 1991 0.01 TSA3 MAXL MAXPOP fragile
Base 0.00 0.00 1.54 5776 0.00
Low -0.03 0.00 -7.35 2441 0.07 ISS2 TSS2 MAXGDP
IND High 0.32 0.02 20.13 5773 0.07 MAXPOP MINTL MAXTL robust
Base 0.32 0.02 19.69 5993 0.06
Low 0.19 0.03 6.82 1192 0.15 ISA2 TSA3 MINK
DEV High 0.03 0.02 1.54 2171 0.03 TSC3 MAXGDP MAXPOP fragile
Base -0.07 0.01 -10.83 5993 0.02
Low -0.09 0.02 -5.43 1389 0.07 ISC2 TSC3 MINL
MINGDP High 0.07 0.01 10.76 2163 0.05 TSS3 DIST MINPOP fragile
Base 0.02 0.00 9.43 5993 0.01
Low -0.01 0.01 -1.45 3398 0.10 ISA2 MINK MINPOP
MAXGDP High 0.08 0.01 10.77 1518 0.12 ISC2 TSC3 MAXPOP fragile
Base 0.02 0.00 8.43 5993 0.01






BT1 High 1.62 0.40 4.04 0.09 TT1 ISC1 CU robust
Base 1.70 0.33 5.20 0.09
Low 1.09 0.45 2.40 0.15 ISA1 TSA3 MINL
BT2 High 6.15 2.27 2.71 0.07 ISC1 MINL CU fragile
Base 5.87 1.23 4.77 0.09
Low 3.99 2.32 1.72 0.11 ISA1 MINED MAXL
BT3 High 2.32 0.45 5.11 0.10 TT2 ISC1 MAXED robust
Base 2.00 0.34 5.96 0.08
Low 1.35 0.40 3.35 0.19 ISC2 TSC3 MINK
BT4 High 3.88 0.95 4.10 0.07 ISC1 MINL CU robust
Base 3.33 0.54 6.17 0.09
Low 2.72 1.01 2.70 0.11 ISA1 ISA2 MAXL
Total Trade
TT1 High -0.02 0.08 -0.28 0.17 ISA1 ISA2 TSA3 fragile
Base 0.03 0.03 1.08 0.09
Low -0.18 0.07 -2.60 0.15 TSA3 MAXED MINL
TT2 High 0.05 0.02 2.71 0.12 ISC1 ISC2 MAXED fragile
Base 0.01 0.01 1.31 0.08
Low -0.06 0.03 -2.31 0.15 TSA3 MAXED MINL
Industrial Similarity
ISC1 High 0.34 0.06 6.11 0.17 TSC3 MAXED MAXL fragile
Base 0.11 0.03 4.34 0.07
Low -0.06 0.03 -1.60 0.13 BT1 ISC2 MINK
ISC2 High 0.27 0.06 4.73 0.16 TT2 ISC1 TSC3 fragile
Base 0.18 0.03 6.65 0.11
Low -0.03 0.05 -0.52 0.20 TSC3 MINED MINK
ISS1 High 0.07 0.05 1.55 0.13 BT1 ISS2 MINK fragile
Base -0.16 0.03 -4.91 0.08
Low -0.31 0.05 -6.33 0.12 TSS2 MAXED MAXL
ISS2 High 0.01 0.06 0.14 0.20 TSS3 MINED MINK fragile
Base -0.22 0.03 -6.98 0.11
Low -0.35 0.07 -5.04 0.17 ISS1 TSS1 TSS3
ISA1 High 0.04 0.02 1.43 0.13 BT1 ISA2 MINK fragile
Gravity Variables Included as I-variables






Gravity Variables Included as I-variables
Table A-2:   EBA Without Country Fixed Effects
Z-Variables Variable
Base -0.09 0.02 -4.86 0.08
Low -0.25 0.04 -6.47 0.17 TSA3 MAXED MAXL
ISA2 High -0.01 0.04 -0.28 0.20 TSA3 MINED MINK fragile
Base -0.14 0.02 -7.93 0.12
Low -0.21 0.04 -5.44 0.17 ISA1 TSA1 TSA3
Trade Similarity
TSC1 High 0.10 0.03 4.18 0.16 TSC3 MAXED MAXL fragile
Base -0.01 0.01 -0.59 0.10
Low -0.04 0.02 -2.06 0.14 BT3 ISC1 ISC2
TSC2 High 0.13 0.05 2.60 0.15 TSC3 MAXED MINL fragile
Base -0.01 0.03 -0.44 0.10
Low -0.10 0.07 -1.47 0.17 ISC1 ISC2 TSC3
TSC3 High 0.03 0.02 1.32 0.20 ISC2 MINED MINK fragile
Base -0.02 0.02 -1.52 0.13
Low -0.02 0.02 -0.86 0.18 BT3 TSC1 MAXED
TSS1 High 0.12 0.04 2.65 0.17 ISS1 ISS2 TSS3 fragile
Base 0.00 0.02 -0.25 0.10
Low -0.11 0.03 -3.17 0.15 TSS3 MAXED MAXL
TSS2 High 0.23 0.11 2.07 0.17 ISS1 ISS2 TSS3 fragile
Base 0.05 0.05 0.90 0.10
Low -0.22 0.08 -2.64 0.18 TSS3 MINED MINK
TSS3 High 0.08 0.03 2.55 0.17 BT2 ISS1 ISS2 fragile
Base 0.02 0.02 1.09 0.13
Low 0.01 0.03 0.37 0.18 TT2 ISS2 MINED
TSA1 High 0.04 0.02 1.50 0.17 ISA1 ISA2 TSA3 fragile
Base 0.01 0.01 1.08 0.10
Low -0.04 0.02 -2.50 0.15 TSA3 MAXED MINL
TSA2 High 0.08 0.05 1.77 0.17 ISA1 ISA2 MAXK fragile
Base 0.05 0.02 2.30 0.10
Low -0.09 0.04 -2.54 0.15 TSA3 MAXED MINL
TSA3 High 0.03 0.02 1.75 0.16 ISA1 ISA2 MINL fragile
Base 0.02 0.01 1.82 0.14





Gravity Variables Included as I-variables
Table A-2:   EBA Without Country Fixed Effects
Z-Variables Variable
Factor Endowments
MINED High 0.13 0.02 5.17 0.20 ISC1 ISC2 TSC3 fragile
Base 0.05 0.01 6.50 0.11
Low -0.05 0.02 -2.42 0.18 BT2 TSA3 MINK
MAXED High 0.13 0.04 3.17 0.17 ISS1 TSS3 MAXL fragile
Base 0.02 0.01 1.19 0.10
Low -0.01 0.03 -0.22 0.16 TSA3 MINED MAXK
MINK High 0.06 0.01 7.09 0.20 ISC2 TSC3 MAXED fragile
Base 0.02 0.00 7.95 0.09
Low 0.01 0.01 0.95 0.10 ISA1 MINED MINL
MAXK High 0.01 0.02 0.59 0.18 ISS2 TSS3 MAXED fragile
Base 0.01 0.00 2.74 0.08
Low -0.04 0.02 -2.10 0.16 ISC1 TSC3 MINK
MINL High -0.01 0.01 -0.99 0.16 BT4 ISC2 TSC3 fragile
Base -0.01 0.00 -3.07 0.07
Low -0.03 0.01 -3.91 0.15 TT2 TSS3 MAXED
MAXL High -0.02 0.01 -2.23 0.10 ISA1 TSA2 MINL robust
Base -0.03 0.01 -4.41 0.07
Low -0.05 0.01 -4.13 0.17 ISA2 TSA3 MAXED
Currency Union
CU High -0.10 0.10 -1.01 0.17 ISC1 TSC3 MINK fragile
Base -0.03 0.03 -0.97 0.08
Low -0.30 0.12 -2.54 0.10 TT1 ISS1 MAXED  31
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ISC1 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.13 0.12 -0.11 -0.10 0.97 0.96 1 0.24 0.25 0.23 0.22 0.13 0.21 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.07 -0.07 -0.04
ISS2 0.18 0.18 0.14 0.22 0.15 -0.24 -0.24 0.29 0.29 0.24 1 0.97 0.95 0.23 0.15 0.25 0.07 0.01 0.08 0.24 -0.04 -0.09
ISA2 0.19 0.19 0.15 0.23 0.16 -0.23 -0.24 0.29 0.30 0.25 0.97 1 0.94 0.21 0.14 0.26 0.06 0.01 0.08 0.23 -0.06 -0.10
ISC2 0.16 0.16 0.13 0.19 0.14 -0.25 -0.28 0.26 0.27 0.23 0.95 0.94 1 0.24 0.20 0.31 0.11 0.07 0.11 0.24 -0.04 -0.08
Similarity of Trade Structure
TSS1 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.03 -0.11 -0.12 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.21 0.24 1 0.85 0.61 0.43 0.46 0.37 0.11 0.01 0.11
TSA1 -0.08 -0.10 -0.08 -0.09 -0.07 -0.15 -0.21 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.15 0.14 0.20 0.85 1 0.71 0.57 0.71 0.43 0.12 0.23 0.38
TSC1 -0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.20 -0.23 0.21 0.22 0.21 0.25 0.26 0.31 0.61 0.71 1 0.47 0.53 0.42 0.14 0.07 0.20
TSS2 -0.06 -0.14 -0.09 -0.16 -0.09 -0.02 -0.08 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.07 0.06 0.11 0.43 0.57 0.47 1 0.92 0.79 0.03 0.11 0.20
TSA2 -0.12 -0.19 -0.13 -0.23 -0.15 -0.05 -0.14 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.46 0.71 0.53 0.92 1 0.71 0.05 0.27 0.36
TSC2 -0.03 -0.08 -0.05 -0.10 -0.05 0.01 -0.05 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.11 0.37 0.43 0.42 0.79 0.71 1 0.03 0.07 0.12
TSS3 0.03 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.12 -0.04 -0.04 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.24 0.23 0.24 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.03 0.05 0.03 1 0.71 0.29
TSA3 -0.10 -0.07 -0.04 -0.11 -0.07 0.00 -0.01 -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 -0.04 -0.06 -0.04 0.01 0.23 0.07 0.11 0.27 0.07 0.71 1 0.66
TSC3 -0.08 -0.04 -0.02 -0.07 -0.04 0.07 0.05 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.09 -0.10 -0.08 0.11 0.38 0.20 0.20 0.36 0.12 0.29 0.66 1
Table 1: Variable Correlation Matrix
VariableBT1 BT2 BT3 BT4 TT1 TT2 ISS1 ISA1 ISC1 ISS2 ISA2 ISC2 TSS1 TSA1 TSC1 TSS2 TSA2 TSC2 TSS3 TSA3 TSC3
Factor Endowments
MINED 0.20 0.19 0.17 0.22 0.21 0.12 0.19 0.35 0.37 0.32 0.25 0.28 0.21 0.01 -0.17 -0.05 -0.09 -0.21 -0.05 0.06 -0.22 -0.21
MAXED 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.13 0.12 0.28 0.35 -0.04 -0.03 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.12 -0.15 -0.33 -0.26 -0.19 -0.31 -0.13 -0.02 -0.18 -0.15
MINK 0.22 0.20 0.19 0.26 0.24 0.17 0.20 0.40 0.39 0.34 0.33 0.32 0.24 0.05 -0.17 -0.08 -0.17 -0.27 -0.12 0.09 -0.21 -0.24
MAXK 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.14 0.13 0.34 0.40 -0.11 -0.12 -0.15 -0.05 -0.07 -0.17 -0.22 -0.41 -0.35 -0.26 -0.36 -0.16 0.00 -0.20 -0.22
MINL -0.03 -0.02 -0.07 -0.06 -0.13 -0.42 -0.56 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.20 0.21 0.18 0.02 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.16 0.13 0.03 0.06 0.01
MAXL -0.01 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.09 -0.11 -0.14 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.00
Gravity variables
ADJ 0.09 0.34 0.31 0.38 0.30 -0.03 -0.03 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.00 -0.01 0.02 -0.07 -0.08 -0.04 0.09 0.02 0.01
LANG 0.02 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.05 -0.04 -0.08 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 -0.05 -0.02 0.00 -0.06 -0.06 -0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01
DIST -0.06 -0.19 -0.18 -0.20 -0.17 -0.02 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.03 -0.11 -0.11 -0.10 0.12 0.10 0.04 0.08 0.10 0.06 -0.12 -0.01 0.02
MINPOP 0.04 0.17 0.10 0.20 0.11 -0.17 -0.06 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.31 0.33 0.23 -0.11 -0.21 -0.10 -0.17 -0.24 -0.07 0.01 -0.19 -0.24
MAXPOP 0.02 0.11 0.02 0.16 0.05 -0.48 -0.29 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.09 0.08 0.00 -0.10 -0.21 -0.10 -0.28 -0.35 -0.23 -0.05 -0.19 -0.23
MINTL 0.00 0.06 -0.01 0.05 -0.04 -0.39 -0.38 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.30 0.28 0.22 -0.05 -0.03 -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 0.02 0.02 -0.03 -0.11
MAXTL 0.02 0.06 -0.03 0.07 -0.04 -0.42 -0.35 0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.16 0.13 0.09 -0.03 -0.06 -0.03 -0.21 -0.21 -0.13 -0.02 -0.10 -0.14
IND 0.25 0.34 0.32 0.37 0.35 0.07 0.09 0.23 0.26 0.20 0.28 0.29 0.24 0.05 -0.07 0.04 -0.06 -0.14 -0.02 0.14 -0.13 -0.09
DEV -0.14 -0.13 -0.11 -0.14 -0.13 -0.23 -0.31 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.10 0.27 0.45 0.33 0.25 0.37 0.14 -0.01 0.18 0.21
Currency Union
CU -0.01 0.04 0.03 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.06 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.01 0.04 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.03
Table 1: Variable Correlation Matrix, cont'd.
VariableMINEDMAXED MINK MAXK MINL MAXL ADJ LANG DIST MINPOP MAXPOP MINTL MINTL IND DEV CU
Bilateral Trade Intensity
BT1 0.19 0.12 0.20 0.11 -0.02 0.01 0.34 0.12 -0.19 0.17 0.11 0.06 0.06 0.34 -0.13 0.04
BT2 0.17 0.10 0.19 0.11 -0.07 -0.03 0.31 0.10 -0.18 0.10 0.02 -0.01 -0.03 0.32 -0.11 0.03
BT3 0.22 0.13 0.26 0.14 -0.06 -0.02 0.38 0.08 -0.20 0.20 0.16 0.05 0.07 0.37 -0.14 0.00
BT4 0.21 0.12 0.24 0.13 -0.13 -0.09 0.30 0.05 -0.17 0.11 0.05 -0.04 -0.04 0.35 -0.13 -0.01
Total Trade Intensity
TT1 0.12 0.28 0.17 0.34 -0.42 -0.11 -0.03 -0.04 -0.02 -0.17 -0.48 -0.39 -0.42 0.07 -0.23 0.00
TT2 0.19 0.35 0.20 0.40 -0.56 -0.14 -0.03 -0.08 0.06 -0.06 -0.29 -0.38 -0.35 0.09 -0.31 -0.06
Similarity of Industrial Structure
ISS1 0.35 -0.04 0.40 -0.11 0.05 0.08 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.23 0.01 0.00
ISA1 0.37 -0.03 0.39 -0.12 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.26 0.01 0.01
ISC1 0.32 -0.05 0.34 -0.15 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.02 -0.01 0.04 -0.03 0.20 0.01 0.00
ISS2 0.25 -0.04 0.33 -0.05 0.20 0.10 0.09 0.03 -0.11 0.31 0.09 0.30 0.16 0.28 0.00 0.05
ISA2 0.28 -0.05 0.32 -0.07 0.21 0.08 0.10 0.04 -0.11 0.33 0.08 0.28 0.13 0.29 0.02 0.05
ISC2 0.21 -0.12 0.24 -0.17 0.18 0.07 0.08 0.05 -0.10 0.23 0.00 0.22 0.09 0.24 0.10 0.07
Similarity of Trade Structure
TSS1 0.01 -0.15 0.05 -0.22 0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.05 0.12 -0.11 -0.10 -0.05 -0.03 0.05 0.27 0.01
TSA1 -0.17 -0.33 -0.17 -0.41 0.10 0.03 -0.01 -0.02 0.10 -0.21 -0.21 -0.03 -0.06 -0.07 0.45 0.04
TSC1 -0.05 -0.26 -0.08 -0.35 0.11 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.04 -0.10 -0.10 -0.02 -0.03 0.04 0.33 -0.01
TSS2 -0.09 -0.19 -0.17 -0.26 0.11 0.01 -0.07 -0.06 0.08 -0.17 -0.28 -0.04 -0.21 -0.06 0.25 -0.02
TSA2 -0.21 -0.31 -0.27 -0.36 0.16 0.03 -0.08 -0.06 0.10 -0.24 -0.35 -0.03 -0.21 -0.14 0.37 0.01
TSC2 -0.05 -0.13 -0.12 -0.16 0.13 0.06 -0.04 -0.02 0.06 -0.07 -0.23 0.02 -0.13 -0.02 0.14 0.01
TSS3 0.06 -0.02 0.09 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.09 0.02 -0.12 0.01 -0.05 0.02 -0.02 0.14 -0.01 0.02
TSA3 -0.22 -0.18 -0.21 -0.20 0.06 0.00 0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.19 -0.19 -0.03 -0.10 -0.13 0.18 0.05
TSC3 -0.21 -0.15 -0.24 -0.22 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.24 -0.23 -0.11 -0.14 -0.09 0.21 0.03
Table 1: Variable Correlation Matrix, cont'd.
VariableMINEDMAXED MINK MAXK MINL MAXL ADJ LANG DIST MINPOP MAXPOP MINTL MINTL IND DEV CU
Factor Endowments
MINED 1 0.48 0.78 0.45 -0.11 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.12 -0.11 -0.02 0.33 -0.33 -0.11
MAXED 0.48 1 0.45 0.76 -0.09 0.14 -0.02 -0.03 0.07 0.01 0.05 -0.10 0.02 0.23 -0.59 -0.16
MINK 0.78 0.45 1 0.49 -0.11 0.06 0.07 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.07 -0.08 0.01 0.39 -0.35 -0.10
MAXK 0.45 0.76 0.49 1 -0.06 0.11 -0.03 -0.11 0.12 0.05 0.07 -0.03 0.03 0.22 -0.71 -0.21
MINL -0.11 -0.09 -0.11 -0.06 1 0.39 0.04 0.01 -0.21 0.18 0.07 0.54 0.24 0.03 -0.05 0.09
MAXL 0.00 0.14 0.06 0.11 0.39 1 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.11 -0.02 0.31 0.41 0.09 -0.14 0.07
Gravity variables
ADJ 0.04 -0.02 0.07 -0.03 0.04 0.00 1 0.07 -0.19 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.13 0.02 0.09
LANG 0.03 -0.03 0.00 -0.11 0.01 0.04 0.07 1 -0.16 -0.03 -0.04 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.05 0.21
DIST 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.12 -0.21 0.01 -0.19 -0.16 1 -0.02 0.08 -0.05 0.08 -0.12 0.04 -0.17
MINPOP 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.18 0.11 0.06 -0.03 -0.02 1 0.44 0.63 0.37 0.09 -0.13 -0.06
MAXPOP 0.12 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.07 -0.02 0.03 -0.04 0.08 0.44 1 0.36 0.60 0.07 -0.12 -0.12
MINTL -0.11 -0.10 -0.08 -0.03 0.54 0.31 0.06 -0.02 -0.05 0.63 0.36 1 0.44 0.06 -0.09 0.02
MAXTL -0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.24 0.41 0.03 0.00 0.08 0.37 0.60 0.44 1 0.02 -0.04 -0.01
IND 0.33 0.23 0.39 0.22 0.03 0.09 0.13 -0.01 -0.12 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.02 1 -0.27 -0.02
DEV -0.33 -0.59 -0.35 -0.71 -0.05 -0.14 0.02 0.05 0.04 -0.13 -0.12 -0.09 -0.04 -0.27 1 0.09
Currency Union
CU -0.11 -0.16 -0.10 -0.21 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.21 -0.17 -0.06 -0.12 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.09 1
Variable
Table 1: Variable Correlation Matrix, cont'd.Independent variables β Std. Error t pr > |t|
constant 0.045 0.042 2.07 0.2853
Adjacency 0.131 0.027 4.77 <.0001
Common Language 0.014 0.009 1.52 0.1289
Distance -1.2E-6 7.5E-07 -1.59 0.1111
Minimum log(Population) 0.005 0.003 1.66 0.0967
Maximum log(Population) -0.003 0.003 -1.12 0.2622
Minimum log(Total land area) -0.006 0.002 -2.82 0.0049
Maximum log(Total land area) 0.006 0.003 2.07 0.0383
Two industrialized countries 0.284 0.017 16.85 <.0001
Two developing countries -0.040 0.007 -5.86 <.0001
Adjusted R-Square:  0.076
Number of observations:  5670 country pairs
Independent variables β Std. Error t pr > |t|
Adjacency 0.121 0.026 4.59 0.00
Common Language 0.017 0.009 1.79 0.07
Distance -3.3E-06 9.2E-07 -3.61 0.00
Minimum log(Population) -0.011 0.007 -1.63 0.10
Minimum log(Total land area) -0.002 0.005 -0.42 0.68
Two industrialized countries 0.240 0.019 12.85 0.00
Adjusted R-Square:  0.2113
B.  With country fixed effects
Table 2:  Regression of business-cycle correlation on gravity variables





BT1 High 2.82 0.28 10.00 0.19 CU MAXPOP MINTL robust
Base 2.42 0.26 9.34 0.20
Low 1.42 0.38 3.70 0.21 ISA1 ADJ DEV
BT2 High 11.89 1.93 6.16 0.18 ISC1 MAXL MINPOP robust
Base 9.27 1.04 8.90 0.20
Low 5.64 1.62 3.48 0.20 ISA1 ADJ DEV
BT3 High 2.85 0.31 9.17 0.19 CB ADJ MINPOP robust
Base 3.13 0.28 11.14 0.19
Low 1.31 0.32 4.13 0.41 TSA3 DIST IND
BT4 High 5.47 0.86 6.39 0.16 ISC1 MAXL MINPOP robust
Base 5.07 0.47 10.76 0.19
Low 2.67 0.75 3.56 0.38 ISA1 TSA3 DIST
BT1 High 1.21 0.39 3.10 0.21 ISC1 MAXK CU robust
Base 1.34 0.32 4.24 0.22
Low 0.67 0.40 1.67 0.31 ISA1 TSA1 MAXED
BT2 High 4.84 2.23 2.17 0.20 ISC1 MAXL CU fragile
Base 4.57 1.19 3.84 0.22
Low 2.69 2.25 1.20 0.27 ISA1 TSA1 MAXL
BT3 High 1.65 0.44 3.77 0.20 ISC1 MAXK CU fragile
Base 1.48 0.33 4.45 0.20
Low 0.57 0.48 1.18 0.40 TT2 ISA1 TSA3
BT4 High 2.65 0.95 2.79 0.18 ISC1 MAXK MINL fragile
Base 2.46 0.53 4.62 0.20
Low 0.94 1.04 0.91 0.38 ISA1 TSA3 MINL
Robustness Tests with Gravity Variables Always Included
Z-Variables
Table 3
Extreme Bounds Analysis of Bilateral Trade
Dependent Variable:  Bilateral Correlation of Cyclic Output





TT1 High 0.02 0.08 0.28 0.24 ISC1 ISC2 MAXPOP fragile
Base -0.26 0.05 -5.48 0.19
Low -0.46 0.09 -5.22 0.37 TSA3 MINPOP MAXTL
TT2 High -0.01 0.03 -0.44 0.42 ISC1 ISC2 TSC3 fragile
Base -0.14 0.02 -8.07 0.18
Low -0.16 0.03 -5.54 0.36 TSA3 MINPOP MINTL
TT1 High 0.06 0.08 0.79 0.27 BT2 ISC1 ISC2 fragile
Base -0.14 0.05 -2.61 0.22
Low -0.32 0.12 -2.68 0.40 ISC1 TSC3 MINL
TT2 High -0.03 0.04 -0.64 0.44 ISS1 ISS2 TSS3 fragile
Base -0.08 0.02 -4.32 0.20
Low -0.11 0.04 -2.70 0.39 ISS1 TSS3 MINL
Robustness Tests with Gravity Variables Always Included
Table 4
Extreme Bounds Analysis of Total Trade
Dependent Variable:  Bilateral Correlation of Cyclic Output






ISC1 High 0.47 0.07 6.58 0.35 TSC1 TSC3 MINTL fragile
Base 0.25 0.03 7.59 0.16
Low 0.04 0.10 0.36 0.39 BT2 TSC3 MAXK
ISC2 High 0.28 0.05 5.47 0.42 ISC2 TSC1 TSC3 fragile
Base 0.22 0.03 7.92 0.25
Low 0.03 0.04 0.87 0.30 BT1 MAXED DEV
ISS1 High 0.68 0.08 8.23 0.35 TSS1 TSS3 MAXTL fragile
Base 0.36 0.04 8.55 0.17
Low 0.11 0.12 0.92 0.39 BT2 TSS3 MAXK
ISS2 High 0.51 0.09 5.95 0.42 ISS1 TSS1 TSS3 fragile
Base 0.27 0.03 7.75 0.25
Low 0.04 0.05 0.78 0.30 BT3 MINED IND
ISA1 High 0.36 0.04 8.54 0.35 TSA2 TSA3 MAXTL fragile
Base 0.19 0.02 8.17 0.16
Low 0.05 0.07 0.72 0.43 ISA2 TSA3 MINK
ISA2 High 0.27 0.04 6.13 0.42 ISA1 TSA1 TSA3 fragile
Base 0.15 0.02 8.40 0.26
Low 0.03 0.02 1.09 0.30 BT1 MAXED DEV
ISC1 High 0.26 0.10 2.70 0.40 TSC3 MAXED MINL fragile
Base 0.15 0.03 4.31 0.19
Low 0.04 0.11 0.42 0.41 TT1 TSC3 MINK
ISC2 High 0.22 0.07 3.16 0.43 ISC1 TSC3 MAXL fragile
Base 0.11 0.03 3.46 0.27
Low -0.02 0.07 -0.36 0.48 TSC1 TSC3 MINED
ISS1 High 0.36 0.09 3.78 0.38 TSS1 TSS3 MINL fragile
Base 0.22 0.04 4.84 0.19
Low 0.09 0.12 0.73 0.41 TT1 TSS3 MINK
ISS2 High 0.33 0.09 3.51 0.44 ISS1 TSS1 TSS3 fragile
Base 0.13 0.04 3.38 0.27
Low -0.01 0.08 -0.06 0.48 TSS1 TSS3 MINED
ISA1 High 0.16 0.05 3.21 0.38 TSA1 TSA3 MINL fragile
Base 0.11 0.02 4.36 0.19
Low 0.03 0.06 0.45 0.41 TT1 TSA3 MINK
ISA2 High 0.18 0.05 3.54 0.44 ISA1 TSA1 TSA3 fragile
Base 0.08 0.02 3.89 0.27
Low -2.8E-03 0.04 -0.06 0.48 TSA1 TSA3 MINED
Robustness Tests with Gravity Variables Always Included
Table 5
Extreme Bounds Analysis of Industrial Structure
Dependent Variable:  Bilateral Correlation of Cyclic Output






TSC1 High 0.16 0.03 6.31 0.38 TSC3 MAXED MINPOP fragile
Base 0.06 0.01 4.72 0.26
Low 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.42 ISC1 ISC2 TSC3
TSC2 High 0.16 0.06 2.71 0.39 TSC3 MAXED DIST fragile
Base 0.03 0.03 0.96 0.26
Low -0.06 0.08 -0.81 0.42 ISC1 ISC2 TSC3
TSC3 High 0.06 0.02 3.48 0.39 MAXED LANG DIST fragile
Base 0.02 0.02 1.58 0.35
Low -0.04 0.02 -1.83 0.38 BT2 ISC1 TSC1
Base 0.08 0.02 4.54 0.26
Low -0.07 0.05 -1.37 0.42 ISS1 ISS2 TSS3
TSS2 High 0.32 0.10 3.31 0.39 TSS3 MAXED DIST fragile
Base 0.07 0.06 1.16 0.26
Low -0.26 0.13 -2.02 0.43 ISS1 ISS2 TSS3
TSS3 High 0.04 0.02 2.11 0.36 MAXED MAXPOP MAXTL fragile
Base 0.04 0.02 2.10 0.35
Low -0.06 0.03 -1.96 0.44 BT2 ISS1 ISS2
TSA1 High 0.12 0.02 5.80 0.38 TSA2 TSA3 MAXED fragile
Base 0.05 0.01 5.36 0.26
Low -0.02 0.02 -1.02 0.42 ISA1 ISA2 TSA3
TSA2 High 0.15 0.04 3.76 0.39 TSA3 MF1 DIST fragile
Base 0.02 0.02 0.79 0.26
Low -0.10 0.05 -1.78 0.42 ISA1 ISA2 TSA3
TSA3 High 0.05 0.01 3.65 0.39 MAXED LANG DIST fragile
Base 0.02 0.01 1.26 0.35
Low -0.02 0.02 -1.37 0.43 BT4 ISA1 MISA3
Table 6
Extreme Bounds Analysis of Structure of Bilateral Trade
Dependent Variable:  Bilateral Correlation of Cyclic Output






TSC1 High 0.11 0.03 3.54 0.48 ISC2 TSC3 MAXED fragile
Base 0.02 0.01 1.16 0.29
Low -3.1E-03 0.04 -0.09 0.44 ISC1 ISC2 TSC3
TSC2 High 0.13 0.06 2.35 0.43 TSC3 MAXED CB fragile
Base 0.02 0.03 0.76 0.29
Low -0.06 0.08 -0.73 0.44 ISC1 ISC2 TSC3
TSC3 High 0.02 0.02 1.19 0.48 ISC2 MAXED MINK fragile
Base 0.02 0.01 1.12 0.41
Low -0.03 0.02 -1.18 0.45 BT2 ISC1 ISC2
TSS1 High 0.13 0.05 2.76 0.48 ISS2 TSS3 MAXED fragile
Base 0.04 0.02 2.07 0.29
Low -0.05 0.05 -1.00 0.44 ISS1 ISS2 TSS3
TSS2 High 0.25 0.10 2.58 0.41 TSS3 MINED MINL fragile
Base 0.05 0.06 0.80 0.29
Low -0.20 0.13 -1.58 0.44 ISS1 ISS2 TSS3
TSS3 High 0.01 0.02 0.29 0.47 ISS2 MINED MAXK fragile
Base -0.01 0.02 -0.29 0.41
Low -0.06 0.03 -2.04 0.45 BT2 ISS1 ISS2
TSA1 High 0.06 0.02 2.94 0.48 ISA2 TSA3 MAXED fragile
Base 0.03 0.01 2.90 0.29
Low -0.02 0.02 -0.63 0.44 ISA1 ISA2 TSA3
TSA2 High 0.12 0.04 2.98 0.41 TSA3 MAXED MINL fragile
Base 0.03 0.03 1.25 0.29
Low -0.05 0.05 -0.97 0.44 ISA1 ISA2 TSA3
TSA3 High 0.04 0.02 2.50 0.48 ISA2 MINED MINK fragile
Base 0.02 0.01 1.61 0.41
Low -0.01 0.02 -0.74 0.44 BT4 ISA1 ISA2
Z-Variables
Table 6, cont'd.
Extreme Bounds Analysis of Structure of Bilateral Trade
Robustness Tests with Gravity Variables Always Included





MINED High 0.21 0.06 3.30 0.38 TT1 ISC1 TSC3 fragile
Base 0.12 0.02 6.27 0.20
Low -0.14 0.06 -2.56 0.45 ISC2 TSC3 MAXK
MAXED High 0.14 0.06 2.56 0.45 ISC2 TSC3 MINK fragile
Base -0.12 0.02 -6.27 0.20
Low -0.21 0.06 -3.30 0.38 TT1 ISC1 TSC3
MINK High 0.14 0.01 9.38 0.39 TSA3 MAXED CU fragile
Base 0.05 0.01 10.00 0.18
Low 0.02 0.01 1.33 0.21 ISS1 MINED DEV
MAXK High -0.02 0.01 -1.33 0.21 ISS1 MAXED DEV fragile
Base -0.05 0.01 -10.00 0.18
Low -0.14 0.01 -9.38 0.39 TSA3 MINED CU
MINL High 0.05 0.02 3.33 0.41 TT1 ISC2 TSC3 fragile
Base 0.02 0.01 1.73 0.15
Low 0.00 0.02 0.17 0.37 BT4 TSS3 MINED
MAXL High 0.00 0.02 -0.17 0.37 BT4 TSS3 MAXED fragile
Base -0.02 0.01 -1.73 0.15
Low -0.05 0.02 -3.33 0.41 TT1 ISC2 TSC3
MINED High 0.05 0.07 0.73 0.42 BT2 ISA1 TSA3 fragile
Base 0.03 0.02 1.64 0.24
Low -0.13 0.06 -2.39 0.48 ISC2 TSC3 MAXK
MAXED High 0.13 0.06 2.39 0.48 ISC2 TSC3 MAXK fragile
Base -0.03 0.02 -1.64 0.24
Low -0.05 0.07 -0.73 0.42 BT2 ISA1 TSA3
MINK High 0.06 0.03 2.05 0.44 ISC1 ISC2 TSC3 fragile
Base 0.02 0.01 2.91 0.20
Low -1.2E-03 0.02 -0.08 0.23 TT1 ISA1 MINED
MAXK High 0.00 0.02 0.08 0.23 TT1 ISA1 MAXED fragile
Base -0.02 0.01 -2.91 0.20
Low -0.06 0.03 -2.05 0.44 ISC1 ISC2 TSC3
MINL High 0.04 0.02 1.92 0.43 ISC1 ISC2 TSC3 fragile
Base 0.01 0.01 1.24 0.19
Low 2.8E-03 0.02 0.18 0.41 BT4 TSS3 MAXED
MAXL High -2.8E-03 0.02 -0.18 0.41 BT4 TSS3 MAXED fragile
Base -0.01 0.01 -1.24 0.19
Low -0.04 0.02 -1.92 0.43 ISC1 ISC2 TSC3
Robustness Tests with Gravity Variables Always Included
Table 7
Extreme Bounds Analysis of  Factor EndowmentVariables
Dependent Variable:  Bilateral Correlation of Cyclic Output






CU High 0.32 0.07 4.45 0.37 ISC1 TSC3 ADJ fragile
Base 0.08 0.03 2.90 0.17
Low -0.20 0.12 -1.77 0.20 TT1 ISA1 MINED
CU High 0.32 0.08 4.17 0.45 ISC1 ISC2 TSC3 fragile
Base 0.03 0.03 1.13 0.20
Low -0.21 0.11 -1.82 0.23 TT1 ISA1 MINED
Robustness Tests with Gravity Variables Always Included
Z-Variables
Table 8
Extreme Bounds Analysis of Currency Union/Currency Board
Dependent Variable:  Bilateral Correlation of Cyclic Output





DIST High -2.3E-06 1.1E-06 -2.03 0.28 BT3 ISC2 MAXK robust
Base -5.9E-06 8.6E-07 -6.87 0.17
Low -1.3E-05 1.4E-06 -9.24 0.37 TSA2 TSA3 MINTL
ADJ High 0.23 0.03 7.58 0.37 TSA1 TSA3 MAXPOP fragile
Base 0.19 0.03 7.36 0.17
Low 0.05 0.05 1.02 0.26 BT2 ISA1 ISA2
LANG High 0.07 0.02 4.15 0.36 ISC1 TSC3 MAXTL fragile
Base 0.03 0.01 3.58 0.17
Low -0.01 0.01 -0.58 0.29 BT2 ISA2 DIST
MINPOP High 0.05 0.02 2.94 0.37 TT1 ISC1 TSC3 fragile
Base -0.01 0.01 -1.15 0.17
Low -0.04 0.01 -2.79 0.35 TSC3 MINGDP MINTL
MAXPOP High 0.04 0.01 2.79 0.35 TSC3 MAXGDP MAXTL fragile
Base 0.01 0.01 1.15 0.17
Low -0.05 0.02 -2.94 0.37 TT1 ISC1 TSC3
MINTL High 0.02 0.01 1.87 0.36 TT1 ISC1 TSC3 fragile
Base -3.5E-03 0.01 -0.68 0.16
Low -0.02 0.01 -1.70 0.40 ISA2 TSA3 MINL
MAXTL High 0.02 0.01 1.70 0.40 ISA2 TSA3 MAXL fragile
Base 3.5E-03 0.01 0.68 0.16
Low -0.02 0.01 -1.87 0.36 TT1 ISC1 TSC3
IND High 0.29 0.03 11.56 0.41 TSS3 MINED MINGDP robust
Base 0.25 0.02 13.65 0.20
Low 0.10 0.04 2.75 0.43 ISA1 ISA2 TSA3
DEV High 0.29 0.03 11.56 0.41 TSS3 MINED MAXGDP robust
Base 0.25 0.02 13.65 0.20
Low 0.10 0.04 2.75 0.43 ISA1 ISA2 TSA3
Table 9
Extreme Bounds Analysis of Structure of Gravity Variables
Dependent Variable:  Bilateral Correlation of Cyclic Output
Robustness Tests with No "Always-Included" Variables 
Z-VariablesFigure 1:  Bilateral Trade and Business Cycle Correlation
y = 3.4991x + 0.0515
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El SalvadorFigure 2:  Total Trade and Business Cycle Correlation
y = 0.1136x + 0.0395
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nFigure 3:  Industrial Similarity and Business Cycle Correlation
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y = 0.1683x - 0.0841
     (0.0258)  (0.0210)
r2=0.0129Figure 4:  Similarity of Bilateral Trade and Business Cycle Correlation
y = -0.0557x + 0.1290
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nFigure 5:  Minimum Education Level and Business Cycle Correlation
y = 0.0905x - 0.0543
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nFigure 6:   Distance and Business Cycle Correlation
y = -3.28E-06x + 0.0777
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Abstract:   Baxter and Kouparistas provide statistical evidence on the robust determinants of Business 
Cycle Comovement. They implement an original empirical method (Extreme Bounds Analysis) to the 
cross-countries correlation of the cyclical component of GDP. Their main findings are: bilateral trade 
is a robust explanatory variable but industrial structure and currency unions are not robust. In my 
discussion, I would essentially insist on two main limits of the empirical methodology adopted by the 
paper. First, the Extreme Bounds Analysis tells us nothing about the true determinants of  Business 
Cycle Comovement, i.e. a robust variable is not necessary a causal variable and/or a causal variable is 
not necessary robust one. Second, there exists another statistical approach (General to Specific) that 
allows to better identifying the true economic determinants, as, with Extreme Bounds Analysis, 
nothing is robust! 
 
 
* This discussion was prepared for the ECFIN Research Conference on ``Business Cycles and Growth in 
Europe'', Brussels, October 7-8 2004. The views expressed herein are those of the author and not necessary those 
of the Banque de France. 
 Introduction 
The research about the main determinants of Business Cycle Comovement (BCC, hereafter) 
has led to an enormous empirical literature. However, the reader will rapidly face a panel of 
empirical findings without any clear conclusions. Given the large number of potential 
candidates for an explanation of BCC, it becomes more and more difficult to determine the 
main mechanisms at work. Using an original empirical methodology, the paper of Baxter and 
Kouparistas delivers a clear answer to the question “What are the main determinants of 
business cycle comovment?”. My comments will start with a brief summary of the paper. I 
will then describe the econometric methodology used y the authors and deliver my general 
excellent feelings about this contribution to international macroeconomics. I will then present 
some general comments about the econometric methodology adopted by this paper and then 
introduce a set of more specific comments. 
A Brief Summary of the Paper 
This paper proposes an empirical investigation on the main and robust determinants of BCC 
between countries (both developed and developing). When applied on BCC
1, this approach is 
really original as the paper tries to deliver a set of “robust” determinants of BCC.  More 
precisely, the paper tries to determine a set of  robust explanatory variables  using the 
``Extreme Bounds Analysis''  (EBA, hereafter) originally proposed by Leamer (1983). The 
paper also considers six main sets of variables: i) bilateral trade between countries,  ii) total 
trade within counries, iii) sectoral structure,  iv) trade similarity,  v) factor endowments and  
vi) gravity variables. The main findings can be roughly summarized as follows: i) bilateral 
trade is a robust explanatory variable of BCC and ii) industrial structure and currency unions 
are not robust. These findings are interesting because they question previous empirical studies 
that conclude that similarity in industrial structure (Imbs (2003)) and currency unions would 
lead to more business cycle synchronization (Rose and Engle (2002)). 
Econometric Methodology 
In this section, I briefly present the econometric methodology adopted by this paper. EBA 
uses a linear equation of the form: 
                                                 
1 Levine and Renelt (1992) and Sala-i-Martin (1997)   have already applied this method to cross-countries 
growth regressions. u Z M I Y Z M I + + + = β β β      (1) 
The dependent variable Y is the cross-correlations of the cyclical component of GDP for each 
country.  The cyclical component is obtained from a Band Pass filter (see Baxter and King 
(1999)). The variable Y thus represents a vector of   N(N-1)/2 cross-correlations. The 
independent variables are divided in three groups: I denote “always included variables”; M is 
the variable of interest, i.e. the variable that we want to evaluate the robustness; Z are all the 
other variables that previous studies have identified as important determinants of BCC. Given 
this simple linear equation, the EBA approach is conducted as follows: 
i)  For M given,  we modify Z and we perform a regression using OLS on (1), 
ii)  We identify the highest and the lowest values for  M β  that cannot be rejected at 5% 
level. EBA is thus defined as the maximum of  M β  plus two standard deviations. 
iii)  M is a robust variable if the range of values for  ) , ( max , min , M M M β β β ∈  does not 
include zero. 
The paper also enriches the linear equation (1) with considering a fixed effect for each 
country. 
This study is an important and significant contribution to the empirical literature on the main 
determinants of BCC. The paper uses a large data set as 100 countries (both developed and 
developing) are considered (almost 5000 cross-correlations).  The quantitative exercise is 
done carefully. This concerns the data construction and their use, the theoretical 
argumentation and the implementation of the quantitative method. More interestingly, the 
empirical results question some previous findings (industrial structure, currency unions) and 
clearly show what are the robust explanations of BCC. The paper provides a useful guidance 
for future works (both theoretical and empirical). 
General Comments on the econometric method 
My general comments point out some limits of the econometric method. More precisely, I 
first argue that EBA is not sufficiently informative about the true determinants of BCC and 
second that another approach (General to Specific) can provide better guidance concerning 
the choice of the main explanatory variables.   
The meaning of robust variable 
The basic idea of EBA is that an explanatory variable is robust if its parameter estimate does 
not present too much sensitivity to the presence or absence of other explanatory variables. 
When the two bounds are sufficiently close, the researcher can have some confidence in the 
parameter estimate. Sala-i-Martin (1997) argues that the use of EBA by Levine and Renelt 
(1992) is too strict and suggests modifying it such that the detection of robust variable is more 
permissive. Whatever the way the EBA is conducted, I think that the EBA cannot help the 
researcher to determine the true determinants of BCC. Is a robust variable necessary a causal 
variable? Or Is a causal variable necessary a robust variable? The EBA tells us nothing about 
this! In other words, there exists no reason to believe that a robust variable is necessary the 
true determinant of BCC and there is no reason to believe that a true determinant of BCC is 
necessary a robust variable! A true determinant of BCC is an explanatory variable whose 
variations imply predictable changes in the cross-countries correlation. EBA only produces 
some numbers and when some estimates do not appear too much sensitive to the presence or 
absence of other determinants of BCC, this variable is robust. But we see immediately, that a 
robust variable is not necessary the true one.  
General to Specific Approach 
There exists another (and less) restrictive approach, defined broadly as the LSE methodology. 
In the case of a linear equation, the General to Specific methodology starts with the idea that 
the truth can be represented by a regression that includes many variables, i.e. the general 
model. In comparison to equation (1), we specify a general model: 







,         ( 2 )  
where  j X  (j=1,…,N)  includes the variables I, M and Z. Equation (2) is equivalent to equation 
(1), except that it does not introduce a priori selection over the variables. Obviously, when a 
large number of explanatory variables are included in the regression, the general model tells 
us nothing about the key determinants of the endogenous variable. However, it is possible to 
determine a specific (and more parsimonious) model that allows selecting the main 
explanatory variables. In general, we consider that this specific regression is acceptable if (i) it is determined from a set of restrictions consistent with the general model and (ii) it is well 
specified in a statistical sense. For example, this approach allows determining a specific 
regression of the form  ε β β + + = 2 2 1 1 X X Y . In this example,  1 X and  2 X  are the main 
determinants of BCC. 
Comparison of the two approaches  
These two approaches are comparable as they are essentially descriptive. However, we can 
also assess their ability to select the true determinants of the endogenous variable. To my 
knowledge, there exist a recent study of Hoover and Perez (2004)  that compares the relative 
performance of these two approaches in a controlled experiment. In the context of cross-
countries growth regressions, Hoover and Perez have shown that the General to Specific 
approach performs better than the EBA used by Levine and Renelt (1992) and its modified 
version of Sala-i-Martin (1997). In their simulation experiments, Hoover and Perez have 
shown that with EBA nothing is robust! These results question the ability of EBA to select the 
main explanatory variables of BCC in the Baxter and Kouparistas’paper. 
Specific Comments 
My specific comments concern the implementation of EBA and the use of OLS regressions. 
Stability and nonlinearity 
The first look (unconditional regression) and EBA (sensitivity analysis in a conditional 
regression) assume a linear regression. Figures 1-6 (in appendix of the paper) presents strange 
clouds of points and also suggests many outliers. Is a non-linear model (stability over 
countries, thresholds effects, non--linear relation) is more suitable for the empirical analysis? 
Endogeneity 
The parameters in the linear equation are estimated using OLS, assuming implicitly that the 
explanatory variables are exogenous, E(u I)=E(uM)=E(uZ)=0 One may easily think that 
many explanatory variables are endogenous!!! For example, an increase in the bilateral trade 
can be the consequence of higher business cycle comovement. In this case, OLS estimates are 
biased and thus we cannot conclude anything with EBA. I think that a simultaneous equation 
approach seems to be preferable. For example, the initial equation (1) can be supplemented 
with two additional equations:  w I Z
v I M











In this system of equations, the variable I (always included variable) represents a set of weak 
exogenous variables, but the variables M and Z are not restricted to be exogenous. 
Measurement errors 
The paper considers measurement errors on the dependent variables (the cross-correlations of 
the cyclical component of GDP), but it does not consider that it may exist measurement errors 
in the explanatory variables (we can legitimately think that these constructed variables are 
subjected to measurement errors). In this case, OLS estimates are biased. 
Data construction 
Explanatory variables are constructed consistently with the sample of GDP. Some of them can 
be viewed as causal if they are constructed at the beginning of the sample period (see BT1 
that use exports and imports in 1970). Other variables (constructed in the middle or at the end 
of the sample) can be in fact endogenous as they can react to a change in business cycle 
comovement during the period 1970-1995. 
Sources of discrepancy 
The possible sources of discrepancy with previous empirical findings are not discussed. For 
example,  Imbs (2003) used quarterly data that cover the 80s and 90s in 24 countries. This 
gives rise to a cross-section of 276 bilateral correlations. Moreover, Imbs used a simultaneous 
equations approach, thus trade, specialization, integration are not considered a priori 
exogenous. Moreover, Frankel and Rose (2002) have estimated a positive and significant 
effect of currency union in a conditional regression framework. The main differences with the 
present paper are the following: the cyclical component of real GDP is obtained via a time 
trend and the use instrumental variable estimation. I think that much more effort can be made 
in order to clarify the sources of discrepancy. 
Conclusion 
The paper of Baxter and Kouparistas delivers a clear answer to the question “What are the 
determinants of business cycle comovment?” using the Extreme Bounds Analysis (having in mind some important limits of this approach, especially if we compared to other empirical 
strategies). They find that bilateral trade is a robust determinant of Business Cycle 
Comovement. Conversely, industrial specialization as well as currency unions is not robust 
determinants. This paper represents an excellent reference for future (both theoretical and 
empirical) researches that aim at studying business cycle synchronization.   
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Abstract:  In this paper we study the link between elections, fiscal policy and economic 
growth/fluctuations.  The set-up is a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of 
growth and endogenously chosen fiscal policy, in which two political parties can alternate 
in power.  The party in office chooses jointly how much to tax and how to allocate its total 
expenditure between public consumption and production services.  The main theoretical 
prediction is that forward-looking incumbents, with uncertain prospects of re-election, find 
it optimal to follow relatively shortsighted fiscal policies, and that this lowers economic 
growth.  The model is estimated using quarterly data for Germany, the UK and the US 
from 1960 to 1999.  Our econometric results provide clear support for the main theoretical 
prediction.  They also give plausible and significant estimates for the productivity of public 
production services, the weight which households place on public consumption services 
relative to private consumption and the time discount rate.  Moreover, we find that changes 
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1. Introduction   
 
Over the past forty years there is mounting evidence in most OECD economies 
suggesting both secular and cyclical changes in the composition of government 
expenditure in favor of public consumption at the expense of public investment.
1 
Moreover, several authors (see e.g. Kneller et al. (1999), Alesina (1999) and Tanzi and 
Schuknecht (2000)) have suggested that these fiscal changes are possible contenders to 
explain lower than expected economic growth in recent decades.  In an effort to provide 
one possible description of the process leading to the observed fiscal outcomes, we develop 
a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model that examines the implications of electoral 
competition between incumbents and challengers for the choice of fiscal policies and in 
turn their impacts on aggregate growth and fluctuations. 
 
The literature on elections, fiscal policy and economic growth is rich and still 
growing (very good surveys can be found in Alesina et al. (1997), Persson and Tabellini 
(1999) and Drazen (2000)).  While there are several channels through which electoral 
uncertainty can affect policymakers’ behavior,
2 a central result of the theoretical literature 
is that uncertainty about remaining in office pushes incumbent politicians to follow 
relatively short-sighted policies and engineer electoral business cycles, which in turn result 
in inefficient macroeconomic outcomes.
3  However, the econometric evidence to date is 
rather mixed.  For instance, while there is some evidence of electoral effects on fiscal 
policy instruments, there is no evidence that this is translated into observed changes in 
macroeconomic activity (see Alesina et al. (1997, chapters 6 and 7) and Drazen (2000, 
                                                           
1 See e.g. Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000) and the references cited therein. 
2 See e.g. Drazen (2000, pp. 220-2) and Persson and Tabellini (1999, p. 1471) for a survey. More details will 
follow below. 
3 On the other hand, elections (or the fear of losing them) can work as a disciplinary device (see e.g. Drazen 
(2000, chapter 7.2)). For instance, they control the moral hazard of politicians, help voters to select the most 




chapters 7.3 and 11.6)).
4  More importantly, irrespective of the econometric results, there 
seems to be a gap between the theoretical literature and the final econometric specification.  
In particular, with few notable exceptions,
5 econometric estimations are based on simple 
autoregressive specifications in which various policy instruments and economic outcomes 
are regressed on lagged values, political dummies (e.g. election and partisan dummies) and 
measures of sociopolitical instability (e.g. government stability and regime changes).   
However, to more thoroughly evaluate the implications of electoral competition for 
economic policy and macroeconomic outcomes, it is important to formally identify the 
channel(s) through which electoral uncertainty affects policymakers’ behavior.  
 
To this end we construct and estimate a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium 
model of economic growth and endogenously chosen fiscal policy consisting of a private 
sector and two political parties. The private sector comprises a representative household 
and a representative firm.  The household consumes, works and saves in the form of 
capital. The firm uses capital and labour to produce a single good.  The political parties can 
alternate in power according to an exogenous stochastic reelection probability.
6  The party 
that wins the election forms a government that chooses economic policy during its term in 
office knowing that it might be out of the power in the future.  It also plays non-
cooperatively (Nash) vis-à-vis the out-of-power party.  By economic policy, we mean here 
                                                                                                                                                                                
following most of the related macroeconomics literature, we abstract from the benefits of electoral 
competition. 
4 Although there are several explanations for this (see Drazen (2000, pp. 244-6)), our reading of the literature 
is that this is still an open issue. 
5 Examples of papers which formally estimate theory-based models include: Alesina and Sachs (1988) for a 
partisan model of monetary policy for the US; Alogoskoufis et al. (1992) for a model of exchange-rate policy 
for the UK; and Lockwood et al. (1996) for a public-finance model for the UK. 
6 Assuming that re-election probabilities are endogenous (e.g. they depend also on the state of the economy) 
would not change our main theoretical results.  More importantly, the assumption that reelection probabilities 
are exogenous is deliberate, i.e. we want to examine how electoral uncertainty affects policy choices and the 
macro-economy.  Specifically, we will assume that the stochastic structure of our exogenous election process 
is first-order Markov.  Dixit et al. (2000) assume a similar exogenous political process and provide empirical 
support.  Note that this process reflects that there is persistence to political parties’ popularity and 
competence (the realization of which determine the election outcome) across terms of office (see also e.g. 




the income tax rate and the allocation of total tax revenues between public consumption 
services (which provide direct utility to households) and public production services (which 
provide production externalities to private firms and hence generate Barro (1990)-type 
long-term growth).  We solve for Markov policy strategies, and hence a Markov-perfect 
general equilibrium, in which optimal decisions depend on the game’s current position.  
An advantage of our modeling framework is that it allows us to distinguish the effects of 
electoral uncertainty upon economic policy from its effects upon macroeconomic outcomes 
in a unified general equilibrium setting.
7  Another advantage is that it allows us to obtain 
an explicit analytical solution for the general equilibrium, so that the model is easy to 
interpret, tractable and useful for formal econometric estimation.
8    
 
  Our main theoretical prediction is as follows.  When the expected probability of 
being re-elected decreases, the total government expenditure-to-output ratio (and the 
associated tax burden) increases, while the share of tax revenue used to finance public 
production services decreases.  Both fiscal policy instruments work in the same direction, 
so that - in general equilibrium - a lower re-election probability leads to lower economic 
growth.  Intuitively, when there is electoral uncertainty and the political parties do not care 
(or care relatively little) about the economy when out of power, they effectively face a 
quasi-finite time horizon.
9  The higher the electoral uncertainty (i.e. the smaller the 
                                                           
7 As Drazen (2000, p. 517) points out, it is necessary to estimate jointly the so-called “political” mechanism 
(the effect of socio-economic variables on the choice of policy instruments) and the so-called “economic” 
mechanism (the effect of policy instruments on macroeconomic outcomes). 
8 See e.g. Campbell (1994) for the advantages of analytical solutions especially in growth models.   
9 The mechanism is as in Lockwood et al. (1996). See Persson and Tabellini (1999, p. 1471) for a survey of 
the related literature, namely how electoral uncertainty induces more “myopic” fiscal policies.  Economides 
et al. (2003) have shown that, only if there are extra rents from being in power per se, the parties find it 
optimal to care relatively more about economic outcomes when in power, and it is this that generates typical 
electoral cycles.  Note that this mechanism is somewhat different from e.g. Rogoff and Sibert (1988) and 
Rogoff (1990) where the incumbent government manipulates policy instruments in an attempt to increase its 
re-election probability.  It is also distinct from e.g. Persson and Svensson (1989) and Alesina and Tabellini 
(1990) where the incumbent government uses strategically the state variables (e.g. public debt) to reduce the 




probability of being re-elected), the less they care about the future.  As a result, they 
choose shortsighted, inefficient policies.
10  
 
In our econometric work, we estimate the general equilibrium model by using 
quarterly data for Germany, the UK and the US over the period 1960 to 1999.  To this end, 
we employ constrained maximum likelihood using the Kalman filter.  In contrast to the 
calibration exercises conducted in the RBC literature, estimation of the model’s structural 
parameters not only allows us to assess their individual significance, but also to undertake 
dynamic inference when conducting the impulse response analysis.  Our econometric 
results provide clear support for the main theoretical proposition.  Namely, in all three 
countries, electoral competition pushes governments to follow short-sighted, inefficient 
fiscal policies (in the form of a high tax burden and a preference for non-productive 
activities with short-term benefits) and this is in turn detrimental for the macro-economy.  
 
Our main numerical results are as follows.  The productivity of public production 
services relative to private capital is highest in Germany (0.309) followed by the US 
( 279 . 0 ) and the UK ( 270 . 0 ).  The estimates for the weight given to public consumption 
services relative to private consumption are  385 . 0 ,  475 . 0  and  600 . 0  for the US, Germany 
and the UK respectively.  The estimates for the time discount rate are  954 . 0 ,  978 . 0  and 
986 . 0  for the US, Germany and the UK respectively.  Finally, persistence of political 
uncertainty is greatest in the UK ( 961 . 0 ), followed by Germany ( 918 . 0 ) and the US 
( 889 . 0 ).  The latter finding appears to be in line with business cycle stylised facts, i.e. the 
US cycle is the shortest followed by Germany and the UK (see, e.g., Zarnowitz (1992) and 
Woitek (1996)). 
                                                           
10 Svensson (1998) obtains a similar prediction in a model in which political instability pushes rational 




  The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 presents the theoretical 
model. Section 3 summarizes the data and the econometric methods employed.  Empirical 
results are presented in Section 4, while Section 5 contains our conclusions. Finally, 
algebraic details pertaining to the model are gathered in the Appendices.   
 
2.  The Theoretical Model  
 
In this section, we solve for the optimal decisions of households, firms and political 
parties.  The (Markov-perfect) general equilibrium solution will consist of a system of log-
linear dynamic equations, which jointly specify the paths of private consumption, private 
investment, government consumption and production services, the tax burden and the share 
of tax revenues allocated to government production relative to government consumption 
services.  That solution will be in terms of the predetermined capital stock and the expected 
values of exogenous electoral uncertainty.  The underlying setup is a two-party variant of 
Barro’s (1990) well-known model of long-term growth and optimally chosen fiscal 
policy.
11  The other difference is that here there are also public consumption services so 
that the incumbent party also chooses the allocation of total tax revenues between 
production and consumption services.
12  
 
2.1  Definition of equilibrium and how we are going to work 
 
The time horizon is infinite.  For simplicity, we assume that elections are held 
every time period.  In each period t, the sequence of events is as follows: first, current 
uncertainty is resolved; in turn, the in-power political party chooses economic policy 
                                                           
11 See also e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, chapter 4) and Glomm and Ravikumar (1994, 1997).   
Benhabib et al. (2001) focus on the properties of optimal fiscal policy in this model.    
12 See also Park and Philippopoulos (2003, 2004) for growth models in which the government chooses the 
allocation of tax revenues to different activities (e.g. public investment, public consumption and 
redistributive transfers).  However, these models assume a single benevolent government that chooses 




during its term in office; finally, private agents make their allocation decisions.
13  We will 
solve the problem by backward induction: within each t, we will first solve the private 
agents’ optimization problem for any feasible economic policy; in turn, we will endogenize 
economic policy by solving the political parties’ optimization problem.  
 
We will solve the optimization problems of private agents and political parties by 
using the method of dynamic programming.  The solution will give Markov policy 
strategies and hence a Markov-perfect general equilibrium.
14  Thus, optimal policies will 
be subgame perfect and time consistent.  Further, when we form a non-cooperative game 
between the political parties, the parties’ Markov policy strategies will be a Nash 
equilibrium of that game.
15  
 
When exact analytical solutions cannot be obtained, we will use first-order Taylor 
approximations around the non-stochastic long-run values of the relevant exogenous 
variables.  Specifically, this will enable us to obtain approximate closed-form analytical 
solutions for the value functions in the dynamic programming problems of private agents 
and political parties.  Campbell and Viceira (2002, chapter 5) use a similar type of 
approximation to solve the Bellman equation in dynamic asset pricing models.
16  These 
approximations will hold in expected value - a certainty equivalence property.    
 
 
                                                           
13 Thus, all decisions are made after the current uncertainty is resolved, so that all economic agents can 
choose directly the value of next period’s state variables. This makes the solution to the dynamic 
programming problem simpler, see e.g. Stokey and Lucas (1989, p. 240). 
14 Following Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, pp. 513-5), a Markov perfect equilibrium is defined to be a profile 
of optimal strategies that are a sub-game perfect equilibrium and depend on the current state of the game 
only.  Specifically, optimal strategies depend only on the set of state variables that are payoff-relevant, i.e. 
they directly affect the current payoff function.  As is known, Markov strategies are without memory.  
15 See also Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000, chapter 6) for examples of what they call “Nash-Markov perfect 
equilibria”.  See below for details.   
16 As Campbell and Viceira (2002, chapter 5) explain, this is the same type of approximation used in e.g. 
Campbell (1993), but instead of using it to linearize the budget constraint, here we use it to solve the Bellman 
equation. Campbell and Viceira also discuss how various authors have suggested different approximate 




2.2  Behavior of households  
 







t h c u E ∑
∞
=
β                                                                                                             (1a) 
 
where  ct  and ht  are respectively private consumption and public consumption services at 
time  t ,  01 << β  is the discount rate, and  t E  denotes the mathematical expectation 
conditional on information known at t.  At time t, current and past values of all variables 
are assumed to be known.  For simplicity, the utility function u(.)  is additively separable 
and logarithmic:   
uc h c h tt t t (,) l o g l o g =+ δ                                                                                              (1b) 
 
where  1 0 ≤ ≤ δ  is the weight given to public consumption relative to private consumption.  
 
At time t, the household rents its predetermined capital, kt , to the firm and 
receives rk tt , where rt  is the market return to capital.  It also supplies inelastically one unit 
of labor services per time-period so that the labor income is wt .  Further, it receives 
profits, π t.  Thus, the household’s budget constraint is:   
() ( ) kc r k w t t t t ttt + +=− ++ 1 1 θπ                                                                                    (2) 
 
where  1 + t k  is the end-of-period capital stock and  1 0 < < t θ  is the income tax rate.  For 
simplicity, we assume full capital depreciation (implying that the end-of-period capital 
stock is equal to investment).  The initial capital stock, k0 , is given.  
 
The household acts competitively by taking prices, tax policy and public services as 
given.  From the household’s viewpoint, the state variables at time t  are the predetermined 
capital stock, kt , and current economic policy.  As is shown below, the independent 




revenue used to finance public production services,  t b .  Therefore, let  () t t t b k V , ;θ  denote 
the value function of the household at any t .
17  This function satisfies the Bellman 
equation:  
() ( ) [] 1 1 1 ,   ; log log max , ;
1   ,
+ + + + + =
+
t t t t t t k c t t t b k V E h c b k V
t t
θ β δ θ .                                             (3) 
 
Using (2) for ct  into (3), the first-order condition for kt+1 and the envelope 
condition for kt  are respectively:
18  
() 1 1 1 , ;
1
+ + + = t t t k t
t
b k V E
c












, ; .                                                                                                (4b) 
 
2.3  Behavior of firms   
As in the literature introduced by Barro (1990), we assume that public services 
provide production externalities to private firms.  We also assume that technology at the 
firm’s level takes a Cobb-Douglas form.
19  Thus, the production function of the 
representative firm is:   
α α α − − =
1 1
t t t t g l Ak y                                                                                                            (5) 
 
where  t l  is the labor input at t ,  gt  is public production services at t,  A>0 and 01 << α  
(we assume that aggregate productivity,  A, is constant so as to focus on growth and 
fluctuations driven by electoral uncertainty).  
                                                           
17 As is known, with logarithmic preferences, Cobb-Douglas constraints and full depreciation, explicit 
closed-form solutions for the optimal controls,  t c  and  1 + t k , can be easily obtained by assuming that controls 
are time-invariant functions of the current state and using these conjectures into the Euler equation (see e.g. 
McCallum (1989, pp. 21-22)). Here, we choose to use dynamic programming to cope with any possible 
complications arising from the presence of the exogenous (from the viewpoint of private agents) stochastic 
policy instruments,  t θ  and  t b .  It is easy to show that the solutions for  t c  and  1 + t k  (see (10a)-(10b) below) 
are the same independently of the solution technique.  On the other hand, here we also obtain an approximate 
solution for the value function in (3) (details will be given in Appendix A). 























The firm maximizes profits, π t, given by:   
t t t t t t l w k r y − − ≡ π .                                                                                                        (6) 
 
The firm also acts competitively by taking prices and public services as given. The 













) 1 ( α −
= .                                                                                                              (7b) 
 
2.4  Government budget constraint   
At each time t , the government runs a balanced budget by taxing the household’s 
income at a rate  1 0 < < t θ .
20  Thus,   
() hg r kw ttt t ttt += ++ θπ .                                                                                           (8a) 
 
 
Without loss of generality, we assume that a share  1 0 < < t b  of total tax revenues 
finances public production services, gt, and the rest  1 ) 1 ( 0 < − < t b  finances public 
consumption services, ht.  Thus, (8a) is decomposed into:   
() t t t t t t t w k r b g π θ + + =                                                                                                 (8b) 
 
() ( ) t t t t t t t w k r b h π θ + + − = 1                                                                                          (8c) 
 




                                                                                                                                                                                
19 The firm is modeled as in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, chapter 4). 
20 For simplicity, there is no public debt in the model since adding one more state variable would not change 
our main results (see e.g. Devereux and Wen (1998) who employ a similar setup). RBC papers that also omit 
public debt include Baxter and King (1993), McGrattan (1994), Ambler and Paquet  (1996) and Klein, 
Quadrini and Rios-Rull (2003).  Finally note that in a public finance model including debt, Lockwood et al. 
(1996) have shown that short-sighted fiscal policies - driven by electoral uncertainty - are also reflected into 




2.5  Competitive decentralized equilibrium (for given economic policy)   
 
Given the time-path of economic policy 
∞
=0 } , { t t t b θ , a competitive decentralized 
equilibrium (CDE) is defined to be a sequence of allocations 
∞
= + 0 1 } , ,   , { t t t t t g h c k  and prices 
{, } rw tt t   =
∞
0 such that: (i) households maximize utility and firms maximize profits by taking 
prices, policy and public services as given; (ii) all budget constraints are satisfied; (iii) all 
markets clear.
21  This CDE is described by equations (1)-(8) above.  The rest of this 
subsection will take advantage of the specific functional forms used to obtain a convenient 
closed-form solution for the CDE.   
 
Consider the economy-wide output.  Using (7a), (7b) and (8b) into (5), we find:  
 




= + + =
1 1
                                                                                 (9) 
 
which shows that the model is a variant of the linear  AK  model.  As in e.g. Barro (1990), 
the coefficient “ A” is a function of policy instruments.
22   
Then, Appendix A shows:
23   
 
Result 1: In a competitive decentralized equilibrium (for any feasible Markov economic 
policy), optimal private consumption and capital accumulation are:    
() () ( ) t t t t t k b A c α
α




1 1                                                                                 (10a) 
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1 1 .                                                                                    (10b) 
 
                                                           
21 In the labor market, the market-clearing condition is  1 = t l . 






t t t b A r , which is the return to capital that drives private 













1 0 < <α , the social return to capital exceeds the perceived or private return. Thus, under production 
externalities, the decentralized growth rate is inefficiently low. 
23 As Appendix A shows, by taking first-order Taylor approximations around the long-run values of the 




It is also useful for what we do next, to write the solutions for the two types of 
public services, gt and ht , in a CDE.  Using (9), (8b) and (8c) become respectively:   
t t t t k Ab g α θ
1
) ( =                                                                                                            (10c) 
 






− = .                                                                                             (10d) 
 
To summarize results so far, equations (10a), (10b), (10c) and (10d) give ct ,  kt+1, 
gt and ht  respectively in a CDE.  This is a function of the predetermined capital stock,  t k , 
and the current policy instruments, θ t and  t b , only.  The next subsection will endogenize 
the choice of θ t  and  t b .
24  
 
Before we move on to choose economic policy, notice two features of the CDE.  





+1  is the sign of  ). 1 ( t θ α − −  If () 10 −− > α θ t ,  kt+1 
increases with θ t ; if  0 ) 1 ( < − − t θ α ,  kt+1 decreases with θ t .  Thus, the effect of the tax 
rate on the growth rate is an inverse U-curve, as in Barro (1990).










.  Thus, a higher share of tax revenues used to finance public production services 




                                                           
24 Here we do not model voting behavior.  We also assume that private agents are indifferent over which 
party wins the election (this is not restrictive because we will solve for symmetric equilibria). All this means 
that elections can affect the CDE only indirectly via the choice of economic policy, 
t θ  and 
t b .  This is 
deliberate since our focus is on the implications of electoral uncertainty.  For voting behavior, see e.g. 
Persson and Tabellini (2000, chapter 4.5).   
25 Intuitively, when the tax rate is initially low, any marginal increase will lead to higher tax revenues and 
higher public production services which increase the productivity of private capital; this more than offsets the 




2.6  The electoral system, political parties and definition of political equilibrium   
To endogenize economic policy, we form a non-cooperative (Nash) game between 
two political parties, denoted by i and  j , which alternate in power according to an 
exogenous stochastic reelection probability.
26  Specifically, if elections take place in each 
time-period, we assume that the party in power at t  has a probability  1 0 1 ≤ ≤ + t q  of 
winning the next election and remaining in power at t +1, and a probability  ) 1 ( 1 + − t q  of 
losing the election and being out of power at t +1.  In other words,  1 + t q  denotes the 
probability that the incumbent wins the election.  
 
To specify the motion of  1 + t q  we assume that it follows an exogenous first order 
autoregressive process.  Thus,   
10 1 tt t qqq ρ ε ++ =+ +                                                                                                        (11) 
 
where 0 0 > q  is a constant,  1 0 < < ρ  is the autoregressive parameter,  t ε  is  ) , 0 (
2 σ IID  
and 1 0 ≤ ≤ t q  for all t.
27  That is,  t q  is a non-negative stochastic variable that is bounded 
from above with probability 1.    
 
Given the above, a political general equilibrium is defined as follows: (i) The 
elected party i chooses  t θ  and  t b  to maximize the utility of the representative household 
                                                           
26 Assuming that re-election probabilities depend also on the state of the economy would not change our 
main theoretical results.  For instance, assume that the reelection probability is a positive function of recent 
economic growth.  This would give an incentive to the incumbent party to follow more long-sighted policies 
(so as to stimulate growth and increase its chances of reelection) than in the case in which the reelection 
probability is exogenous.  However, it would still be the case that, since the reelection probability is less than 
one, policies are less long-sighted than in the case without electoral uncertainty.  
27 We include a constant, 
0 0 q > , since otherwise the mean of 
t q  would be zero, which is counter intuitive in 
the case of reelection probabilities given that electoral uncertainty is always present. Also note that the 
autoregressive process we have chosen is consistent with previous empirical studies. For instance, when Price 
and Sanders (1994) examine the determinants of government popularity in post-war Britain, they find 
evidence of substantial history-dependence in popularity.  Finally, note that while the theoretical model can 
be solved using higher order processes for q, we find in our econometric estimation below that only first 
order terms are significant.  To preserve space, these results are not reported here but will be made available 




in (1a)-(1b) subject to the CDE summarized by (10a)-(10d), and by taking as given the 
policy of the other party,  i j ≠ , which may be in power at t +1.  That is, the in-power 
party plays Nash vis-a-vis the out-of-power party.  The out-of-power party takes no action 
until it wins an election.  (ii) We solve for Markov policy strategies, i.e. θ t and  t b  can be 
functions of the current state of the game.  (iii) We solve for a symmetric Nash equilibrium 
in Markov policy strategies, i.e. parties’ policies will be symmetric ex post.
28  (iv) We 
assume that political parties do not care about the economy when out of power. Implicit 
here is the assumption that they earn extra rents when in power.
29  (v) The solution for θ t 
and  t b , in combination with the CDE above, will give a Markov-perfect political general 
equilibrium.  
 
2.7  Problem formulation and chosen fiscal policies   
Recall that all current and past values are known at the beginning of t.  Then, from 
the political parties’ viewpoint, the state variables at t are the economy’s inherited capital 
stock  kt , and the current value of the exogenous  ) 1 ( AR  shock,  t q .
30  Therefore, let 
) ; ( t t
P q k V
i  and  ) ; ( t t
N q k V
i denote the value functions of party i at time t when in 
power and when out of power respectively (party  j ’s problem is symmetric).  These value 
functions must satisfy the following pair of Bellman equations:
31   
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28 Thus, there are no partisan effects. Here, the focus is on the effects of electoral uncertainty.  Note that 
partisan effects do not have a persistent impact on growth [for evidence, see e.g. Alesina et al. (1997)].  
29 This is for simplicity.  Our results do not change if we assume that parties care less about the economy 
when out of power than when in power.  See Economides et al. (2003) for the micro-economic determinants 
of these political preferences in a similar setup.  See also Lockwood et al. (1996) for references from the 
political science literature that support this approach. 
30 Since  t k  and  t q  are the payoff-relevant state variables, this selection of state variables is consistent with 
the definition of Markov strategies (see also Appendix B). 








t t t t
N q k V q q k V q E q k V
i i i β                                    (12b) 
 
where ct , kt+1 and ht  follow (10a), (10b) and (10d) respectively.  Notice that in (12a), the 
incumbent has a probability  1 + t q  of remaining in power, and a probability  ) 1 ( 1 + − t q  of 
losing the coming election.  In (12b), the party out of power knows that there is a 
probability  1 + t q  of continuing to be out of power and a probability  ) 1 ( 1 + − t q  of coming 
back to power in the next election.  When out of power, parties do not care about macro 
outcomes; hence the zero term on the right hand side of (12b).  In (12a), all policy 
instruments are chosen by the incumbent party i, while in (12b) all policy instruments are 
those of party  j  since party i is out of power.
32  Finally, notice that the optimization 
problem in (12a)-(12b) has a recursive structure.
33   
          Then, Appendix B shows:
34 
 
Result 2: In a Markov-perfect general equilibrium of a symmetric Nash game between the 
political parties, the income tax rate,  t θ , and the share of total tax revenues used to 
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1 1  because party i  has been in power at t , while in (12b) 






t t k b A k α
α




1 1  because party  j  has been in power at t .    
33 It is recursive in the sense that, given the other party’s policy choices, current policy choices affect returns 
dated  t  and later but not earlier (see Sargent (1987)).  In a recursive formulation, optimal policies are time 
consistent (see also Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000)).   
34 As before, to obtain closed-form analytical solutions for the value functions defined in (12a)-(12b), we use 
first-order Taylor approximations around the long-run value of the exogenous variable,  t q . See Appendix B 
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E  and  t t t q q q E ρ + = + 0 1  from (11). Thus, 




In what follows, we focus on the effects of electoral uncertainty, as summarized by 
the expected re-election probability,  1 + t tq E .  The expected “effective discount rate”, 
defined as  1 + Ω t t E , increases with  1 + t tq E .  In other words, as the probability of being 
reelected increases, policymakers care effectively more about the future. In turn, (13a) and 


















.  In other words, as the probability of being 
reelected increases, the total government expenditures-to-output ratio (and the associated 
required tax rate,  t θ )
36 decreases, while the share of tax revenues earmarked for financing 
government production services,  t b,   increases.  Then, since  () ( ) α
α










decreasing in  t θ  and increasing in  t b  along the optimal path,
37 it follows that, as  1 + t q  
                                                           
35 Notice three features of the solution in (13a)-(13b).  First, if  t q  is constant, it is optimal to keep the policy 
instruments flat over time.  This is as in the basic Barro (1990) setup, in which the optimal open loop tax rate 
that maximizes the utility of the representative agent (or equivalently the growth rate) is flat over time and 
there is no time inconsistency problem (for details, see Benhabib et al. (2001)).  Second,  ) 1 ( α θ − > t , where 
) 1 ( α −  is the productivity of public services.  By contrast,  ) 1 ( α θ θ − = ≡ t  in Barro (1990).  This is because 
here there are also public consumption services and electoral competition; both lead to larger public sectors 
and higher tax rates.  Third, the two policy instruments,  t θ  and  t b , should move in opposite direction in each 
period.  Intuitively, when the government allocates a larger share of tax revenues to public production 
services (i.e.  t b  increases), it can afford a lower tax rate (i.e.  t θ  decreases) since public production services 
stimulate private investment and hence increase the tax base.  Thus,  t θ  and  t b  are substitutes along the 
optimal path (see also Park and Philippopoulos (2003)).   








37 Since  0 ) 1 ( < − − t θ α  along the optimal path, it follows from (10b) that  1 + t k  decreases with  t θ . 
Intuitively, when policy is chosen endogenously, it is not possible for any further increases in tax policy 




increases, both policy instruments work in the same direction leading to an increase in 
capital and output growth.   
 
The intuition is as follows.  When there is electoral uncertainty (in the sense that 
there is a non-zero probability of being out of power in the next election), and the political 
parties care less about economic outcomes when out of power than when in power, they 
face a quasi-finite time horizon (see also Lockwood et al. (1996)).  As a result, the party in 
power, which is the party that sets policy, cares effectively less about the future. 
Specifically, the higher the electoral uncertainty (i.e. the smaller the probability of being 
re-elected), the less it cares about the future.  In our model, higher electoral uncertainty 
pushes policymakers to go for a higher total expenditures-to-output ratio and also spend 
more on non-productive activities relative to productive activities. Here, the benchmark 
case is the second-best case without any electoral uncertainty,  1 1 = + t q . In turn, the effects 
of these two policy instruments work in the same direction and discourage private capital 
accumulation and economic growth. We summarize results in the following proposition:   
 
Proposition 1: There is a unique Markov-perfect general equilibrium in symmetric Nash 
strategies among political parties. In this equilibrium, when the probability of being re-
elected decreases, it is optimal for incumbent politicians to follow relatively shortsighted 
fiscal policies (in the form of relatively high total expenditure-to-output ratio and low 
share of tax revenues used to finance government production services) and this is 
detrimental for economic growth.  
 
3.  The Econometric Model  
 
In this section we jointly estimate the general equilibrium (GE) model given the 
exogenous process for  t q  developed in Section 2 for Germany, the UK and the US using 
quarterly data from 1960 to 1999.  The GE model consists of equations (10a-10d) and 




exogenous process for  t q  is given by equation (11).  The internal and external dynamics of 
the model are captured respectively by the capital stock,  t k , and the reelection probability, 
t q . To focus attention on the effects that political uncertainty has on policy outcomes and 
in turn the aggregate economy, we have only specified one explicit stochastic process, 
namely  t q .  When moving to the econometric specification, we have to account for the fact 
that our data measures for  t q  are at best proxies.  This is because actual  t q  embodies 
multiple dimensions of electoral certainty and political stability in general, which make it 
different from the  t q  implied by the model (i.e. the “probability of staying in office”).  The 




Given that the model in (10a-10d) and (13a-13b) is non-linear, both in variables 
and parameters, prior to estimation, we transform it into its log-deviations form by using 
the long-run restrictions imposed by the theory developed in Section 2.  This has two 
advantages: (i) the transformed model is in a form more tractable for estimation, i.e. it 
becomes log-linear (with the non-linearity only entering in the parameters); (ii) the log-
linear structure is necessary when using the Kalman Filter.  The latter procedure is a 
natural choice for this exercise since, as mentioned above, we need to account for both 






                                                           
38 This treatment is particularly relevant when it comes to the distinction between government consumption 
and production services,  t h  and  t g .  Typically, national income accounting practice fails to recognise the 
investment characteristics of many categories of government expenditure. Examples include expenditure on 
education, or expenditure on social security programs.  This is widely recognized in the literature (see e.g. 




3.1  The Data  
 
The quarterly time series for private and public consumption and investment are 
from the OECD Business sector database.  As mentioned above, since it is not possible to 
measure the probability of staying in office directly, we have to use proxies for  t q . In the 
case of the UK and Germany, the political data are from the data-set collected by 
Carmignani (2003).  Since we do not have a direct measure for the probability of staying in 
office, we convert the information from Carmignani’s measures for political uncertainty to 
an index varying between 0 and 1, e.g.  )) ~ exp( 1 /( ) ~ exp( t t t q q q + = .  Our choice of measures 
is based on data availability: for Germany, we use an index of portfolio volatility and 
ideological diversity of the cabinet; for the UK, we use the share of parliamentary support.  
Portfolio volatility measures the number of changes in the structure of portfolio allocation 
between two consecutive cabinets.  The lower the portfolio volatility, the higher the 
probability a minister stays in office.  Ideological diversity reflects the potential conflict of 
interest between coalition partners, based on the ideological location of the parties 
involved in the coalition on a ten points Left-Right continuum (see Carmignani (2003) and 
the reference cited therein for details).  The more diverse the coalition, the smaller is the 
probability of staying in office.  In the case of the UK, and since the UK is a typical single-
party majority system, we cannot use measures based on potential conflicts within a 
coalition.  Instead, we will use the share of parliamentary support (share of seats controlled 
by the government) as a proxy for the survival probability.  In the case of the US, we have 
(relatively more direct) data on the presidential job approval for the entire observation 
period collected by the Gallup Organization,
39 which we convert from the bi-weekly to the 
quarterly frequency.  
                                                           
39 Source: http://roperweb.ropercenter.uconn.edu/.  We are aware that similar data exist for the UK and 
Germany, but using this would restrict the sample size considerably.  For example, in the case of Germany, 




3.2    The Model in log-deviations form  
Taking logs in (10a-10d), (13a-13b) and (11) and differentiating with respect to 







≡ ˆ , where  1 −
•
− ≅ t t t x x x  and x  is the non-stochastic long-run value of  t x ):  
() 1 (1 ) ˆˆ ˆ ˆ
(1 )







                                                             (14a) 
()
1
1 (1 ) ˆˆ ˆ ˆ
(1 )








                                                                    (14b) 
11 ˆˆ ˆ ˆttt t gb k θ
αα
=++                                                                                            (14c) 









 −−   =+ +   −  
                                                               (14d) 
1 ˆ










Ω − + Ω +
−
= t t q q
q α δ δ
αδ
θ                                                       (14e) 
1 ˆ










Ω − + Ω +





                                                       (14f) 
11
1 ˆˆ tt t qq
q














) )( 1 (
α δ
δ α







) 2 1 )( 1 (




2 ) 2 1 (
) 1 (







,  () , , , ckg h are deterministic quadratic trends of (,  , ,) ckg h from 





                                                           
40 The value of  5 . 0 = q  reflects that it is not reasonable to expect either an incumbency advantage or 




3.3  The Kalman Filter set-up 
 
To estimate the parameters, we first cast the model in equations (14a) – (14g) in 
state space form.  The transition equation system is given by the economic model and 
determines the dynamics of the (7× 1) state vector at: 
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In the measurement equation, the state vector is linked to observable 
12 ˆˆ ˆˆ ˆ ,  ,  ,  , and   tt tt t ck gh q ++ : 
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ε t ∼  N(0, H), and the variance-covariance matrix H is assumed to be diagonal.  We do not 
require proxies for  ˆ ˆ  and  tt b θ , since they can be linked via the  1 ˆ ˆ and   tt ck +  equations to 
observable data. The error vector reflects the fact that all variables in the system are subject 
to measurement error, or have to be seen as proxies, as in the case of  2 ˆt q + . 
 
3.4  Constrained Maximum Likelihood 
 
Given that the parameters (i.e.  ,  ,  ,  ,  abcde %% %%% ) are comprised of complex non-linear 
convolutions of the underlying “deep” parameters ( ρ δ β α , , , ), which also embody the 
within- and cross-equation restrictions imposed by the theory, we find it appropriate to 
employ constrained maximum likelihood estimation.  Maximizing the likelihood function 
using standard numerical methods in these circumstances does not guarantee that the 
estimated parameters will lie within the ranges suggested by the theory. To ensure this, we 
could use parameter transformations such as  b=exp(a)/(1+exp(a)) which ensures that b 
lies in [0,1] interval.  However transformations such as these lead to problems with 
convergence (see Schoenberg (1997)). Accordingly, we will restrict the structural 
parameters  β α , a n d  δ  to stay within acceptable ranges (see below).  
 
Before we move on, it is important to point out that, in contrast to standard 
calibration exercises, our proposed methodology has several advantages.  First, we are able 
to assess the individual statistical significance of each of the structural parameters.   




dynamics and long-run effects of changes in political uncertainty, we are able to undertake 
dynamic inference. 
 
To estimate the state space model given by (15) and (16), we calculate the 
likelihood function using the Kalman filter.  As discussed above, when maximising the 
likelihood, we take into account that all of the variables (with the exception of ρ ) are 
bounded.  The restricted ranges we use are as follows: α  (i.e. the productivity of private 
capital relative to public production services) is in between 0.6 and 0.8, β  (i.e. the time 
discount rate) lies in between 0.95 and 0.99, and δ  (i.e. the weight given to public 
consumption services relative to private consumption) cannot be greater than 1 or less than 
0.
41   
 
  The range for α  was motivated by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, see e.g. pp 82-
87), who undertake calibrations using a point estimate of  75 . 0 = α  for private capital.  
They argue that a value around 0.75 (which is higher than the one usually used) gives 
reasonable transitional dynamics, generates predictions that accord well with historical 
growth experiences in advanced economies and is consistent with a broad measure of 
private capital.  The range for β  reflects values most often used in the theoretical DSGE 
literature (see, e.g. Baier and Glomm (2001) and Lansing (1998) who set β  to 0.98 and 
0.96 for the US respectively).  Finally, concerning the range for δ , since as Baier and 
Glomm (2001) state, “little is known about this value”, we employ the 0 to 1 range. Note 
that values of δ  used in calibration studies for the US include  287 . 0  (see Lansing (1998)), 
368 . 0  (see Guo and Lansing (1999)),  107 . 0  (see Ambler and Paquet (1996)), while Baier 
and Glomm (op cit) experiment with values of (0.15, 0.0075, 0) . 
                                                           
41 The variances are also bounded, in the sense that they cannot be negative.  Forcing the algorithm to take 
this property into account is straightforward: we maximize with respect to standard deviations and calculate 




To impose the above restrictions on  β α ,  and δ , we use the GAUSS module for 
constrained maximum likelihood estimation version 1.0 (for a detailed description, see 
Schoenberg (1997)). Since the standard errors for the parameters have to allow for the 
possibility that the true values are near or actually on the constraint boundaries, we 
construct bootstrap confidence intervals at the 95 % level. 
 
4.  Econometric Results  
We next present the results of estimating the econometric model setout in Section 3 
(see Table 1) as well as the results of impulse response analysis (see Table 2 and Figures 1-
3).  Examination of the results in Table 1 reveals that all parameters are significantly 
different from zero and some interesting cross-country differences.  More specifically, the 
physical productivity of public production services relative to private capital, ( α − 1 ), is 
highest in Germany ( 309 . 0 ) followed by the US ( 279 . 0 ) and the UK ( 270 . 0 ). The 
difference between Germany and the UK is significant, but the US does not differ 
significantly from either country.  Estimates of the time discount rate, β , are  954 . 0 , 
978 . 0  and  986 . 0  for the US, Germany and the UK respectively and are all statistically 
significantly different from each other.  The estimates for the weight private consumers 
place on public consumption services relative to private consumption, δ , are  385 . 0 ,  475 . 0  
and  600 . 0  for the US, Germany and the UK respectively.  The UK and German results 
differ significantly from each other, while the US differs significantly from the UK but not 








Table 1: Estimation Results 
   United Kingdom  Germany  United States 


















q   0.5  - -  - - -  - - -  - 
α   0.20≤  1-α  ≤   0.40  0.270  0.255 0.279 0.309 0.293 0.325 0.279  0.242 0.320
β   0.95 ≤  β  ≤   0.99  0.986  0.982 0.990 0.978 0.973 0.980 0.954  0.950 0.958
δ   0 ≤ δ  ≤  1  0.600  0.595 0.605 0.475 0.405 0.555 0.385  0.314 0.510
ρ     0.961  0.934 0.991 0.918 0.882 0.956 0.889  0.863 0.929
θ     0.277  0.262 0.289 0.318 0.301 0.336 0.297  0.261 0.338
b     0.972  0.966 0.980 0.970 0.959 0.976 0.941  0.915 0.955
Log-
Likelihood 
  -2.946 -3.157 -5.428 
N    140 153 149 
Notes: Estimation method: constrained Maximum Likelihood (Gauss CML module Version 1.0); parameter restrictions are 
displayed in column 2. The 95% confidence intervals are based on 1000 re-samplings. 
 
We now turn to the estimated policy parameters reported in Table 1.  Persistence of 
political uncertainty, captured by ρ  in equation (11), is highest in the UK ( 961 . 0 ) 
followed by Germany ( 918 . 0 ) and the US ( 889 . 0 ).  The UK and German results do not 
statistically differ from each other, while the US differs significantly from the UK but not 
from Germany.   The estimates for the long-run values of the optimal tax rate (θ ) and the 
optimal share of total tax revenues allocated to public production services relative to 
consumption ones (b ) are all within the ranges predicted by the theory (see equations 
(13a-13b)).  Specifically, the long-run tax rates are  277 . 0 ,  297 . 0  and  318 . 0  for the UK, 
the US and Germany respectively. The British and German tax rates (θ ) are statistically 
different from each other, but the US does not differ from either of the European countries.  
Finally, the optimal long-run share of tax revenues allocated to public production services 
(b ) is  941 . 0 ,  970 . 0  and  972 . 0  for the US, Germany and the UK respectively.
42  The 
British and German values are not significantly different from each other, while the US 
differs from both the UK and Germany.  
                                                           
42 The estimated long-run values of b , although consistent with the theory (see equation (13b)), seem to be 
too high.  However, recall that here the engine of perpetual economic growth is public production services as 




To more fully assess the persistence of fluctuations resulting from a change in the 
probability of being reelected (q), as well as the effects on the steady-state values of the 
endogenous variables, we next undertake impulse response analysis.  To do so, we analyze 
a temporary positive unit shock to q ˆ . Results are reported in Table 2.     
Table 2: Summary Impulse Response Results 
  United Kingdom  Germany  United States 




















estimated q ˆ  
0.963  0.221 1.660 0.333 0.126 0.582 0.179  0.145 0.221
Long-run 
response of  y ˆ   0.375  0.107 0.838 0.355 0.184 0.640 0.933  0.464 1.547
t
*  17.424  10.152 76.670 8.102 5.520 15.404  5.891  4.704 9.412
Notes:  t
* : time (quarters) in which the initial shock to q ˆ halves ( ) ln( / ) 5 . 0 ln( * ρ = t ). The responses of y ˆ  are based on a 
unit shock to  q ˆ . 
 
As predicted by the theory, Figures 1-3 show that the endogenous policy 
instruments θ ˆ and b ˆ  move in opposite directions.  Specifically, in all three countries, as a 
result of a temporary rise in q ˆ , θ ˆ  decreases before monotonically increasing to its steady 
state (i.e. zero), whereas b ˆ  increases prior to decreasing to its steady state deviation of 
zero.  The confidence bands also suggest that these changes (as well as all changes 
reported in Figures 1-3) are statistically significant for the duration of the simulation.   
 
Turning to effects of a temporary rise in the re-election probability upon 
macroeconomic outcomes, we can see for all countries that private consumption and 
investment (c and i), as well as public investment (g ), all monotonically increase before 
converging to new balanced growth paths which are higher than their pre-shock paths.  On 
the other hand, public consumption (h) increases before monotonically decreasing to its 
                                                                                                                                                                                
tax bases and this can be achieved by relatively high b  and low θ . This is especially true in the long run 




new balanced growth path that is higher than the pre-shock one.
43  If we concentrate on 
output, the point estimates appear to indicate that long-run growth in the US is relatively 
most affected by the increase in the re-election probability.  For example, Figures 1-3 and 
Table 2 (see row 2) show that steady-state growth is about 0.4 points higher for the UK and 
Germany and nearly a point for the US.  However, closer inspection of the confidence 
bands in Table 2 indicates that there is no significant difference between these countries.  
Nonetheless, an increase in the probability of being re-elected has a statistically significant 
and positive effect on the steady-state growth rate of output for all countries.  Finally, to 
demonstrate the relative importance of the four components of output ( g i c , ,  and h) in the 
transmission of a shock to q ˆ  to output growth, Figure 4 contains a decomposition of the 
output growth response into the contributions of each component. 
 
Figure 1: Percentage Deviation Responses to a Unit Shock to q ˆ  
(United Kingdom) 
 
                                                           
43 Recall that this is a model of endogenous growth (an  AK  model).  This means that even temporary shocks 
in fiscal policy can have permanent effects on levels and growth rates (see also e.g. King and Rebelo (1990), 























We now return to the issue pertaining to the persistence of shocks discussed in 
relation to the estimates of ρ  in Table 1.  Table 2 (see row 3) shows the time (in quarters) 
it takes for the initial shock to q ˆ  to half.  The point estimates suggest that it takes 
approximately 4 years for the UK, 2 years for Germany and 1.5 years for the US.
44  
Broadly speaking, this rank ordering is consistent with business cycle stylized facts, i.e. the 
US cycle is shorter, which is reflected in the lower modulus/higher damping that we find 
(see, e.g., Zarnowitz op cit. and Woitek op cit.). 
 
 
5. Conclusions   
 
This paper has solved and estimated a tractable dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium model to study the link between elections, fiscal policy and 
                                                           




fluctuations/growth.  The model was formally estimated for Germany, the UK and the US, 
which are generally believed to be the economies closest to the neoclassical paradigm.  
The focus has been on the effects of electoral uncertainty and party competition upon the 
choice of fiscal policy instruments and in turn upon the macro-economy.  The main result 
is that electoral competition pushes governments to follow relatively short-sighted fiscal 
policies and this is detrimental for the macro-economy.  Our econometric results provide 
clear support for this proposition from both fluctuations and growth perspectives.  By 
explicitly modeling the channel through which political uncertainty affects the economy, 
we found a statistically significant effect of electoral uncertainty on output growth.  This 
effect is small in magnitude, which might help to explain why previous empirical studies 
can at best identify a political business cycle in policy instruments.   
 
Our research contributes to both the literature on political business cycles, as well 
as the quantitative RBC literature.  It adds to the former mainly because, to the extent that 
we formally estimate the solution of the theoretical model, we fill the gap between 
theoretical and empirical research.  To date, there has been very little econometric work, 
which has successfully made the formal link between political uncertainty, endogenous 
fiscal policy and ultimately aggregate outcomes.  Our research also adds to the RBC 
literature mainly because, instead of relying only on non-sample information, we combine 
this with observed data to obtain estimated values of a number of parameters which are of 
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7.1  Appendix A: Result 1  
This appendix solves for a Competitive Decentralized Equilibrium (CDE) as defined 
in the text. Note that the household’s problem is only a part of this CDE.  The log-linear 
objective (1a)-(1b), the Cobb-Douglas functional forms for the production function in (9) 
and government consumption services in (10d), and the assumption that policy instruments 
( t θ  and  t b ) are Markov, imply a value function of the form 
t t t t t t b u u k u u b k V 3 2 1 0 log ) , ; ( + + + = θ θ , where ( 3 2 1 0 , , , u u u u ) are time-invariant undetermined 
coefficients.  Substituting this conjecture for the value function into the optimality 
conditions (4a) and (4b), and using (7a) and (9), we get (10b).  Then, (10a) follows from 
(10b) and (2). See also e.g. McCallum (1989, equations (1.16-1.21) for a similar solution.  
  
We now have to solve for ( 3 2 1 0 , , , u u u u ) and verify our conjecture for the value 
function.  To do so, we substitute (10a), (10b) and (10d) back into (3) and equate 
coefficients on both sides of the Bellman.  For instance, by equating coefficients on  t k log , 









u .  Notice that  1 u  is the crucial coefficient; 
namely, it is the coefficient that matters for the optimal decisions, ( 1 , + t t k c ), in (4a)-(4b). 
The other undetermined coefficients ( 3 2 0 , , u u u ) may matter for the solution of the value 
function, but not for ( 1 , + t t k c ).  Hence, we will only sketch their solution here. To solve for 
( 3 2 0 , , u u u ), we need to contend with  t θ log , ) 1 log( t θ − ,  t b log  and  ) 1 log( t b −  [recall that 
we have substituted  (10a), (10b) and (10d) for  t c ,  1 + t k  and  t h  back into the Bellman in 
(3)].  To do so, we take first-order Taylor approximations of  t θ  and  t b  around their long-
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− − ≅ − t t  and similar 
expressions for  t b log  and  ) 1 log( t b − . Using these approximations into (3), and if the 
policy instruments ( t θ  and  t b ) are Markov, we can equate coefficients on both sides of the 
Bellman to get Riccati equations for ( 3 2 0 , , u u u ).  It is important to point out that those 
solutions for ( 3 2 0 , , u u u ) can be obtained only after we solve for optimal policy,  t θ  and  t b  
(see Appendix B below). This is how it should be, since this is a general equilibrium model 
in which policy instruments are chosen endogenously [see also Economides et al. (2003)]. 
By contrast, if policy were exogenous, we could simply assume (exogenous) statistical 
processes driving  t θ  and  t b  over time. This also verifies (approximately) our conjecture 
for the value function.  
 
7.2  Appendix B: Result 2  
We conjecture that the two value functions in (12a)-(12b) take the form 
() t t




P P q u k u u 2 1 0 log + + =  and  () t t




N N q u k u u 2 1 0 log + + = , where 
(
N N N P P P u u u u u u 2 1 0 2 1 0 , , , , , ) are time-invariant undetermined coefficients.  Party  j  solves a 
symmetric problem, so that we have two pairs of equations like (12a)-(12b).  We will solve 
party i’s problem.  If we use the above conjectures into (12a)-(12b), differentiate the right-
hand side of (12a) with respect to the controls 
i
t θ  and 
i
t b , and impose the ex post 








t b b b ≡ = , 
P Pj Pi u u u ≡ =  and 
N Nj Ni u u u ≡ = , then the first-
order conditions for θ t and  t b  in a symmetric Nash equilibrium in Markov strategies are 




t t q E u q E u E β .  
 
We now have to solve for (
N N N P P P u u u u u u 2 1 0 2 1 0 , , , , , ) and verify our conjecture for the 




(10b) and (10d), and then equate coefficients on both sides of the two Bellman equations 
(12a)-(12b).  The crucial coefficients are 
N P u u 1 1 , .  Namely, these are the coefficients that 
solve  1 + Ω t t E  and hence matter in the solution for the optimal strategies in (13a)-(13b).  
Equating coefficients on  t k log  in (12a)-(12b), we obtain two Riccati equations, 
)] 1 ( [ 1 1 1 1 1 1 + + − + + + = t t
N
t t
P P q E u q E u u β δ  and  ] ) 1 ( [ 1 1 1 1 1 + + + − = t t
N
t t
P N q E u q E u u β , which 
can be solved for 
P u1  and 
N u1 . Their solution gives 
0
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The solution for the rest of undetermined coefficients (
N N P P u u u u 2 0 2 0 , , , ), and hence 
for the value functions, will be based on first-order Taylor approximations around long-run 
values. Notice that (
N N P P u u u u 2 0 2 0 , , , ) do not affect the optimal strategies, ( t t b , θ ), in (13a)-
(13b).  Since they are not of particular interest, we will only sketch their solution here. 
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 and q  denotes the long-run value of 
t q .  Working similarly and using (13b), we can get analogous approximations for  t b log  
and ) 1 log( t b − . This implies that  t θ log , ) 1 log( t θ − ,  t b log  and  ) 1 log( t b −  are linear 
functions of  1 + t tq E  only.  Also notice that  ) (
2
1 + t t q E ) ( 2 1
2 q q E q q t t − + ≅ + , where 
t t t q q q E ρ + = + 0 1 . Thus, we only have intercepts and terms with  t q  on the RHS of (12a)-




(12b) to get Riccati equations for (
N N P P u u u u 2 0 2 0 , , , ). This also verifies (approximately) our 
conjecture for the value functions.  
 
Notice that this also completes the solution of the competitive decentralized 
equilibrium in Appendix A.  This is because  t θ  (the same arguments apply to  t b ) on the 
LHS of the Bellman in (3) is a function of  1 + t tq E  and hence [since  t t t q q q E ρ + = + 0 1 ] a 
linear function of  t q , while  1 + t t E θ  on the RHS of (3) is a function of  2 + t tq E  and hence 
[since  t t t q q q E
2
0 2 ) 1 ( ρ ρ + + = + ] also a linear function of  t q . Accordingly, we can equate 
coefficients on both sides of the Bellman to solve for ( 3 2 0 , , u u u ) in the private agents’ 
problem.  





1G o a l
This paper tries to investigate the link between elections, ﬁscal policy and growth and ﬂuctuations.
The production function used is of the AK type and therefore ﬂuctuations are the result of changes
in the growth regime.
2 Comments on the model and estimation results
In the model posed by the authors, consumers derive utility from private consumption (ct)a n df r o m









which is borrowed from Barro [1990] where gt is capital provided by the public sector, kt is private
capital and lt is hours worked.
The government revenues (R
g
t) are collected through a uniform income tax (θt). Imposing bal-




ht =( 1 − bt)R
g
t
1where bt is the share of public revenues that goes for the production of the public consumption
good.
In the economy there are two political parties. The utility function of each party is such that
whenever they are in power the instantaneous utility ﬂow is equal to GDP and whenever they are not
is zero. The electoral system is exogenous. Speciﬁcally, the probability that the incumbent party
is reelected next period (qt+1) follows an AR(1) process with autocorrelation coeﬃcient ρ. Since
parties face a positive probability of not being reelected, their policies tend to be too shortsighted
relative to the constrained maximum. Speciﬁcally, in equilibrium there tends to be too high tax
rates (θt) and too much spending on the public consumption good (1 − bt).
This speciﬁcation is a bit artiﬁcial and also abstracts from important special interest consider-
ations.
More fundamentally, this speciﬁcation is hard to rationalize. One might think that the rents the
party in power gets are proportional to GDP, but then that should be reﬂe c t e di nt h ec o n s u m e r s
budget constraint. On the other hand, it might be the case that the prestige a party gets while
in power is proportional to current GDP, but then that should be reﬂected on the probability of
reelection.
The authors can solve the model and linearize the solution around the steady state. Then
they estimate the structural parameters of the model. In this exercise the authors use various
measures to estimate the law of motion for q. I am going to digress slightly about this issue since
it is one interesting aspect that highlights the costs of diverging from the most natural modelling
strategy. Namely, introducing political economy considerations through lobbies or parties that make
contributions to inﬂuence the votes or decisions of the political authority.
This is the predominant line of research that the theoretical literature on political economy has
taken in the last 15 year or so and it has been for good reasons. First, we know that politicians
are not benevolent agents that value only social welfare. instead, they care about their probability
of reelection, the monetary contributions they receive from private agents, the prestige of being in
power and so on. Second, we know that these distortions of the political process make a diﬀerence
in that they aﬀect not only the outcomes but also the set of feasible actions agents can take. Finally,
Even if qualitatively we did not observe important diﬀerences when taking opposite approaches to
the modellling of political interactions, quantitatively there may be important diﬀerences.
Avoiding the natural route has a toll. Here the toll consists in estimating the process for
the probability of reelection. This is enormously diﬃcult. One way to do it consists in looking at
2prediction markets. Recently, economists have discovered the relevance of these markets to calibrate
and estimate the expectations of the agents in their models. Take for example the last election in
the US. Throughout the campaign and election day (and night) there was an active betting market
on the internet. Presumably the premia in this market was correlated to the aggregate of the
opinions about the outcomes. If the persons that participated in the market had beliefs about the
preferences of the american electorate that were in line with reality, then this can be taken as a
good predictor of the election outcome. It has been proven that even thoug prediction markets are
imperfect, they are more accurate and precise than an average of the opinions of the experts.
Of course, one challange with prediction markets is that they sometimes the premia ﬂuctuate
a lot. This makes it harder for researchers to estimate the type of stochastic processes that the
authors want to estimate in this piece. However, they are still a good resource to take advantage
of. This ﬁnishes my digression.
Coming back to the estimation, this type of econometric exercises consist on forcing the data
through the restrictions imposed by the model. If these restrictions are unreasonable this will show
up in the form of weird parameter estimates. However, there is one potential problem with this
approach that is important to bear in mind. Namely, that diﬀerent models may be observationally
equivalent in terms of the restrictions they impose on the data.
Where does the data cry?
1. Forcing the labor and the g − shares to be the same in the production function is probably
unreasonable. This claim is supported by the low estimate the authors obtain for the labor share
(1/3 vs. the actual 2/3).
2. The share of government consumption over GDP implied by the model for the US and
Germany are very similar. In the data, probably there are important diﬀerences. This maybe
the result of either a poor theory for the motivations of political parties to determine government
consumption or a poor measure of the probability of reelection (q).
3. A similar remark applies to the income tax rate (θ).
3C o n c l u s i o n s
This is an interesting attempt to answer an important question. The authors have tried to be very
serious in the estimation of a political economy model but in the process have relaxed the rigourosity
of the modelling approach. I think it is possible to answer this question without compromising the
3modelling side. To do that I would suggest the authors two variations with their current approach.
1. Stick to a neoclassical production function. The currently used endogenous production function
is too primitive. I think that if you want to do endogenous growth you must go all the way;
otherwise the misspeciﬁcations in production contaminate all the other parameters. 2. I would set
up a simple political economy model where parties get some private beneﬁt from staying in power.
this beneﬁt is sustracted from the consumers budget constraint. The probability of reelection is
increasing in the GDP level. These two modiﬁcations would make the model more reasonable and
would still keep it suﬃciently simple to solve it and estimate it.












We propose a comprehensive methodology to characterize the business cycle co-
movements across European economies and some industrialized countries, always try-
ing to “leave the data speak”. Out of this framework, we propose a novel method
to show that there is no an “Euro economy” that acts as an attractor to the other
economies of the area. We show that the relative comovements across EU economies
are prior to the establishment of the Monetary Union. We are able to explain an im-
portant proportion of the distances across their business cycles using macro-variables
related to the structure of the economy, to the directions of trade, and to the size of
the public sector. Finally, we show that the distances across countries that belong to
the European Union are smaller than the distances across newcomers.
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11 Introduction
The academic literature and the press are full of references to the importance of global-
ization and the links across economies. Several economists talk about the “world business
cycle” and, assuming from the beginning that this cycle exists, estimate it and calculate
its importance in explaining country speci…c movements. Recent examples are Lumsdaine
and Prasad (2003), Canova, Ciccarelli and Ortega (2003), or Gregory, Head and Raynauld
(1997). At the same time, many other economists talk about the “European business
cycle”, also assuming that there exist European-speci…c business cycle driving forces, or
Euro-area speci…c factors. Supporting this view, signi…cant examples are Mansour (2003),
Del Negro and Ottrok (2003), Artis, Krozlig and Toro (1999), and obviously all the liter-
ature behind the well known coincident indicator for the Euro-area economies by Forni,
Hallin, Lippi and Reichlin (2001a and 2001b). Most of the previous papers, when dealing
with international business cycle movements, spend serious amount of e¤ort in explaining
how much or how little the common business cycle explains the cyclical behavior of the
di¤erent economies. In addition, an important part of those papers deal with estimating
the law of motion for the unobserved common business cycle that better …ts the individual
economies data.
The purpose of our paper is to go behind the assumptions of this literature. We want to
analyze the comovements across economies without previously assuming that they should
or should not move together. We want to “leave the data speak” without imposing any
kind of a priori restrictions. This approach will allow us to draw a map of comovements
across economies where we can check which economies are close together and which are
further away from each other. At the same time, this approach will allow us to answer
the leading question about the existence of either a world or an European attractor: Do
the economies move according to a common driving force? We think that our answer to
this question is more careful than any that we can previously …nd in other papers of the
literature and require serious investment in applying and mixing di¤erent techniques to
2the data, much more when we do not pretend to impose a particular model or a particular
framework to the data. To that extend, we think that we present di¤erent contributions
to the literature. First, we propose a two by two comparison across economies without
taking any of them as “reference” for the others. Second, we calculate di¤erent measures
of comovements across economies, in order to check for the robustness of our results and
not to condition our …ndings to a given framework. Third, we propose new measures of
business cycle synchronization. Finally, we analyze the role of macroeconomic and policy
variables in explaining distances across economies.
To deal with these questions, we will concentrate in this paper on European economies,
although we will extend the usual European sample of countries in two di¤erent ways.
On the one hand, we will include a set of industrialized economies that will allow us to
understand how close or how far European economies are from those major industrialized
countries. On the other side, we will include the Eastern European economies which
represent most of the enlargement of the European Union. Extending the sample in this
way allow us to address additional questions which are key to measure the gains and costs
of the enlargement of the Union (and the future enlargement of the Euro-area) for both
the accession and the existing countries. When countries join a monetary union they leave
to a supranational decision maker traditional instruments for the control of the business
cycles. Obviously, the optimality of this delegation of the decisions to a higher authority
will be a direct function of the similarities across these economies. If the economies move
together, we might think that they need the same type of economic policy decisions at the
same time. If, there is no synchronization of their business cycle comovements, we might
think that di¤erent solutions are optimal for di¤erent economies and probably, the costs
associated to an economic union might be higher than the gains. In this context, little has
been written about the business cycles of emerging economies and even less about Euro-
accessing countries. All the literature about these economies have to do with convergence
criteria and convergence tests as in Brada, Khutan and Zhou (2003). Other authors like
Babetski, Boone and Maurel (2002), and Frenkel and Nickel (2002) try to identify demand
and supply shocks, with the identi…cation restrictions that this speci…c purpose implies.
Finally, other authors take as given a “leading” economy and analyze the transmission of
3shocks from this economy to the accessing economies as in Boone and Maurel (2002), but
we do not …nd in any paper a careful analysis of the comovements of each of the accessing
economies with each of the European and other major industrialized economies.
In addition, with this European focus in mind, there is an additional set of economic
questions that we can address; for example, so far, the European economies linked their
decisions together without any major trauma in their economies, but was the link across
these economies not traumatic because these economies had previous linkages? Have these
economies increased their comovements since they decided to join their policies? Is there
an attractor across these economies? Is there a limit to the expansion of the EU? Finally,
a more general question is analyzed in the last section of the paper; is there a role for
macroeconomic variables in explaining the possible links across these countries’ business
cycles?
We think that an appropriate answer to these questions is necessary to understand
deeply the bene…ts and the costs that for di¤erent economies imply leaving traditional
instruments for controlling aggregate demand to a supranational decision maker.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 characterizes the concept of business
cycles synchronization and checks whether the economies move together and how far are
these economies from each other. Section 3 analyzes the existence of a common attractor or
leader among European economies. Section 4 relates all these distances across economies
with macroeconomic variables. Section 5 concludes.
2 Business cycles synchronization
2.1 Data
In our business cycle analysis, we have used the monthly (seasonally adjusted) Indus-
trial Production series as an indicator of the general economic activity. We understand
that choosing the Industrial Production as a measure of aggregate activity could be con-
troversial. Obviously we are measuring only one sector and only the supply side of the
economy. However, there is a trade o¤ between the statistical reliability of the series and
how representative this series is of the overall economic activity. We tried to use a more
4comprehensive measure activity using aggregate GDP. However, the frequency of this se-
ries is quarterly, not monthly, the sample is shorter and, for most of these countries, the
GDP is not calculated from national accounts on a quarterly basis but the series is annual
and converted into a quarterly frequency using indicators.1 We have also tried to create
a di¤usion index for each economy, following the di¤usion index approach of Stock and
Watson (1999). However, the results were disappointing when we analyzed the calculated
series, probably due to the small number of series available for the accessing economies.
The sample of the countries include all the European Union countries, all the accession
countries but Malta, and all the negotiating countries but Bulgaria.2 Finally, we also
include some industrialized countries: Canada, US, Norway and Japan. The source of
the data is the OECD Main Economic Indicators and the IMF International Financial
Statistics. In the analysis of European and industrialized countries we use data from
1965.01 to 2003.01. The exercises including the accession countries use data from 1990.01.3
In order to facilitate a quick visual inspection of our data set, given the big number
of countries, we plot the industrial production index for each country in Figure A1 of
Appendix A.4
1In a preliminary version of this paper, we also constructed a composite index for each country by using
a Kalman …lter speci…cation of the type proposed by Stock and Watson (1991), with the series of Industrial
Production, Total Sales, Employment and a measure of income for the di¤erent economies. However, this
speci…cation gave in many cases a weight of 0.99 to the Industrial Production series and almost 0 to the
others. In addition, we found in the all cases very high correlation with the GDP quarterly series of the
country.
2The accession countries are Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta,
Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia. The negotiating countries are Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey.
3Even though we have statistical information for most of the accession countries from 1990, we do not
use the …rst two years of observations. Blanchard (1997) or The World Bank (2002) point out the atypical
characteristics of the transition period in which falls experienced in output can not be considered as sign
of a conventional recession.
4See Appendix D for a more detailed description of data sources, missing data, and the nomenclature
used for the di¤erent countries.
52.2 Correlation as measure of comovements
We will spend a serious amount of time and e¤ort computing the degree to which the
economies move together. However, as a preliminary approach, we think that a few pic-
tures could help the reader to understand the nature of the problem. Figure 1 plots the
the industrial production series of Italy, Spain, Romania and Ireland as well as the …rst
di¤erence of the logs of the industrial production series of Italy and Spain. Looking at
the pictures in levels, it seems that the industrial production of some, but not all, of these
countries move together. A …rst glance to the picture would say that Italy and Spain (both
of them, Mediterranean countries) industrial productions present synchronized business
cycles, which lead us to think that they should not have major problems linking their
economies. However, in the case of Italy and Romania or Italy and Ireland the synchro-
nization of their industrial production business cycles do not seem to be so evident, which
leads us to think that joining these economies with a supranational decision maker should
reduce the optimality of the stabilization policies for at least one of the economies.
Figure 1 also raises an additional question. The most standard measures to deal with
the comovements across time series are the correlations among the series. However, what
it is not so obvious is to choose between the correlations in levels (or log levels) and the
correlations in rates of growth. For example, using the industrial production of Italy and
Spain, the correlation between the log levels of the series is 0:94 whereas the correlation
between their growth rates is 0:09. That is, the log levels of the series seem to show that
the comovements of the series are very important, while the …rst di¤erences lead to the
opposite conclusion. In order to illustrate why this puzzling result occurs, let us to propose
the following clarifying example. Let us assume that the data generating process for the
series xt and yt be equal to
xt = a + xt¡1 + `(yt¡1 ¡ yt¡2) + et; (1)
yt = b + yt¡1 +ut; (2)
with serially uncorrelated errors, et » N(0;￿2
e), ut » N(0;￿2
u), and with E (et;ut) =
0. Finally, let us assume that both x1 and y1 are zero. Using these assumptions, the
6correlation between the series in log levels is
Corr(xt;yt) = Corr
0












which clearly tends to unity because it is dominated by the trend e¤ect. However, the
correlation between the …rst di¤erences of the log levels is
Corr(xt ¡ xt¡1;yt ¡ yt¡1) = Corr(a + `(b + ut¡1) + et;b + ut); (4)
which is cero. This example illustrates a general problem in de…ning the correlation across
industrial productions as a measure of business cycle comovements: we can not use series
in levels or log levels because in these series dominates the long-term rather than the
business cycle correlation. In addition, we can not simple take …rst di¤erences of the logs
because the correlation between these transformations is dominated by the short-term
noise. Thus, it is clear that we need some kind of …ltering (more sophisticated that just
taking the di¤erences) in order to extract the information of the series about the short
term movements (and comovements) of the series. Obviously, the chosen …lter will a¤ect
the shape of the cycle, and, of course, the comovements across economies. In order to give
robustness to our results we propose three di¤erent measures of comovements. The …rst
is based on VAR estimations, following Den Haan (2000); the second, based on spectral
analysis, following Reichlin, Forni and Croux (2001); and the third, based on business cycle
dummy variables, following Harding and Pagan (2002). Our …rst de…nition tries to relate
the business cycle comovements with the “rate of growth cycle”, the second de…nition
relates to the “growth cycle” and the third de…nition is close to the “classical cycle”. A
good review of these de…nitions can be found in Harding and Pagan (2002).
2.3 Synchronization of cycles. Measure 1. Den Haan (2000)
Den Haan (2000) argues that unconditional correlation coe¢cients lose important infor-
mation about the dynamic aspects of the comovement across variables. In addition, in the
case of non-stationary variables (as the ones in the previous example), the unconditional
correlation produces spurious estimates. In order to solve these problems he proposes
7to use the correlations of the VAR forecast errors at di¤erent horizons as a measure of
comovements of the series.
He proposes the following identi…cation scheme:
Zt = „ +
N X
j=1
AjZt¡j + "t; (5)
where Zt represents in our case, the logs di¤erences of the industrial production indexes
for each pair of countries at time t, Aj is a (2 £ 2) matrix of regression coe¢cients, „ is
a vector of constants, N is the number of necessary lags, and "t are serially uncorrelated
errors with zero mean and covariance matrix -.5 Out of this speci…cation, the k-period
ahead forecast error is









j¡i, with £0 = I, and £¿ = 0 for any ¿ < 0. Therefore, the covariance
matrix of this k-period ahead forecast error e Zt+k=t = Zt+k ¡ Zt+k=t becomes
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Finally, the correlation between the k-period ahead forecast error between the two variables
that form Zt will be the element (2;1) of the previous matrix divided by the product of
the two forecasted standard deviations for the two series (elements (1;1) and (2;2) of the
previous matrix).
To facilitate comparisons, we present the empirical results by using distances instead
of correlations. These distances are measured by one minus the value of the correlations.
In this respect, Table A1 of Appendix A shows all the distances computed from the
correlation of 48 months ahead forecasting errors.6 Of special interest is the correlation
of 0:60 computed for Italy and Spain (distance of 0:40), which represents a less extreme
5Den Haan presents a more general model by allowing for both linear and quadratic deterministic
trends. In our case, for the sample considered, these trends were not necessary for most of the countries.
In addition, he shows that the results are robust to estimate the model in level and in …rst di¤erences. We
present the results of the estimation in …rst di¤erences but the results using the leves are very similar.
6Hence, we consider business cycle horizons of four years.
8value than the correlations of almost one (using the logs levels) and of almost cero (using
…rst di¤erences). In order to illustrate this point, let us consider the correlation computed
from the 2 months ahead forecast error in the example outlined in equations (1) and (2).
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1 + `2¢¤; (9)




Table 1 shows a summary of the distances (one minus correlation coe¢cient) computed
from the industrial production series since the nineties.7 The table shows that the Euro
economies are more interlinked across them than with the accession countries economies
(distances of 0:61 versus 0:82). In fact, if we test the null hypothesis of no correlation
with respect the alternative of positive correlation, we reject the null in more than 50%
of the occassions in the case of Euro countries with themselves, but only in 27% in the
7The correlation between two variables in a sample is not the average correlation of the subsamples.
Therefore, the correlation across the Euro-area economies is not the average of the correlations between
each pair of countries. There is one transformation in the statistical literature, the hyperbolic tangent, that
allows us to obtain a statistic with a known distribution for the correlation and combine several correlation





(ln(1 + r) ¡ ln(1 ¡ r));
where ‡ v N(r;1=n), r is the correlation coe¢cient and n is the sample size. This is also call the Fisher’s
z-transformation (David, F. N, 1949). When we want to combine di¤erent correlations coe¢cients (e.i.











Hence, we undo the transformation to get a correlation coe¤cient which summarizes both (r = tanh(‡
0)).
In the case of correlation coe¢cients, this is a more suitable form of combination than a simple average.
9case of accession countries with themselves.8 However, according to this measure, this link
is previous to the creation of the Eurozone (the distance computed from series since the
sixties to the eighties is 0:56; and the null of no correlation is rejected in 73% of cases).
A summary of the information about all the pair of cross correlation across European
economies is displayed in Figure 2. This …gure plots the kernel estimation of the density
function of the distances for two groups of countries, the Euro economies and the accession
countries. The former countries presents a distribution of the distances more concentrated
around a smaller mean than the latter countries. In addition, and as explained in the
…gure, a test of equality of the correlation mean of these two groups clearly rejects the
null of equality for any standard critical value.
2.4 Synchronization of cycles. Measure 2. Forni et al. (2001)
It is well-known that a time series can be expressed as a sum of in…nite sinusoidal functions
or waves with di¤erent frequencies and amplitudes. This is what is called the spectral
decomposition of a time series. This decomposition allows the disaggregation of a time
series into components of di¤erent periodicities. The study of business cycles is based on
the components with periodicities ranging from 1:5 to 8 years. In terms of frequencies,
this implies frequencies from 0:07 to 0:35 radians.
If we want to know the explanatory power of each component in the behaviour of the
original series, it is possible to use the spectral and cross-spectral density functions. Thus,
the spectral density would be a function that assigns the variance of variable xt to intervals
















autocovariance generating function. In the bivariate case, the spectral function is known
as the cross-spectral density function, which assigns the covariance between two variables
8We have bootstrapped the VAR forecasts errors for di¤erent forecast horizons. With this distribution,













where ￿x;y (h) is the cross-covariance function, ! again holds ¡… · ! · …, and ￿x;y
¡
ei!¢
is the cross-covariance generating function.
Using this decomposition of variance, through both functions calculated in the fre-
quency band of the business cycle, we are able compute the correlation in frequency
domain. In particular, we choose the measure of correlation de…ned by Forni et al (2001)






The main advantages of this measure of correlation is that it is a real number, takes values
between -1 and 1, incorporating the sign of the relation and that it permits to calculate
the correlation for each band of frequencies.9
We need some …nal remarks concerning the estimation of the spectrum. First, Granger
and Hatanaka (1964) showed that the spectral and cross-spectral methods applied to non-
stationary series should be used with caution, since the variance of these series tends to
in…nite. In these cases, the spectrum should be estimated as an approximation (pseudo-
spectrum) and the series should be transformed to stationary. Hence, before estimating
the spectrum, we need some …lter to reduce or eliminate the lower frequencies of the series.
The …lter used for removing trends depends on what subsequent analysis one intends to
perform. If, for example, one is interested in studying long cycles, the …rst di¤erences
appear to be inappropriate as although they attenuate the power of low frequencies, they
give a lot of importance to the high frequencies. The resulting distortion may obscure
important features of the original series. In order to be as general as possible, we use the
most popular …lter to remove low frequency movements of the data, the Hodrick Prescott
(HP) …lter (see Hodrick and Prescott, 1980 and 1997). The HP …lter is a symmetric
9This measure overcomes some problems of other measures used in the literature. The “coherency” can
take imaginary values and the “squared coherence” does not keep the sign of the relation. See Forni et al.
(2001) for further details.
11linear …lter that decomposes a time series into two components: a long-term trend and
a stationary cycle. This …lter requires the speci…cation of one parameter (usually called
lambda) which penalizes the bad …t and the lack of smoothness in the trend component.
This parameter depends on the periodicity of the data and the band of frequencies which
we are interested in.10 Second, to overcome the asymptotic inconsistency of the estimates,
we use the standard Barlett’s lag spectral window (this weights the sample covariance in
the spectral estimator and reduces the variance). Third, as it is impossible to calculate
the sum of in…nite terms, we truncate it with a truncation parameter equals to the sample
size to the power of one third.11
The dynamic correlations for all the pairwise combination of countries are collected in
the Appendix A, Table A2, and they are summarized in Table 2. These tables con…rm the
results of the previous section. The Euro area countries are closer than accession countries
(distances of 0:55 versus 0:66). Besides, if we test the null hypothesis of no correlation
with respect the alternative of positive correlation, we reject the null in more than 65%
of the occassions in the case of Euro countries with themselves, and 45% in the case of
accession countries with themselves.12 And, with respect the Euro Area countries, this
link is also previous to the creation of the EMU (distance of 0:44 since the sixties to the
eighties, and 83% of rejections of the null of no correlation among Euro countries). As in
the previous section, we complete the description of the results in Figure 3 where we also
present the test that clearly reject the equality of means.
10We have applied the most commonly used lambda for monthly series of 14;400.. However, we have
come to similar results using other values which extract longer cycles as, for example, the lambda of
129;119 proposed by Maravall and del Río (2001).
11Whichever lag window function is used, either if the truncation parameter M tends to in…nite or if it is
a function of the sample size T, the asymptotic unbiasedness is guaranteed (see Priestley, 1981). Andrews
(1991), proposes using M = O(T
1=3) when we work with Bartlett window. In our work we employed values
from 3 to 6, according to the formula M = T
1=3:
12We use, as in the previous section, the Fisher transformation in order to obtain a standard error for
the correlation coe¢cient. Obviously, after calculating the Fisher transformation, we use the delta method
to obtain the standard errors of the correlation coe¢cients.
122.5 Synchronization of cycles. Measure 3. Harding and Pagan (2002)
In this section, we describe a third approach to assess the degree of synchronicity among the
countries’ business cycle. In this respect, Harding and Pagan (2002) propose to consider
the pairwise correlation coe¢cient among their reference cycles, that is a binary variable
having value one when the country is in recession and zero otherwise.13 Unfortunately, with
the exception of the US economy, for which the NBER dates its o¢cial peaks and troughs,
no generally accepted reference cycles appear to be available for the other countries. In
this paper, we follow the well-known procedure of Bry and Boschan (1971) to identify
the countries’ business cycle turning points.14 These authors develop an algorithm that
isolates the local minima and maxima in a series, subject to reasonable constraints on
both the length and amplitude of expansions and contractions. Table B in Appendix B
shows the output results (classi…ed by decades) of this dating procedure applied to the
thirty industrial production series. Note that the NBER reference dates, also shown in the
table, provides an obvious standard of comparison for the results of our procedure applied
to US data. This shows that the Bry-Boschan procedure identi…es US turning points that
are either identical or close to the o¢cial NBER turning points.15
Having a look at these tables, it is easy to anticipate two conclusions about the business
cycle synchronization. First, as noted by Massmann and Mitchel (2003), the timing of the
European business cycle phases is more synchronous during the period before 1990 than
in the period from this date. For example, all of the countries that experienced the …rst
recession of the seventies showed the peak in 1974. However, it does not happen with the
…rst recession of the nineties which depending on the country starts in a range from 1989
to 1992. Second, the synchronization between European and accessing countries is rather
limited. In this respect, while more than 80% of the European countries experienced
13These authors show the advantages of using the correlation index instead of the concordance index of
Artis et. al (1997) to analyze business cycle synchronicity.
14Several authors propose slightly di¤erent versions of the Bry-Boschan dating rule. In this respect,
Garnier (2003) …nds that they lead to similar turning points for most of the industrialized countries.
15One noticeable exception is the peak in the last eighties. This seems to be a characteristic of non-
parametric dating rules based on industrial production indexes, as documented by Artis et al. (1997) and
Garnier (2003).
13the …rst recession of the new century, this percentage is less than 40% for the group of
accessing countries.
Harding and Pagan (2002) measured the degree of business cycles synchronicity be-
tween country i and country j with the sample correlation between their reference cycles.
A simple way to obtain this measure is by the regression
￿¡1
i Dit = aij + ‰ij￿¡1
j Djt + ut; (13)
where Di is the reference cycle of country i, ￿i is its standard deviation, and ‰ij is the
sample correlation between the reference cycle of countries i and j. Table 3 shows the mean
distance estimated among each of the countries within the Euro area and the accessing
countries. With respect to the Euro countries, the distance across Euro economies has
not decreased with the implementation of the EMU. At the same time, as in the other
previous measures, distances across Euro economies are slightly smaller than distances
across accessing countries (0:7 versus 0:73) although in this case, it is remarkable the big
distances from accessing countries to the Euro economies (0:93). Information in Table
3 is complemented with the display in Figure 4, where it is clear that, by contrast with
the previous distances, it is in the dispersion, and not in the mean where the di¤erences
between Euro and accession countries are more evident. Table A3 in the appendix A shows
all the individual correlations.
In contrast to the previous measures of business cycle correlations, Harding and Pagan
(2002) propose a simple test of the null of no business cycle synchronization by using the t-
ratios of the null that the correlation coe¢cient is zero, allowing for heteroskedasticity and
serial correlation. However, we think that this test may be biased to reject the null of no
correlation simply because there are more zeroes than ones in the countries’ reference cycles
since expansions are typically longer than recessions. In this respect, we propose a new
approach to develop the test of no business cycle synchronization between countries i and j
based on the bootstrap approximation of the t-ratio’s true distribution. First, we compute
the countries’ reference cycles Dit using the Bry-Boschan dating procedure. Second, for
each country we estimate the probability of being in recession, the probability of being in
expansion, and the probability of switching the business cycles phase. Third, given these
14estimates, we generate 10;000 reference cycle variables sharing the same business cycles
characteristics than these two countries. Finally, we compute the p-value associated to the
null of zero correlation coe¢cient. The results of applying this test show that correlation
has decreased since the 60s in the Euro area. The percentage of rejections of the null of no
correlation is 52% since the sixties, becoming 46% in the nineties. As detected by Garnier
(2003), the business cycle phases in the EU countries have become more idiosyncratic. At
the same time, the results of the comparison Euro area and accessing countries con…rm
previous results, correlation across accessing countries is smaller than across Euro countries
(46% of rejections of the Euro versus 27% of the accessing) and the same happens with
the average rejection in the correlation across Euro and accessing countries (9:84%).
2.6 A comprehensive measure of distance
The result from the previous sections is a collection of distances among countries, applying
three di¤erent methodologies, which measure the degree of business cycle synchronization
among several European and Non-European countries. However, despite the heterogeneity
of the approaches, they come to the same two conclusions: synchronization between Euro-
zone countries with themselves is higher than synchronization between accession countries
with themselves, and there are no appreciable gains in synchronization between EMU
countries in the last decade.
As frequently stated in the literature, a mixing of techniques should give more robust
results than individual measures by themselves. Given that we do not have any a pri-
ori on which is the most accurate measure,we again follow the Fisher transformation to
combine them into a comprehensive measure of distance.16 Following this strategy, Table
A4 (in Appendix A) displays all distances across all the economies. We summarize these
combined distances in Table 4 and Figure 5. A test of the null hypothesis that the mean
or the volatility of distances across Euro and accessing economies are equal rejects both
16The reader could think of ways to give more weight to some measure versus the others. However, it
is worth mention, that potential ways of weighting the measures as could be the dispersion of rates (more
weight to the measure with less dispersion) do not help in this case because the standard error of the
distribution of distances for each measure is the same.
15hypothesis. Again, the conclusion is that Euro economies seem to be more homogeneous
and closer together than the accession countries.
We explore the combined distances in the following subsections by using both multi-
dimensional scaling techniques, that are designed to represent distance measures among
objects on a plane (such as a map), and cluster analysis techniques, that are designed to
classify objects into groups. The former is concerned with the geometric representation,
while the latter is concerned with the group identi…cation.
2.6.1 Multidimensional Scaling
Multidimensional Scaling (MDS) techniques (Cox and Cox, 1994) seek to …nd a low di-
mensional coordinate system to represent n-dimensional objects and create a map of lower
dimension (k) which gives approximate distances among objects. The k-dimensional co-
ordinates of the projection of any two objects, r and s, are computed by minimizing
a measure of the squared sum of divergences between the true distances (dr;s) and the
approximate distances (b dr;s) among these objects.17 That is,
minb drs
P













where zr and zs are the k-dimensional projection of the objects r and s; and zri and zsi
are the k dimensions of each object. It is noticeable that MDS is equivalent to using k
principal components.18
In the case of 2-dimensional representations, the resulting picture is much easier to
interpret than distances in higher dimensional spaces because it allows plotting the dis-
tances in a plane. In the resulting map, countries which present big dissimilarities have
representations in the plane which are far away from each other. Figure 6 represents the
map of the average distances (mean of distances among countries obtained with the above
three methods) using MDS. This representation gives us a glimpse of the how close are
17This measure is usually called the Stardardized Residual Sum of Square (STRESS).
18We refer the reader to Kruskal (1964) and Timm (2002) for more details.
16the cycles among countries. It can be seen, for example, that United Kingdom cycles are
closer to those of Canada and United States than to the Euro area countries. Euroarea
countries are closer to each other than to any other group of countries, and the accessing
countries are far from each other.
2.6.2 Cluster analysis of business cycle synchronization
In this section, we try to identify clusters of countries attending to their business cycle
synchronization. Countries in the same cluster will have more syncronization across them
than countries in other groups. There are di¤erent methods to do this grouping. First, we
use hierarchical clustering algorithms, which enable us to determine the number of clusters
(explanatory method). Secondly, we use this information to apply non-hierarchical clus-
tering or partitioning algorithms (con…rmatory method), which search the best partition
given the number of clusters.19
1st step: Hierarchical clustering.
Hierarchical algorithms are used to generate groups from a set of individual items. The
algorithms begin with each item forming its own cluster. Then, the clusters are combined
iteratively with the two “most similar” clusters employing some criteria, until all of them
form a single cluster.20
When we represent the sequence of cluster solutions in a plot we obtain a tree diagram
or dendogram. The tree starts with the leaves at the bottom, which are the original items.
Then, the pair with the lowest distance forms the …rst group. In the following steps, the
items or clusters are successively combined, forming the branches of the tree until we get
at the top of the graphic. The height of the tree represents the level of dissimilarity at
which observations or clusters are merged. The higher the height of the tree, the more
dissimilar are the observations contained in the clusters. When a great jump has to be
given to join two groups, it implies a big intergroup dissimilarity. The optimal number of
groups is often situated at those junctures.
19In this section we just describe an overview of clustering methods. For a more detailed view, see
chapter 9 in Timm (2002).
20We use the “most similar” criterium of Ward (1963) that is based on the minimal increment of
within-group sum of squares.
17Figure 7 shows the dendogram for our set of distances among countries.21 This algo-
rithm joins items or clusters based upon minimizing the increase in the sum of squares of
distances within clusters. Looking at the …gure, we can observe big jumps in forming two,
three and four groups. We do not have a clear tool to decide which is the optimal number
of groups. We will try in the next step these three possible options. However, just looking
at the tree, we can observe a group formed by most of the EU countries, another group
formed by the US and relatives, a third group with most of the accession countries, and a
fourth group with three “atypicals”, Cyprus, Greece and Portugal.
2nd step: Non-hierarchical clustering.
These algorithms try to …nd a “good” partition, in the sense that objects of the same
cluster should be closed to each other, whereas objects of di¤erent clusters should be
far away. They classify the data into k groups (k is given by the user) satisfying the
requirements that each group must contains at least one object, and that each object
must belong to exactly one group. These methods are usually called partitioning methods
since they make a clear-cut decision. In this paper, we follow Kaufman and Rousseeuw
(1990) to employ the k-medoid method.22
In the previous step, the data have revealed us that there may be between two and
four clusters of countries. Hence, we start by considering four groups. The fact that one of
the cluster includes countries that are basically atypicals implies that once we decide four
groups, these atypicals do not form a group but they get integrated in the other groups,
because the distance across them is too big to link themselves together. On the other side,
allowing just for two groups make one group too big, including the atypicals, all the EU
countries and the US and others, with very high heterogeneity across them. Therefore,
we try three groups, obtaining the most sensible characterization of the data with the
…rst cluster that includes Euro Area economies (except Finland) plus Denmark, Sweden,
Cyprus, Lithuania, Slovenia and Hungary, the second cluster includes the United States
and other industrialized economies as Canada, United Kingdom, Japan and Finland. The
21For robustness, we constructed the dendograms for two other criteria, the average link and complete
link methods, leading to similar results.
22These authors show the advantages of the k-medoid method of Vinod (1969) with respect to others
clustering method as the k-means method of McQueen (1967).
18last cluster is the cluster of accession countries: Latvia, Estonia, Slovakia, Czech Republic,
Romania, Turkey, Norway and Poland. Figure 8 displays the resulting clusters from the
k-medoid method when imposing three groups.23
3 Is there a European attractor?
Most of the papers cited in the introduction that deal with the problem of European
business cycle comovements or even world business cycle comovements, consider a leading
economy or an attractor formed by a weighted average of all the economies of the area. In
this section we want to check if this attractor matches with what we …nd in the pictures
and maps previously showed in the paper. The papers that analyze how important is
an attractor in de…ning the comovements across economies usually try to decompose the
idiosyncratic and common components in each of the series analyzing how much of the
variance can be explained from each of them.24 In order to check if a common attractor
could explain the comovements across economies we propose a new methodology that, to
our knowledge has not been used in the previous literature.
The idea is the following: If there exist an attractor, most of the distances between the
leading country and the rest of countries would be small, and we would observe a great
amount of small distances and a very few large ones. In practical terms, looking at Figure
6, the question to ask is: are those points (countries) in the map randomly distributed or
is there any kind of attractor that keep them together? In order to answer this question,
we propose the following exercise. First, we normalize the distances to include them
in a square of dimensions 1 by 1. Second, we generate 27 observations (30 countries
minus Japan, US and Canada) from a bivariate uniform distribution and we calculate the
23A word of caution must be said when interpreting Figure 8. Even though we plot three groups, the
average similarities between groups are very small in all cases. We have computed the “silhouette width”
(Rousseeuw, 1987), a measure of cohesion within a cluster with respect to the neighbour clusters. A value
close to one means that countries are well clustered. A small coe¢cient means poor clustering structure.
In our case we have obtained silhouette width values of 0:2 or 0:3 for each cluster. Special mention deserves
the case of Hungary with a high negative value for its silhouette width which suggest that the methodology
has trouble in assigning this economy to any of the existing groups.
24Bordo and Helbling (2003) is a good example.
19distances between each pair of points.25 We repeat this exercise 10;000 times and we
generate the density function of those distances between each pair of countries (Figure 9
top). The plotted distribution represents the distances across economies when there is no
attractor across them (they have been generated by a uniform distribution).26 Third, we
generate 27 observations with the same support space but coming from a bivariate normal
distribution, where an attractor is clear. We repeat the exercise 10;000 times and show
the distribution of the distances (Figure 9 middle). As we can see, in the case of one
attractor, there is a concentration of small distances across the points, implying a higher
value for the skewness than in the case of the uniform distribution.
Additionally, we consider the possibility of the existence of two attractors. In order
to simulate economies with two attractors we consider a mixture of bivariate normals.
If this is the data generating process of the data and the distances between the two
attractors is big enough, we will expect a bimodal distribution as the one plotted in
Figure 9 (bottom). We have generated the plot by extracting 10;000 times observations
from a mixture of normals. The bimodality comes from the fact that there is a set of
short distances associated with observations that are generated by the same normal and a
set of long distances associated with observations that has been extracted from di¤erent
normals.27
We then represent the estimated distribution of the distances of the actual data, plotted
in Figure 10. There are a few basic statistics that could help us to distinguish which is the
distribution that best describe the data generating process of the observations. High values
of the skewness will imply evidence of the existence of one attractor and bimodality will be
evidence of two attractors. Table 5 presents the basic statistics of the di¤erent distributions
of the simulated and observed data. Even though we concentrate our explanation on
the combined measure of distance, the results are extremely robust to any of the three
other measures, as shown in Table 5. We can observe that the estimated skewness of the
25For this exercise, we consider all the European economies in order to maximize the number of obser-
vations used for the kernel density estimation.
26The plot represents the density function of the distances across the 27 points, generated 10;000 times.
The density function has been approximated with a kernel estimator following Silverman (1986).
27We use a 0:5 probability for mixing the two normals.
20observed data is ¡0:08, which is statistically di¤erent than the estimated value for one
attractor, 0:65 (p-value of equality of the coe¢cients is 0:00) but not di¤erent from the
value estimated for the uniform, 0:20 (p-value 0:15). With respect to the existence of two
attractors, the bimodality index of the data is 0:41, below the critical value of 0:55.28
However, the hypothesis of two attractors implies an estimated modality index of 0:59.
Out of this experiment, we obtain no evidence of the existence of one or two attractors in
the comovements across European economies. The null of no attractor can not be rejected.
4 Can distances across economies be explained?
In the paper, we have shown that some economies are closer than others. However, as
economists, we might want to understand what is behind those distances. Are there any
macroeconomic variables that could help us to explain these distances? The attempt to
answer these questions is not new in the literature. Some papers have tried to explain
these facts but in di¤erent contexts. A seminal paper in this literature is Frankel and
Rose (1998), where they introduce the importance of trade in explaining the correlations
across economies, carefully considering the endogeneity of this variable in the regression of
correlation measures and trade. Clark and Van Wincoop (2001) analyze correlations across
regions in the US and Europe, with a di¤erent measure of correlations (basically annual
rates of growth). Bordo and Helbling (2003) analyze annual data from 1880 to 2001, trying
to measure the e¤ect of the exchange rate regime on the correlations.29 The results are
mixed but they all coincide that trade linkages are relevant in explaining comovements.
We want to explain comovements using our measures trying to incorporate in the
analysis as much variables as we can with the only restriction that they should be available
28The bimodality index Timm (2002, pag. 535) is de…ned by:
BM = (m
2
3 + 1)=[m4 + 3(n ¡ 1)
2=(n ¡ 2)(n ¡ 3)];
where m3 is the skewness coe¢cient, m4 is the kurtosis coe¢cient, and n is the number of observations.
29They use also three di¤erent measures of the correlations, di¤erent to ours because they concentrate
more on the static correlations rather than in the dynamics concepts that we consider. In their case, it
makes more sense to contemplate di¤erent measures of static correlations because they observe long series
of annual data.
21for all the countries in the sample. We careful explain in Appendix D the data sources and
the exact de…nition of each variable used. After trying di¤erent speci…cations, the most
successful one is displayed in Table 6.30 In this table, all the variables represent di¤erences
from country i to j. For example, the variable called percentage of industry means the
di¤erences in percentage of industry output divided by total output in country i and
country j. As we can see, the distances can be explained, partially by the specialization
of the economy, captured by di¤erences in the percentage of industry production in total
production and percentage of agriculture in total production. Other signi…cant variables
are di¤erences in average saving ratio and average labor productivity. These variables
are basically related to the structure of the economy, both, on the production side (the
productivity) and on the consumer’s side (the saving ratio).
Obviously, the trade variable is fundamental in explaining the relations across economies.
We move slightly away from the standard measures of trade linkages in the literature.31
We want to capture the transmission of the business cycle comovements through trade.
We assume that a country i can export or import its cycle to another country j if the
proportion of imports or exports coming in or going to the other country is high. In order
to account for those relations, we create the trade variable as the maximum of two di¤er-
ent averages (over the sample): the proportion of exports of country i that go to country
j and the proportion of exports of country j to country i.32 For example, in the case of
Austria and Germany, the average proportion of exports of Austria going to Germany is
37%. The average proportion of exports of Germany going to Austria is 5%. Therefore,
for this pair of countries we will use 37% as the trade linkages across them.33
30Table 6 presents the results for the combination of distances. Just for completeness, the results for
each of the individual distances are displayed in Appendix C.
31We also include the de…nition of trade linkage proposed by Frankel and Rose (1998) in terms of the
sumation of exports and imports from country i to country j, divided by the total amount of export and
imports of country i plus country j, with very similar results.
32We tried the same measure with imports with extermely similar results. Actually, the correlation
between both measures is 0:93.
33The idea behind using the maximum is that, if business cycles are linked to trade, when a small
economy has strong trade linkages with a big economy, we will observe that the business cycle of the small
22However, the trade variable presents a serious problem of endogeneity.34 We solve
this problem by estimating the equation by instrumental variables. We use the standard
instruments in the literature for explaining trade, a border dummy, a Euro dummy, a
European Union dummy, the log of geographical distances, and the absolute di¤erence of
the log population.35 The results of Table 6 show that this is a very important variable
in explaining the business cycle comovements and with the appropriate (negative) sign.
Pairs of countries with a high level of this variable are closer together, which implies that
there is a transmission of the cycle through trade. Countries that are more linked by trade
are more linked in their business cycles.
Finally, it is important to remark the role of the policy variables. Fiscal variables
are signi…cant (the size of the public balance on the GDP) but monetary policy related
variables seem not to explain any of the cyclical di¤erences. We tried lots of possible
combinations to include monetary policy variables (in‡ation di¤erentials, in‡ation corre-
lations, etc), but the results were not very satisfactory. In all cases, the macro variables
used as explanatory variables are sample means for the longer period of information avail-
able. We pretend to capture “structure” of the economy and avoid as much as possible
all the cyclical variation in the variables. We consider that our results are fundamentally
di¤erent from the previous results found in the literature where most of the variables but
trade were non signi…cant. We …nd a role for di¤erent macro-variables in explaining the
comovements across economies.
economy is linked to the business cycle of the big one.
34It might be a problem for some other variables used in the estimation, particularly the policy ones.
However, we think that the problem is partially solved by taking averages at the beginning of the sample
as explanatory variables for future comovements. This caveat do not apply so clearly to trade because
trade structures and trade relations are deeply related with business cycle comovements.
35The dummies take the value 1 when both countries share a common border or both belong to the
Euro-area or EU, respectively. Sargan test for the correct speci…cation of the orthogonality restrictions
accepts the null of correct speci…cation (p-value 0:33).
235 Conclusion
We think that this paper has di¤erent lessons according to the interest of the reader. Much
of the papers that analyze international links among economies usually assume that there
is an “European business cycle”, which is usually associated to some economies with a
leading role in the area. This paper tries to go further by testing if such business cycle
attractor actually exists. For this attempt, we present a comprehensive methodology to
characterize the comovements across the economies. In addition, we propose a new method
to test for statistical support of the supposed attractor. Using this test, we show that there
is no evidence of the existence of neither one nor two attractors in the comovements across
European economies. Obviously, this result put a question mark in those papers that either
implicitly or explicitly assume that it exists.
In addition, we consider two features of the international business cycles. The …rst one,
is related to the evolution of the business cycle synchronization. As Stock and Watson
(2003) have recently documented, we show that the international economies seem to be
less (rather than more) synchronized in the last …fteen years. The second one, is related
to the role of trade in explaining international business cycle transmissions. In contrast to
the standard results in the literature, we …nd that, apart from trade, there is a signi…cant
role for other macroeconomic variables (structural and some economic policy variables) to
explain business cycle comovements.
Finally, due to the imminent incorporation of ten new members to the European Union,
we think that the analysis of similitudes and di¤erences among the actual members and the
newcomers is going to be a source of many studies. In the context of the business cycles,
this is the …rst paper that proposes a systematic analysis of these countries’ linkages. We
show that the distances across Euro economies are more closely linked than distances across
newcomers, and these newcomers are on average further away from the Euro countries
than across themselves. Finally, we have shown that the linkages across Euro economies
are prior to the establishment of the union, showing that the smooth transition towards a
more integrated economic area could be due to previous strong business cycles correlations,
fundamentally through trade. This is not the case of the current enlargement because the
24di¤erences among the newcomers and the current members (and among themselves) seem
to be much more important than the di¤erences that the actual members exhibited prior
to the establishment of the union.
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  The distance across the Euro area countries from 1965.1-1989.12 is 0.55 ( 0.05).
Notes: 
Tables 1 to 4 describe the combined distance across economies. 
Distance is measured as 1 minus the correlation. Standard errrors are in parenthesis.
* The sample starts in 1992 for all the accession countries but Turkey and Cyprus , because the first two
years after the fall of the communist regimen had exceptional characteristics (see footnote 3 in the main text).
Table 3
 Measure 3: Distances based on Harding and Pagan (2002)
Table 4




 Measure 1: Distances based on  VAR estimations
Table 2
 Measure 2: Distances based on the SpectrumTable 6
 Can distances be explained?
Mean Median Min Max Std. Dev Skewness Kurtosis BM
(*)
no attractor 0.52 0.51 0.00 1.36 0.25 0.20 -0.68 0.44
one attractor 0.36 0.33 0.00 1.28 0.19 0.65 0.26 0.42
two attractors 0.44 0.41 0.00 1.18 0.24 0.19 -1.19 0.59 OLS IV
0.578 0.583
Our Sample Mean Median Min Max Std. Dev Skewness Kurtosis BM
(*) (0.0249) (0.0311)
Measure 1 0.79 0.81 0.03 1.40 0.26 -0.15 -0.44 0.40 0.839 0.830
Measure 2 0.68 0.67 0.11 1.47 0.27 0.24 -0.41 0.40 (0.1825) (0.1863)
Measure 3 0.84 0.84 0.05 1.47 0.27 -0.16 -0.45 0.40 1.547 1.549
Combined Dist. 0.76 0.77 0.18 1.31 0.23 -0.08 -0.56 0.41 (0.259) (0.2591)
(*) BM refers to the bimodality index. Values bigger than 0.55 indicate the existence of bimodal or multimodal distributions. 0.362 0.356
(0.1665) (0.1680)
Notes: The  table collects the summary of most relevant statistics for the distributions of our three measures of business cycles distances and 0.080 0.078
for the combination of these three measures. We have only into account the sample of european countries (all the countries considered except (0.0441) (0.0446)
US, Canada and Japan). At the top of the table there are those statistics for the simulation exercises of distances associated with the existence 0.557 0.545




Notes: The table shows the estimated coefficients for the OLS and instrumental variables (IV) regression of
the distances across business cycles in different economies and distances of those economies in each of the
macroeconomic variables.The instruments employed to solve the possible endogeneity problem of trade
variable are: log of the geographical distance between countries, border dummy, euro dummy, EU dummy
and the absolute differences between the logs of population.
The results for each of the alternative measures of distances are displayed in the tables of Appendix C.
All the explanatory variables are explained in Appendix D.














Combined Distances of Business Cycles Figure 1 
A first graphical approach
Note: The top left figure plots the levels of the Industrial Production series for Italy and Spain and the top right,
for Italy and Romania. The bottom left figure represents the rates of growth of the Industrial Production for Italy
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Note: The figure plots the estimated density function of the distribution of distances. The dark line
represents the Euro area data, the clear line is the accessing countries data. 
Ho: Euro mean = Acces. mean 
p-value:  < 0.01
Ho: Euro variance = Acces. variance
p-value: 0.90Figure 3
Distribution of distances based on Spectrum.
Note: The figure plots the estimated density function of the distribution of distances. The dark line
represents the Euro area data, the clear line is the accessing countries data. 
Ho: Euro mean = Acces. mean 
p-value:  0.03























Distribution of distances based on Harding and 
Pagan, 2002.
Note: The figure plots the estimated density function of the distribution of distances. The dark line
represents the Euro area data, the clear line is the accessing countries data. 
Ho: Euro mean = Acces. mean 
p-value:  0.12



















Distribution of distances based on Combined 
distances
Note: The figure plots the estimated density function of the distribution of distances. The dark line
represents the Euro area data, the clear line is the accessing countries data. 
Ho: Euro mean = Acces. mean 
p-value:  <0.01
































Note: The figure plots in a two dimensional scale the distances across the economies.





























0.0 1.0 0.5Figure 7
Hierarchical clustering (Timm, 2002) 
Note: The graph plots a tree where the height represents the level of dissimilarity at which observations or
clusters are merged. 
* The symbols used to represent countries are explained in Appendix D. 
Figure 8
Non-hierarchical clustering (Kaufman and Rousseeuw, 1990)
1- Group “ Europeans”: All 
EMU countries (except 
Finland), Denmark, 
Sweden, Cyprus, 
Lithuania, Slovenia and 
Hungary.
2- Group “United States and 
relatives”: US, Canada, 



















Note: The figure plots in a two dimensional scale the distances across the economies. And the circles represent 
the groups obtained in the clustering analysis.  

















































































Density functions of distances across 27 points
Figure 10 
Density function of distances across 27 European countries
Note: The density function has been approximated with a Kernel estimator 
developed in more detail in Silverman, 1986.





















Table A1: Measure 1 - Distances across countries based on VAR (4-years forecast errors)
Austria Belgium Germany Greece Finland France Italy Luxemburg Netherland Portugal Sweden UK Canada Norway Japan USA Spain Denmark Ireland Cyprus Czech Hungary Latvia Poland Slovenia Turkey Romania Slovakia Estonia Lithuania
Austria - 0.27 0.15 0.45 0.73 0.49 0.53 0.87 0.45 0.98 0.27 0.86 0.37 0.97 0.64 0.52 0.26 0.43 0.36 1.15 0.95 0.21 1.02 0.46 0.41 0.80 1.29 0.87 0.81 0.03
Belgium - 0.36 0.57 0.59 0.51 0.42 0.43 0.49 0.49 0.52 0.82 0.85 0.62 0.35 0.45 0.40 0.57 0.51 1.13 1.18 0.54 0.80 0.59 0.54 0.82 1.15 0.62 0.75 0.35
Germany - 0.72 0.68 0.18 0.61 0.80 0.40 0.87 0.47 0.62 0.86 0.84 0.40 0.55 0.58 0.47 0.75 0.90 0.78 0.65 0.75 0.87 0.40 1.00 1.40 0.70 0.38 0.45
Greece - 0.86 0.38 0.84 0.68 0.83 1.02 0.73 0.81 1.03 1.04 0.96 0.68 0.82 0.92 0.48 0.85 0.96 0.91 1.11 0.88 0.95 1.19 1.18 1.21 1.16 0.48
Finland - 0.58 0.65 0.89 1.18 0.84 0.25 0.70 0.23 0.77 0.46 0.49 0.50 0.83 1.00 0.84 1.02 0.22 0.88 0.84 0.77 0.69 1.37 0.73 0.77 0.99
France - 0.45 0.67 0.41 0.80 0.82 0.59 0.54 0.95 0.57 0.46 0.47 0.35 0.77 1.09 0.79 0.46 0.93 0.89 0.55 0.94 1.35 0.88 0.81 0.94
Italy - 0.74 0.41 0.76 0.69 0.48 0.44 0.78 0.35 0.56 0.40 0.61 0.64 0.97 0.54 0.56 0.46 0.51 0.67 0.86 1.11 0.69 0.55 0.69
Luxemburg - 0.84 0.82 1.03 0.80 0.64 0.83 0.64 0.82 0.76 0.81 0.83 0.99 0.77 0.83 0.64 0.60 1.09 1.13 1.22 0.83 0.59 1.20
Netherland - 1.10 0.68 0.63 0.79 0.93 0.59 0.79 0.45 0.56 0.81 0.83 0.89 0.61 0.92 0.94 0.68 1.11 1.14 0.89 0.81 1.31
Portugal - 1.25 1.11 0.85 0.95 0.86 0.92 0.97 1.01 0.89 0.83 0.90 1.09 0.85 0.88 1.14 0.87 1.12 0.87 0.91 1.31
Sweden - 0.58 0.76 0.77 0.45 0.68 0.31 0.59 0.58 0.99 1.24 0.80 1.19 0.82 0.41 0.96 0.95 0.74 1.15 1.14
UK - 0.22 0.69 0.53 0.34 0.77 0.71 0.62 0.93 1.06 0.58 1.14 0.25 0.65 1.04 1.11 1.05 0.85 1.05
Canada - 0.92 0.22 0.19 0.71 0.71 0.61 0.98 0.79 0.26 1.02 0.29 0.77 0.98 1.03 0.88 0.72 1.11
Norway - 1.07 0.87 0.92 0.85 0.94 1.01 0.96 0.98 0.77 0.79 0.97 0.78 1.11 0.80 0.81 1.18
Japan - 0.30 0.46 0.84 0.68 1.17 0.67 0.60 0.85 0.33 0.81 0.65 0.65 1.02 0.58 0.78
USA - 0.59 0.66 0.59 0.82 1.13 0.32 1.07 0.35 0.74 0.70 1.42 0.90 0.59 0.97
Spain - 0.35 0.63 0.94 0.77 0.43 0.60 0.68 0.42 0.84 1.35 1.02 0.68 1.16
Denmark - 0.79 0.66 0.84 0.70 0.74 0.55 0.29 1.15 0.98 0.65 0.62 1.15
Ireland - 1.14 0.89 0.86 0.95 0.96 0.78 0.86 1.09 0.89 1.14 1.06
Cyprus - 0.90 0.63 1.01 1.19 0.75 1.00 1.20 0.72 0.61 1.19
Czech - 0.84 0.54 0.60 0.65 1.01 0.97 0.80 0.49 1.29
Hungary - 1.11 0.80 0.72 0.91 1.12 0.85 0.64 1.17
Latvia - 0.86 0.82 1.07 1.01 0.68 0.53 1.28
Poland - 0.50 0.76 1.02 0.83 0.46 1.06
Slovenia - 1.04 0.90 0.53 0.79 0.95
Turkey - 1.06 0.95 0.90 0.93
Romania - 0.48 0.77 0.54




Table A2: Measure 2 - Distances across countries based on Spectrum (Dynamic correlation at business cycle periodicities)
Austria Belgium Germany Greece Finland France Italy Luxemburg Netherland Portugal Sweden UK Canada Norway Japan USA Spain Denmark Ireland Cyprus Czech Hungary Latvia Poland Slovenia Turkey Romania Slovakia Estonia Lithuania
Austria - 0.39 0.21 0.82 0.44 0.21 0.31 0.60 0.45 0.77 0.16 0.52 0.55 0.86 0.48 0.52 0.26 0.44 0.55 0.62 0.71 0.18 0.83 0.39 0.33 0.95 0.99 0.67 0.58 0.96
Belgium - 0.38 0.94 0.63 0.44 0.33 0.62 0.57 0.77 0.45 0.74 0.68 0.63 0.55 0.60 0.42 0.40 0.46 0.59 0.64 0.47 0.63 0.36 0.45 0.67 0.80 0.52 0.49 0.92
Germany - 0.93 0.67 0.16 0.29 0.64 0.26 0.68 0.31 0.70 0.84 0.82 0.41 0.74 0.21 0.33 0.66 0.45 0.50 0.32 0.56 0.30 0.20 1.05 0.79 0.61 0.37 0.79
Greece - 1.06 0.76 0.89 0.93 0.95 0.87 0.90 0.98 1.00 1.30 1.28 1.07 0.77 0.86 0.78 0.64 1.11 0.98 1.19 1.18 0.86 1.42 1.33 1.07 1.47 1.00
Finland - 0.56 0.53 0.85 0.78 1.23 0.35 0.20 0.26 0.77 0.69 0.27 0.58 0.65 0.65 0.97 0.80 0.20 0.82 0.56 0.48 0.87 1.06 0.77 0.59 0.98
France - 0.17 0.54 0.38 0.73 0.28 0.57 0.66 0.97 0.65 0.63 0.13 0.29 0.59 0.47 0.48 0.33 0.46 0.38 0.25 1.21 1.01 0.59 0.48 0.61
Italy - 0.50 0.36 0.77 0.31 0.54 0.51 0.81 0.52 0.54 0.19 0.34 0.39 0.55 0.46 0.29 0.47 0.30 0.41 0.98 0.87 0.48 0.46 0.80
Luxemburg - 0.72 0.90 0.67 0.67 0.60 0.75 0.59 0.65 0.53 0.70 0.86 0.72 0.70 0.68 0.81 0.33 0.73 1.12 1.03 0.88 0.65 1.34
Netherland - 0.56 0.40 0.61 0.95 0.78 0.53 0.90 0.47 0.50 0.60 0.55 0.68 0.51 0.78 0.57 0.49 1.26 0.65 0.57 0.82 0.83
Portugal - 0.77 1.16 1.36 0.97 0.93 1.28 0.83 0.96 0.66 0.74 0.97 1.21 0.92 1.05 1.04 1.04 0.79 0.68 1.35 0.86
Sweden - 0.42 0.57 0.68 0.53 0.60 0.27 0.42 0.58 0.59 0.71 0.34 0.87 0.50 0.31 1.08 0.83 0.73 0.62 0.94
UK - 0.29 0.87 0.62 0.30 0.62 0.70 0.73 0.94 0.89 0.29 0.97 0.50 0.55 1.22 0.90 0.83 0.70 1.18
Canada - 0.98 0.56 0.10 0.58 0.77 0.72 1.00 0.91 0.27 1.04 0.50 0.67 0.84 1.08 0.95 0.74 1.45
Norway - 0.82 0.93 0.94 0.68 0.89 0.72 0.62 0.87 0.71 0.60 0.75 0.63 0.83 0.87 0.58 1.05
Japan - 0.54 0.59 0.75 0.82 0.97 0.78 0.49 0.98 0.29 0.72 0.73 0.54 0.80 0.60 1.39
USA - 0.63 0.72 0.69 0.87 0.82 0.26 0.96 0.40 0.70 0.70 1.16 0.87 0.65 1.30
Spain - 0.34 0.70 0.48 0.68 0.37 0.71 0.47 0.27 1.16 1.02 0.78 0.58 0.94
Denmark - 0.75 0.43 0.42 0.48 0.47 0.41 0.24 1.09 0.92 0.68 0.41 0.67
Ireland - 0.77 0.68 0.54 0.75 0.71 0.79 0.80 1.00 0.59 0.92 0.87
Cyprus - 0.77 0.80 1.08 0.71 0.59 1.18 1.17 0.83 0.97 1.05
Czech - 0.71 0.11 0.36 0.53 0.79 1.01 0.48 0.27 0.42
Hungary - 0.77 0.38 0.42 0.87 0.94 0.75 0.53 0.96
Latvia - 0.49 0.63 0.63 1.03 0.32 0.27 0.30
Poland - 0.47 0.79 0.81 0.56 0.24 1.03
Slovenia - 1.18 0.78 0.69 0.43 0.64
Turkey - 1.00 0.84 0.55 0.98
Romania - 0.66 0.77 1.01
Slovakia - 0.35 0.38
Estonia - 0.53
Lithuania -Appendix A
Table A3: Measure 3 - Distances across countries based on Harding-Pagan (2002)
Austria Belgium Germany Greece Finland France Italy Luxemburg Netherland Portugal Sweden UK Canada Norway Japan USA Spain Denmark Ireland Cyprus Czech Hungary Latvia Poland Slovenia Turkey Romania Slovakia Estonia Lithuania
Austria - 0.75 0.57 0.80 0.87 0.36 0.66 0.54 0.33 0.69 0.64 0.94 0.86 0.89 0.62 0.91 0.49 0.57 0.73 0.70 0.91 0.64 1.31 0.97 0.62 1.20 1.19 0.94 1.21 1.11
Belgium - 0.57 0.74 0.86 0.62 0.54 0.71 0.70 0.65 0.43 0.69 0.70 1.02 0.64 0.76 0.41 0.74 0.77 0.98 0.55 0.61 0.90 0.68 0.53 0.87 0.92 0.46 0.62 1.00
Germany - 1.16 0.94 0.29 0.75 0.92 0.56 0.93 0.80 0.96 0.78 1.00 0.67 0.92 0.57 0.63 0.70 1.09 0.59 0.70 0.75 0.81 0.62 1.03 1.00 0.53 0.75 0.99
Greece - 0.95 1.08 0.82 0.58 0.85 0.38 0.58 0.81 1.02 1.15 1.06 0.95 0.76 0.79 1.14 0.69 1.08 1.15 1.37 1.23 0.67 1.31 1.11 1.15 1.19 1.28
Finland - 0.82 0.63 0.86 0.93 1.11 0.74 0.71 0.32 1.07 1.26 0.68 0.57 1.11 0.76 0.79 1.28 0.61 0.84 0.94 1.20 1.21 1.41 1.29 1.28 0.94
France - 0.74 0.74 0.41 0.82 0.62 1.06 0.63 1.15 0.52 0.78 0.36 0.81 0.69 0.97 0.84 0.62 1.19 0.95 0.77 1.22 1.16 0.85 1.18 1.19
Italy - 0.54 0.65 0.78 0.60 0.85 0.84 0.81 0.65 0.86 0.55 0.66 0.82 0.81 0.58 0.73 0.74 0.60 0.46 1.02 0.87 0.60 0.69 1.04
Luxemburg - 0.76 0.40 0.63 0.94 1.07 1.05 0.72 1.12 0.70 0.67 1.14 0.56 0.62 1.17 0.97 1.00 0.38 1.18 0.98 0.64 0.85 0.85
Netherland - 0.74 0.63 0.67 0.94 0.78 0.63 0.79 0.62 0.50 0.70 0.88 0.89 0.63 1.39 0.95 0.61 1.22 1.21 0.93 1.20 1.30
Portugal - 0.64 1.01 1.22 1.20 0.75 1.10 0.84 0.67 1.13 0.72 0.82 1.16 1.30 1.23 0.52 1.24 1.10 0.82 1.15 1.07
Sweden - 0.63 0.61 1.15 0.62 0.55 0.40 1.04 0.72 1.18 1.06 0.49 1.27 0.83 0.81 1.06 1.01 1.15 1.14 1.21
UK - 0.71 0.56 1.10 0.43 0.89 0.82 0.75 0.98 0.96 0.61 1.18 0.63 0.90 0.79 1.11 0.89 0.79 1.24
Canada - 1.06 1.09 0.47 0.34 1.24 0.68 1.12 1.20 0.46 1.18 0.81 1.30 0.99 1.29 1.21 1.19 1.21
Norway - 0.95 0.95 1.18 0.68 0.84 1.08 0.75 0.87 1.01 0.45 0.64 0.55 0.70 0.71 0.56 1.08
Japan - 0.94 0.77 0.89 0.76 1.15 0.66 0.68 1.25 0.72 0.68 1.05 0.73 0.69 0.82 1.31
USA - 0.63 1.18 0.58 1.00 1.18 0.38 1.33 0.75 1.26 0.94 1.25 1.18 1.17 1.25
Spain - 0.92 0.74 0.97 0.94 0.58 1.23 0.91 0.79 1.14 1.11 0.98 1.17 1.11
Denmark - 1.08 0.67 0.51 1.12 0.94 0.87 0.34 0.99 1.03 0.52 0.64 1.11
Ireland - 1.15 1.09 0.22 1.16 0.59 1.13 1.00 1.12 1.09 1.08 1.12
Cyprus - 0.90 1.19 0.95 1.28 0.93 1.31 1.47 0.99 1.25 0.97
Czech - 1.11 0.68 0.53 0.36 0.70 0.76 0.07 0.05 0.99
Hungary - 1.20 0.61 1.16 0.97 1.16 1.11 1.10 1.15
Latvia - 0.88 0.73 0.72 0.87 0.61 0.64 0.47
Poland - 0.72 0.50 0.71 0.55 0.33 1.14
Slovenia - 0.78 0.61 0.26 0.33 0.89
Turkey - 0.65 0.61 0.37 0.64
Romania - 0.65 0.49 0.83




Table A4: Distances across countries (Combination of the before three measures)
Austria Belgium Germany Greece Finland France Italy Luxemburg Netherland Portugal Sweden UK Canada Norway Japan USA Spain Denmark Ireland Cyprus Czech Hungary Latvia Poland Slovenia Turkey Romania Slovakia Estonia Lithuania
Austria - 0.44 0.27 0.68 0.67 0.34 0.48 0.66 0.41 0.81 0.31 0.76 0.57 0.91 0.58 0.64 0.32 0.48 0.53 0.81 0.86 0.30 1.05 0.58 0.44 0.98 1.16 0.82 0.86 0.39
Belgium - 0.43 0.75 0.69 0.52 0.43 0.58 0.58 0.63 0.46 0.75 0.74 0.75 0.50 0.60 0.41 0.56 0.57 0.89 0.78 0.54 0.77 0.53 0.51 0.79 0.96 0.53 0.62 0.73
Germany - 0.93 0.76 0.20 0.53 0.78 0.39 0.83 0.50 0.75 0.83 0.89 0.48 0.73 0.42 0.46 0.71 0.79 0.62 0.53 0.68 0.62 0.38 1.03 1.07 0.61 0.48 0.73
Greece - 0.96 0.71 0.85 0.73 0.88 0.73 0.73 0.87 1.02 1.16 1.10 0.90 0.78 0.86 0.78 0.72 1.05 1.02 1.23 1.10 0.83 1.31 1.21 1.15 1.28 0.91
Finland - 0.65 0.60 0.87 0.96 1.06 0.41 0.49 0.27 0.87 0.78 0.46 0.55 0.86 0.80 0.86 1.04 0.31 0.84 0.77 0.80 0.92 1.28 0.93 0.88 0.97
France - 0.40 0.65 0.40 0.78 0.54 0.73 0.61 1.03 0.58 0.62 0.29 0.45 0.68 0.83 0.69 0.46 0.84 0.71 0.49 1.13 1.18 0.77 0.80 0.91
Italy - 0.59 0.46 0.77 0.51 0.61 0.58 0.80 0.50 0.64 0.36 0.52 0.60 0.77 0.53 0.50 0.55 0.46 0.50 0.95 0.95 0.59 0.56 0.84
Luxemburg - 0.77 0.69 0.77 0.80 0.76 0.88 0.65 0.86 0.66 0.72 0.94 0.75 0.70 0.89 0.80 0.61 0.70 1.14 1.08 0.78 0.69 1.14
Netherland - 0.79 0.56 0.64 0.89 0.83 0.58 0.83 0.51 0.52 0.70 0.75 0.82 0.58 1.04 0.81 0.59 1.20 1.00 0.79 0.94 1.15
Portugal - 0.88 1.09 1.15 1.04 0.85 1.10 0.88 0.88 0.89 0.76 0.90 1.15 1.02 1.06 0.89 1.05 1.00 0.79 1.14 1.08
Sweden - 0.54 0.64 0.87 0.53 0.61 0.32 0.66 0.62 0.91 1.00 0.52 1.11 0.71 0.48 1.03 0.93 0.87 0.97 1.10
UK - 0.37 0.70 0.74 0.36 0.76 0.74 0.70 0.95 0.97 0.47 1.10 0.44 0.69 1.02 1.04 0.92 0.78 1.16
Canada - 0.99 0.56 0.22 0.53 0.90 0.67 1.03 0.97 0.32 1.08 0.50 0.91 0.94 1.14 1.02 0.88 1.26
Norway - 0.95 0.92 1.02 0.73 0.89 0.93 0.77 0.90 0.83 0.60 0.78 0.65 0.88 0.79 0.64 1.11
Japan - 0.56 0.60 0.83 0.75 1.10 0.70 0.59 1.03 0.42 0.73 0.81 0.64 0.84 0.66 1.17
USA - 0.61 0.85 0.62 0.90 1.04 0.32 1.12 0.48 0.89 0.78 1.28 0.98 0.80 1.18
Spain - 0.50 0.69 0.78 0.79 0.45 0.84 0.67 0.46 1.05 1.16 0.92 0.80 1.07
Denmark - 0.87 0.58 0.57 0.75 0.70 0.59 0.29 1.08 0.97 0.62 0.55 0.97
Ireland - 1.02 0.88 0.49 0.95 0.75 0.90 0.89 1.07 0.85 1.05 1.01
Cyprus - 0.86 0.87 1.01 1.06 0.75 1.17 1.29 0.84 0.94 1.07
Czech - 0.88 0.37 0.49 0.50 0.83 0.91 0.32 0.20 0.88
Hungary - 1.02 0.58 0.75 0.92 1.07 0.90 0.74 1.09
Latvia - 0.73 0.73 0.80 0.97 0.52 0.46 0.63
Poland - 0.56 0.68 0.85 0.64 0.34 1.08
Slovenia - 1.00 0.76 0.47 0.50 0.82
Turkey - 0.90 0.80 0.58 0.84
Romania - 0.59 0.67 0.78
Slovakia - 0.18 0.54
Estonia - 0.65
Lithuania -Appendix A







































































































90 92 94 96 98 00 02
ES
Levels of  monthly Industrial Production Index (S.A.)          * The symbols used to represent countries are collected in Appendix D. 
Source: OECD Main Economic Indicators.
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US
Levels of  monthly Industrial Production Index (S.A.)            * The symbols used to represent countries are collected in Appendix D. 
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TK
Levels of  monthly Industrial Production Index  (S.A.)           * The symbols used to represent countries are collected in Appendix D.
Source: OECD Main Economic Indicators and IMF  International Financial Statistics.Table B. Classical bus in ess cycle chronologies of Eu ro-area cou ntries.












































































































































































































-Table B (cont.). C lass ical bu siness cycle ch ron ologies of ot her Europ ean and non- Europ ean cou ntries.























































































































































-Table B (cont.). C las sical b usiness cycle ch ronologies of acced in g cou ntries.





























































































































Notes: The tables C1, C2 and C3 show the estimated coefficients for the OLS and instrumental variables (IV) 
regression of the distances across business cycles in different economies and distances of those economies 
in each of the macroeconomic variables.The instruments employed to solve the possible endogeneity problem 
of trade variable are: log of the geographical distance between countries, border dummy, euro dummy, EU 
dummy and the absolute differences between the logs of population.
All the explanatory variables are explained in Appendix D.
Standard errors are in parenthesis.
Dependant variable: 





























Countries and data availability
Industrial Production Index (S.A.)
Euro-area European Union
Country Sample Source Country Sample Source
Austria OE 62.01-02.12 OECD -MEI Denmark DK 74.01-03.01 OECD - MEI
Belgium BG 62.01-03.01 OECD -MEI Sweden SD 62.01-03.01 OECD - MEI
Germany BD 62.01-03.01 OECD -MEI United Kingdom UK 62.01-03.01 OECD - MEI
Greece BR 62.01-03.01 OECD -MEI
Finland FN 62.01-03.01 OECD -MEI Acceding (by 2007)
France FR 62.01-03.01 OECD -MEI Country Sample Source
Italy IT 62.01-03.01 OECD -MEI Bulgaria  -- -- --
Ireland IR 75.07-03.01 OECD -MEI Romania  RO 90.05-03.01* OECD - MEI
Luxembourg LX 62.01-03.01 OECD -MEI
Netherlands NL 62.01-03.01 OECD -MEI Negotiating 
Portugal PT 62.01-03.01 OECD -MEI Country Sample Source
Spain ES 65.01-03.01 OECD -MEI Turkey TK 90.01-03.01 OECD - MEI
Candidates (1st May 2004) Macro variables
Country Sample Source
Cyprus CY 90.01-03.01 IMF - IFS Variable Smp Aver 
(1) Source Observation
Czech Republic CZ 90.01-03.01* OECD - MEI Trade Variable 1989-1998 IMF, Dir Trade
Explained in 
text.
Estonia ET 95.01-03.01 OECD - MEI Saving Ratio 1995 Penn World Table
Hungary HN 90.01-03.01* OECD - MEI %Public Sector 1998-2002 Eurostat
(2)
Latvia LA 90.01-03.01* OECD - MEI Inflation 1998-2002 Eurostat
(3)
Lithuania LI 96.01-03.01 OECD - MEI Labor productiv. 1995-1999 Eurostat
(4)
Malta -- -- -- %Industry 1996-2000 World Devel Report
Poland PO 90.01-03.01* OECD - MEI %Agriculture 1996-2000 World Devel Report
Slovak 
Republic
SK 93.01-03.01 IMF - IFS
Slovenia SL 90.01-03.01* OECD - MEI
(1) The sample average is, in all cases, the maximum allowed by the data
(2)  Public balance - Net borrowing/lending of consolidated 
Other countries      general government sector as a percentage of GDP
Country Sample Source
(3) Inflation rate - Annual average rate of change in
Canada CN 62.01-03.01 OECD - MEI     Harmonized Indices of Consumer Prices (HICPs)
Norway NW 62.01-03.01 OECD - MEI
(4)  Labour productivity - GDP in PPS per person employed 
Japan JP 62.01-03.01 OECD - MEI      relative to EU-15 (EU-15=100)
USA US 62.01-03.01 OECD - MEI * The sample used in the estimation starts in 1992.01.Dating the European Business Cycle:
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11 Introduction
Many papers have analyzed diﬀerences and similarities between the Euro area and
the US business cycles (e.g. Artis et al., 1997, Artis and Zhang, 1997, Canova and
Ciccarelli, 2003, Del Negro and Otorok, 2003, Monfort et al. 2002, Stock and Watson,
2003). Moreover, the CEPR has recently produced dates of recessions in the Euro area
aggregate cycle since 1970 and these dates can now be compared with those established
by the NBER on the US cycle. Knowledge on the Euro area cycle is building up and
times are perhaps mature to model the interaction between the US and the Euro area
cycle and to try understand diﬀerences and similarities between business ﬂuctuations
in the two economies.
The literature has focused on a variety of concepts of business cycle and stressed
similarities rather than diﬀerences with the US. The comparison shows that Euro area
and US recessions are mostly synchronous, in both cases they are rare events and
shorter than expansions which are the “normal state” of both economies.
This paper starts from the observation that although level cycles are strikingly
similar in the two economies, the growth rate of output in the Euro area is less volatile
than in the US and more persistent. Persistence implies that the eﬀect of an exogenous
shock in the Euro area is longer than in the US and, as a consequence, the ratio between
long-run variance to total variance of output growth is larger.
How can diﬀerences between growth cycles be reconciled with the similarities in
level cycles?
We argue that a simple statistical model of joint US - Euro output behavior that
is able to produce these characteristics has the following features: (i) Euro area and
US output have a common trend, but US output grows at an average rate one fourth
higher than Euro area output; (ii) the Euro-US output gap, deﬁned as the diﬀerence
between the Euro output and the common Euro-US output trend, does not Granger
cause (and it is not Granger caused by) the US output growth; (iii) the shock generating
the common trend has larger contemporaneous impact but less persistence eﬀect on US
output than on the Euro area output.
By deﬁnition, the shock generating the common trend has long-run eﬀects on the
output of both economies and can therefore be interpreted as a technology shock. The
model described above then implies that, in the US, the technology shock is rapidly
absorbed while it takes longer time to work its eﬀect throughout European economies.
The shock can be interpreted either as the world shock, immediately absorbed in the
US, or as a shock originating in the US which spread to the Euro area with a lag. The
two hypotheses are empirically indistinguishable.
The immediate eﬀect of the shock is a divergence between the level of economic
activity in the US and the Euro area. The divergence seems to reach its maximum
in the middle of the cycle (roughly ﬁve years). Europe eventually catches up, but the
catching up lasts about 10 years.
The model suggests that the leading-lagging relation between the two cycles is
explained by the diﬀerent rates of absorption of the technology shock. This feature
also explains the diﬀerent proﬁle of output volatility in the two economies, with the
US showing larger volatility at high than at low frequencies and the Euro area showing
2more persistence.
Beside estimating the model testing for cointegration and Granger causality, we
use the constraints implied by characteristics (i) to (iii) to deﬁne an hypothetical data
generating process that we then use to generate artiﬁcial data. When using standard
techniques to identify peaks and troughs in the cycles of the generated data, we ﬁnd
features which are insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent than those identiﬁed on output data. These
features are also very similar to those implied by the CEPR and the NBER dating.
This suggests that our simple model is able to capture the essential characteristics of
cyclical output in the two economies.
The same model ﬁts consumption data.
The model and the CEPR-NBER “fact” that classical recessions are rare events
while expansions are the normal state of the economy can be assembled to draw some
conclusions on the welfare implications of ﬂuctuations in both economies. Even assum-
ing that there are no long-run diﬀerences in trend, Europe loses welfare because, after
a technology shock, reaches its steady state later than in the US. In other words, the
US enjoys all advantages of growth immediately while Europe has to wait much longer.
In Europe, losses in terms of both output and consumption during recessions are not
as drastic as in the US and they are distributed over a long period of time. Recessions
are less sharp, but recoveries are very slow. Given that expansions are the normal state
of aﬀairs in the economy (the mean of the shock is positive) while recessions are rare
events, at realistic real interest rate values, the larger loss of welfare that the US incurs
on impact is more than compensated by the rapid recovery.
2 Stylized Facts
2.1 Classical cycles: NBER and CEPR dating
The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) and the Center for Economic
Policy Research (CEPR) provide a chronology for, respectively, the US and the Euro
area business cycle. In both cases the chronology is established by informal inspection
of a variety of key macroeconomic time series and it is not just based on GDP. The
dates refer to what is typically called the classical cycle, i.e. the turning points in the
level of economic activity. Figure 1 plots quarterly US and Euro area GDP since 1970
(the ﬁrst date for which aggregate euro statistics are available) and dates established
by CEPR and NBER.
NBER and CEPR dating illustrate striking similarities between the cyclical char-
acteristics of the two economies. In both economies, recessions are rare and of short
duration if compared with expansions and they are roughly synchronized.
The dates produced by CEPR and NBER, based on informal data analysis, can
also be compared by dates for peaks and troughs identiﬁed by the automatic algorithm
designed by Bry and Boschan, 1971 (BB from now on). The latter is a non-parametric
procedure deviced to identify local maxima and minima and it is widely used in business
cycle analysis.1. Table 1 reports results.
1For the BB algorithm, we have applied the parameterization suggested by Harding and Pagan,
2002a
3Figure 1: GDP since 1970




























The light shadow corresponds to a recession in the US, the dark one to a recession in the Euro
Area and overlapping recessions show with an intermediate shade
Notice that the informal CEPR and NBER procedures give similar results to the
BB procedure. There are two exceptions, both pertaining to the Euro area: the early
eighties and the recent slowdown. The diﬀerences are explained by the fact that CEPR
(as NBER) dating is not exclusively based on GDP and both in the eighties and in the
recent slow-down, Euro area GDP dynamics is not clearly correlated to labor market
variables, industrial production and investment (on this point, see the discussion by
the CEPR dating committee on www.cepr.org).
We will now compute some descriptive statistics on duration, amplitude and syn-
chronization of cycles to document further similarities and diﬀerences between the
two business cycles. Table 2 reports statistics for the two classiﬁcations of peaks and
troughs: the informal CEPR and NBER classiﬁcation (bold ﬁgures) and the dating
resulting from the application of the BB algorithm to quarterly GDP (in parenthesis).
Amplitude is measured as the quarterly average growth rate of GDP during the sub-
period, duration is measured in quarters while the concordance index is a measure of
synchronization developed by Harding and Pagan, 2002b. Calling the log of US GDP
4Table 1: Dating Algorithm
EURO ZONE US
PEU TEU PUS TUS
1974 q3 1975 q1 1973 q4 1975 q1
(1974 q3) (1975 q1) (1973 q4) (1975 q1)
1980 q1 1980 q3
1980 q1 1982 q3 (1980 q1) (1980 q3)
(1980 q1) (1980 q3)+8q —————– —————–
1981 q3 1982 q4
(1981 q3) (1982 q3)+1q
1992 q1 1993 q1 1990 q3 1991 q1
(1992 q1) (1993 q1) (1990 q2)+1q (1991 q1)
? ? 2001 q1 2001 q4
(2002 q4)+?q (2003 q2)+?q (2000 q4)+1q (2001 q3)+1q
Both the CEPR and NBER dates for the Peaks and the Troughs appear in bold. We show between
parentheses the date computed by the Dating Algorithm and ﬁnally the number of quarters of mismatch
as yUS
t and the log of Euro area output as yEU








t +( 1− SyUS





is a binary random variable that takes the values unity during recessions and
zero during expansions. The concordance index ranges between 0 and 1.
The Table shows that, as suspected by inspection of Fig. 1, there is high concordance
between the two cycles. However, cyclical amplitude in the US is larger than in the
Euro area while recessions are shorter. In general, the Euro area cycle seems to be
smoother than the US one.
2.2 Growth cycles
The problem with the deﬁnition of the cycle in terms of level of economic activity is
that it depends on the underlying trend growth rate so that in period of sustained
growth, one may be led to never detect a business cycle. An alternative is to refer to
the growth cycle and deﬁne a recession as a period of deceleration of the growth rate,
an event which may occur even when the GDP growth rate is positive (clearly, growth
cycles exhibit more frequent turning points than classical cycles).
The analysis in terms of growth rates brings further insights on diﬀerences and
similarities between business cycles. Since the growth of output is typically stationary,
growth cycle characteristics can be illustrated by looking at volatility, persistence and
dynamic correlations.
Volatility is typically measured by the variance of the growth rate of the series.
This is an average of the variance at all frequencies and therefore captures short-run,
long-run and business cycle variance. Persistence can be measured in diﬀerent ways.
5Table 2: Business Cycle Statistics
US Euro Area
peak to trough amplitude -0.5658 -0.2433
(-0.6294) (-0.4979)
trough to peak amplitude 0.9445 0.7653
(0.9589) (0.6254)
peak to trough duration 3.4000 5.3333
(3.4000) (2.5000)
trough to peak duration 23.25 29
(23.500) (35.00)




The business cycle statistics corresponding to the NBER and CEPR dating are in bold. We show
in parentheses the same statistics, produced by the Bry-Boschan Dating Algorithm.
We will here deﬁne it as the variance of that component of the growth rate of output
corresponding to cycles eight years or longer. This roughly corresponds to the variance
of the Hodrick and Prescott trend with smoothing parameter equal to 1600 (HP-trend).
Table 3 reports the variance of the growth rates of output, the variance of the HP-trend
and the ratio between the latter and the former for both the Euro and the US economy.
We can observe the following characteristics:
1. Output volatility is higher in the US than in the Euro area.
2. Persistence, as measured by the ratio between the variance of the HP trend and
the total variance, is larger in the Euro area.






Diﬀerences in volatility and persistence characteristics of growth cycles between the
US and the Euro area are the same as what observed for level cycles based on amplitude
and duration statistics. Larger persistence in the Euro area is not surprising, since
recessions, as we have seen, are less pronounced, but last longer than in the US.
What about synchronization?
6Figure 3 plots quarterly growth rates of GDP (upper quadrant) and Hodrick and
Prescott cycles (lower quadrant) corresponding, as we have seen, to cycles 8 years or
longer. The plot shows that the persistent component of output growth in the Euro
area is lagging the US analog.
Figure 2: growth rates and HP trends
























3 Classical and growth cycles: reconciling the evidence
The descriptive statistics reported in the previous Section show that, although level
cycles are similar in the Euro and US economies, the Euro area is characterized by
lower volatility of output growth and larger persistence. This implies that shocks have
a larger impact eﬀect on the US economy but they are absorbed faster than in the Euro
area 2. Moreover, the US growth cycle seems to lead the Euro area cycle at medium to
long term frequencies.
In this Section we identify a statistical model of joint US-Euro area output dynamics
which can account for these characteristics.
We will proceed as follows. We ﬁrst test for cointegration to determine whether
the two economies have a common trend. Then, we apply Granger causality tests to
determine whether the Euro area growth adjusts to the US’s as suggested by the lagging
relation of its HP cycle illustrated in Figure 3.
Results from Johansen cointegration test are illustrated in Table 4. They show
that, at the 1 % level, the hypothesis of cointegration cannot be rejected and that with
2On this point, see also Forni and Reichlin, 2001
7cointegration coeﬃcients are estimated to be [1,−3/4]. This implies that, during the
sample period, the average rate of growth in the US has been three fourth higher than
in the Euro area and that there is only one shock driving output in the long-run in
both countries (the world shock).









where GAPt = yEU
t − 3/4yUS
t is the output gap between the Euro and the US. The
VAR augmented by an error correction term can be written as:
B(L)Xt =  t.
The F-test rejects the hypothesis of the signiﬁcance of GAPt on ∆yUS
t implying
that the gap does not Granger-cause (and it is not Granger-caused by) the US rate of
output growth (results are reported in Table 5).
Table 4: Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test
N o .o fC o i n t .v e c t o r s eigenvalue value trace statistics 5% cv 1% cv
None * 0.111818 15.56124 15.41 20.04
At most 1 0.001123 0.146078 3.76 6.65
cointegrating equation yeu − 0.72yus (0.01931)
Table 5: Granger Causality Tests
Null Hypothesis F-Statistic Probability
GAP does not Granger-Cause yEU 9.84170 0.00011
yEU does not Granger-Cause GAP 2.74502 0.06806
GAP does not Granger-Cause yUS 0.43504 0.64820
yUS does not Granger-Cause GAP 0.00992 0.99013
The restricted form of the model is:
∆yUS
t = α + β1∆yUS
t−1 + ···+ β4∆yUS
t−4 +  t1
GAPt = ρ1GAPt−1 ···+ ρ4GAPt−4 +  t2.
This triangular form implies that the Euro area rate of growth adjusts itself to the
US growth while the US does not respond to shocks speciﬁc to the Euro area.
On the basis of the constrained model we can now compute impulse response func-
tions to the non-neutral (world) shock (Figure 3 reports impulse responses and boot-
strapped conﬁdence intervals).
Notice that a given shock has a larger impact in the US, but it takes longer to
get absorbed in the Euro area than in the US. This is a consequence of the higher
persistence in European output noticed above.
If the non-neutral common shock is interpreted as the world technology shock this
result implies that the US economy has a higher ability to absorb technology faster
8Figure 3: Impulse Response Functions
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than the Euro economy. The high rapidity with which technology is absorbed in the
US seems to induce high short-term volatility. In the Euro area, on the other hand,
the bulk of the variance is in the long-run because it takes longer to absorb shocks.
An alternative interpretation is that the world shock is in fact the US shock. The two
hypotheses cannot be distinguished statistically, but the economic implication of the
two alternative interpretations is the same.
The result on Granger causality indicates that the world growth is led by the US
with the Euro area following with a lag. This should explain why turning points of the
Euro cycle lag those of the US cycle.
The restricted model can now be used to simulate levels of output to verify whether
we can reproduce the BB dating described in Section 1.
The model is simulated using 2000 drawings. On the generated output series we
apply the BB algorithm and compute the same statistics on duration and amplitude
as in Table 2. Table 6 reports true values and simulated values with bands and shows
that true values are in the bands in all cases.
Table 7 reports the simulated and true concordance statistics for US and Euro area
GDP log levels. They are strikingly similar.
It is interesting to note that in order to generate the empirical characteristics of
Euro area and US cycles, with rare recessions and prolongues phases of expansions, we
do not need to simulate out of a complicated non-linear model: our simple linear model
does the job. This has already been documented by Harding and Pagan (2002a) and
stressed in their discussion with Hamilton, 2001 (see also Harding and Pagan, 2003a-b).
Notice that the model implies that the second shock, which is neutral on output, is
9Table 6: Simulation results
peak to trough amplitude
True Lower Bound Simulated Upper Bound
Euro 0.4979 0.0937 0.3324 0.5744
US 0.6294 0.2163 0.5306 0.8851
trough to peak amplitude
True Lower Bound Simulated Upper Bound
Euro 0.6254 0.4038 0.6065 0.7781
US 0.9589 0.6441 0.8621 1.0612
peak to trough duration
True Lower Bound Simulated Upper Bound
Euro 2.5000 2.0000 3.0921 5.6667
US 3.4000 2.0000 3.1397 6.0000
trough to peak duration
True Lower Bound Simulated Upper Bound
Euro 35.0000 10.0000 36.9428 95.0000
US 23.5000 11.2500 29.5700 65.5000
n. of recessions
True Lower Bound Simulated Upper Bound
Euro 4.0000 1.0000 3.2033 6.0000
US 5.0000 2.0000 4.0433 7.0000
Table 7: Concordance Index
Real Lower Bound Simul Upper Bound
0.8222 0.7463 0.8427 0.9254
10European speciﬁc so that to explain Euro area cyclical output we need more than tech-
nological shocks while for the US, technology explains the bulk of cyclical ﬂuctuations.
4 The costs of business cycles: consumption
The statistical model we have deﬁned is very simple, but, to a ﬁrst approximation, is
able to characterize the basic features of the cycles in the US and the Euro economies.
A proper multivariate analysis goes beyond the scope of this paper. Rather than fully
going in that direction we perform, on consumption, the same analysis we did for output
to obtain a ﬁrst rough estimate of the welfare costs of business cycle.
Table 8 shows standard deviations of consumption in the short and long-run.






Comparing these results with those for GDP, we can see that, in Europe, the stan-
dard deviation of consumption is larger than the standard deviation of output. This
implies that there is less consumption smoothing in Europe than in the US, probably
as a consequence of less eﬃcient capital markets. A ﬁrst observation is then that, al-
though in the US, output volatility is more pronounced than in the US, the relative
eﬀect on welfare is mitigated by a relatively high degree of consumption smoothing.
There is another aspect of ﬂuctuations that indicate that the welfare losses asso-
ciated to output volatility are less pronounced in the US. This can bee seen from the
impulse response functions of consumption in response to the technology shocks.
Figure 3 reports the impulse response functions to the non-neutral shock to con-
sumption. The impulses are computed from a model which has the same parameteri-
zation of that estimated for GDP: autoregressive order equal to four and cointegrating
vector [1 − 3/4]. This parameterization is justiﬁed by the fact that tests for cointe-
gration and Granger causality tests give the same results (results available on request).
Note that the result on cointegration is consistent with stationarity of savings in both
economies.
The impulses do not take into account diﬀerences in trend. We are imposing the
same long-run value of consumption which implies to multiply the Euro area impulses
by 4/3.
The diﬀerences in persistence noticed for GDP also emerge for consumption. Even
assuming that there are no long-run diﬀerences in variance and no diﬀerences in trend,
Europe loses welfare because, after a technology shock, reaches its steady state later
than in the US. In other words, the US enjoys all advantages of growth immediately
11Figure 4: Impulse Response Functions of Consumption to International Shocks









while Europe has to wait much longer. Notice, however, that this also implies that
losses, during recessions, are not as drastic as in the US and they are distributed
over a long period of time. Given that expansions are the normal state of aﬀairs in the
economy (the mean of the shock is positive) while recessions are rare events, at realistic
real interest rate values, the larger loss of welfare that the US incurs on impact is more
than compensated by the rapid recovery.
125 Conclusions
This paper argues that a model of the joint behavior of US output and Euro area
output that can account for stylized facts on business cycle in the two economies has
one common trend with a larger drift in the US than in the Euro area. We also ﬁnd
that the Euro-US output gap, deﬁned as the diﬀerences between the Euro output and
the common Euro-US trend, does not Granger cause (and it is not Granger caused by)
the US output growth.
The model implies that there is one technology shock originating in the US (world
shock). We show that this shock has larger contemporaneous impact but less persistence
eﬀect on US output than on the Euro area output where it is absorbed at a slower rate.
Fast absorption in the US induce large short-run variance of US output while slow
absorption in Europe induce high long-run volatility of Euro area output.
A similar pattern is found in consumption data. The technology shock aﬀects long-
run volatility of the two economies by the same amount, but, after the long-run shock,
it takes longer for Europe to reach the steady state. Since the shocks have positive drift
and recessions are rare event, this implies that the Euro area incurs a larger welfare
loss due to business cycle ﬂuctuations.
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7 Appendix: Data Sources
US GDP and consumption: OECD, Main Economic Indicators
Euro Area GDP and consumption: Fagan et al., 2001 for sample 1970-1997 and Eu-
rostat starting in 1998, ﬁrst quarter.
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Comments on  
 
Dating the European Business Cycle 
 
by Lucrezia Reichlin, ECARES, Université Libre de Bruxelles 
and CEPR 
 
The presentation by Lucrezia Reichlin gives a glimpse into her research program over the 
last few years, albeit a perhaps rather surprising glimpse. While her research on dynamic 
factor models utilizing large numbers of data series is probably by consensus among the 
most important in all of recent empirical macroeconomics, the current presentation on 
Euro area and U.S. business cycles is based on methodologically altogether different 
approaches: informal assessment of Euro area business cycle dynamics based on 
summary statistics and a restricted bivariate VAR model for Euro area and U.S. GDP to 
capture key features of the U.S. and Euro area business cycles as well as business cycle 
interaction. 
The presentation touches on a great many issues, but in light of time constraints my 
comments will be restricted to two of the issues addressed in the presentation: the 
formation and initial work of the CEPR business cycle dating committee (chaired by 
Lucrezia Reichlin), and the comparison of U.S. and Euro area business cycle dynamics 
using a restricted bivariate VAR. 
 The CEPR Business Cycle Dating Committee  
 
Some essentials to know about the CEPR business cycle dating committee: 
•  According to the CEPR’s announcement of the formation of the committee, “the 
committee is to establish the chronology of recessions and expansions, not to 
forecast, nor even to characterize the current conjuncture”. 
•  The committee’s methodology to dating business cycles is to by and large follow 
that of the NBER’s business cycle committee’s work for the U.S.; in particular, 
the dating of peaks and troughs is to occur in an informal, non-rule based manner. 
•  In some of the specifics of its work the CEPR committee will differ from the 
work of its counterpart at the NBER. For example, the CEPR committee will not 
go back beyond 1970 in its analysis; its dating of business cycle turning points 
will be at quarterly rather than monthly frequency as at the NBER; both Euro area 
aggregated and country-specific data series are to be considered (without public 
specification of the relative weight of the area-wide and country-specific series); 
the number of countries to be considered is larger from 1999 onwards than before 
1999 (the whole Euro area is considered from 1999 onwards, whereas only the 
eleven original Euro member countries plus Greece are considered before 1999). 
While the CEPR obviously is to be commended for forming a business cycle dating 
committee, it is difficult not to be concerned about some of the choices the committee has 
made: •  It may be misleading to date a Euro area-wide business cycle in the pre-EMU era. 
When business cycle dynamics differ markedly across countries, then the 
interpretation of a Euro area-wide business cycle is unclear. 
To develop this critique a little further, consider a dynamic heterogeneous panel 
data model for some variable y: 
 
 
Suppose that a researcher ignores the heterogeneity of the slope coefficient (λi) 
and instead estimates the homogeneous slope model: 
 
 
What we know from the econometrics literature (Pesaran and Smith, Journal of 
Econometrics, 1995) is that in this case 
 
 
That is, the slope coefficient estimated by the researcher does not only improperly 
suppress the existing heterogeneity, but also does not have an interpretation of 
being the average slope coefficient.  
An implication of this point is that if business cycle dynamics do differ markedly 
across European countries, then the dynamics of the Euro area-wide business 
cycle are most unlikely to be the average of country-specific business cycles, and 
its interpretation is not clear, which seems particularly troublesome for the pre-
EMU era: An example at hand for heterogeneity prevailing in the pre-EMU era 
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≠being strong is that the CEPR business cycle dating committee has dated a 
recession for 1980:Q1 to 1982:Q3, even though GDP for example for Italy and 
France was growing during this time period. 
•  It does not seem clear what the advantages of a non-rule based, informal 
methodology to date business cycles are; rather such an approach seems costly for 
the timely work of the committee itself (take as an example the fact that the 
NBER business cycle dating committee in its announcement of October 2003 of a 
trough in U.S. economic activity occurring in November 2001 writes: “Why did 
the committee wait so long before identifying a trough? … The committee felt it 
was important … to study the NBER’s past practices carefully to ensure that its 
decision in this episode was consistent with the dating of earlier turning points.”), 
and even more so seems costly for the transparency of the work of the committee 
towards the public.  
•  Except for historical studies of business cycles and their determinants, it is not 
clear how useful business cycle dating announcements are that involve quarterly 
(rather than monthly) frequencies and that occur with a sizeable lag. The 
perspective of policy makers for example was summarized by Klaus Regling in 
his opening remarks at this conference: “We would like to date cycles in real 
time, not with a long lag.” The choice of methodology by the CEPR’s business 
cycle dating committee seems thus surprising, given that strong alternatives to a 
non-rule based, significantly lagging business cycle dating procedure are 
available: for example, one might make use of the EuroCOIN coincident monthly 
indicator of Euro area-wide economic activity (“EuroCOIN: A Real Time Coincident Indicator of the Euro Area Business Cycle, Altissimo, Bassanetti, 
Cristadoro, Forni, Lippi, Reichlin and Veronese, CEPR Working Paper, 
December 2001) coupled with a modified Bry-Boschan business cycle dating 
algorithm (for example, Harding and Pagan, 2001). Invoking such a latter 
probabilistic framework as the core piece of information for business cycle dating 
decisions would of course not rule out simultaneous visual inspection of and 
illustration of decisions by means of graphs. 
Finally, even if a non-rule based procedure for dating business cycle turning 
points was to be maintained, it would still seem desirable to achieve more timely 
announcements by means of using the most recently available  data and then 
revising the dating of turning points as revised data do become available. Such a 
revision of turning points due to data revision surely would not involve a loss of 
reputation for the CEPR business cycle dating committee. 
 
Comparison of U.S. and Euro Area Business Cycle Dynamics  
 
The second part of Lucrezia Reichlin’s presentation is based on work in progress with 
Domenico Giannone. Analyzing quarterly data for the U.S. and for the aggregated Euro 
area since 1970, the main findings and arguments advanced by Giannone and Reichlin 
are: 
•  Output growth in Europe is less volatile but more persistent that U.S. output 
growth. The persistent component of U.S. output growth leads that of the Euro 
area. •  These dynamics may be captured using a bivariate VAR model in U.S. output 
growth and a Euro area/U.S. output gap (which is also the cointegrating 
relationship between U.S. and Euro area output). The argument that the model 
matches up well with the actual data is mainly made by means of matching up the 
model’s Bry-Boschan dated business cycles with those observed for the actual 
data. 
While there is no doubt that the bivariate VAR model of Giannone and Reichlin is an 
interesting demonstration of how far a simple low-dimensional model can go in capturing 
U.S. and Euro area business cycled dynamics as well their interaction, some of the 
analysis in the present version of the paper by Giannone and Reichlin may warrant 
further scrutiny and reflection: 
•  As noted above, inclusion of pre-EMU era data for the analysis of an aggregated 
Euro area business cycle may be rather problematic. In the work of Giannone and 
Reichlin this problem manifests itself through the results delivered by the Bry-
Boschan dating algorithm that is being used by the authors to date business cycle 
turning points. While Giannone and Reichlin argue that the Bry-Boschan dating 
algorithm “does not work” for the Euro area in that it would deliver turning points 
different from those set by the CEPR business cycle dating committee, it actually 
works very well (even by this definition of working well)  except for the CEPR 
dated recession of the early 1980’s. That recession, however, features a very 
strong degree of heterogeneity across Euro area countries, as noted above.  
•  As far as I can tell, the current analysis of the paper seems to pre-suppose 
(without providing any empirical evidence for it) that Euro-area and U.S. data are co-trending, and in any case does not separate the phenomena of two series being 
co-trended vs. two series being co-integrated, even though these are actually 
conceptually distinct phenomena. A proper specification of a bivariate VAR of 





For such a bivariate VAR cointegration occurs when the matrix Π is rank 
deficient. Co-trending, on the other hand, occurs when  
 
 
My experience working with output data for the U.S. and individual Euro area 
countries has been that there is quite strong empirical evidence that output in the 
U.S. and  individual Euro area countries is not co-trended; thus my prior for the 
present analysis would have been: 
 
 
It would seem strongly desirable that the authors provided evidence in favor of 
the co-trending hypothesis of Euro area and U.S. data, should they wish to 
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•  I am not clear about the interpretation of the cointegrating vector between U.S. 
and Euro area output provided by Giannone and Reichlin. They seem to argue that 
the cointegrating vector  
 
would imply that the “average rate of growth in the U.S. has been three fourths 
higher than in the Euro area”.  The cointegrating relationship between U.S. and 
Euro area output seems to measure a long-run levels relationship, however, which 
may also be driven by initial conditions, and not just average past growth. 
•  There is a growing literature that the nature of international business cycle 
dynamics has changed over the time period since 1970. Stock and Watson (2004) 
in particular argue that these changing dynamics are for the U.S. data best 
captured by a single break in 1984 (mostly due to subsequent moderation of 
shocks), but for European data are best captured by a drawn-out pattern of 
moderation of the volatility of output growth. Under such asymmetry of the 
change of business cycle dynamics in the U.S. versus the Euro area, Giannone and 
Reichlin are likely to overestimate the size of shocks in the U.S. relative to those 
in the Euro area for sizeable parts of their sample period. This in turn would cast 
doubt on various of their empirical findings. 
•  Finally, it does not seem a particularly challenging hurdle for a time-series model 
to do well in terms of its Bry-Boschan dated business cycles matching up well 
with those in the actual data. Even early generation Real Business Cycle models 
did quite well on this count, but are now well understood to perform rather poorly 
in terms of capturing the conditional dynamics of U.S. and Euro area output data. 
.75
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t t y y −Thus, to make the argument that the Giannone and Reichlin captures well the 
dynamics of U.S. and Euro area business cycles (as well as their interaction), it 
would seem necessary to present model evaluation criteria that provide an 
adequate measurement of conditional dynamics in time series. 
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Abstract
We revisit Western Europe’s record with labor-productivity convergence, and tenta-
tively extrapolate its implications for the future path of Eastern Europe. The poorer
Western European countries caught up with the richer ones through both higher rates
of physical capital accumulation and greater total factor productivity gains. These (rel-
atively) high rates of capital accumulation and TFP growth reﬂect convergence along
two margins. One margin (between industry) is a massive reallocation of labor from
agriculture to manufacturing and services, which have higher capital intensity and use
resources more eﬃciently. The other margin (within industry) reﬂects capital deepen-
ing and technology catch-up at the industry level. In Eastern Europe the employment
share of agriculture is typically quite large, and agriculture is particularly unproductive.
Hence, there are potential gains from sectoral reallocation. However, quantitatively the
between-industry component of the East’s income gap is quite small. Hence, the East
seems to have only one real margin to exploit: the within-industry one. Coupled with
the fact that within-industry productivity gaps are enormous, this suggests that conver-
gence will take a long time. On the positive side, however, Eastern Europe already has
levels of human capital similar to those of Western Europe. This is good news because
human capital gaps have proved very persistent in Western Europe’s experience. Hence,
Eastern Europe does start out without the handicap that is harder to overcome. JEL
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11 Introduction
Western Europe is the quintessential convergence club. In 1950, real labor productivity
in some of its richest countries was more than three times that of some of its poorest. By
the end of the century, all Western European labor-productivity ratios were well below two.
One aspect of this decline in cross-country European inequality is, of course, the catch-
up by the Southerners: Italy ￿rst, then Spain, Greece, Portugal, and eventually Ireland
(a Southerner in spirit) all had their spurts of above-average productivity growth. Spain’s
experience is emblematic and inspiring: In less than 15 years between the late 1950s and
the early 1970s, its labor productivity relative to France’s (our benchmark for the \average"
European experience) went from roughly 65 percent to over 90 percent.
On May 1, 2004, the European Union (EU) admitted 10 new members, primarily from
Eastern Europe. To varying degrees, the Easterners’ current relative labor productivities are
similar to the relative labor productivities of the Southerners before their convergence spurts.
For example, Hungary today is almost exactly as productive relative to France as Greece was
in 1950, while Poland is roughly as productive { always relative to France { as Portugal was
then. This widely noted analogy has naturally given rise to hopes that the Easterners will
be the new Southerners, and Poland, the new Spain. Indeed, this hope is one of the very
reasons why these countries have wanted to join (and several others hope to join) the club.
Given that so many people are pinning so many hopes on the continued ability of the
European club to generate convergence among its members, this seems a useful time to re-
visit the data on the relative growth performance of European countries in the second half of
the 20th century. Our main aim is to look behind the aggregate labor productivity numbers
and present a couple of di￿erent approaches to \decompose" the overall convergence experi-
ence into more disaggregated processes. We make no claim of methodological or conceptual
innovation: Our goal is to organize all the data \under one roof" and take stock.
We organize the discussion around four views or hypotheses potentially explaining
the convergence process. The ￿rst view is grounded in the Solovian-neoclassical hypoth-
esis, according to which initially capital-poor countries have higher marginal productivity
of capital, and hence faster growth. The second hypothesis, motivated in part by endoge-
nous growth models, explains the convergence process as the result of technological catch-up.
Backward countries converge to the technological leaders mainly through a process of imi-
tation (which is presumably cheaper than innovation). The third hypothesis interprets the
convergence process as driven mainly by gains from trade from European integration, which
may have been disproportionately larger for the poor economies (as a proportion of GDP)
both because of their initially more autarchic status and because of their relatively smaller
size. The fourth and ￿nal hypothesis views the convergence process as a by-product of the
2structural transformation, which is partially a process of reallocation of resources from low-
productivity to high-productivity sectors. If initially poorer countries had a longer way to go
in this transformation, this process may itself have been a source of convergence.
With respect to the relative contributions of capital deepening and technological
change to the reduction of European inequality we ￿nd that physical capital accumulation and
total factor productivity (TFP) growth were roughly equally important. However, somewhat
surprisingly, we also ￿nd virtually no role for human capital accumulation: Di￿erences in
human capital per worker { at least, as measured by years of schooling { are both substantial
and persistent. Another somewhat surprising result is that TFP was not always initially
lower in poor countries, a fact that is hard to reconcile with catch-up theories of technological
di￿usion.
As an explanation for regional convergence the trade view runs into some problems.
For example, countries with a comparative disadvantage (or no advantage) in agriculture
invariably show larger shares of agriculture, while countries with a comparative advantage
in agriculture tend to show systematically lower shares. The structural-transformation ap-
proach fares better. For example, we ￿nd that Southerners converged to the rest mainly
through a faster rate of reallocation of the labor force from low-productivity agriculture
into high-productivity manufacturing and services. However, in other cases within-industry
productivity catch-up was also quite important.
When we turn our attention to 13 (mostly) Eastern European countries that have
either recently joined the EU, or are in line to join, we tend to ￿nd very large labor produc-
tivity gaps vis-￿ a-vis Western Europe. In accounting for these gaps, we ￿nd substantial roles
for physical capital and TFP gaps, but no role whatsoever for human capital gaps. This is
in a sense good news for the Easterners, because the Western European experience suggests
that human capital gaps are the hardest to bridge.
Like Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Greece 50 years ago, the new and forthcoming EU
members exhibit substantially larger shares of workers employed in agriculture, which tends
to be the least productive sector. Manufacturing and services are also less productive in the
East than in Western Europe, though the gaps are not as large as in agriculture. There
is, therefore, some scope for large productivity gains through both labor reallocation out of
agriculture and within-industry catch-up. However, quantitatively, in Eastern Europe the
distribution of employment among sectors is much less important as a source of income gaps
vis-￿ a-vis the rest of Europe than it was in Southern Europe in 1960. Hence, in a way, the
Easterners have only one margin to exploit in their quest for convergence { the within-industry
productivity gap. In contrast, the South was also able to exploit the between-industry margin.
There are, of course, several other authors who have looked at Western European con-
3vergence from various angles. These include Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991), Quah (1996),
and Boldrin and Canova (2001). There are also several excellent studies of individual coun-
tries’ convergence experiences, such as Honohan and Walsh (2002) and Oltheten, Pinteris,
and Sougiannis (2003). Finally, the idea of using the experience of other countries/regions to
speculate on the convergence prospects of Eastern Europe is also not new: see, among others,
Fisher, Sahay, and Vegh (1998a, 1998b) and Boldrin and Canova (2003). Our contribution,
however, looks at the data from a di￿erent perspective and is thus complementary to the
existing ones.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the
European experience with labor-productivity convergence in the second half of the 20th
century. In Section 3, we discuss various possible views one can advance to explain the
convergence process. In Sections 4 and 5, we take a look at more disaggregated data to try
to shed light on the explanatory power of the various approaches. In Section 6, we introduce
the Easterners, and compare their characteristics with those of the Southerners before their
catch-up. We summarize and conclude in Section 7.
2 European Convergence 1950-2000
The point of this section is to refresh our memories on the basic fact of European
convergence. This is done in Figure 2.1, where we plot, for each of 14 Western European
countries, per worker GDP in purchasing power parity (PPP) relative to France. We choose
France as a benchmark because its growth experience between 1950 and 2000 is virtually
identical to that of the average European country. In fact, the ratio of per-worker GDP
(in PPP) of France relative to the European (population-weighted) average is practically
1 throughout the whole period. The 14 countries are the other members of the European
Union (pre-May 1), less Luxembourg plus Norway.1 The data for Figure 2.1 come directly
from the Penn World Table, Version 6.1 (PWT) and measure GDP per worker [via the
variable GDPWOK. See Heston, Summers, and Aten (2002)].2
In order to highlight the convergence outcomes we draw horizontal lines in each graph
through 0.9 and 1.1. Note that 13 of the 14 countries start out outside this range, and 10
out of 14 end up inside (or right at the threshold). Furthermore, in three of the four cases in
which relative GDP is still outside our \convergence band," the distance from the band has
nevertheless declined considerably. The overall reduction in inequality is dramatic. To cap it
1Hence, other than city-states, we are missing only Iceland and Switzerland, for which there were too many
gaps in some of the data we use later in the paper.
2For Germany we actually use the series on Western Germany from Version 5.6 of PWT up to 1990 and
the series on Germany from Version 6.1 thereafter.
4all, the only case in which the absolute distance from France has increased rather than fallen
is not so much a case of failed convergence but one of, so to speak, \excessive convergence":
Ireland started out poor, converged from below, and then forgot to stop { ending up the most
productive in Europe. It is now well above the upper bound of the convergence band.
The geographical patterns are also well known but nonetheless striking. Note that
the country graphs are arranged in increasing order of latitude (using the countries’ capitals
as the reference points). The Southerners (Greece, Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Austria) all
start out poorer and experience various degrees of catching up. Spain, Italy, and Austria fully
make it; Greece has virtually made it by 1975, but then slips and loses some (but by no means
all) of the gains between 1975 and 1995; Portugal’s progress is slower, but it seems on track
to reach the lower edge of the band in the not-too-distant future. Then there are most of
the \Northerners" (Belgium, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, and
Norway), which start out richer than France and converge \from above" to within 90 percent
and 110 percent of France’s labor productivity -- with the minor exception of Belgium, which
ends up slightly above the upper boundary. Germany is the geographical and economic \in-
betweener," starting and ending within the 90 to 110 band. The only two serious deviations
from the geographical-economic pattern are Finland, which converges from below instead
of from above like the other high-latitude countries; and Ireland, which is exceptional both
because it converges from below instead of from above, and because { as we have already
seen { it fails to stop after converging.
Of course, convergence from above by the Northerners really means that France has
caught up with them. Hence, what Figure 2.1 truly tells us is that there has been a generalized
catching up from South to North or that the growth rate has been, on average, decreasing
with latitude fairly smoothly.
As mentioned in the Introduction, the rest of this paper explores a couple of ways of
peering into the black box of the convergence processes depicted in Figure 2.1 in the hope of
shedding some light on some of its mechanics.
Before proceeding, we quickly dispose of a secondary issue having to do with entering
into formal membership in the EU. Figure 2.2 is identical to Figure 2.1, except that it
adds a vertical line for the date at which each country joined the European Community.
Visual inspection suggests that it is extremely hard to argue for an important role for formal
EC (later, EU) membership per se in facilitating convergence. Italy, Spain, Greece, and
Austria all had their convergence spurts before formally joining European institutions, and
the Northerners lost ground whether or not they were in the EC/EU. One can squint at the
behavior of the relative income series around the dates of accession, but no systematic \kink"
up or down seems to be associated with that date. What seems to matter for convergence is
5not so much entry into formal membership in European institutions, but rather { if anything
{ participation in a generalized trend towards greater economic integration at the European
level. This integration would probably have occurred with or without the EC.3
3 Four Ways to Converge
Depending on one’s background and tastes, there are at least four possible reactions
to the graphs in Figure 2.1 and to the convergence processes they describe. In this section
we brie￿y outline these four possible responses, and in the rest of the paper we query the
available data for the corresponding supporting evidence. We stress at the outset that the
four views are not mutually exclusive.
1) Solovian convergence. If you are steeped in neoclassical growth theory [Ramsey
(1928), Solow (1956), and subsequent developments] you will be strongly tempted to interpret
Figure 2.1 in terms of capital deepening. The idea, of course, is that initially capital-poor
countries have higher marginal productivities of capital. This leads them to grow faster than
initially capital-rich countries. This argument still works if you take a broader view of capital,
to include human capital [Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992)]. It is also independent of whether
one thinks the capital is generated by domestic savings or ￿ows in from abroad { though that
may a￿ect the speed of convergence [Barro, Mankiw, and Sala-i-Martin (1995)]. This Solovian
interpretation of convergence processes motivates much of the growth-regression literature of
the 1990s [Barro (1991), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992), and all the rest]. It also ￿nds strong
support in growth accounting exercises for East-Asian miracle economies [Young (1995)].
2) Technological catch-up. If instead you have been captivated by so-called \endogenous-
growth" models [Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991), Aghion and Howitt (1992)],
you may tend to read in the graphs of Figure 2.1 the e￿ects of technological catch-up by
initially backward countries. In particular, you will have in mind models where imitation
is less costly than innovation, so that countries initially behind the world technology fron-
tier experience faster improvements in technology than the leaders [for example, Nelson and
Phelps (1966), Krugman (1979), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997), Howitt (2000)]. Empirical
work on cross-country TFP growth is generally motivated by this view [for example, Coe
and Helpman (1995), Coe, Helpman, and Ho￿maister (1997)]. Evidence that cross-country
income di￿erences are largely due to di￿erences in TFP is also consistent with this view [for
example, Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997), Hall and Jones (1999)].
3Some authors use growth regression techniques to estimate the coe￿cient of an \EC-dummy." Results are
mixed. Even if it were more strongly in favor of a positive EC-e￿ect, however, this type of evidence does not
bear directly on the issue of the sources of convergence. A positive coe￿cient on the EC-membership dummy
means that EC members grow faster than non-EC members, not that they should converge to one another.
63) Gains from trade. If you are a trade theorist your instinct may be to interpret the
graphs in terms of gains from trade. In particular, suppose (realistically) that initially the
richer European countries were more integrated among themselves and with the rest of the
world than the poorer ones. Suppose further (and also realistically) that over the second half
of the century the poorer countries gradually became more integrated with the rest. Then
not only should they have experienced gains from trade but also { due to their initially more
autarchic status { their gains from trade should have been larger as a proportion of GDP than
those of the richer economies: Hence, the convergence. The fact that poorer countries have
tended to be smaller is another reason to expect disproportionate gains by these countries
and ultimately convergence.
It is customary to object to trade-based interpretations of rapid growth that the theory
predicts higher income levels, not higher growth rates. But looking again at Figure 2.1, one
cannot reject outright the hypothesis that convergence was the result of one-o￿, discrete
jumps in income levels. Consider again the fewer than 15 years it took Spain to recover
from a 25-percent productivity handicap, or the 10 years or so it took Greece to bridge an
even larger gap. Furthermore, it is actually possible { exploiting the idea of a \ladder of
comparative advantage" { to turn the static gains-from-trade theory into a dynamic one
[Jones (1974), Findlay (1973), Kruger (1977), and Ventura (1997)].4
4) Structural transformation. If you are an old-fashioned macro-development econo-
mist, you are used to thinking about the growth process as inextricably linked with structural
transformation: vast reallocation of resources from one industry to another. The early clas-
sics include Clark (1940), Nurske (1953), and Lewis (1954), among others. There is more
systematic recent work by Imbs and Wacziarg (2003) and Koren and Tenreyro (2004). If
resources are reallocated from low-productivity to high-productivity sectors, this structural
transformation is itself a source of growth. If Southern countries { as is likely { underwent
a more radical structural transformation than Northern countries during the 1950 to 2000
period, then this is also a source of convergence.
This reasoning is best illustrated by recent work on another South-to-North conver-
gence, that of the southern United States to the rest of the United States over the 20th
century [Caselli and Coleman (2001)]. At the beginning of the century, the South was over-
whelmingly agricultural, while the rest of the United States was predominantly specialized in
manufacturing and services. Since agriculture had much lower output per worker, the South
4Not all trade theorists will look at Figure 2.1 with comparative advantage in mind. Readers of Helpman
and Krugman (1989) may view increased integration as allowing for increasing returns in the presence of
intra-industry trade. We do not attempt to assess this view in the present draft (except for a brief remark
in footnote 16), but perhaps in the future we can explore this by seeing whether there have been particular
gains in labor productivity in sectors experiencing the biggest increases in trade.
7also had much lower aggregate labor productivity. Over the decades, the U.S.-wide cost of
migrating from the agricultural sector to the non-agricultural ones declined sharply, mainly as
a result of improved access to schooling for rural children. In turn, the lower cost of migration
to the more productive sectors led to overall aggregate productivity gains. However, these
productivity gains were disproportionately concentrated in the South, which had the largest
share of workers initially trapped in agriculture. Perhaps the Southern Europeans also had
their labor force initially disproportionately concentrated in low-productivity industries?
We should stress that the mapping between the accounting exercise that follows and
the four convergence hypotheses we study is not perfect. The accounting analysis is aimed at
providing guidance as to the main forces behind convergence, and hence the results should
be taken as suggestive indications rather than as conclusive verdicts.
4 Solovian Convergence and Technological Catch-Up
In this section we tackle the ￿rst two of the possible views of convergence we listed in the
previous section: the capital deepening explanation associated with the Solow and other
neoclassical models of growth, and the technology-di￿usion explanation, which would be
emphasized by endogenous growth theories.
Our approach will be to decompose the convergence series plotted in Figure 2.1 into
three components: convergence in physical capital, convergence in human capital, and conver-
gence in Total Factor Productivity. The sum of the ￿rst two may be seen as the contribution
of Solovian convergence, while the third may capture the contribution of technology catch-
up. Plainly, this approach is a hybrid of growth accounting, which decomposes growth rates
into capital growth and TFP growth, and development accounting, which decomposes cross-
country di￿erences in income levels into capital and TFP. Here, since we decompose relative
growth rates, we have both the time and the cross-country dimension. Hence, we may term
the exercise we perform convergence accounting.
More speci￿cally, we will use the following familiar-looking expression:
￿logyR
it = ￿￿logkR
it + (1 ￿ ￿)￿loghR
it + ￿logAR
it; (1)
where ￿ is the capital share in output, and ￿ is a ￿rst-di￿erence operator. The only slightly
unusual aspect is that output, inputs, and total factor productivity are measured relative to
those of France. Hence, yR
it is aggregate labor productivity in country i relative to aggregate
labor productivity in France, kR
it and hR
it are relative physical and human capital, and AR
it is
relative TFP.5
5Of course, equation (1) can be interpreted as an approximation for the growth rate of relative labor




it are of course the data we plotted in Figure 2.1. For kR
it and hR
it we need
to construct time series for each country’s physical and human capital stocks. We construct
physical capital stocks from the Penn World Tables (PWT) series on real investment. Invest-
ment data start in 1950. To initialize the capital stock we assume that the growth rate of
investment up to 1950 has been the same as the observed growth rate of investment between
1950 and 1955.6 In order to minimize the bias arising from this arbitrary choice of initial
value of the capital stock we begin our convergence decomposition in 1960. Little is lost
by this curtailing of the time series as most of the important convergence spurts (with the
exception of Italy) begin right around, or after, this date.
To construct data on hR
it we mostly use the De La Fuente and Domenech (2002) data
set on average years of schooling in the OECD. However, De La Fuente and Domenech data
stop in 1990 or 1995, depending on the country. To extend the series to 2000 we use the growth
rates (over the relevant periods) of the corresponding series in the Barro and Lee (2001)
data set { in combination with the latest level reported by De La Fuente and Domenech.7
With these data at hand, we follow the development-accounting literature and estimate each
country’s human capital as hit = exp(￿sit), where sit is the average years of schooling in
the labor force, and ￿ is the Mincerian rate of return to one extra year of schooling. We set
￿ = 0:10, which re￿ects a broad consensus on the average returns to schooling around the
world. Finally, following yet again the development-accounting literature, we set ￿ = 0:33:
We report later on how results change when using country-speci￿c capital shares.8
Before proceeding to the formal results, we spend a minute looking at the time series
in Figure 4.1, where we plot the time paths of kR, hR, and AR for all countries. For phys-
ical capital we see patterns of convergence that broadly resemble those in Figure 2.1: Poor
countries started out with lower physical capital levels than France and accumulated faster
over time, while rich countries started out with more capital and accumulated more slowly
than France. This is very Solovian. The only exceptions are Italy, which by 1960 already had
a level of capital intensity very close to France’s (and kept it that way thereafter), and the
6Hence, K1950 = I1950=(g + ￿), where g is the investment growth rate between 1950 and 1955, and ￿ is the
depreciation rate: Young (1995) follows a similar approach. Following the development-accounting literature
we set ￿ = 0:06:
7An alternative would have been to use Barro and Lee throughout, but the De La Fuente and Domenench
data are supposed to constitute an improvement over Barro and Lee for this set of countries. In the Appendix
we compare the average years of schooling variable from the two data sets (Figure A.1). It does appear that
the Barro and Lee numbers contain some surprising jumps in their series. The country rankings of attainment
are also more consistent with our priors. In footnote 10 we report on the results of the convergence-accounting
exercise when using the Barro and Lee data.
8For a survey of development-accounting methods see Caselli (2003). We will not bore the reader with the
obvious list of caveats and disclaimers about the very rough and tentative nature of the exercise just described.
9U.K., which in 1960 had lower capital intensity than France { despite being richer. Relative
human capital in 1960 was also generally lower in poor countries and higher { or about the
same as in France { in rich countries. However, unlike what we see for physical capital,
relative human capital levels are extremely persistent, so that relatively human-capital-poor
countries remain that way throughout the period. This is not very \augmented-Solovian" at
all, and it implies that human capital accumulation cannot have contributed much to aggre-
gate convergence. Two exceptions are perhaps Denmark and Norway, which have lost some
of their human-capital advantage relative to the rest.
Initial relative TFP levels were lower in Greece, Portugal, and Austria, but rose
after 1960, so technology catch-up contributed to these countries’ convergence. In Spain and
Italy, however, TFP was already at the same level as in France, or higher, in 1960. Still,
after that date these two countries continued to outpace France in e￿ciency gains, so that
technological change did contribute to their overall convergence. Basically, these countries
used faster technological change (and Spain also faster capital deepening) to bridge the gap
caused by their persistently lower human capital. For the initially rich countries, the expected
pattern of initially higher and subsequently falling relative TFP is observed in the U.K., the
Netherlands, and Sweden. However, Denmark’s TFP is roughly at France’s level throughout
the period, so that its relative loss is entirely due to slower rates of physical and human
capital accumulation. Norway actually starts out with lower TFP and converges to France
from below, so that France’s convergence to Norway occurs despite technological catch-up
from Norway to France. One objection to the use of years of schooling as a measure of
human capital is, of course, that it does not take into account the di￿erences in the quality of
education across countries. Caselli (2003) performs a development accounting exercise using
quality-adjusted measures of human capital based on international tests and schooling inputs
(pupil/teacher ratios and education spending) and ￿nds that these di￿erences are relatively
immaterial. While level comparisons might be di￿erent from growth comparisons, Caselli’s
￿ndings are somewhat reassuring.
The casual observations described before are made more precise in Table 4.1, which
reports the formal results of the decomposition in equation (1). The ￿rst panel shows changes
over the entire 1960 to 2000 period. Formally, this means that the ￿ operator in equation
(1) represents the 40-year di￿erence. The ￿rst column reports the value of ￿logyR
it for each
country. This is basically the same information already reported in Figure 2.1. Hence, for
example, Greece’s productivity relative to that of France increased by almost one-fourth,
or roughly equivalently; over these 40 years Greece’s average annual growth rate exceeded
France’s by little more than one-half percentage point. The biggest gain, of course, was posted
by Ireland, whose productivity grew by 60 percentage points more than France’s, followed
10by Portugal. Italy’s gain looks slightly more modest than those of the other Southerners
because most of its convergence spurt took place in the 1950s. The biggest comparative
losses were experienced by Sweden and the Netherlands, against which France gained about
30 percentage points of relative income.
The remaining three columns show how relative physical and human capital accumu-
lation and TFP growth contributed to these changes in relative income. These numbers are
illustrated in Figure 4.2, where the bars show the contribution of the three terms. (The sum
of the bars corresponds to the total convergence to France.) The clearest indication to emerge
from the table (as from the ￿gure) is that in nearly all cases { despite substantial di￿erences
in levels, and aside from the already-noted two exceptions { convergence in human capital
played a nearly insigni￿cant role in driving aggregate productivity convergence.
This leaves it to physical capital and total factor productivity to share the role of
proximate sources of convergence. Broadly speaking, in most cases relative TFP growth
appears to have contributed slightly more to convergence than capital deepening, but the
orders of magnitude of the two contributions are similar.9 In view of the noisy nature of the
data, it seems warranted to conclude that { as a general rule { Western European conver-
gence is attributable in roughly equal parts to faster capital accumulation and technological
improvement by the poorer countries. The only clear exceptions are Italy and Ireland, both
of which converged overwhelmingly through relative e￿ciency gains, and Denmark, whose
slowdown relative to France we have already noted to be entirely due to slower human and
physical capital accumulation.
In sum, the glass is half full both for neoclassical and endogenous growth theorists:
Poorer countries experienced faster physical capital deepening, and this explains about 50
percent of their relative gains; and they experienced faster TFP growth, accounting for
the remaining 50 percent. But the glass is also half empty for both. Neoclassical growth
theorists may be puzzled by the lack of convergence in human capital. And endogenous
growth theorists may be disoriented by the fact that not all initially poorer countries lagged
the rest technologically, so that their continued faster TFP growth does not square well with
the technology catch-up story that these theorists would probably favor.
Inspection of Figure 2.1 reveals in many cases what may loosely be termed a \struc-
tural break" around 1975 (that fateful year!). Indeed, 1975 looks like the year of accomplished
convergence for several countries. After that year, relative incomes tend to look much more
stable. In the case of Greece there is actually a convergence reversal around 1975. For these
reasons, it seems useful to present additional decomposition results for the 1960 to 1975 pe-
9This may seem puzzling given the apparently bigger swings of physical capital shown in Figure 4.1, but
recall that k
R in equation (1) gets weighted by 0.33.
11riod. This is done in Table 4.2, which is otherwise an exact replica of Table 4.1. Notable
in this table are the truly exceptional relative performances of Greece and Spain during this
sub-period, driven in equal parts by physical capital accumulation and TFP growth in the
former and about two-￿fths by capital and three-￿fths by TFP in the latter. For complete-
ness, in Table 4.3 we also show the convergence decomposition for the 1975 to 2000 period.
Here we see with dismay the reversal of much of Greece’s gains of the previous sub-period,
driven once again in equal parts by a slowdown in capital accumulation and a (relative) tech-
nological falling-back; the solid gains that Portugal keeps posting, again attributable to both
physical capital and TFP growth; and the TFP-driven explosion of Ireland.10
As a robustness check on our conclusions we repeated the capital-TFP convergence
decomposition using country-speci￿c capital shares instead of the common value of 0.33.
Country-speci￿c capital shares have recently been estimated by Gollin (2002) and by Bernanke
and Gurkaynak (2001). Using ￿gures from the latter paper, we found our main conclusion {
that human-capital convergence played a very small role in cross-country productivity con-
vergence { to be very robust. More speci￿cally, the numbers for the contribution of human
capital to convergence change very little. However, for some countries the relative contribu-
tions of physical capital accumulation and technology catch-up do change. In particular, for
Greece in 1960 to 2000, convergence becomes overwhelmingly a matter of TFP convergence,
while for Spain most of the action becomes concentrated on physical capital. Most of France’s
catch-up to the Netherlands becomes technological, while its physical-capital catch-up to Den-
mark and Norway becomes more pronounced (so that, correspondingly, these countries no
longer vastly outpace it in TFP growth). The detailed results using country-speci￿c capital
shares are presented in Tables 4.4 to 4.7.
5 Trade and Structural Transformation
In this section we turn to interpretations (3) and (4) of the European convergence experi-
ence. According to explanation (3), gains from trade following European economic integration
disproportionately bene￿ted the (initially less integrated) poor economies. Explanation (4)
10There are some important di￿erences in results when using the Barro and Lee (2001) data on years of
schooling instead of those of De La Fuente and Domenech (2002). In particular, convergence in human capital
becomes an important source of overall convergence for Greece and Spain. In the former, convergence in human
capital almost entirely displaces convergence in TFP as a source of overall convergence, while in the latter it
grabs half of TFP’s contribution. (Of course, the contribution of physical capital is insensitive to measurement
of human capital.) There are also several changes in the results for the Northerners. In particular, according
to the Barro and Lee data, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Norway greatly outpace France in human capital
accumulation, so that their convergence from above takes place despite strong divergence in human capital.
Also, Finland’s convergence from below becomes primarily a matter of human capital accumulation.
12is that the initially poorer countries had the productive structure most distorted towards
low-productivity sectors and that they therefore bene￿ted proportionately the most from the
gradual removal of barriers to inter-sectoral mobility.
It is easy to see why these two views can be assessed jointly: They have broadly
opposite predictions on the patterns of structural change we should see across countries.
In particular, by emphasizing specialization according to comparative advantage, the tradi-
tional trade view implies that productivity convergence should be associated with structural
divergence. On the other hand, by envisioning a world in which all countries gradually shift
resources to the greatest value-added sectors, the structural-transformation view predicts that
productivity convergence should be accompanied by convergence in industrial composition
as well.
In order to investigate these two convergence hypotheses we have put together a data
set on the evolution of the industrial composition of output and employment in our 15 coun-
tries. Speci￿cally, we have data on the value-added and number of workers employed in the
following six sectors: (1) agriculture, hunting, and ￿shing (henceforth agriculture); (2) man-
ufacturing, mining, and quarrying (henceforth manufacturing); (3) utilities; (4) construction;
(5) transportation; and (6) everything else (henceforth, services). We would, of course, have
preferred to work with more ￿nely disaggregated data, but this is the best we have been able
to do. We observe these data at ￿ve-year intervals, starting for most countries in 1955 (but
in some cases in 1950 and in some others in 1960). We have assembled these data through
a laborious process of parsing from many di￿erent sources, both international and national.
We give details in the appendix.11
We begin the exploration of these data by looking at a series of graphs. Figure 5.1
shows for each country the evolution over time of the employment shares of agriculture,
manufacturing, and services. (The other three industries together invariably account for a
very small proportion of overall employment.) The textbook pattern of declining employ-
ment share of agriculture, increasing employment share of services, and inverted-U-shaped
employment share of manufacturing is clearly visible in the graphs for most countries.12 This
is little more than a check on the basic reasonableness of our data. Still, it is useful to be
reminded of the sheer magnitude of the di￿erences in industrial composition among Western
European countries in the 1950s. For example, all of the Southerners have employment shares
of agriculture between 40 and 60 percent (roughly the level of the United States in 1880),
while the Northerners have agricultural shares well below 30 percent { and in a few cases
well below 10 percent. Fittingly, our \middle-of-the-road" benchmark, France, is in between,
11Given the paucity of organized information on this subject, especially for the early (and more interesting)
period, the creation of this data set may well be the most important contribution of the present paper.
12See Ngai and Pissarides (2004) for a recent model that matches these empirical regularities.
13with 35 percent. For completeness, Figure 5.2 shows the shares of the three \small" sectors.
They jointly account, on average, for less than 15 percent of total employment.
That all of the club members have been steadily moving out of agriculture and (even-
tually) into services is neither surprising nor conclusive with respect to which interpretation of
European convergence has more explanatory power. The more important question is whether
the various countries are converging towards similar industrial structures { as predicted by
a theory in which all countries shift resources towards the highest value-added sectors {
or towards permanently di￿erent ones { as would be more consistent with a comparative-
advantage explanation for convergence. To try to get a handle on this question, we plot in
Figure 5.3 the sectoral employment shares in Figure 5.1 minus the corresponding shares in
France. We also plot a horizontal line at 0 to better gauge whether the general movement is
towards convergence in employment shares.13
The data show a general tendency towards structural convergence. The Southern-
ers, together with Ireland and Finland, all start out with higher-than-average agricultural
labor shares, but experience a substantial decline in these shares relative to France. Greece,
Portugal, and Austria, though, have not yet closed the gap. The Northerners, in contrast, ex-
perience a signi￿cant increase in agricultural shares relative to France. Manufacturing shares
also show remarkable convergence, with some overshooting in the cases of Portugal, Ireland,
and Italy. The share of labor in services converges quickly for the Northerners, but less so
for the Southerners.
Obviously, if we had all the sectors in the economy, the sum of all the lines would
be zero. The persisting di￿erences between the services shares in Greece and Austria and
the services share in France are the mirror image of the persisting di￿erences between the
corresponding agricultural shares. For Italy, the services gap is made up by a symmetric
gap in manufacturing. For Portugal, Ireland, and Finland, the services di￿erence is partly
compensated for by the overshooting in manufacturing, partly by a persistent gap in agri-
cultural shares, and partly by an increase in these countries’ shares of construction relative
to France’s, which is shown in Figure 5.4, together with the shares of the remaining (small)
sectors relative to the corresponding ones in France.
In sum, at least judging by the coarse evidence of Figure 5.3, the conclusion seems to
be that Western European countries did grow closer in industrial structure over the second
half of the 20th century { as in the \structural-transformation" view of convergence { but
there remain some potentially permanent di￿erences in industrial composition { as in the
\comparative advantage" view.
13The analytics in the next sub-section justify using employment-share di￿erences instead of employment
share ratios.
14Another way to think about trade is to look at the relative labor productivities in
the various sectors. In particular, under a comparative-advantage interpretation we would
expect non-convergence to occur in those sectors in which labor productivity relative to the
\average country" is relatively higher. For this reason, and also because it is interesting in
and of itself, we plot in Figure 5.5 each sector’s output per worker as a ratio of France’s
output per worker in the same sector. (We continue to choose France as a plausible stand-in
for the average country).
We draw two lessons from these graphs. First, over time there has been signi￿cant
convergence in the labor productivities of the various sectors towards French sectoral labor
productivity levels. We will return to this important within-industry productivity convergence
process shortly. Second, and more directly relevant to the discussion at hand, it actually
does not look as if the remaining di￿erences in industrial structure that seem to emerge from
Figure 5.3 are dictated by comparative advantage. For example, looking at recent years,
Italy seems to have a comparative advantage in services and a comparative disadvantage
in manufacturing. Yet, as we have seen, its pattern of specialization has tilted towards
manufacturing. Greece, which specializes in agriculture, has a comparative advantage in
everything but.14;15 An alternative way to look at this is through the plot of di￿erences in
sectoral shares with France against relative productivity.
Clearly, this reading of the data relies on all sectors being tradable. One may object,
however, that services are very likely less tradable than both manufacturing and agriculture.
Restricting the analysis to these two sectors, Greece does not exhibit any clear pattern of
comparative advantage vis-￿ a-vis France. Austria and Portugal seem to have a comparative
advantage in manufacturing. But then it is certainly di￿cult for the comparative-advantage
view to explain why Greece, Austria, and Portugal have larger shares of agriculture than
France. Ignoring services, Italy and Spain exhibit a comparative advantage in agriculture with
respect to France until 1970, when the comparative advantage shifts in favor of manufacturing.
A similar pattern emerges for Ireland, although the shift occurs more than two decades later.
Throughout most of the period, and again at odds with the comparative-advantage view, the
shares of agriculture in Spain, Italy, and Ireland, although declining, have been systematically
larger than that in France.
14Comparative advantage should be judged against all trading partners and not only France. So, for
example, if other trading partners had signi￿cantly higher productivity in all sectors relative to agriculture
when compared with Greece, we could rationalize the fact that Greece specializes in agriculture. However,
looking at the ￿gures we see that this criterion would imply that all other EU members (except for Austria,
Germany, and perhaps Norway) should also specialize in agriculture! Note also that Austria, which should
not, according to this view, specialize in agriculture, has a relatively large agricultural labor force.
15For completeness, Figure 5.6 shows the sectoral labor productivities of the three small sectors.
15We now turn the focus to the structuralist interpretation of the data. Let us reca-
pitulate that story. First, there are some sectors that are intrinsically more productive than
others. Second, there are labor-market distortions that prevent the ￿ow of resources to the
more productive sectors, with the result that even in equilibrium one observes di￿erences
in value-added per worker. Third, these imperfections notwithstanding, resources do grad-
ually ￿ow toward the more productive sectors, leading to catch-up by the countries whose
industrial structure was initially most distorted.
As a ￿rst step to evaluating this view, we plot, for each country, the levels of sectoral
labor productivity relative to agricultural productivity. These plots are displayed in Figure
5.7. It is clear from this ￿gure that, for all countries, and throughout the entire period,
agriculture is the least productive sector. The (weak) exceptions are the U.K. before 1975,
for which the productivity levels of the three sectors are very close, the Netherlands before
1970, and Sweden between 1975 and 1990, for which the productivity gap of services over
agriculture is nil. To the extent that poorer countries experience ￿ows of labor away from
agriculture larger than the Northerners, these productivity gaps should be a source of overall
productivity convergence. As we saw above, this has indeed been the case: Greece, Portugal,
Spain, Ireland, and Italy have experienced substantial declines in their shares of agriculture
relative to France, whereas the Northerners, having started out with relatively small shares
of agriculture, experienced a relative increase in agricultural shares (always with respect to
France).
While the inter-sectoral productivity gaps are generally large, there are few clear
general trends in their behavior over time. In several countries the gap between the high-
productivity sectors (services and manufacturing) and the low-productivity sectors (agricul-
ture) has been slowly closing over the period. This is the case for Greece, Spain, Italy,
Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, and our reference country, France. However, in all
these cases, the inter-sectoral productivity gaps remain well above 50 percent. For Portugal,
the productivity gap in favor of manufacturing declines until 1980, stabilizes during the eight-
ies, and then shoots up decisively, together with the productivity advantage of the services
sector, which shows no trend in the earlier period. In the U.K., the Netherlands, and Norway,
we see a sizeable increase in the productivity premium of manufacturing starting in the mid
seventies. Ireland shows a similar pattern, although the increase starts in 1980. Austria ex-
hibits signi￿cant increases in the productivity advantage of both services and manufacturing
relative to agriculture in the sixties. Belgium’s experience is an attenuated and more gradual
version of Austria’s.
For the sake of completeness, Figure 5.8 shows the labor productivity of the remaining
(small) sectors relative to agriculture. Again there are no uniform trends across countries.
16What strikes the eye is that the utilities sector is substantially more productive than the two
other sectors and agriculture, although this is neither very surprising (given that the utility
sector is not labor-intensive), nor very relevant (as utilities account on average for less than
2 percent of the labor force). Far below utilities, the next sector in this B-league ranking is
transportation and the third and last is construction (although in some countries { such as
Greece { and in some sporadic years, the ranking between these two is reversed).16
This discussion so far suggests the following tentative conclusion. Initially poorer
Western European countries converged to France because: (i) The productivity of the sectors
in which they specialized converged to the productivity of the same sectors in France { this
is the within industry productivity convergence documented in Figure 5.5; (ii) They moved a
larger share of their workforce towards the higher productivity sectors { this is the pattern
of convergence in sectoral composition of the labor force documented in Figure 5.3; and (iii)
(For some of these countries) there was a generalized convergence of the productivity of the
sectors in which they had a disproportionate share of the labor force to the productivity of
the sectors in which France was specialized { when and where this inter-sectoral productivity
convergence occurred can be seen in Figure 5.7. We turn now to a quantitative assessment
of these three channels.
5.1 Convergence Decomposition: Analytics
Let us call yi
jt the per worker value added in country i, sector j; at time t: Denote
by ai
jt the share of employment in country i, sector j; at time t. Total value added per
worker in country i at time t, yi









16As we mentioned, new trade theories not grounded on comparative advantage are harder to di￿erentiate
from the structural-transformation view in that they do not necessarily predict that integration leads to struc-
tural divergence. We observe, however, that if trade-induced scale economies had been an important source
of catch-up for the Southerners we should see their tradable sectors (agriculture and/or manufacturing) sys-
tematicaly outpace their non-tradable sectors (services, utilities, construction, and electricity) in productivity
gains. It is hard to discern any such systematic pattern in Figures 5.7 and 5.8.
17As always, we use France, i = F; as the numeraire for our convergence analysis. We thus




















This measure of convergence is convenient because it can be exactly decomposed into the
three channels mentioned in our previous discussion: i) within-industry convergence, ii) con-
vergence due to labor reallocation, and iii) inter-sectoral, or between-industry convergence.





























































































































In the tables that follow, we call \Total convergence" the quantity on the left-hand
side in equation (3). \Within-industry convergence" is the quantity on the ￿rst line of the
right-hand side; this captures the productivity catch-up of each sector with the corresponding
one in France, weighted by the average labor share in that sector. \Labor reallocation" is
17Note that the two expressions we study in our convergence decomposition exercises are, to a ￿rst-order






















































18the quantity in the second line that quanti￿es the part of convergence due to inter-sectoral
workforce movements; it is appropriately weighted by the relative productivity of the sector.
In particular, in the special case where there are no within-industry labor productivity gaps
(yi
jt = yF
jt), labor reallocation contributes to convergence if and only if country i transfers
a larger share of the labor force than does France towards the high-productivity industries.
If there are within-industry productivity gaps, this e￿ect may be attenuated. Speci￿cally, if
sector j is much more productive in France than in country i, labor reallocation may lead
to divergence even if France is moving fewer workers towards this sector. Finally, \between-
industry convergence" is the quantity in the third line; it measures the contribution to con-
vergence of inter-sectoral productivity convergence. In particular, if the productivity of the
sectors in which a country had a disproportionate share of the labor force converges to the
overall productivity of France, we will see convergence.
We perform this decomposition for the whole period, 1960 through 2000, for which
sectoral data are available in all countries (except for Ireland, which has data beginning in
1970). The results are summarized in Table 5.1. Panel A shows the convergence decomposi-
tion in absolute terms. The ￿rst column shows the total productivity convergence to France
from 1960 through 2000 (for Ireland, we report the ￿gures for 1970 to 2000). These are









t , as noted before). As we already know, six
countries experienced substantial convergence from below: Ireland, Spain, Portugal, Austria,
Italy, and Greece. The other countries converged from above or remained at roughly the
same level as France.
The three following columns in Panel A show the quantitative magnitudes of the three
sources of convergence. The corresponding columns in Panel B show the contribution of each
source as a percent of total convergence. These numbers are illustrated in Figure 5.10, which
shows graphically the contribution to convergence of the di￿erent components. Interestingly,
the true Southerners { Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal { achieved convergence mainly by
reallocation of the labor force from low- to high-productivity sectors (at a faster rate than
France, as always). Labor reallocation accounts for about 60 percent of total convergence in
Spain and Portugal, 100 percent in Italy, and more than 100 percent in Greece (other elements
played against convergence in this country). Hence, for the true Southerners, we ￿nd a lot
of support for what we called the \structuralist" view of convergence. Labor reallocation is
also quite important for the convergence of France to the U.K., as it accounts for about 50
percent of it. (An important part of the story here is that agricultural shares declined much
more slowly in the U.K. than in France.)
Austria and Ireland, instead, converged mainly through within-industry productivity
19catch-up. The within-industry mechanism is also behind the convergence of the Northerners,
accounting in all cases for more than 60 percent of the total convergence. Within-industry
productivity convergence is not well accounted for by either the trade view or the structural-
transformation view. Rather, it probably has more to do with the capital deepening and
technology catch-up processes highlighted in the previous section.
Given the qualitative evidence from Figure 5.7 it is not surprising that the third
component of the sectoral decomposition of convergence, between-industry productivity con-
vergence, is never the most important factor. Indeed, in most cases it is the least important
source of convergence { and in some cases it even operates in the direction of divergence.
Nevertheless, in the case of Greece, inter-sectoral productivity convergence has been fairly
important. In particular, Greece bene￿ted from the productivity gains of agriculture, given
its large share in this sector. Portugal and Spain also gained some ground thanks to this
between-industry catch-up, although the quantitative contribution of this source has not been
as substantial.
Before concluding and summarizing this section we take a brief look at the role of
sectoral developments in shaping convergence dynamics in di￿erent sub-periods. Hence, we
decompose each of the terms in (3) into the two sub-periods 1960 through 1975 (60-75) and
1975 through 2000 (75-00). We now introduce sub-indices to indicate the period to which





























































































































































































































































































































































































































Between-industry conv. 75-00 Between-industry conv. 60-75
Table 5.2 looks at the within-industry convergence in the two sub-periods 1960 through
1975 and 1975 through 2000. As mentioned before, Austria and Ireland converged mainly
through within-industry catch-up. However, in the case of Austria, this catching up took
21place very early: More than 90 percent of the within-industry productivity gain took place
in the ￿rst sub-period, whereas in the case of Ireland, more than 90 percent of the catch-up
took place in the second sub-period. As for the Northerners, typically more than two thirds
of the within-industry convergence took place in the ￿rst sub-period. The only exception
is Germany, which exhibits signi￿cant convergence in the second sub-period, clearly due to
the addition of East Germany. An interesting case is Greece, which lost signi￿cant ground
in terms of within-industry productivity in the second period. This source of divergence is
behind the reversal in relative overall productivity noted in Figure 2.1.
Table 5.3 shows the part of the convergence due to labor reallocation in each of the
sub-periods. About 50 percent of the labor-reallocation-induced convergence experienced by
the Southerners took place in the ￿rst 15 years. This fraction is even larger for Greece in this
sub-period (65 percent), so we can conclude that Greece converged through labor reallocation
in the 1960s and early 1970s and subsequently diverged by losing within-industry relative
productivity. For the Northerners, more than 50 percent of the convergence due to labor
reallocation appears to have taken place in the ￿rst sub-period, except for Norway, where
the contribution of the early period’s reallocation was 20 percent. All in all, then, these 15
years witness substantial convergence induced by labor reallocation. As discussed early on,
this is primarily driven by the relatively faster decline in agricultural shares experienced by
the deep Southerners. Recall that Austria, in contrast with the deep Southerners, started
with a relatively low share of agriculture, and hence there was little action on this margin.
Ireland started out with a somewhat higher agricultural share than Austria, but a share still
well below the corresponding ones of the true Southerners.18
Summing up to here, the deep Southerners { Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Italy {
converged mainly through labor reallocation, with about half of it taking place between
1960 and 1975. In the case of Greece, this e￿ect was counterbalanced in 1975 by signi￿cant
losses in within-industry productivity. The other (real or honorary) Southerners, Austria
and Ireland, converged mainly through within-industry productivity gains, most of which
occurred in the ￿rst 15 years for Austria and in the second sub-period for Ireland. France
converged to the Northerners mainly through the within-industry channel, although in the
U.K. labor reallocation also played an important role.
Our tentative overall conclusion on the Western European convergence experience
is as follows. First, at least by the admittedly coarse standards we have applied, sectoral
specialization according to comparative advantage has not been a critical source of catching up
by the initially poorer countries. Instead, disproportionately large labor reallocation towards
18For completeness Table 5.4 shows the between-industry catch-up in the two sub-periods. We do not linger
on this table because we saw in Table 5.1 that this mechanism did not play a prominent role for most countries.
22more productive sectors has contributed substantially to the convergence of Portugal, Spain,
Greece, and Italy towards average Western European levels of labor productivity. Second, we
also see substantial within-industry labor productivity convergence, and this was especially
important in the catching up of Austria and Ireland. This within-industry labor productivity
convergence is probably best understood in the light of the substantial relative gains in
physical capital per worker and total factor productivity by poorer countries documented in
the previous section. It is probably not linked to human-capital deepening.19
6 The Easterners
Enough with latitude: Let’s turn to longitude. As mentioned in the Introduction, rel-
ative to France, labor productivity in Eastern Europe is roughly where it was in Southern
Europe before the South staged its catch-up. Given what we have learned about some of
the mechanics of this catch-up, we can try to speculate about the Easterners’ prospects. In
particular, we can ask two sets of questions. The ￿rst set of questions is based on the analysis
of Section 4. How much do gaps in physical capital per worker, human capital, and TFP
account for the overall productivity gap of the Easterners relative to France? How do these
three gaps compare with the corresponding gaps prevailing in Southern Europe in 1960?
The second set of questions is linked to the analysis in Section 5. How does the industrial
structure of the Easterners di￿er from France’s? How do these di￿erences compare to the
corresponding di￿erences in Southern Europe before the catch-up?
We begin, however, by brie￿y reviewing the aggregate picture. Figure 6.1 plots current
levels of labor productivity relative to France in 13 \Eastern-European" countries: the 10
admitted into the EU in May 2004, plus three candidates, Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey.
For comparison, we also plot the corresponding relative productivities in the ￿ve Southerners
in 1960. (For these aggregate GDP comparisons we could have plotted the 1950 values for
the Southerners, but { for reasons already discussed above { the earliest available date for the
disaggregated comparisons we present later is typically 1960. Hence, we chose to write this
section with 1960 as the benchmark). To continue with the geographic theme, these relative
productivities are plotted in increasing order of longitude. As before, these productivity data
come from PWT.
The Easterners are very unproductive relative to France. In fact, their real produc-
19Needless to say, intersectoral reallocation of labor also contributes to overall capital deepening and TFP
gains if labor ￿ows towards more capital-intensive and e￿cient sectors. It would indeed be very interesting
to be able to decompose the capital and TFP convergence of the previous section into a within-industry
relative capital deepening and TFP growth component and a component linked to sectoral reallocation. At
the moment we do not have the data to do this.
23tivity gap with France is on average substantially larger than the Southerners’ productivity
gap in 1960. The exceptions are Malta (which is where Austria was then), Cyprus (between
Spain and Austria), Slovenia (similar to Spain in 1960), and Hungary, the Czech Republic,
and Slovakia (at about Portugal’s level back then). Some of the other countries are far below
these levels and indeed considerably poorer (in relative terms) than the Southerners were
even in 1950. Romania’s relative productivity, 15 percent, is especially low.
What are the sources of these large productivity gaps? One way to answer this
question is presented in Figure 6.2, which shows physical capital gaps, that is, levels of
physical capital per worker relative to France (￿rst panel); human capital gaps (second panel);
TFP gaps (third panel); and investment gaps (fourth panel). The physical capital stocks and
TFPs of the Easterners are constructed in the same way as the corresponding variables for
Western European countries in Section 4. Unfortunately, we have long time series on real
investment rates for only ￿ve of the Easterners, which explains the thinner data clouds in the
￿rst and third panels. The human capital stocks are also constructed as in Section 4, except
that now we must use the Barro and Lee (2001) data as the De La Fuente and Domenech
(2002) data set does not cover these countries. Relative capital stocks and relative TFPs are
plotted against relative labor productivities. The solid line in each graph is the 45-degree
line.
Once again, the most striking feature of this decomposition seems to pertain to human
capital: Most of the Easterners have current levels of human capital above those of France.
Only Slovenia, Malta, and Turkey have fewer average years of schooling than France, and only
the last one substantially so. Hence, one conclusion is that among the Easterners, Turkey
is the only country whose productivity gap with France is partially explained by a human-
capital gap. This was not generally true for the Southerners in 1960: Portugal, Greece, Spain,
and Italy all had signi￿cantly lower human capital than France. Since human capital gaps
seem to be very persistent (see Section 4), this may be viewed as very good news for the
Easterners: The handicap that is toughest to overcome is one they do not have.
For the countries with available long investment series, physical capital gaps are
large. Indeed, by checking relative physical capital levels against the 45-degree line, we can
see that in most cases physical capital gaps are even larger (though not by much) than
real productivity gaps. The same was true in 1960 of Portugal, Greece, and Spain. Not
surprisingly, for the same countries we also see TFP gaps that are large, but not as large as
the labor productivity gaps. The Southerners had smaller TFP gaps, even controlling for the
level of relative income. (This makes up for their lower relative human capital.) In sum, it
would appear that for the Easterners to converge, what is required is a combination of capital
deepening faster than that of the West and technological catch-up. This is exactly what the
24Southerners did. However, the Southerners’ initial disadvantage was not as large, so it may
be presumed that the Easterners’ convergence will take somewhat longer.
One way to see whether the Easterners appear to be on the path to catch up in
physical capital levels is to look at investment shares of GDP. These are shown in the fourth
panel of Figure 6.2. (Examining these shares is a way of extending the assessment of the
physical capital position of a larger number of Eastern European countries.) Judging from
the position of relative investment vis-￿ a-vis the 45-degree line, in 1960 the Southerners had
investment shares relative to France somewhat higher than their labor productivities relative
to France. The same seems to be broadly true today of the Easterners. This is reassuring.
We now turn to industrial structure. The discussion that follows is based on the data
reported in Table 6.1 or shown in its graphical equivalent, Figure 6.3, which plots against
total productivity (i) the di￿erence in sectoral shares (resh) of each country with respect to
France, (ii) the relative sectoral productivity (rely) of each country with respect to France,
and (iii) the relative productivity of manufacturing and services vis-￿ a-vis agriculture for each
country (secty). Table 6.1 begins by reporting di￿erences in employment shares of the three
main sectors vis-￿ a-vis France { in 1960 for the Southerners and in 2000 for the Easterners.
Once again, sectoral data construction is described in the Appendix.
There is signi￿cant variance in the relative shares of agriculture both within the
group of Southerners and within the group of Easterners. Romania and Turkey exhibit
the highest agricultural share relative to France. The agricultural share in Romania is 40
percentage points higher than that in France; in Turkey it is 30 percentage points higher.
The closest parallel in 1960 is Greece, with roughly a 35-percentage-point di￿erence over
France. Poland and Bulgaria are closer to Spain, with a di￿erence in shares vis-￿ a-vis France
of about 20 percentage points. Latvia and Lithuania resemble Italy in 1960. If the historical
experience of their Southern counterparts is any guide, there seems to be a substantial margin
for convergence through labor reallocation for all these countries. In Hungary, Estonia, the
Slovak Republic, and Slovenia, di￿erences in labor shares in agriculture with respect to France
are lower (somewhere between the corresponding share di￿erentials in Austria and Italy in
1960), while Malta, Cyprus, and the Czech Republic have agricultural labor shares that are
very close to those in France (as was the case for Austria in 1960).
Labor shares in manufacturing are larger than France’s for all Easterners, except
Cyprus, which exhibits approximately the same share as France. On these dimensions, then,
the situation is quite di￿erent from the Southerners’ in 1960, when manufacturing shares
were systematically below those in France (except for Austria, whose share was very close to
France’s).
Services, broadly speaking, take up the slack between these sectors. Romania, Turkey,
25Poland, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, and Bulgaria have services shares that are
well below the corresponding shares in France in 2000, and the di￿erences are remarkably
higher (in absolute terms) than those exhibited by the Southerners in 1960. Continuing
with the parallel between the two years, Hungary looks like Greece, Slovenia like Portugal,
Lithuania like Spain, and Estonia and Latvia like Italy.
Turning to sectoral productivity (fourth to seventh columns of Table 6.1, second row
of Figure 6.3), the Easterners in 1960 are on average signi￿cantly less productive vis-￿ a-vis
France than the Southerners were in 1960. In particular, with three exceptions, agricultural
productivity relative to France is lower for all Easterners than it was for Greece { the country
with the lowest relative agricultural productivity in 1960. The exceptions are the Czech
Republic, whose relative agricultural productivity is comparable to that in Portugal in 1960;
Cyprus, with relative productivity comparable to Spain’s; and a big outlier, Malta, whose
agricultural productivity is well above France’s in 2000.
There are also big contrasts in manufacturing productivity. The Easterners’ produc-
tivity is remarkably lower than that in France, and the productivity gap is again higher than
that exhibited by the Southerners in 1960. Ten out of the 13 Easterners show productivity
levels well below 50 percent of France’s. The relative productivities for these 10 countries
range from 19 percent in Romania to 43 percent in Hungary. In 1960, even Greece, the least
productive country in manufacturing, was in a better position, with a productivity equal to
53 percent of France’s. This is quite remarkable, given that { as we just mentioned { the
industrial production of the Easterners is tilted towards manufacturing. The productivity
gaps for Slovenia, Cyprus, and Malta ￿nd some counterparts in the Southerners in 1960.
Slovenia’s relative productivity is similar to that of Portugal. Cyprus’s relative productivity
falls between that in Spain and Italy, and Malta’s compares with Austria’s.
A similar picture emerges in services. With the three small exceptions { Cyprus,
Malta, and Slovenia { the Easterners’ productivity in services is much lower than France’s,
and productivity gaps are larger than those shown by the Southerners in 1960. Labor produc-
tivity relative to France’s ranges from 32 percent to 57 percent for the Easterners|without
counting the three exceptions|whereas the lowest value for the Southerners in 1960 was 70
percent (in Portugal). Slovenia’s relative productivity (77 percent) falls between those of Por-
tugal and Austria, while Cyprus’s and Malta’s productivities fall between the corresponding
ones in Austria and Spain
The last two columns of Table 6.1 (and the last row of Figure 6.3) take up inter-
sectoral productivity di￿erentials. For the Southerners in 1960 manufacturing was between
two to three times as productive as agriculture. The corresponding range for services was
about two to ￿ve. In the East we ￿nd more variation. At one extreme, Malta’s agriculture
26is (slightly) more productive than are the other sectors. At the other, Polish manufacturing
is eight times as productive as agriculture, and services ten times! Romania also has an ex-
traordinarily unproductive agriculture, vis-￿ a-vis the other sectors. On balance, and weighted
by population, we can conclude that inter-sectoral productivity di￿erentials in the East are
at least as large as they were in the South in 1960.
In sum, there are some broad qualitative similarities between the Easterners today
and the Southerners in 1960. First, both groups have large shares of their workforce in their
least productive sectors. Poland’s large share of agriculture illustrates this massive failure of
comparative advantage particularly strikingly. But Malta and Estonia also appear to have
manufacturing shares that are too big.20 Second, there is a component of the productivity
gap that is not due to sectoral structure but to within-industry productivity di￿erentials. We
brie￿y turn now to a quantitative assessment of these similarities.










































The left-hand side is the aggregate productivity gap between France and country i, as a
percentage of country i’s income. The right-hand side decomposes this gap into three com-
ponents. The ￿rst term is the \within-industry" component. Holding constant country i’s
sectoral employment shares, it answers the question by how much would country i’s income in-
crease if its sectoral labor productivities converged to the productivities of the corresponding
sectors in France? The second term is the \between-industry component." Holding constant
country i’s sectoral labor productivities, it asks by how much would country i’s output per
worker increase if its employment shares were the same as France’s. The third component is
a \covariance" term.
The results of this decomposition are reported in Table 6.2. The ￿rst column is the
productivity gap on the left-hand side of equation (4), while columns 2 to 4 report the three
pieces on the right-hand side. The top panel, reserved to the Southerners in 1960, shows
that broadly speaking within-industry productivity gaps and sectoral composition were both
important determinants of the productivity gaps of these countries. The between component
was larger than the within component for Italy and Greece, while the within component
dominated for Austria, Spain, and Portugal.
The bottom panel reports decomposition results for the Easterners. Consistent with
our previous discussion, we ￿nd enormous within-industry productivity di￿erences. For some
20This failure of comparative advantage has been noted more broadly. For example, developing countries
have huge employment shares of agriculture and much lower relative labor productivity in this sector than in
the rest of the economy. For example, Gollin, Parente, and Rogerson (2001).
27of the poorest countries, within-industry productivity convergence (holding constant employ-
ment shares) would lead to a four-fold increase in aggregate labor productivity. Also, as
expected, the within-industry component of the income gap with France is much larger than
was the case for the Southerners in 1960.
What is new and somewhat unexpected in Table 6.2 is the relatively limited role of
the between-industry component. Despite their large employment shares in the relatively
unproductive industries, for 8 out of the 18 Eastern European countries the income gap due
to the structure of employment is less than 10 percent (that is, moving to French employ-
ment shares holding constant labor productivities would increase output by less than 10
percent). As a result, the between component explains a relatively modest fraction of the
overall productivity gap with France. In comparison, except for Austria, the Southerners
had substantially larger between components, both in absolute terms and as a percent of the
overall income gap. The smaller role of the between component is particularly evident if one
compares South and North at similar levels of the income gap with France.
Nevertheless, for some of the largest and poorest countries, labor reallocation towards
the more productive sectors would make a substantial di￿erence. In the case of Poland it
would raise income by 27 percent { hardly enough to bridge the gap with France, but certainly
important in absolute terms. Similarly, attaining French sectoral employment shares would
increase income per worker by 32 percent in Turkey, 19 percent in Bulgaria, and 68 percent
in Romania.
To summarize, then, we could say the following. In the South, structural imbalances
towards the low-productivity sectors were important determinants of their initial income
gaps vis-￿ a-vis France, and a big part of their convergence experience is associated with the
reallocation of resources towards greater value-added industries. These structural distortions
are also present today in the East. Indeed, some of the poorest and largest countries can
look forward to meaningful labor productivity gains from inter-sectoral labor reallocation.
However, in contrast with the story in the South, these potential gains constitute a relatively
small share of their overall income gap. Hence, to the extent that productivity gains through
structural reshu￿ing are a relatively low-hanging fruit, one comes away from this evidence
somewhat less bullish about the prospects of fast convergence by the Easterners.
Nevertheless, the news is not all bad. The South also had sizable within-industry
productivity gaps { as well as between-industry ones { and was able to bridge most of these
gaps through physical capital accumulation and TFP growth. One can only presume that
the East will be able to replicate this experience. Furthermore, whatever gaps remain in the
South are due to a failure to catch up in human capital. If anything, then, the Easterners
should do even better in the long run, as they face no permanent handicap arising from human
28capital di￿erentials. But the fact that the within-industry gaps are much larger, coupled with
having to rely exclusively on the \within" margin (and not also on the \between" margin),
suggests that the long run may take a long time to arrive.
7 Conclusions
In 1950, the average Spanish worker generated goods and services worth little more than
60 percent of the goods and services generated by the average French worker. By 1970, the
ratio was 90 percent. How did this happen? The data suggest that a critical mechanism
for Spain’s explosive catch-up has been a vast redeployment of labor out of agriculture and
towards higher value-added sectors. This redeployment was going on in France as well, but
because Spain started out with a much larger agricultural sector, it bene￿ted disproportion-
ately. The sectors receiving these labor ￿ows are presumably more productive because they
are characterized by higher capital intensity and higher total factor productivity. Consistent
with this conjecture, we see Spain’s overall capital-labor ratio and TFP catching up strongly
with France’s. However, a secondary but not trivial part of Spain’s convergence to France
is the catch-up of labor productivity within sectors: For example, Spanish manufacturing
was 60 percent as productive as French manufacturing in 1960, but by 1970 this ratio had
increased to 87 percent. Hence, presumably, not all of the overall convergence in physical
capital and TFP is linked to the structural transformation: Some of it is driven by relative
productivity trends within industries. Despite substantial convergence in sectoral structure,
physical capital per worker, and TFP, Spanish average labor productivity has hovered at
around 90 percent of French average labor productivity since the mid-1970s . Our data indi-
cate that this persistent remaining gap is due mostly to an equally persistent gap in human
capital per worker.
In 2000, the average Polish worker generated goods and services worth 41 percent
of those produced by the average French worker. Various elements contribute to this low
productivity. As was true for Spain in 1960, a substantially large fraction of workers in
Poland is employed in agriculture. The di￿erence between the labor shares of Poland and
France is above 22 percentage points. As was true for Spain then, this disproportionate
share of agriculture ￿ies in the face of economic e￿ciency. The average worker in agriculture
in Poland produces less than 9 percent of what his counterpart produces in France, while
the relative productivities of manufacturing and services are, respectively 40 percent and 56
percent. There is, therefore, substantial scope for e￿cient labor reallocation in the country.
However, these numbers also imply that { once again { as was true for Spain in 1960, there is
also a big margin for within-industry productivity catch-up. Indeed, quantitatively, the case
of Poland is quite di￿erent from the case of Spain, as most of the aggregate productivity gap
29with France is attributable to these within-industry productivity gaps. Hence, for Poland,
the road to convergence passes through physical-capital deepening and TFP gains at the
industry level. This means that convergence may take quite a bit longer. On the other hand,
unlike Spain, Poland could actually look forward to a complete catch-up, as it is not hobbled
by a human-capital handicap.
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33APPENDIX ON SECTORAL DATA
Data on PPP-adjusted real GDP per worker and total employment come from the
Penn World Tables 6.1. Real GDP per worker is the variable RGDPWOK and total em-





Shares of sectoral GDP and sectoral employment were computed from the Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)’s \STAN Database for Industrial
Analysis," Volume 2004, release 03. This database reports the value-added at basic prices
(named VALU) and employment (EMPN) by sector (ISIC Rev. 3) from 1970 to 2000. The
countries covered (and used in our analysis) are: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Repub-
lic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom. There are,
however, missing values for some countries/years, which we completed using the OECD’s \Na-
tional Accounts of OECD Countries" (Detailed Tables, Volume II, 1970-2001). The variables
used are Valu-B (value-added at basic prices), and ETOP (number of persons employed).21
Both STAN and National Accounts are available online through SourceOECD.
For data on sectoral value-added in the period 1950 through 1970, and for missing
values in SourceOECD during 1970 through 2000, we use sectoral value-added from various
printed editions of the OECD’s \National Accounts of OECD Countries" (Volume II). In
particular, for 1950-1965, we use Table 3 of the 1950-1969 Volume. For 1970-1980, we use
Table 12 of the 1970-1982 Volume. For 1985-1990 we use Table 12 of the 1983-1995 Volume,
and for 1995 we use Table 7 of the 1989-2000 Volume. (Note that, while available in the books,
the information is not always provided by the electronic version of \National Accounts of
OECD Countries.")22 For Portugal, \Construction" and \Manufacturing" are aggregated in
21Data for Turkey are available from this source.
22There are some di￿erences in the classi￿cation across books, for which we performed the appropriate
adjustments. In particular, in the ￿rst volume, some countries do not separate between \Mining and Quar-
rying" and \Manufacturing." We created an additional industry (Mining and Quarrying and Manufacturing)
with these aggregated data. For countries that do report separately \Mining and Quarrying" and \Man-
ufacturing," the aggregate industry is the sum of the two. An analogous rationale is behind the sectors
Public administration, education, and health services, which are aggregated under Community Services. To
match the categories between the ￿rst two periods in the books and the latter ones, we match \Banking etc."
with \Finance etc." \Owenrship of dwellings" is always aggregated with \Finance, etc." in the latter issues.
Hence we aggregate them through the whole sample. \Public administration" is matched with \Producers of
Government Services." \Health and Education" is matched with \Community, Social, and Personal Services."
341955; we split them by applying the corresponding shares obtained from Bank of Portugal’s
\S￿ eries Longas para a Economia Portuguesa p￿ os II Guerra Mundial," available online at
http://www.bportugal.pt/.
For sectoral employment information missing from SourceOECD during 1970 through
2000, we use employment data from the International Labor O￿ce (ILO)’s \LABORSTA
Labour Statistics Database," available on line at http://laborsta.ilo.org/. For the period 1950
through 1970, we use data from \ILO Yearbook of Labor Statistics - Retrospective Edition -
Population Censuses," along with three editions (1961, 1966, and 1972) of the Book \ILO
Yearbook of Labor Statistics." The general strategy is to use overlapping years across di￿erent
volumes to construct a consistent series. In the case of Italy, for 1965 we split some sectors
that were aggregated using the corresponding shares of 1966. Still, labor share data were
missing for some country-years. We completed them using Table 1, page 20*, of the \Annuaire
Statistique de la France 1972," edited by the Institut National de la Statisque et des Etudes
Economiques (INSEE). From this report, we used data for France and the United Kingdom
(taking the ￿gures in 1954 in lieu of 1955, which were missing; we also took the averages
between 1958 and 1962 in lieu of 1960, and 1964 in lieu of 1965). We used these data also
for Italy and Spain, in combination with the ILO’s Yearbook of Labor Statistics data (for
1955 we used 1954; for 1960 we used the average of 1958 and 1962). Finally, we ￿lled in data
for Spain in 1965 using data from the book \Poblaci￿ on, Actividad y Ocupaci￿ on en Espa~ na:
Reconstrucci￿ on de la series hist￿ oricas: 1960-1978."
Given that part of the data are based on ISIC. Rev. 1, ISIC Rev. 2 and part are based
on ISIC Rev 3., we converted the data into a maximum common denominator. The resulting
sectors are 1) Agriculture, Fishing, Forestry and Hunting; 2) Manufacturing, Mining and
Quarrying; 3) Construction; 4) Transport, Storage, and Communications; 5) Electricity, Gas,
and Water; and 5) Services (including Trade, Restaurants and Hotels, Finance, Insurance,
Real State and Business Services, and Community, Social, and Personal Services).
For a group of Easterners, SourceOECD has complete data in 2000. This group
includes Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Turkey. For the remaining East-
erners, we took the sectoral shares of GDP and employment from the 2002 regular reports by
the European Economic Commission on each country’s progress towards accession. Hence,
data for Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovenia, and Malta come
from this source.
Sectoral value-added and sectoral employment are obtained by applying the sectoral
shares to total real GDP and employment from the Penn World Tables.
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36                   Figure 2.1: GDP per Worker Relative to France
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38                      Figure 4.1: Capital Intensity and TFP Relative to France
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Greece 0.24 0.10 0.01 0.12 Greece 0.39 0.21 -0.03 0.21 Greece -0.15 -0.10 0.04 -0.09
Portugal 0.37 0.18 -0.04 0.23 Portugal 0.12 0.03 -0.03 0.12 Portugal 0.25 0.15 0.00 0.11
Spain 0.29 0.14 0.00 0.14 Spain 0.39 0.16 -0.06 0.29 Spain -0.10 -0.01 0.06 -0.15
Italy 0.17 0.00 0.02 0.15 Italy 0.08 0.01 -0.02 0.09 Italy 0.10 -0.01 0.04 0.07
Austria 0.20 0.08 -0.02 0.13 Austria 0.12 0.06 -0.05 0.11 Austria 0.08 0.03 0.03 0.02
Germany -0.18 -0.11 0.00 -0.07 Germany -0.06 -0.03 0.01 -0.04 Germany -0.12 -0.07 -0.01 -0.03
Belgium 0.03 -0.08 -0.03 0.15 Belgium 0.00 -0.06 -0.02 0.08 Belgium 0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.06
United Kingdom -0.24 -0.04 -0.05 -0.14 United Kingdom -0.29 -0.04 -0.04 -0.21 United Kingdom 0.05 0.00 -0.01 0.06
Netherlands -0.30 -0.17 0.01 -0.14 Netherlands -0.16 -0.07 -0.01 -0.08 Netherlands -0.14 -0.10 0.03 -0.07
Ireland 0.61 0.11 -0.03 0.54 Ireland -0.03 -0.07 -0.04 0.08 Ireland 0.64 0.18 0.01 0.45
Denmark -0.25 -0.17 -0.14 0.06 Denmark -0.27 -0.11 -0.06 -0.10 Denmark 0.02 -0.06 -0.08 0.15
Sweden -0.33 -0.20 -0.01 -0.11 Sweden -0.20 -0.11 -0.03 -0.06 Sweden -0.13 -0.09 0.01 -0.06
Norway -0.05 -0.16 -0.10 0.21 Norway -0.19 -0.14 -0.06 0.01 Norway 0.13 -0.02 -0.05 0.20

















Greece 0.24 0.00 0.03 0.21 Greece 0.39 0.09 -0.02 0.32 Greece -0.15 -0.09 0.05 -0.11
Portugal 0.37 0.18 -0.05 0.24 Portugal 0.12 0.04 -0.04 0.12 Portugal 0.25 0.14 -0.01 0.12
Spain 0.29 0.24 -0.02 0.07 Spain 0.39 0.22 -0.07 0.24 Spain -0.10 0.03 0.05 -0.17
Italy 0.17 0.04 0.01 0.12 Italy 0.08 0.03 -0.02 0.07 Italy 0.10 0.01 0.03 0.05
Austria 0.20 0.13 -0.03 0.10 Austria 0.12 0.09 -0.05 0.09 Austria 0.08 0.05 0.02 0.01
Germany -0.18 -0.03 -0.02 -0.13 Germany -0.06 0.01 0.00 -0.08 Germany -0.12 -0.04 -0.02 -0.05
Belgium 0.03 -0.07 -0.03 0.13 Belgium 0.00 -0.05 -0.02 0.07 Belgium 0.03 -0.01 -0.02 0.06
United Kingdom -0.24 -0.05 -0.05 -0.14 United Kingdom -0.29 -0.04 -0.04 -0.20 United Kingdom 0.05 -0.01 -0.01 0.07
Netherlands -0.30 -0.07 -0.01 -0.22 Netherlands -0.16 -0.01 -0.02 -0.13 Netherlands -0.14 -0.06 0.01 -0.09
Ireland 0.61 0.10 -0.04 0.55 Ireland -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 0.07 Ireland 0.64 0.15 0.01 0.48
Denmark -0.25 -0.11 -0.16 0.01 Denmark -0.27 -0.07 -0.07 -0.13 Denmark 0.02 -0.03 -0.09 0.14
Sweden -0.33 -0.18 -0.01 -0.14 Sweden -0.20 -0.11 -0.03 -0.06 Sweden -0.13 -0.08 0.02 -0.08
Norway -0.05 -0.01 -0.14 0.09 Norway -0.19 -0.06 -0.07 -0.06 Norway 0.13 0.05 -0.07 0.16
Finland 0.09 0.02 0.04 0.03 Finland -0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.06 Finland 0.12 0.00 0.03 0.09
Table 4.5. Convergence Decomposition with Country
Specific Capital Shares, 1960-1975
Table 4.6. Convergence Decomposition with Country
Specific Capital Shares, 1975-2000
Table 4.1. Convergence Decomposition 1960-2000 Table 4.2. Convergence Decomposition 1960-1975 Table 4.3. Convergence Decomposition 1975-2000
Table 4.4. Convergence Decomposition with Country
Specific Capital Shares, 1960-2000
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Within Industry Labor Reallocation Between Industry








Austria 0.18574 0.19021 -0.01690 0.01243
Belgium 0.03656 0.07528 -0.01508 -0.02364
Denmark -0.29550 -0.29159 0.00174 -0.00566
Finland 0.08694 -0.01294 0.07648 0.02339
Germany -0.18532 -0.17639 0.01365 -0.02259
Greece 0.15108 -0.14367 0.22265 0.07211
Ireland
a 0.66513 0.64484 0.00509 0.01519
Italy 0.17588 -0.01138 0.17731 0.00994
Netherlands -0.37501 -0.23461 -0.12447 -0.01593
Norway -0.05943 0.06120 -0.12580 0.00517
Portugal 0.22085 0.04858 0.13063 0.04164
Spain 0.22670 0.05847 0.14043 0.02780
Sweden -0.35827 -0.36782 0.02396 -0.01440
United Kingdom -0.24639 -0.09833 -0.11848 -0.02958








Austria 100.00% 102.41% -9.10% 6.69%
Belgium 100.00% 205.91% -41.24% -64.67%
Denmark 100.00% 98.68% -0.59% 1.91%
Finland 100.00% -14.88% 87.98% 26.90%
Germany 100.00% 95.18% -7.37% 12.19%
Greece 100.00% -95.09% 147.37% 47.73%
Ireland
a 100.00% 96.95% 0.77% 2.28%
Italy 100.00% -6.47% 100.81% 5.65%
Netherlands 100.00% 62.56% 33.19% 4.25%
Norway 100.00% -102.98% 211.68% -8.70%
Portugal 100.00% 22.00% 59.15% 18.85%
Spain 100.00% 25.79% 61.95% 12.26%
Sweden 100.00% 102.67% -6.69% 4.02%
United Kingdom 100.00% 39.91% 48.09% 12.00%
a The values for Ireland correspond to 1970-2000.
Table 5.1. Convergence Decomposition 1960-2000
 
 
51Country 1960-2000 1960-1975 1975-2000
Austria
a 0.19021 0.17845 0.01176
Belgium 0.07528 -0.01176 0.08704
Denmark -0.29159 -0.33765 0.04606
Finland -0.01294 -0.11098 0.09804
Germany -0.17639 -0.06089 -0.11550
Greece
a -0.14367 0.06531 -0.20898
Ireland
b 0.64484 0.03368 0.61117
Italy -0.01138 -0.04220 0.03083
Netherlands -0.23461 -0.15446 -0.08015
Norway 0.06120 -0.20269 0.26389
Portugal 0.04858 0.00786 0.04071
Spain 0.05847 0.20573 -0.14727
Sweden -0.36782 -0.26671 -0.10111
United Kingdom -0.09833 -0.24155 0.14322
Panel B. Contribution of each subperiod to Within-Industry Convergence
Country 1960-2000 1960-1975 1975-2000
Austria
a 100.00% 93.82% 6.18%
Belgium 100.00% -15.62% 115.62%
Denmark 100.00% 115.80% -15.80%
Finland 100.00% 857.81% -757.81%
Germany 100.00% 34.52% 65.48%
Greece
a 100.00% -45.46% 145.46%
Ireland
b 100.00% 5.22% 94.78%
Italy 100.00% 370.99% -270.99%
Netherlands 100.00% 65.84% 34.16%
Norway 100.00% -331.18% 431.18%
Portugal 100.00% 16.19% 83.81%
Spain 100.00% 351.88% -251.88%
Sweden 100.00% 72.51% 27.49%
United Kingdom 100.00% 245.66% -145.66%
Table 5.2. Within-Industry Convergence. 1960-1975 and 1975-2000.
Panel A. Within-Industry Convergence, by sub-period
a Values for Austria and Greece correspond to the subperiods 1960-1980 and 
1980-2000. 
b Values for Ireland correspond to the subperiods 1970-1975 and 
1975-2000.
 
52Country 1960-2000 1960-1975 1975-2000
Austria
a -0.01690 -0.04635 0.0294519
Belgium -0.01508 -0.01534 0.00026
Denmark 0.00174 -0.01001 0.01175
Finland 0.07648 0.06019 0.01629
Germany 0.01365 0.00791 0.00574
Greece
a 0.22265 0.14552 0.07713
Ireland
b 0.00509 0.00882 -0.00373
Italy 0.17731 0.08253 0.09478
Netherlands -0.12447 -0.07747 -0.04700
Norway -0.12580 -0.02582 -0.09999
Portugal 0.13063 0.06996 0.06067
Spain 0.14043 0.07103 0.06941
Sweden 0.02396 0.01126 0.01269
United Kingdom -0.11848 -0.06430 -0.05418
Panel B. Contribution of each subperiod to Labor Reallocation
Country 1960-2000 1960-1975 1975-2000
Austria
a 100.00% 101.71% -1.71%
Belgium 100.00% 101.71% -1.71%
Denmark 100.00% -573.88% 673.87%
Finland 100.00% 78.70% 21.30%
Germany 100.00% 57.93% 42.07%
Greece
a 100.00% 65.36% 34.64%
Ireland
b 100.00% 173.15% -73.14%
Italy 100.00% 46.55% 53.45%
Netherlands 100.00% 62.24% 37.76%
Norway 100.00% 20.52% 79.48%
Portugal 100.00% 53.55% 46.45%
Spain 100.00% 50.58% 49.42%
Sweden 100.00% 47.01% 52.99%
United Kingdom 100.00% 54.27% 45.73%
Table 5.3. Labor Realllocation. 1960-1975 and 1975-2000
Panel A. Labor Reallocation Convergence, by sub-period
a Values for Austria and Greece correspond to the subperiods 1960-1980 and 
1980-2000. 
b Values for Ireland correspond to the subperiods 1970-1975 and 
1975-2000.
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54                    Figure 6.2: Capital Intensity and TFP Relative to France
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55Table 6.1. The Southerners in 1960 and the Easterners in 2000
Agriculture Manufacturing Services Agriculture Manufacturing Services Manufacturing Services
Spain 1960 0.207 -0.046 -0.144 0.854 0.597 1.036 2.099 2.863
Italy 1960 0.113 -0.017 -0.089 0.940 0.715 1.321 2.283 3.315
Austria 1960 0.017 0.028 -0.060 0.948 0.812 0.803 2.572 1.998
Greece 1960 0.344 -0.144 -0.155 0.565 0.529 1.130 2.815 4.719
Portugal 1960 0.268 -0.091 -0.135 0.571 0.567 0.690 2.977 2.848
Malta 2000 -0.025 0.105 -0.022 1.983 0.829 1.016 0.750 0.779
Estonia 2000 0.028 0.112 -0.091 0.472 0.252 0.400 0.959 1.287
Czech Republic 2000 0.013 0.152 -0.240 0.599 0.392 0.559 1.174 1.420
Cyprus 2000 0.012 -0.015 0.031 0.852 0.644 0.869 1.356 1.551
Hungary 2000 0.024 0.092 -0.160 0.521 0.435 0.556 1.499 1.621
Slovak Republic 2000 0.050 0.098 -0.216 0.379 0.384 0.549 1.821 2.203
Bulgaria 2000 0.225 0.075 -0.213 0.194 0.208 0.320 1.926 2.510
Latvia 2000 0.102 0.052 -0.087 0.150 0.219 0.344 2.628 3.494
Slovenia 2000 0.054 0.167 -0.147 0.359 0.562 0.769 2.810 3.257
Lithuania 2000 0.142 0.059 -0.132 0.184 0.294 0.322 2.868 2.663
Turkey 2000 0.303 0.026 -0.265 0.189 0.331 0.453 3.150 3.647
Romania 2000 0.410 0.065 -0.384 0.072 0.190 0.327 4.728 6.899
Poland 2000 0.220 0.042 -0.263 0.087 0.404 0.568 8.368 9.973
Sectoral Productivity                
Relative to France
Sectoral Productivity Relative 
to Agricultural Productivity
Country Year
Difference in Employment Shares 
Relative to France
 















































































































































































































































































57Table 6.2. Sectoral Sources of Income Gaps
Country Year Total Gap Within Between Covariance
Italy 1960 0.08 0.00 0.12 -0.04
Austria 1960 0.19 0.18 0.00 0.00
Spain 1960 0.49 0.28 0.19 0.02
Greece 1960 0.77 0.33 0.42 0.02
Portugal 1960 1.03 0.65 0.26 0.12
Malta 2000 0.06 0.09 0.02 -0.05
Cyprus 2000 0.24 0.23 0.02 0.01
Slovenia 2000 0.48 0.51 0.07 -0.10
Hunagary 2000 0.93 0.98 0.01 -0.06
Czech Rep. 2000 1.02 1.08 0.04 -0.10
Slovakia 2000 1.08 1.09 0.06 -0.06
Poland 2000 1.43 1.30 0.27 -0.14
Estonia 2000 1.85 1.88 0.04 -0.07
Turkey 2000 2.23 1.91 0.32 0.00
Latvia 2000 2.51 2.42 0.10 -0.01
Lithuania 2000 2.52 2.39 0.09 0.03
Bulgaria 2000 3.13 2.89 0.19 0.05
Romania 2000 4.79 4.09 0.68 0.03
58                     Figure A.1: Two Measures of Years of  Schooling
Greece
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59Comment on  
 
Is Poland the Next Spain? 
 




st 2004 the European Union admitted ten new menbers, primarily from 
Eastern Europe. One of the main reasons why these countries have wanted to join the 
club is the hope that their levels of real labor productivity (GDP per man-hour) will 
converge to the level of Western Europe. This hope is based on the widely noted 
analogy between the Easterners and – some fifty years back – the so called 
Southerners (Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal, and Ireland – a Southerner in spirit). 
These Southerners all had their spurts of above-average productivity growth. For 
example in Spain labor productivity relative to France (the benchmark for the 
“average” European experience) went from roughly 65 percent to over 90 percent. To 
varying degrees, the Easterners’ current relative labor productivities are similar to the 
relative labor productivities of the Southerners before their convergence spurts. 
Caselli and Tenreyro’s aim is to look behind the aggregate labor productivity numbers 
and present a few different approaches to decompose the overall convergence 
experience into more disaggregated processes. The result of this exercise can then be 
used to assess the supposed “road to convergence” of the new EU members. 
 
The convergence experiences of the Southerners can be explained in at least four 
different (but not mutually exclusive) ways. These are: 
1.  Solovian convergence. Initially capital-poor countries have higher marginal 
productivities of capital (capital deepening). 
2.  Technological catch-up. Countries initially behind the world technology 
frontier experience faster improvements in technology than the leaders (TFP 
growth). 
3.  Gains from trade. Poorer countries – due to their initially more autarchic status 
– experience larger gains from trade as a proportion of GDP than rich 
countries. 4.  Structural transformation. Poor countries undergo more radical structural 
transformations (resource reallocation from low-productivity to high-
productivity sectors) than rich countries. 
 
Casselli and Tenreyro show that, concerning the Western European convergence 
experience, the gains from trade hypothesis has not been a critical source of catching 
up. Instead, large labor reallocations towards more productive sectors have 
contributed substantially to the convergence experience. Moreover, substantial within-
industry labor productivity convergence has occurred due to capital deepening and 
technical change. 
 
What can we learn from the experience of the Southerners with regard to the 
prospects of convergence in the East? While a big part of the convergence in the 
South was caused by structural transformation, these potential – and relatively easy – 
gains constitute a relatively small share of the overall income gap in the East. A large 
share of the income gap is due to sizable within-industry productivity gaps. 
Convergence in the East, then, should presumably take place through – relatively hard 
– physical capital accumulation and TFP growth. A positive result for the East is the 
fact that there does not seem to be a human capital gap. As the income gap that still 
remains in the South is due to a failure to catch up in human capital, the Easterners 
should do even better in the long run. But the fact that the within-industry gaps are 
much larger, coupled with having to rely exclusively on the “within’ margin, suggests 
that the long run may take a long time to arrive. 
 
This analysis gives us valuable insights and information concerning the European 
convergence experience, past and future. The Easterners can be reassured that 
convergence will most probably take place, although they should expect convergence 
to be slow. Moreover, the analysis points out which types of convergence they should 
focus on. This gives the policymakers in the East a good idea which kind of policies 
they should be considering; i.e. policies directed towards technological catch up and 
capital accumulation. However, although labor reallocations towards more productive 
sectors represent just a small fraction of the income gap, they would still make a 
substantial difference in absolute terms. Hence, it is also important to pursue this 
route, as these reallocations will arguably raise income levels more quickly than TFP growth and capital accumulation. In addition, this will give the citizens of these 
countries a clear indication that their hope is not futile. 
 
Two remarks remain. One major puzzling result in the empirical analysis on total 
factor productivity growth is that TFP was not always initially lower in poor 
countries. This is not only hard to reconcile with catch-up theories of technological 
diffusion, it is simply not a very plausible outcome. One possible explanation is that 
the initial capital stock is not correctly specified. The construction of human capital 
stocks, only based on years of schooling, is also subject to caution. Educational 
qualifications may be relatively easy to measure, but offer only a poor proxy for 
human capital. What one wants is a direct measure of economically relevant skills. 
 
Another remark concerns the convergence accounting exercise. The purpose of this 
exercise is to calculate the contributions of (relative) physical capital, human capital, 
and TFP growth to changes in (relative) incomes. Caselli and Tenreyro conclude that 
– as a general rule – Western European convergence is attributable in roughly equal 
parts to faster capital accumulation and technological improvement by the poorer 
countries. However, as technological improvements imply faster capital 
accumulation, the ultimate source of convergence may be just technological progress. 
At least, part of the faster capital accumulation is caused by faster TFP growth, 
implying a larger contribution from TFP growth. 
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11 Introduction
There is a considerable heterogeneity across OECD countries in the variance of annual GDP
growth rates. This variance ranges from 25% and 15% for Greece and Japan in the 1961 to
1983 period down to 1.7% and 1.3% for France and Italy for 1984 to 2003. Empirical studies
show further that countries have breaks in their variance of growth rates over time (e.g. Kim
and Nelson, 1999; McConnell and Perez-Quiros, 2000; Stock and Watson, 2003). Do these
diﬀerences in volatility have only external causes such as terms of trade shocks, monetary or
exogenous productivity shocks? Or is growth volatility of a country an endogenous, natural
phenomenon of any growing economy and thereby also a function of various fundamentals
of the economy under consideration, including economic policy? Stock and Watson (2003),
surveying the literature on the ”big moderation”, attribute (roughly and with caveats) one
quarter of the moderation in volatility in the US to improved policy, one quarter to good
luck (lower volatility of productivity and commodity price shocks) and 50% to "unknown
forms of good luck".
This paper provides a theory of volatility that helps understanding some possible deeper
reasons behind these various sources of volatility. It is part of a small but rapidly growing
literature that integrates endogenous short-run ﬂuctuations with endogenous long-run growth
(e.g. Bental and Peled, 1996; Matsuyama, 1999; Wälde, 1999, 2002, 2005; Francois and
Lloyd-Ellis, 2003; Maliar and Maliar, 2004, Phillips and Wrase, 20052). It argues that
volatility of a country can be viewed to be something natural, inherently linked to its growth
process. As a consequence, volatility is just as endogenous as is the GDP growth rate.
Sustained per-capita growth is obtained by R&D causing jumps of technological frontiers
(as in Aghion and Howitt, 1992 or Aghion, 2002). The resulting step function of labour
productivity implies that growth and volatility can be traced back to the same source.3
In this setup, volatility and long-run growth result primarily (but not exclusively) from the
introduction of new technologies. "Lower volatility of productivity" or "other unknown forms
of good luck" can therefore be traced back to changes in fundamentals of the economy. As
both long-run growth and short-run volatility are endogenous and therefore react to changes
in policy, we can analyze to what extent policy changes aﬀect volatility and growth at the
same time or independently of each other. Understanding breaks over time for e.g. the US
seems to require a break in volatility without a break in the growth trend (McConnell and
Perez-Quiros, 2000). In a model without an explicit analysis of growth, such a simultaneous
analysis would not be possible.
We analyze two measures of volatility: the variance of the growth rate of the economy,
a widely used measure in empirical regression work (e.g. Ramey and Ramey, 1995), and
2These papers share the view that intentional investment into R&D can not only explain long-run growth
but also short-run ﬂuctuations - without invoking exogenous disturbances to the economy. At the risk
of simplifying too much, short-run ﬂuctuations and long-run growth result from the introduction of more
productive technologies as new technologies increase TFP by a discrete amount, similar to a step function,
and not smoothly and continuously as in standard models. Due to the explicit modelling of R&D processes,
these models can be viewed to represent industrialized economies. Aghion, Banerjee and Piketty (1999)
analyse an AK-type economy with borrowing constraints and investors and savers that are distinct agents.
They ﬁnd that when ”the separation <b e t w e e ni n v e s t o r sa n ds a v e r s > is large but not too large <...> we
observe short-run instability” (p. 1375). If the separation is too large, there would be a permanent slump.
Without separation, the economy converges to balanced growth. Hence, their intermediate case with growth
and ﬂuctuations seems to best describe developing countries.
3Stochastic models of this theoretical literature therefore share Beveridge and Nelson‘s (1981) econometric
view that trend and cycle are driven by the same shock, i.e. (here) jumps in the technological frontier.
2the coeﬃcient of variation for cyclical components of time series, similar to those used in
the RBC literature. It turns out that the variance of the growth rate does not - due to its
complexity - lend itself to an intuitive theoretical analysis. Cyclical components have very
simple moments, however, that reveal insightful relationships between model parameters
and volatility. All measures are obtained analytically due to assuming a simple parameter
restriction.
A question that arises immediately in a ﬂuctuating economy asks whether higher or lower
volatility should give rise to policy concerns. One possible answer to this question is a clear
’No’. The RBC approach is built (at least initially) on the belief that agents adjust optimally
to a ﬂuctuating world where markets are perfect and factor allocation is eﬃcient (Kydland
and Prescott, 1982; Long and Plosser, 1983)4. Lucas (1987, 2003) and others (surveyed
in Lucas, 2003) show that, even in such a perfect world, welfare gains from removing all
volatility do exist in principle (due to risk-aversion of households) but are quantitatively
small. They amount to ”about one-twentieth of 1 percent of consumption”.5
The present paper argues that the belief that volatility per se is not an argument for
welfare concerns in the Lucas sense is true indeed - as long as one beliefs that the engines of
growth in an economy work under the absence of any imperfections as well. This assump-
tion is implicit in standard RBC models where the growth process - in the Solow tradition
- is viewed as exogenous. It is then easy to imagine indeed that in a perfectly competitive
economy adjustment to exogenous disturbances takes place in an eﬃcient way. This paper
starts from the belief that (empirically speaking: at least to some extent) ﬂuctuations in
an economy are the result of the same type of technological progress that causes long-run
growth. As the source of long-run growth and therefore short-run ﬂuctuations is explicitly
modelled, this endogeneity introduces various types of imperfections. Hence, if one believes
that sources of growth are endogenous and taking the lessons from the ”new” growth the-
ory seriously (where it might be diﬃcult in R&D based models to justify that endogenous
technological progress comes along without any externalities), ﬂuctuations go hand in hand
with imperfections. This is true even in our setup where all ﬁrms operate under perfect
competition, including R&D ﬁrms.6
We will see that an economy with exogenous growth and ﬂuctuations is a special case of
our more general model. In this special case, which could be argued to reﬂect the standard
RBC approach, ﬂuctuations and eﬃciency are no contradiction. In the general case with en-
dogenous long-run growth and endogenous short-run ﬂuctuations, ﬂuctuations and eﬃciency
contradict each other. Here as well, a simple parameter restriction allows us to derive a very
intuitive closed form expression for the value function - the standard measure of welfare.
We relate our analysis of endogenous volatility and welfare to taxation for two reasons:
First, there is a considerable heterogeneity in tax systems across countries and over time
(e.g. Mendoza, Tesar and Razin, 1994; Padovano and Galli, 2001). For the US, two major
tax reforms, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (see
e.g. Auerbach and Slemrod, 1997), took place around the point in time where the break in
4More recent work, analysing international linkages under imperfections or monetary business cycles
under price staggering, include Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2000) or Kehoe and Perri (2002).
5Epaulart and Pommeret (2003), Krebs (2003) or Barlevy (2004) ﬁnd that welfare gains from less volatility
can be substantially larger and increase up to several percentage points. Lucas (2003) argues that welfare
gains remain small under realistic parameter assumptions.
6There are by now various papers that stress that R&D and perfect competition does not contradict each
other. The ﬁrst paper seems to be Funk (1996). Later work includes Boldrin and Levine (2004), Hellwig
and Irmen (2001) and Wälde (2002).
3GDP volatility is usually identiﬁed (between the 4th quarter of 1982 and 3rd quarter of 1985,
according to Stock and Watson, 2003). It is therefore natural to ask whether tax reforms
or cross-country diﬀerences in tax systems are candidates for understanding diﬀerences in
volatility. It is generally accepted that taxes can aﬀe c tt h eg r o w t hr a t eo fac o u n t r yo r
its natural rate of unemployment - they could therefore also aﬀect its natural amount of
volatility. Second, the ineﬃciency introduced by the endogeneity of R&D and volatility can
in principle be eliminated by appropriate taxes and subsidies. We do not require that the
government has a lot of information about the current state of the economy and assume that
it sets constant, i.e. time- and state-invariant, taxes on labour and capital income, wealth,
consumption, investment and R&D.
Talking more precisely about our results, one contribution is the derivation of analytical
measures of volatility in a model characterized by ”standard” properties: inﬁnite planning
horizon of the representative agent, standard intertemporal optimization decisions concern-
ing savings and investment under risk aversion, uncertainty from properties of technologi-
cal progress and perfect competition for all production processes. Analytical measures for
volatility (and also welfare) can be obtained by assuming a simple parameter restriction.
Analyzing the behaviour of an economy for restrictions of this type has turned out to be
very useful (e.g. Long and Plosser, 1983; Xie, 1991; Benhabib and Rustichini, 1994; Wälde,
2005). This restriction allows us to represent equilibrium properties of our economy by a
simple linear stochastic diﬀerential equation for instantaneous utility. Using the methods
presented by Garcia and Griego (1994), we can then analytically compute moments of time
series as predicted by our model. We then use the coeﬃcient of variation as our measure of
volatility.
This parameter restriction also allows us to compute an explicit expression for welfare.
In doing so, we obtain a deterministic diﬀerential equation that describes how the economy
evolves in an expected sense, i.e. how expected instantaneous utility evolves for τ>t ,where
t is today. This diﬀerential equation nicely shows that our economy behaves in this expected
sense exactly as a deterministic Solow growth economy behaves with a ﬁxed saving rate.
Intuitively speaking, our stochastic economy turns out to be a Solow growth economy where
labour productivity increases at (endogenous and optimally chosen) random points in time
by discrete amounts.
Concerning the eﬀects of taxation on volatility, we ﬁnd that volatility is aﬀected through
three channels: The speed of convergence, the expected length of a cycle and the degree
how strongly cyclical components are thrown back once a new technology arrives. All of
these three channels can be easily related to properties of transitional paths towards some
steady state. As taxes aﬀect transitional paths of various economic variables, taxation aﬀects
volatility. For the equilibrium we analyze, taxes on labour and capital income and invest-
ment goods increase volatility, taxes on R&D and wealth have a stabilizing eﬀect, a tax on
consumption goods is neutral. A stabilization policy does not require knowledge about the
current state of the economy. Taxes are constant and thereby time- and state-invariant.
Nevertheless, higher or lower tax levels can stabilize or destabilize the economy.
Our welfare analysis shows that taxes on investment goods and R&D directly aﬀect the
source of volatility and growth, i.e. the portfolio choice between capital accumulation and
R&D, and can therefore be used to internalize externalities. All other taxes are welfare
reducing, given that they are used for some exogenous government expenditure (which, for
simplicity, is modelled to have no welfare or productivity eﬀect). When we look at the
eﬀects of taxes on volatility and welfare jointly, it turns out that stabilizing an economy
is not necessarily welfare increasing. Increasing a tax on wealth or factor income reduces
4welfare, but the tax on factor income increases volatility while the tax on wealth reduces
volatility. The objective of government intervention should be to internalize external eﬀects,
as in standard public ﬁnance approaches. The eﬃcient factor allocation would then be
characterized by a certain corresponding amount of volatility. The causal link from volatility
to welfare in the Lucas sense is therefore opened up with endogenous volatility and implies
that one can only talk of (positive or negative) correlations between volatility and welfare.
Clearly, the (in-)eﬃciency of ﬂuctuations has been discussed or analyzed at least since
Keynes’s General Theory. In contrast to the traditional RBC approach referred to above,
many authors have stressed various types of ineﬃciencies in the economy which arise or are
ampliﬁed because of ﬂuctuations. In the recent literature, Aghion, Banerjee and Picketty
(1999), also referred to above, argue that ﬂuctuations contain phases where "savings are
underutilized in the sense of being invested in an inferior asset". More quantitatively, Gali,
Gertler and Lopez (2003) compute gains from stabilization that arise because of an ineﬃcient
factor allocation and the asymmetry of changes in ineﬃciencies over the cycle. Greenwood
and Huﬀman (1991) study an economy whose ineﬃciency stems from taxation and ﬁnd that
a stabilization policy that builds on information about the current state of the economy is
welfare improving. None of these papers stresses the ineﬃciency resulting from the joint
endogeneity of long-run growth and short-run ﬂuctuations. With exogenous growth and
ﬂuctuations, ﬂuctuations are eﬃcient, with endogenous ﬂuctuations, they are not.
From a more positive (and not normative) perspective, understanding and explaining
the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy has a long tradition as well. Greenwood and Huﬀman (1991)
ﬁnd, following a RBC-type calibration approach, that taxes on average amplify variability
of macroeconomic aggregates. Jones (2002) ﬁnds in his mainly econometric analysis that
ﬁscal policy in the US (captured by the tax rates on labour and capital income and gov-
ernment purchases from 1958 to 1997) has not stabilized the economy to a strong degree.
Burnside, Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004) argue that increases in US government military
purchases increase tax rates on capital and labour income which in turn increase aggre-
gate hours worked and decrease real wages. They argue that the neoclassical growth model
can reasonably replicate these links. Fatás and Mihov (2003) empirically analyze the link
between discretionary government spending and volatility and ﬁnd that "aggressive use of
ﬁscal policy generates undesirable volatility and leads to lower economic growth". To the
best of our knowledge, ours is the ﬁrst paper that proposes an explicit analytical expression
for volatility. This expression allows to understand the diﬀerent channels through which tax
policy aﬀects volatility. As we keep taxes constant, we highlight that a volatile economy is
not necessarily the result of large variations in tax rates over time but could be the result of
a too high or too low level of constant tax rates. Hence, breaks over time can result from a
single change of a tax rate and cross-country diﬀerences result from diﬀerences in tax levels.7
2T h e m o d e l
The model will be presented in three parts: technologies, the government and consumers.
As the technological setup of our economy is close to the one in Wälde (2005), the ﬁrst part
will be relatively brief. The introduction of government activities and the implications for
household behavior are new and will be presented in more detail.
7From a modeling perspective, the present paper uses the model developed in Wälde (2005) and extends
it for various tax rates and the government sector. The methods of Garcia and Griego (1994), on which most
of our results here are based, were not used in Wälde (2005).
52.1 Technologies
Technological progress is labour augmenting and embodied in capital. All capital goods can
be identiﬁed by a number denoting their date of manufacture and therefore their vintage.
A capital good Kj of vintage j allows workers to produce with a labour productivity Aj,
where A>1 is a constant parameter. Hence, a more modern vintage j +1implies a labour
productivity that is A times higher than labour productivity of vintage j. The corresponding
production function reads Yj = Kα
j (AjLj)1−α, where the amount of labour allocated to that
vintage is denoted by Lj and 0 <α<1 is the output elasticity of capital. The sum of labour
employment Lj per vintage equals aggregate constant labour supply,
Pq
j=0 Lj = L where q
is the most advanced vintage currently available.
Independently of which vintage is used, the same type of output is produced. Aggregate
output is used for producing consumption goods C, investment goods I, as an input R for
doing R&D and for government expenditures G,
C + I + R + G = Y = Σ
q
j=0Yj. (1)
The quantities C, I and R stand for net resources used for these activities, i.e. after taxation.
All activities in the economy take place under perfect competition. The producer prices of
the production, consumption, investment and research good will therefore be identical,
pY = pC = pI = pR. (2)
R&D is a risky activity. This is modelled by the Poisson process q where the probability
per unit of time dt of an innovation, i.e. of successful R&D, is given by λdt,w h e r eλ is the
arrival rate of q. At the level of an individual R&D ﬁrm f, there are constant returns to
scale and the ﬁrm arrival rate is λf = D−1h(R/D)Rf, where D captures the ”diﬃculty”
of doing R&D, h(·) is an externality and Rf are resources used by the ﬁrm. The diﬃculty
function D and the externality h(·) are taken as given. As ﬁrm-level Poisson processes qf














, 0 <γ<1, (3)
at the sectoral level where h(·) implies decreasing returns to scale.
The exogenous function D captures the diﬃculty to make an invention. Following the
arguments in Segerstrom (1998), an economy that discovered already many innovations needs
to put more eﬀort into a new innovation if this innovation is to come at the same rate λ.
While the amount of innovations in the past can be measured in diﬀerent ways, we simply
capture it by the tax-independent current size Kobs
∗ of the capital stock of the economy,
D ≡ D0K
obs
∗ ,D 0 > 0. (4)
This measure of the capital stock will be deﬁn e di n( 1 2 ) .
The objective of R&D is to develop capital goods that yield a higher labour productivity
than existing capital goods. When an innovation takes place, a ﬁrst prototype of a production
unit of size κ that yields a labour productivity of Aq+1 becomes available. This distinguishes
this approach from standard modeling of R&D where successful R&D is argued to lead
to a blueprint only. As seems to be common in many cases (Rosenberg, 1994), only the
development of a ﬁrst "pioneer plant" that can be used for production characterizes success
6of research. Technically, this implies that the capital stock of vintage q +1is a function of
the Poisson process q as well. The increment dq of this process can either be 0 or 1.A s
successful research means dq =1 ,w ec a nw r i t e
dKq+1 = κdq. (5)
T h es i z eo ft h ep r o t o t y p ei se x o g e n o u st ot h em o d e l . W ek e e pi tp r o p o r t i o n a lt ot h et a x -
independent size Kobs
∗ of the total capital stock,
κ ≡ κ0K
obs
∗ , 0 <κ 0 ¿ 1. (6)
When resources are allocated to capital accumulation, the capital stock of vintage j
increases if investment in vintage j exceeds depreciation δ,
dKj =( Ij − δKj)dt, j =0 ,...,q. (7)
In contrast to R&D, this is a deterministic process as capital accumulation simply means
replicating existing machines.
Allowing labour to be mobile across all vintages such that wage rates equalize, total




where vintage speciﬁc capital stocks have been aggregated to an aggregate capital index K,








This index can be thought of as counting the ”number of machines” of vintage 0 that would
be required to produce the same output Y as with the current mix of vintages.
The evolution of the capital index K follows from (5) and (7) by applying the change of
variable formula (CVF)8 to (9),
dK =( B
qI − δK)dt + B
q+1κdq. (10)
The capital index increases continuously as a function of eﬀective investment BqI minus
depreciation. When an innovation takes place, the capital index increases by Bq+1κ.
2.2 Government
The government can levy taxes on capital (τK) and labour income (τL), wealth (τW), con-
sumption expenditure (τC), investment (τI)a n dR & De x p e n d i t u r e( τR). A positive tax
implies a real decrease in income or an increase in the eﬀective price (consumer price),
whereas a negative tax is a subsidy. The government uses taxation to provide basic govern-
ment services G like rule of law. In order to focus on the eﬀects of taxation from government
expenditures, we assume that government expenditure does not aﬀect household utility or
production possibilities of the economy.
8In models with Brownian motion as a source of uncertainty, the ”rules” for computing diﬀerentials are
based on Ito’s Lemma. The expression Ito’s Lemma is inappropriate in the presence of Poisson processes
and the diﬀerentials are obtained from a change of variable formula. See e.g. Garcia and Griego (1994) and
Sennewald (2005) for a rigorous background and Sennewald and Wälde (2005) for an introduction.
7As argued in (2), producer prices are identical for all three production processes. When
consumption and investment goods C and I or research services R are sold, they are taxed
diﬀerently such that consumer prices are (1 + τC)pC, (1 + τI)pI, (1 + τR)pR. In order to
rule out arbitrage between diﬀerent types of goods, we assume that once a unit of production
is assigned for a special purpose, it is useless for other purposes: once a consumption good
is acquired, it cannot be used for e.g. investment purposes.
Taxes that increase the producer price have no theoretical upper bound. A 300% tax on
the consumption good would imply that 3/4 of the price are taxes going to the state and
1/4 goes to the producer. Their lower bound is clearly −100%, where a good would be for
free for the purchaser. The upper bound for taxes on income is 100% (instant conﬁscation
of income), while there is no lower bound. Hence, −1 <τ C,τI,τR and τL,τK,τW < 1.
Our capital stock index K in (9) measures the size of the capital stock in units of vintage
0. Measured in units of vintage q, its size is B−qK. This is also the value of the entire capital
stock in pre-tax units of the consumption good, as the relative pre-tax prices are unity from
(2). Measuring wealth in after-tax prices, i.e. in ”purchasing power” terms, the price of the
capital good increases by the tax τI and the price to be paid for one unit of the consumption
good increases by τC. Hence, total wealth in the economy is given by
K





where a is wealth of the representative household. The tax-independent measure of the









The economy is populated by a discrete ﬁnite number of suﬃciently small representative
households. They maximize expected utility U(t), given by the "sum" of instantaneous













,σ > 0. (14)
T h eb u d g e tc o n s t r a i n tr e ﬂects investment possibilities in this economy and the impact of
t a xp o l i c ya n ds h o w sh o ww e a l t ha evolves over time. Households can invest in a risky asset
by ﬁnancing R&D and in an (instantaneously) riskless asset by accumulating capital. We
measure wealth in units of the consumption good, priced at consumer prices. The budget
9For analytical convenience and readability, we neglect the term −(1 − σ)
−1 , which is sometimes included
in the instantaneous utility function.






































Nominal gross capital income
Pq+1
j=0 wK
j kj from all vintages j is taxed at τK, yielding net
capital income. Dividing by the consumer price (1 + τC)pC of the consumption good gives
real net capital income in units of the consumption good. The same reasoning applies to
labour income w, consumption c and investment i into R&D. The expression on the ﬁrst
line therefore captures the increase in wealth a, measured in units of the consumption good
at consumer prices. The ﬁrst expression on the second line captures the wealth-reducing
eﬀect of the after-tax depreciation rate and of the tax on wealth. The tax rates τK and τI
in front of the depreciation rate ensure that taxes are partly refunded i.e. only net (and not
gross) investment will be taxed (cf. eqs. (A.14) and (A.2)). The second expression increases
an individual’s wealth in case of successful research by the "dividend payments" minus an
economic depreciation term. Dividend payments at the household level are given by the share
i/R of the successful research project the household ﬁnanced times total dividend payments
1+τI
1+τCκ. Dividend payments are determined by the size κ of the prototype times its after-
tax price (1 + τI)/(1 + τC) in units of the consumption good.10 The term 1+τI implies
that research yields not only a capital good (which would have a value of pI) but already an
installed capital good (whose value is (1 + τI)pI). Economic depreciation (B − 1)/B results
from the vintage capital structure as the most advanced capital good has a relative price of
unity (cf. (2)) and all other vintages then lose in value relative to the consumption good.
After some further steps (especially the pricing equations for vj), and using the notation
















1+τCκ, s ≡ B−1


















3 Endogenous cyclical growth
3.1 Equilibrium
Solving the model requires ﬁrst order conditions for households for consumption and R&D
expenditure. These two conditions, together with the aggregate capital accumulation con-
straint (10), the goods market equilibrium (1), optimality conditions of perfectly competitive
ﬁrms and a certain taxation policy ﬁxing G provides a system consisting of 7 equations that
determines, given initial conditions, the time paths of K, C, R, Y, T, w and r.
10We use the term dividend payments in a narrow sense, i.e. only for payments from successful R&D.
Data on dividend payments would also include part of factor rewards r for capital.
9Such a system can best be understood by introducing auxiliary variables that are similarly
used in many other models as well: In the classic Solow growth model, capital per eﬀective
worker K/(AL) is shown to converge to a steady state and the analysis of e.g. convergence
can be separated from the analysis of long-run growth. In the present context, we deﬁne
ˆ K (τ) and ˆ C (τ) as
ˆ K (t) ≡ K (t)/A
q(t)/α, ˆ C (t) ≡ C (t)/A
q(t) (17)
which is almost identical to capital and consumption per eﬀective worker as labor supply is
constant here. These variables also allow us to separate the analysis of cyclical properties
of the model from long-run growth. Most of the time, we will call ˆ K (τ) and ˆ C (τ) cyclical
components of K (t) and C (t), as Aq(t)/α and Aq(t) will turn out to be the stochastic trend
in our economy.
”Detrending” in (17) is undertaken by dividing by measures of the current technology
level that diﬀers between capital and consumption. This is due to the fact that K (t) is a
capital index and not capital expressed in units of the consumption good. Capital measured
in units of the consumption good would be detrended by Aq(t) as well. When detrending other
endogenous variables by Aq(t) as well, these detrended variables turn out to be stationary
and within a bounded range. Equilibrium properties can therefore best be illustrated by
studying an equilibrium in cyclical components which consists of a system in 7 equations
and 7 cyclical components as well.
3.2 An explicit solution
It would be interesting to analyze such a system in all generality. One would run the risk,
however, of losing the big picture and rather be overwhelmed by many small results. We
therefore restrict ourselves to a particular parameter set of the model that allows very sharp
analytical results.
Theorem 1 If the preference parameter σ of the utility function satisﬁes the relationship
σ =
(1 − τK)α
1 − τL − (τK − τL)α
, (18)
we obtain a linear solution for consumption and research
ˆ C = Ψ ˆ K, ˆ R = Γ ˆ K, (19)















































w h e r ew ed e ﬁned
ξ ≡ 1 − s + κ0. (23)
10Proof. App. B.1.4.
Parameter restrictions as in (18) have proven useful to derive equilibrium properties which
otherwise would not be easily visible (e.g. Long and Plosser, 1983; Xie, 1991; Benhabib and
Rustichini, 1994; Wälde, 2005). What is peculiar about this condition is that a change
in the tax rate τL or τK would at constant α require a change in σ for the closed form
solution to prevail. As a change in preference or technology parameters following a change
in policy is not convincing, we will restrict our policy analyses to identical income tax rates,
i.e. τL = τK ≡ τF. This simpliﬁes (18) to11
σ = α. (24)
We will assume in what follows that ξ<1 in (23), i.e. economic depreciation s due to the
innovation is larger than the relative size of dividend payments κ0.
3.3 Cyclical growth
Exploiting the implications of theorem 1 fully, we can summarize general-equilibrium behav-
iour of agents in a way as simple as e.g. in the Solow growth model with exogenous growth
a n dac o n s t a n ts a v i n gr a t e ,e v e nt h o u g hw eh a v ef o r w a r d - l o o k i n ga g e n t sa n da nu n c e r t a i n
environment. In terms of cyclical components, our economy follows (19) and (app. B.1.3)
d ˆ K =
³






















¢ ˆ Kdq, (26)
































The diﬀerential equation (25) is the capital accumulation constraint (10), expressed for
cyclical components and satisfying utility-maximizing behaviour of agents. Inserting (19)
and some further steps (app. B.2.1) give the one-dimensional stochastic diﬀerential equation
(26) in ˆ K.
Note that the expressions containing parameters b0 and b1 have an economic meaning:
the ﬁrst term represents cyclical output of this economy, reduced by taxation. This is visible
from ˆ Y = ˆ KαL1−α (app. B.1.3). The b1 term represents resource allocation to R&D and
consumption, in addition to physical capital depreciation, all corrected for taxation. As
(26) shows, b1 also captures the speed of convergence of ˆ K relative to its steady state. The
11The parameter restriction σ = α implies a relatively high intertemporal elasticity of substitution σ−1 of
above unity. Wether the intertemporal elasticity of substitution implied by this restriction is plausible or not
(for a discussion, see Wälde, 2005), the relevance of our results depends only on whether one believes that
changes in σ will fundamentally change our insights. As will turn out further below, this is not the case.
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Figure 1: General equilibrium dynamics of the capital stock per eﬀective worker and GDP
growth cycles
The ﬁgure on the left plots ˆ K on the horizontal axis and the proportional (deterministic
part of the) change d ˆ K/ˆ K on the vertical one. The steady state ˆ K∗ to which the economy


























where we used (28) for the second equality.
We can now start our analysis as we do in deterministic models. Assume an initial capital
stock ˆ K0. Agents invest part of their savings in R&D, the rest goes to capital accumulation.
Assuming a certain length of time without jumps, i.e. without successful innovation, the
economy grows due to more capital and converges to the steady state ˆ K∗. As in the Solow
model, growth is initially high and approaches zero. Once a jump occurs and q increases
by 1, the capital stock of the economy increases by the size κ of the prototype from (5). If
the capital stock K remained unchanged, capital per eﬀective worker ˆ K (τ) from (17) would
decreases by a discrete amount as the frontier technology increases by the discrete amount
A. When we assume that the size of the new machine is suﬃciently small relative to the
technological improvement, A−1ξ<1 (which is the only empirically plausible assumption
and which also follows from our assumption after (23)), the cyclical component ˆ K (τ) falls
due to an innovation, i.e. the economy is thrown back towards the origin in ﬁg. 1. With a
lower capital stock per eﬀective worker, investment in capital accumulation becomes more
proﬁtable as the marginal productivity of capital is higher. Growth rates jump to a higher
level and approach zero again unless a new innovation takes place.
The discrete increases of labour productivity by A imply a step function in TFP - in
contrast to the smooth increase in TFP in balanced growth models. The implied evolution
of GDP is shown in the right panel of ﬁg. 1. Fluctuations are natural in a growing economy.
124 Measuring welfare and volatility
4.1 The value function
O u rm e a s u r eo fw e l f a r ei st h ev a l u ef u n c t i o nw h i c h ,b yd e ﬁnition, is V (t) ≡ max{c(τ),i(τ)}
Et
R ∞
t e−ρ[τ−t]u(c(τ))dτ. Pulling the expectations operator into the integral gives






Obviously, the value of the optimal program depends on the evolution of expected instanta-
neous utility, Etu(c(τ)).12
4.1.1 Evolution of expected instantaneous utility
Let us now analyze how expected instantaneous utility,
m1 (τ) ≡ Etu(c(τ)), (31)
evolves. For notational simplicity, we denote
Θ ≡ A
1−σ, Ξ = ξ
1−σ. (32)
Computing expected quantities as in (31) can be done in two ways. Either, a stochastic
diﬀerential equation is expressed in its integral version, expectations operators are applied
and the resulting deterministic diﬀerential equation is solved. Or, the stochastic diﬀerential
equation is solved directly and then expectation operators are applied. The background for
either approach is in Garcia and Griego (1994). We follow the ﬁrst way here.







dt − b2u(t)dq(t), (33)
where b0 and b1 are as in (27) and (28) and
b2 ≡ 1 − Ξ (34)
can be understood as a measure of the "novelty" of a new technology. When A is high, b2
is high as well as a high degree of novelty increases b2 t h r o u g hh i g he c o n o m i cd e p r e c i a t i o n
s, deﬁned before (16). Note that we assume b2 > 0 which holds due to the plausibility
assumption of ξ<1 made after (23). This diﬀerential equation shows that u(t) behaves
similarly to ˆ K illustrated in ﬁg. 1. Starting from some u0,u(t) m o v e st o w a r d st h ec u r r e n t
steady state b0Θq(t)/b1 as long as no technology jump takes place, i.e. as long as dq =0 .W h e n
q jumps, u(t) reduces by a small amount as agents postpone consumption13 and as a fraction
12The integral and the expectations operator can be exchanged when, under a technical condition, both
the expected integral, i.e. our objective function (13), and the integral of the expected expression exist. The
expected integral exists by assumption as otherwise the maximization problem of the household would be
meaningless. The existence of the integral of the expected expression will be shown by computing it. The
existence proof is therefore an ex-post proof. We are grateful to Ken Sennewald for discussions of this issue.
13This is due to σ = α and the implied intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Under an alternative
condition and closed form solution, consumption would not decrease (Wälde, 2005, footnote 20). The
behavior of the utility level after a technological jump is not important for subsequent results. The σ = α
assumption would also matter for the link between growth and uncertainty (cf. e.g. de Hek 1999).
13of their wealth depreciates economically. The diﬀerence to ˆ K consists in the behaviour of the
current steady state. As u(t) is the level of utility and not its cyclical component or utility
per representative worker, the steady state moves to the right with each new technology.
A f t e ra ni n n o v a t i o na n dt h es u b s e q u e n tr e d u c t i o ni nu(t), instantaneous utility approaches
this new steady state until the next jump occurs - similar to GDP in ﬁg. 1.
Given this stochastic diﬀerential equation and forming expectations about u(τ) for τ>t
leads to a deterministic ordinary diﬀerential equation in m1 (τ). Computing a solution for
this ODE is possible as its non-linearity can be removed by a variable transformation similar
to the approach for the deterministic Solow growth model (e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin,
1995, p. 53). Deﬁning g a st h eg r o w t hr a t ea n dβ as the convergence rate of expected utility
m1(τ) (and keeping the diﬀerence to b1 in (28), the speed of convergence of ˆ K, in mind),
g ≡ (Θ − 1)λ, (35)
β ≡ g + b1 + b2λ = b1 + λ[Θ − Ξ], (36)
respectively, we obtain (app. 7.1) an explicit expression for (31),
m1(τ)=e





The second term of this equation, eg[τ−t]µ, says that expected utility, starting in t where
q(t) and K (t) and thereby u(t) are given as initial conditions, grows exponentially at the
innovation rate g. From (35), the innovation rate is basically driven by the arrival rate λ.I n
the long run, g is the average growth rate of instantaneous utility. The ﬁrst term says that
u(t) converges to µ at the convergence rate β. The term µ is the expected value, today in t,
of instantaneous utility in τ →∞ , when instantaneous utility is deterministically detrended.
This follows immediately from rewriting (37) as e−g[τ−t]m1(τ)=e−β[τ−t] (u(t) − µ)+µ.14
Somewhat imprecisely but nevertheless useful, µ could be called "average instantaneous
utility".
Apart from showing growth of expected quantities in our setup, equation (37) illustrates
the similarity of the evolution of expected quantities in this setup to the evolution of quan-
tities in the Solow growth model. When we replace µ by the Solow steady state utility level,
the expected evolution here is identical to the certain evolution in Solow’s model (where g
and β would then stand for the growth and convergence rate in the Solow sense). In contrast
to Solow, the role played by short-run convergence is ambiguous: while in the Solow model
one usually assumes a capital stock that lies to the left of the steady state and convergence
implies higher average growth rates between today and some future point in time τ, the cap-
ital stock here (and the implied consumption and utility level) will in 50% of all realizations
lie to the right of the mean µ. Convergence then implies lower average growth rates.
14Obviously, detrending is possible in at least two ways here: The ”stochastic detrending” in (17) looks at
past realizations of q (t) and removes the stochastic trend Aq(t)/α or Aq(t) of some stochastic trended variable
X (t). ”Deterministic detrending” removes an expected growth trend by dividing expected expressions by its
growth component eg[τ−t]. In either case, by deﬁnition, the resulting cyclical component has a ﬁnite constant
long-run mean. Stochastic detrending also implies ﬁnite and constant higher long-run moments (app. 7.3),
which, however, is not necessarily the case for deterministic detrending (app. 7.2).
144.1.2 Computing the value function
We can now insert the expression for utility under optimal behaviour from (37) into (30)






ρ − g + β
. (39)
The derivation assumed ρ>gwhich makes the integral in (13) bounded.15 While in de-
terministic models the growth rate of utility must not be larger than the time preference
rate, in this stochastic model, the boundedness condition requires that the growth rate of
expected instantaneous utility must not exceed the time preference rate.
T h ev a l u ef u n c t i o nc a nb e s tb eu n d e r s t o o db yg o i n gb a c kt oe q u a t i o n( 3 7 ) :T h ev a l u e
to which the expected value of deterministically detrended utility converges is µ. This value
appears in (39) as µ/(ρ − g), i.e. the present value of utility that amounts to µ today,
grows at rate g a n dw h e r et h ed i s c o u n tf a c t o ri sρ. In addition, welfare today depends on
a convergence term. If utility today is lower than µ, there will be convergence towards this
long-run mean and utility will be lower compared to a situation where u(t) equals or exceeds
µ. However, the diﬀerence µ−u(t) is not as important as µ i nt h eo t h e rt e r m ,a st h i se ﬀect
is transitory. Hence, the present value of the convergence process is computed subject to the
convergence rate β.
Note that an identical expression for the value function would result in an analysis of the
Solow model. The only diﬀerence would consist in the meaning of µ. While here, µ stands
for "average instantaneous utility", it would stand for steady state utility in Solow’s model.
Summarizing, the value of the optimal program V (t) basically depends on four crucial
determinants: "average instantaneous utility" µ, utility today u(t), the innovation rate g and
the convergence coeﬃcient β. Studying welfare eﬀects of taxation can therefore be broken
down into eﬀects on these four elements that determine the value function.
4.2 The cyclical component
While the measure for welfare was straightforward, there is an almost inﬁnite number of
possible measures of volatility. The empirically oriented literature provides two examples:
The variance of growth rates (e.g. of GDP) and the variance of cyclical components. App.
7.2 analyses the variance of the growth rate of instantaneous utility u in detail. It turns out
that the resulting expression and therefore variances of all other time-series like e.g. GDP,
do not lend themselves to a straightforward analysis. This is due to two facts. First, growth
rates for long time horizons, i.e. for τ →∞ , do approach a constant mean but do not
have ﬁnite variance or ﬁnite higher moments. Second, while annual growth rates have ﬁnite
moments, they are extremely complex (cf. equ. (52)) and a comparative static analysis is
close to intractable. We therefore use cyclical components as our basic random variable to
measure volatility.
4.2.1 The evolution of the cyclical component
Cyclical components of time series can be deﬁned and therefore computed in many ways
and the literature oﬀers a large number of ﬁlters. None of these ﬁlters, given their computa-
tional complexity, would allow us to derive cyclical components that would yield an explicit
15Hence, the integral of the expected expression exists. See footnote 12.
15analytical expression for volatility. We therefore use a very simple ﬁlter, the Solow-type
detrending rule used in (17), to compute our cyclical components. Usual ﬁlters, think of the
Hodrick-Prescott ﬁl t e r ,d e t r e n db yr e m o v i n gas m o o t ht r e n df r o mat i m es e r i e s .O u rﬁlter
captures the trend by a step function Aq(t), caused by the discrete increases of q(t). In spirit,
however, these ﬁlters are very close as both remove past realizations of growth processes to
obtain the cyclical components.
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Figure 2: Detrended utility
In order to understand the detrending method proposed here, we look at the evolution
of detrended utility.16 We deﬁne detrended individual utility, in analogy to (14), as the






ˆ b2 ≡ 1 − Ξ/Θ, (41)
detrended utility follows (app. 7.3)
dˆ u(t)=( b0 − b1ˆ u(t))dt −ˆ b2ˆ u(t)dq(t). (42)
This law of motion is basically identical to (33), only that the Θq(t) term is missing and ˆ b2
slightly diﬀers from b2. Again, we can gain an intuitive understanding by plotting in ﬁg. 2
the deterministic part (b0 − b1ˆ u(t)) with ˆ u(t) on the horizontal axis.
Obviously, the cyclical component of utility has a range between 0 and b0/b1, pro-
vided that ˆ u0 lies within this range. Starting from ˆ u0 and as long as no innovation takes





ˆ u(t), i.e. Ξ/Θ percent of its level before the innovation. As the reduction is
proportional, ˆ u(t) is always positive.
16In Lucas-type approaches, the measure of volatility is based on the evolution of consumption. For
analytical tractability, we need to work with detrended utility. There are approximation rules, however,
which allow to compute e.g. the coeﬃcient of variation of consumption once the coeﬃcient of variation of
utility (a monotone transformation of consumption) is known (cf. e.g. Rinne, 1997).
164.2.2 The coeﬃcient of variation
Exploiting again the methods in Garcia and Griego (1994), we can compute moments of this
cyclical component. This follows similar step as above for (37). In fact, denoting the ith
moment, in analogy to (31), by
ˆ mi(τ) ≡ Etˆ u(τ)
i , (43)
the ﬁrst and second moment are given in the long run by (app. 7.3.2)17
ˆ m1 (∞)=
b0






1 − (1 −ˆ b2)2
i ˆ m1 (∞). (45)
Using these moments, computing the variance would be straightforward. As a measure of
volatility, the variance seems less suitable in our context, however, as it is scale dependent.
We therefore prefer the coeﬃcient of variation (cv). Given that the variance of a random








2 − 1. (46)
When computing the second moment in all generality, an expression similarly complex
as for the variance of the growth rate, presented in the appendix in (52) appears. When
w ef o c u so nt h el o n gr u nw h e r et h ec o n v e r g e n c eo ft h ei n i t i a lv a l u eˆ u0 to ˆ m1 (∞) in (42) is
ignored, however, this measure simpliﬁe s .T h i sw o u l db et h ec a s ef o rt h ev a r i a n c eo fg r o w t h
rates as well, see (53). Studying the long run with this measure of volatility is not at all as
problematic as using growth rates, however. In the latter case, we analyze the variance of
multi-annual growth rates. Those could never be observed. In the former case, looking at
the long run simply means studying the volatility of some stationary long-run distribution.
This corresponds to studying the variance of the cyclical component of a time series that is









To obtain a feeling for this measure, we go back to ﬁg. 2. The ﬁrst moment ˆ m1 (∞)
lies between 0 and the steady state b0/b1. This is intuitively clear, given the permanent
convergence towards b0/b1 and the occasional being thrown back. As the process ˆ u(t) is
completely described by (42), given an arrival rate λ, only the parameters of this process,
b0,b 1, ˆ b2 and λ, c a ns h o wu pi ni t sm o m e n t s .Al a r g e rb0 and a smaller b1 shifts the mean
ˆ m1 (∞) t ot h er i g h t ;t h i si sc l e a rf r o mﬁg. 2 as a larger b0 and a smaller b1 shift the dˆ u line
to the right. When ˆ b2 or λ increase, the mean shifts to the left as either jumps to the left
are larger or more frequent.
T h es e c o n dm o m e n th a st h es a m ep r o p e r t i e sa st h eﬁrst moment ˆ m1 (∞) with respect to




increases in ˆ b2, it
17The structure of the moments is remarkable as it shows that the distribution of ˆ u exists, is unique and
represents a generalization of the β-distribution. We are grateful to Christian Kleiber for pointing this out
to us. For more discussion see app. 7.3.2.
17also behaves as ˆ m1 (∞) with respect to ˆ b2, i.e. it decreases in ˆ b2. Simply speaking, a larger
range and more frequent jumps increase the second moment, a measure of dispersion.
Computing the cv t h e ns h o w st h a ti ti si n d e p e n d e n to fb0. This is not surprising as b0 is a
scaling parameter and the cv is by construction scale independent. This can intuitively also
be understood from ﬁg. 2 where the eﬀect of b0 on the cyclical component could be removed
by scaling both axes with 1/b0.T h ee ﬀect of other parameters will be discussed below.
4.2.3 Random walks and stationary cyclical components
Following the work of Nelson and Plosser (1982), the majority view seems to be now that
most observed macroeconomic time series exhibit diﬀerence-stationarity rather than trend-
stationarity.18 This implies that theoretical models should predict diﬀerence stationary time
paths as well, i.e. trends and cyclical components should both be stochastic as opposed to
models where only cyclical components are stochastic and the trend is deterministic. An
example of the latter type is given by King and Rebelo (1999), where the technology is
Yt = AtKα
t [NtXt]
1−α , labour productivity increases according to Xt+1 = γXt with γ>1
and TFP follows At = A
ρ
t−1eεt with ρ<1 and εt being normally iid. Models of the former
type are presented e.g. by King, Plosser, Stock and Watson (1991) where the log of TFP
is assumed to follow a exogenously given random walk with drift. Models with endogenous
stochastic trends include King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988, sect. 3.3), Fatás (2000) or Barlevy
(2004). Sources of ﬂuctuations are exogenous in these models.
We now show that our model exhibits indeed a stochastic trend and stochastic stationary
cyclical components. The crucial diﬀerence to models just cited is of course the endogeneity
of shocks to TFP. How often shocks occur, i.e. how often the technology jumps, depends on
decisions made by investors.19 The well-known Aghion-Howitt (1992) random technological
progress speciﬁcation can therefore also endogenously account, once properly included in a
model of growth and ﬂuctuations, for business cycle properties so far replicated only in an
exogenous way.
We can write (17) as lnK (t)=q(t)(lnA)/α +l nˆ K (t), i.e. we split our time series
lnK (t) i n t oat r e n dc o m p o n e n tq(t)(lnA)/α and into a stationary cyclical component
ln ˆ K (t), in the sense of Beveridge and Nelson (1981). Both the trend component and the
stationary component are stochastic. Even though we are in continuous time, we can easily
relate our trend component to a discrete time random walk as we can describe it by the pure
random walk with drift: q(t)=q(t − 1)+λ+ε(t), where ε(t) ∼ (0,λ).20 Hence, our trend
component has a unit root and our cyclical component ˆ K (t) is stationary as just shown for
ˆ u.
18More recent work on stationarity includes Bai and Ng (2004).
19Other models of endogenous ﬂuctuations and growth, all cited in the introduction, are of a deterministic
nature. The only exception is Bental and Peled (1996) who were the ﬁrst to study endogenous ﬂuctuations
and growth. Unfortunately, their model is fairly complex which makes an explicit analysis of stochastic
properties of trends and cycles a very hard task.
20The fact that the expectation and variance of q(t) − q(t − 1) are both equal to λ results from the
distributional properties of a Poisson process. If the increment of the trend term was not constant, i.e. if
e.g. A was vintage dependent and stochastic, the expectation and variance would diﬀer. This would be an
interesting extension for future work and should help in empirical applications.
185 Volatility, welfare and taxation
Given our measures of welfare and volatility derived in the last section, we can now ask how
taxation aﬀects these quantities.
5.1 Volatility and taxation
5.1.1 The volatility channels
Our central measure of volatility in (47) is aﬀected through three channels: the speed of
convergence b1, the altitude of the slump ˆ b2 and the arrival rate λ. The interpretation of
these parameters is based on (42) but other interpretations are possible. When we plot an
arbitrary realization of our cyclical components in ﬁg. 3, this becomes more transparent.
The range of our cyclical components is ]0,b 0/b1[. The upper limit corresponds to the
steady state ˆ K∗ for the cyclical component of capital in ﬁg. 1. Hence, b1 is at the same
time a measure of the range of the cyclical component (cf. ﬁg. 2, remembering that b0 is
only a scaling parameter) and thereby of its amplitude. The arrival rate λ also measures the
expected number of jumps or (the inverse of) the expected length of a cycle. The simple
reason why volatility depends on taxation is therefore the same reason why the steady state
capital stock (29) (i.e. the speed of convergence), the novelty of a new technology or the
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Figure 3: The cyclical components and their determinants b1, ˆ b2 and λ
When we want to understand the eﬀects of taxation, we can restrict attention to b1 and
λ as ˆ b2 is independent of taxation. The independence of ˆ b2 (and of b2)f r o mt a x e sf o l l o w s
from their deﬁnitions in (34) and (41) and the fact that ξ from (23), with s from (16) and
κ0 from (6), is independent of tax rates. Economically, this independence of ˆ b2 follows from
t h ef a c tt h a td i v i d e n dp a y m e n t sκ are not taxed and that economic depreciation s does not
imply tax-exemption as does physical depreciation δ.
The tax eﬀects on the arrival rate λ are straightforward from looking at (22) and are
summarized in table 1. As the growth rate g of expected utility has λ as its only tax-
dependent determinant, it has the same qualitative properties and is also included in the
table. The composite parameter b1 in (28) depends on taxes both directly and indirectly
through the arrival rate. When we insert (22) into (28), we obtain unambiguous results,
19except for τI (app. D.1.1).
τL = τK
(∗) τC τR τI τW
b1 − 0 − +(1) +
b2, ˆ b2 00 0 0 0
g, λ 00 − +0
volatility +0 − + −
welfare −− ±± −
(∗)only joint changes of τL and τK can be studied, see (24)
(1) for high τI or τK and low δ
Table 1: Taxation eﬀects on composite parameters, the arrival rate, volatility and welfare
5.1.2 Comparative statics
L e tu sn o wc o m b i n et h ee ﬀects of these three channels on volatility. As we have only two
tax-dependent channels, b1 and λ, taxation can aﬀect volatility by either changing λ or b1
(without the λ in b1), or both. Clearly, when a tax has no eﬀect on b1 and λ,t h ecv is not
aﬀected by this tax either. This is the case for taxation of consumption.
When taxing wealth, the arrival rate and the ”slump parameter” ˆ b2 are not aﬀected,
while the (inverse) range parameter b1 increases and, as a consequence, volatility goes down.
Economically speaking, a tax on wealth decreases the households’ return r∗ in (16) on savings
and thereby implies a lower steady-state cyclical capital stock and utility level ˆ u.H o l d i n g
constant the length of a cycle but "squeezing" the cyclical components in ﬁg. 3, the relative
dispersion must be lower.
An increase in the income tax on capital and labour reduces the range parameter b1 but
not the arrival rate λ. As a consequence, volatility unambiguously increases in this tax.
How can this result be understood? The speed of convergence b1 in (28) reduces for two
reasons: (i) only net investment is taxed (as discussed before (15)), i.e. a higher tax on
capital increases the positive eﬀect of the refunding policy and reduces the impact of the
depreciation rate δ as visible in (28). A lower (eﬀective) depreciation rate increases incentives
for capital accumulation and the steady-state capital stock increases. (ii) Due to our σ = α
restriction, direct eﬀects of joint changes in capital and labour taxation just cancel out and
only this indirect refunding eﬀect is left over. Clearly, this second eﬀe c tw o u l dn o ts u r v i v e
for α 6= σ and τK 6= τL and should potentially overcompensate the ﬁrst eﬀect. Hence,
currently, the eﬀect of income taxation is the opposite of wealth taxation but should go in
similar directions for more general cases.
When analyzing R&D and investment taxes τR and τI, results are at ﬁrst sight less clear-
c u ta st h e s et a x e sa ﬀect the arrival rate which aﬀects the cv directly positively and indirectly
negatively through λ. Computing the derivatives, however, we get unambiguous results as
presented in table 1 above (app. D.1.2). The analytics for τR say in words: a higher tax on
research depresses the arrival rate. When the arrival rate falls, the ratio b1/λ increases and
the cv falls. Intuitively, a higher τR makes investment in research less proﬁtable and the
arrival rate λ falls. Less frequent jumps in technology imply a lower volatility. A lower λ also
decreases b1 which by ﬁg. 3 implies a larger range b0/b1 and higher volatility. This is because
b1 represents physical depreciation but also consumption and expenditure for research. A
lower λ therefore implies ceteris paribus a lower b1. This second indirect eﬀect, however, is
20not large enough such that the direct volatility decreasing eﬀect of higher taxes on research
dominates.
Given the explanations for the previous ﬁnding, understanding the result for τI is also
easy: a higher tax on investment increases the arrival rate which again has a direct and an
indirect eﬀect on volatility. The direct eﬀect via the frequency of jumps overcompensates
t h ei n d i r e c te ﬀect on the range and volatility increases. The additional eﬀect of taxation on
investment via the depreciation rate δ makes the range increasing eﬀect of a higher λ less
strong such that the indirect eﬀect is even weaker than under a change of τR. Consequently,
volatility falls more when τI increases as when τR falls.
If growth and volatility were exogenous, i.e. if there was an arrival rate given by λ
without any resources R being required for R&D, the model would from its basic structure
resemble a simple RBC model. Any activity takes place under perfect competition and labour
productivity improves by discrete amounts at random points in time. Volatility would still
be aﬀected by taxation as the arrival rate is only one out of three channels in our measure of
volatility (47).21 As argued in the introduction, however, an endogenous arrival rate allows
us to investigate whether taxes can explain a break in volatility without aﬀecting the growth
rate. As McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000) argue, there was a break in volatility in the
US in 1984 without a break in the trend of GDP. Hence, given our results in table 1, this
model predicts falling income taxes τL = τK and rising wealth taxes τW to reduce volatility
without aﬀecting trend growth.
5.1.3 Quantitative importance
This section takes a ﬁrst look at the quantitative properties of our model and asks whether
changes in tax rates can have eﬀects that are "suﬃciently large". Clearly, our analytically
convinient approach of assuming the parameter restriction (24) imposes strong restrictions
for calibration purposes. Calibration here is also more ambitous than in standard circum-
stances as we have additional statistical properties of observed economies which we want to
match: Table 2 shows on the left-hand side that the average (expected) length of a cycle
a n dg r o w t hr a t eg and the tax elasticitiy of the growth rate enter as central predictions of
the model. Reasonable values are obtained by choosing A, D0 and the externality measure
γ (cf. app. D.1.3 for details) 22. Initial tax rates and exogenous parameters were set at
(τI,τR,τC,τF,τW)=( .15,.00,.15,.30,.01) and (α,δ,ρ,κ0)=( .5,.075,.03,10−12), respec-
tively. The exogenous parameter values for δ and ρ are standard. The value for α depends
on whether one perceives human capital to be captured by K as well. We set it somewhat
higher than the pure national account value of .3. Intuitively, the size of the new machine κ
is small relative to the capital stock in the economy as a whole. This explains the low value
for κ0.
imposed calibrated
E length of cycle E growth tax elasticity of λ AD 0 γ
5 years 3% 0.33 1.16 1.55 × 10-10 .75
Table 2: A simple calibration
21The amount of volatility would therefore remain endogenous even in this exogenous shock economy.
Volatility could, however, no longer be called "natural" as its source is exogenously imposed on the economy.
22Regression analyses show that the eﬀect of taxation on growth is not without controversy: see e.g.
Mendoza et. al. (1994) and Padovano and Galli (2001) for a survey.














Figure 4: Quantitative dependence of the cv on tax rates
Given these parameter values, ﬁg. 4 shows the coeﬃcient of variation as a function of tax
rates. Taxes vary from −1 (a subsidy) to 1.T h ec o e ﬃcient of variation (cv) of the baseline
calibration is .13.T h ec o e ﬃcient of variation for an HP-ﬁltered cyclical component of real
GDP for the U.S. economy decreased from about .4 in the 1955:2-1984:1 period to about .2
in 1984:2-2004:2. The decline in the variance of quarterly growth rates are of similar pattern
(see e.g. McConnell and Perez-Quiros 2000). This implies that endogenous ﬂuctuations
of our model match roughly 33% to 65% of observed ﬂuctuations (dividing .13 by .4 and
.2). This is remarkable given the absence of exogenous sources of volatility or the σ = α
restriction.
Some tax rates, i.e. the tax on research τR a n dt h et a xo nw e a l t hτW reduce the cv of the
baseline calibration potentially by 10% and 60%, respectively. Other tax rates, i.e. the tax on
investment τI and the factor income tax τF increase the cv: a decrease of τF by 10 percentage
points decreases the cv roughly by 3%. The break in volatility in the US could therefore be
explained quantitatively only to some extent. It should be remembered, however, that tax
eﬀects enter only through the arrival rate λ and the speed of convergence b1.E ﬀects of τR
and τI on λ are small by construction whereas eﬀects on b1 in (28) are - due to our explicit
σ = α solution - only through τW, the arrival rate λ, and the refunding eﬀect, as direct eﬀects
of τF just cancel out. The consumption tax τC does not aﬀect the cv at all as the labour-
leisure choice is not modelled. We summarize our quantitative ﬁndings by stating that the
l e v e lo ft a xr a t e sd o e sh a v ea ne ﬀect on volatility. A more elaborate calibration exercise (no
parameter restriction, endogenous labour and some exogenous source of volatility) is needed,
however, before the quantitative importance can be judged more convincingly.
5.2 Volatility and welfare
5.2.1 The welfare channels and comparative statics
When we look at our measure of welfare (39), it is aﬀected by taxation through four quan-
tities, average instantaneous utility µ, current utility u(c(t)),a n dg and β, the growth and
convergence rate. These four quantities in turn depend on four channels, b0,b 1,λand Ψ.
We could now, following the approach from our measure of volatility, analyze the eﬀects
of taxation on these channels ﬁrst and then combine the results and derive conclusions for
22welfare. As this does not yield additional insight, we directly link welfare to taxation by the
following
Theorem 2 (Taxation and welfare) A tax reduces welfare (39) when the permanent com-
ponent of welfare µ/(ρ − g) falls faster or increases less fast than the transition component









































(ρ − g + β)2 .
Proof. app. D.2
The left-hand side is the derivative of the permanent component of welfare, the right-
hand side is the derivative of the transition component (where both sides are divided by µ).
Both derivatives can be both negative or positive.
Going through these derivatives for individual taxes shows that (compare table 1 and
app. D.2) taxes on factor income, consumption and wealth have unambiguous negative ef-
fects on welfare while taxes on investment and R&D can increase welfare. Taxes τF,τ C
and τW decrease welfare as resources are taken away from households and G has in the
model no productivity- or utility-enhancing eﬀect. The potentially welfare increasing eﬀect
of τI and τR can best be understood when looking at the ﬁrst order condition for invest-
ment in research: in our decentralized setup, the ﬁrst order condition (1 + τR)Va (a(t),q)
= λV˜ a (˜ a,q +1 )
(1+τI)κ
R from (A.17) shows that individuals invest in R&D because of dividend
payments κ∗, their increased wealth ˜ a and the better technology q+1. Optimal investment in
a planner economy, where the planner maximizes the Bellman equation (A.15) with respect
to R rather than i and where Σa(t) stands for wealth in the economy as a whole, would
satisfy VΣa (Σa(t),q)= ∂λ
∂R [V (Σ˜ a,q +1 )− V (Σa,q)]. Incentives to do research therefore
results from ∂λ/∂R, the eﬀect of more resources on the probability λ to ﬁnd a new tech-
nology, and the diﬀerence in well-being between a situation with more wealth and a better
technology, V (Σ˜ a,q +1 ), and today, V (Σa,q). While there are certainly various opposing
eﬀects, externalities are strongest for this trade-oﬀ between capital accumulation and R&D.
It is therefore not surprising, that taxes τI and τR which are directly aﬀecting this ﬁrst order
condition are best suited to potentially internalize externalities.
As the ﬁrst order conditions for consumption is identical for the planner and the repre-
sentative household, there are no externalities or imperfections present in the model apart
from those visible in the diﬀerence between the ﬁrst order conditions for R&D. Put diﬀer-
ently, if the arrival rate equalled λ exogenously without any resources R being allocated to
R&D, the decentralized economy would be eﬃcient. This RBC-type version of our model
would then predict that ﬂuctuations allow for an optimal adjustment by individuals to ex-
ogenous disturbances. If one believes, however, that the process of ﬁnding and developing
new technologies implies certain externalities (and that new technologies at least partially
induce ﬂuctuations), factor allocations in an economy ”growing through cycles”, to use Mat-
suyama’s (1999) words, are ineﬃcient.
235.2.2 The tax-link between volatility and welfare
Given the ineﬃciency of ﬂuctuations, should taxes be used to stabilize the economy? In the
literature, more volatility is usually associated with lower welfare: In perfect-market models
(Lucas, 1987, 2003 or, more recently, Epaulard and Pommeret, 2003 and Barlevy, 2004),
exogenous volatility implies ﬂuctuations of consumption and the curvature of the utility
function implies lower welfare than in an economy without ﬂuctuations but identical average
growth. Gali et al. (2003) focus on ineﬃciencies and argue - due to the ineﬃciency of the
steady state and the larger welfare losses in recessions than welfare gains in booms - that
ﬂuctuations on average cause welfare losses.
This is not necessarily the case when ﬂuctuations are endogenous: While the curvature of
the utility function à la Lucas and the asymmetry as in Gali (and others) is welfare-reducing
in our setup as well, volatility is only the result of the more fundamental factor allocation
in an economy. Asking whether volatility is welfare reducing and by how much is therefore
meaningful only if one believes that the sources of ﬂuctuations are exogenous to an economy
(which, in the real world, they are - to a certain extent). The welfare eﬀects of endogenous
ﬂuctuations, however, can only be understood when understanding the welfare properties of
the underlying factor allocation that causes these ﬂuctuations. When this is done, it becomes
clear that more or less ﬂuctuations can be associated (and are not causal as in the exogenous
ﬂuctuation case) with higher or lower welfare. Tax policy should therefore not be used in all
cases to stabilize the economy.
This association between welfare and volatility, illustrated for taxes with unambiguous
welfare eﬀects, is depicted in the following ﬁgure.
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Figure 5: Welfare, volatility and taxation - anything goes
Arrows indicate in which direction to move on the line when the tax is increased. Fig. 5
shows that there is no association between volatility and welfare in general. It all depends
on the source of the change in volatility. While certain taxes increase volatility and reduce
welfare (τF), others reduce volatility but still decrease welfare (τW). Lowering the tax on
wealth increases welfare as fewer resources are taken away from the economy as argued
above. At the same time, volatility increases as the steady state capital stock (29) increases.
Hence, despite the curvature of the utility function and the asymmetric eﬀect of volatility
on eﬃciency, more volatility implies higher welfare.
246C o n c l u s i o n
Growth rates above and below long-run trends are a common feature of all real-world
economies. The present paper used a model that perceives endogenous ﬂuctuations as a
natural phenomenon of all endogenously growing economies by stipulating that new tech-
nologies increase labour productivity in a discrete way. Agents in this setup are not solely
responding to shocks but rather are the source of shocks, i.e. jumps in technologies, due
to their ﬁnancing of innovation and growth. This framework was used to analyze the ef-
fects of taxation on volatility and the associated welfare eﬀects. Due to a sharp decrease of
volatility in the US and an almost simultaneous strong tax reform, taxation was expected
to potentially explain part of the ’big moderation’ starting in 1983.
We used the coeﬃcient of variation of the cyclical component of a typical time series as
our measure of volatility. It was shown that this measure is most tractable from a theoretical
perspective and that three economically meaningful channels aﬀect this measure: potential
range of cyclical components, slumps and frequency of new technologies. Taxes aﬀect these
channels in various ways which allows, inter alia, to understand a change in volatility without
requiring a simultaneous change in the growth rate of the economy.
Welfare eﬀects associated with changes in volatility can be manifold. In a special case
of our model where the source of long-run growth and short-run ﬂuctuations is exogenous,
factor allocation is eﬃcient and volatility does not signal the need for stabilization. With
endogenous growth and ﬂuctuations, however, ineﬃciencies enter the economy and ﬂuctua-
tions hint at the possibility of welfare-increasing policy measures, even though all production
and R&D activities were modelled to take place under perfect competition.
Stabilization is not necessarily welfare increasing, however: Lower volatility can imply
higher or lower welfare, depending on whether the tax change reducing volatility implies
higher or lower welfare. Analyzing the link between volatility and welfare should therefore
not be restricted to the usual mono-causal link from an exogenous source of volatility and
an endogenous welfare reaction but expanded to exogenous change in ﬁscal policy (or other
exogenous changes in the economic environment) and how natural volatility and welfare
react to this.
An important extension of the present analysis (and other papers in the literature on
endogenous ﬂuctuations and growth) would combine endogenous and exogenous sources of
ﬂuctuations. It appears reasonable to start an analysis of ﬂuctuations of any real word
economy by allowing for both endogenous jumps of and exogenous shocks to the technol-
ogy as well as nominal sources of ﬂuctuations. Labour market participation decisions and
unemployment should also be included in future work. The implications of our analysis for
the growth and volatility debate could also be worked out more precisely. With endogenous
volatility, taxes (or other policy parameters) aﬀect both long-run growth and volatility. As
in our welfare argument, the causal link from volatility on growth becomes a correlation.
The implied endogeneity of volatility in regression analyses could be tested.
7A p p e n d i x
This appendix contains derivations that are interesting from a theoretical perspective beyond
this speciﬁc paper. Section 7.1 derives the evolution of expected instantaneous utility. It uses
methods that were developed in the applied mathematical literature, e.g. Garcia and Griego
(1994). These methods are potentially useful also in other areas where Poisson processes are
25used (e.g. all search and matching models in monetary or labour economics). Section 7.2
computes an explicit expression for the variance of the growth rate. Again, various methods
are borrowed from Garcia and Griego (1994). Finally, section 7.3 computes the moments of
our basic random variable. This forms the basis for our measure of volatility. Interestingly,
we obtain a generalized β-distribution from this analysis.
Further derivations are included in the Referees’ appendix which is available upon request.
7.1 Evolution of expected instantaneous utility
This section computes the expected value of instantaneous utility, conditional on the current
state in t,g i v e nb yq(t) and K (t). The results provide information about expected growth
but are especially needed for computing the value function.
7.1.1 A lemma for E
¡
ckNτ¢
We ﬁrst compute some simple expectations that are used later.
Lemma 3 Assume that we are in t and form expectations about future arrivals of the Poisson




(ck−1)λ(τ−t),τ > t ,c , k = const.
Note that for integer k, these are the raw moments of cq(τ).
Proof. We can trivially rewrite ckq(τ) = ckq(t)ck[q(τ)−q(t)]. At time t, we know the realiza-
tion of q(t) and therefore Etckq(τ) = ckq(t)Etck[q(τ)−q(t)]. Computing this expectation requires


































summation of the probability function over the whole support of the Poisson distribution
which was used in the last step.
Lemma 4 Assume that we are in t and form expectations about future arrivals of the Poisson
process. Then the number of expected arrivals in the time interval [τ,s] equals the number




(ck−1)λ(τ−s),τ > s > t ,c , k = const.
Proof. This proof is in appendix C.1.1, it simply applies lemma 3.
267.1.2 Expected instantaneous utility
We will use in what follows the martingale property of various expressions. These expressions
are identical to or special cases of
R τ
t f (q(s),s)dq(s) − λ
R τ
t f (q(s),s)ds, of which Garcia










where λ is the (constant) arrival rate of q(s).












t b2u(s)dq (s). When we pull expectations into the integral (as in equation (30)), use











t b1m1 (s)ds −
R τ
t b2λm1 (s)ds and diﬀerentiating with respect
to time τ gives
˙ m1 (τ)=Θ
q(t)b0e
(Θ−1)λ[τ−t] − (b1 + λb2)m1 (τ). (49)





























where the last line used m1 (t)=Etu(t)=u(t) and (36) for β. Rearranging gives (37) in
the text.
7.2 The variance of the growth rate
This section derives an alternative expression for volatility, the variance of the growth rate.
This measure is more common in empirical work (e.g. Ramey and Ramey, 1995 or McConnell
and Perez-Quiros, 2000) than the variance of cyclical components, which in turn is used more
intensively in the RBC literature.
It is not immediately clear, however, how this variance should be computed. Is it the
variance of some long-run stationary distribution, limτ→∞vart [gτ,t], is it the variance of some
”annual” growth rate of some long-run distribution, limτ→∞vart [gτ+1,τ], or is it the variance
of the next ”period” in this model, vart [gt+1,t]? In a way, the choice of measure of variance is
arbitrary. We therefore choose the one that comes closest to the estimation of the variance
of observed growth rates. The counterpart to an observed annual growth rate for a ”year” t
in our model is gt+1,t. Taking many drawings, there is a set of annual growth rates {gt+1,t}
for which the variance can be estimated. Noting that annual growth rates are computed
given the knowledge on t, the analytical expression corresponding to this is the t-contingent
variance of gt+1,t, i.e. vart [gt+1,t].
Now, we can take advantage of the following straightforward relationship: The t-contingent
variance of the growth rate of some random variable is the same as the t-contingent variance










While this is trivial in a sense, it has the huge advantage that we can just compute the
second moment of u(τ) and thereby obtain the theoretical counterpart of the variance of
observed growth rates.
T h ev a r i a n c eo fu(τ) is computed by ﬁrst computing its second moment. To this end,













C o m p a r i n gi tt o( 3 3 )s h o w st h a tt h em a i nd i ﬀerence, apart from the square term u2 instead
of u, is the interaction Θqu between Θq and u. When forming expectations, we therefore have
to compute the expected interaction term, i.e. look at ψ(s) ≡ EtΘq(s)u(s). After "some
steps” (ﬁlling 6 pages in app. C.2), denoting
gψ ≡ (Θ2 − 1)λ>0,
βψ ≡ gψ + b1 +( 1− Θ[1 − b2])λ = b1 +( Θ2 − ΘΞ)λ>0,
β2 ≡ gψ +2 b1 +
¡

















































The structure of the variance is similar to previous structures in e.g. (37) for expected utility.
There are growth and convergence rates (51) and there are expected long-run quantities. As
a measure of volatility, however, the variance of the growth rate is less suitable for a variety
of reasons: First, when we let τ become very large, i.e. when we look at the ”long run”














This expression, however, represents the variance of the growth rate between t and T, i.e.
we would not compute the variance of annual growth rates but of T − t-year growth rates.
Clearly, such a variance can never be estimated in reality. Second, the expression for the
variance for annual growth rates, i.e. growth rates from t to t+1, is the complete expression in
(A.50) for τ = t+1. Understanding properties of this expression, like derivatives with respect
to certain tax rates appears analytically hopeless. Third, as a potential theoretical way out,
one could try and deterministically detrend u(τ) as discussed on page 14. Computing the
variance of the growth rate of deterministically detrended u(τ) (and not of u(τ) as done
here), however, does not yield a ﬁnite expression either as the variance grows at gψ while
inserting e−g[τ−t] in front of u(τ) in (50) would not compensate for gψ.
287.3 The cyclical component
7.3.1 The basic diﬀerential equation (42)




/(1 − σ) from (40), we have dˆ u =
(1/L)1−σ
1−σ d ˆ C1−σ. With ˆ C = Ψ ˆ K from
















































1−α (1 − σ) − b1 ˆ C
1−σ
´
dt − (1 − Ξ/Θ) ˆ C
1−σdq.








1−α (1 − σ) − b1 ˆ C
1−σ
´
dt − (1 − Ξ/Θ) ˆ C
1−σdq
i
=( b0 − b1ˆ u)dt − (1 − Ξ/Θ)ˆ udq.
7.3.2 Computing moments
The integral version of (42) for τ>tis ˆ u(τ)=ˆ u(t)+
R τ




Using the martingale result (48), the expected value of ˆ u(τ) is Etˆ u(τ)=ˆ u(t)+
R τ




ˆ b2Etˆ u(s)ds. This describes the evolution of the ﬁr s tm o m e n to fˆ u. Expressed as a dif-
ferential equation and using the deﬁnition in (43), we obtain ˙ ˆ m1 (τ)=b0−(b1+λˆ b2)ˆ m1 (τ).


















ˆ m1 (t) −
b0




b1 + λˆ b2
. (54)
As b1+λˆ b2 > 0, the ﬁrst moment of ˆ u is in the long run given by ˆ m1 (∞) ≡ limτ→∞ ˆ m1 (τ)=
b0
b1+λˆ b2,a sp r e s e n t e di n( 4 4 ) .
For higher moments, the basic diﬀerential equation determining the evolution of ˆ un is
from (42)
dˆ u
n = nˆ u
n−1 [b0 − b1ˆ u]dτ −
³




























dt. Using again (43),








29It can now be shown that all moments are constant for τ →∞ . This follows from (54)
for the ﬁrst moment and from appendix C.3.1 for the 2nd moment. This proof simply inserts
(54) into (55) and solves the diﬀerential equation. Proofs for higher moments would follow





1 − (1 −ˆ b2)n
i ˆ mn−1 (∞). (57)
By inserting n =2 , this directly implies (45), with n =1 , it becomes (44), remembering that
ˆ m0 =1by deﬁnition.
A well-known theorem states that a distribution with limited range is completely char-
acterized by its integer moments (e.g. Casella and Berger, 1990, th. 2.3.3.). As our
long-run moments are constant and the range of ˆ u is ﬁnite, the distribution of ˆ u exists,
is unique and stationery. Looking at the structure of moments in (57) further shows that
























¶n Γ(n +1 ) Γ(1 + λ/b1)
Γ(n +1+λ/b1)
,
where Γ(·) is the gamma-function. The last expression represents, apart from the scaling
factor (b0/b1)n,t h enth moment of a β-distribution with parameters 1 and λ/b1. (On the
β-distribution, see e.g. Johnson, Kotz and Balakrishnan (1995, ch. 25).) Since the β-
distribution is determined by its moments, we conclude that, for ˆ b2 =1 , ˆ u has the asymptotic





X, where X ∼ Beta(1,λ/b 1).W h e n ˆ b2 6=1 , we therefore obtain
a generalized β-distribution which, to the best of our knowledge, has not been encountered
before. Analyzing its properties in detail will have to be done in future research. We are
indebted to Christian Kleiber for pointing this out to us. For related aspects, see Kleiber
and Kotz (2003).
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33Comments on “Volatility, Welfare and Taxation” 
 
Romain Ranciere 
CREI and Universitat Pompeu Fabra. 
 
This paper belongs to an important literature that attempts to integrate growth and 
volatility in order to understand the uneven nature of the economic growth process. 
Though the idea of growing in cycles was only recently formalized by Matsuyama (1999) 
it has been present in the literature on economic development for some time (Hirschman 
(1958). Endogenous growth and cycles have been modeled jointly using two approaches: 
the “innovation view” (e.g. Francois-Lloyd-Ellis (2003), Walde (2004) and this paper), 
and the “credit view” (e.g. Ranciere, Tornell and Westermann (2003)).   
 
This paper is motivated by the fact that a large share of cross-country differences in 
volatility among OECD countries has not been explained. The authors suggest that 
differences in endogenous innovation cycles may explain this variation in output 
volatility. The core of the paper consists of an analysis of the relationship between two 
sources of volatility: the invention of new technologies and different tax policies. 
 
The authors provide a very simple “Solowian” representation of a stochastic growth 
model with new inventions endogenous to the model. The economy evolves through a 
succession of research and capital accumulation phases. Research fosters discoveries that 
lead to the introduction of new prototypes. Once a new invention arrives, there is an 
abrupt increase in productivity which induces capital accumulation and a gradual 
decrease in the marginal productivity of capital that brings the economy back to a steady 
state growth path. This simple representation enables us to compute the long run expected 
growth, the long run expected welfare and the mean and volatility of the cyclical growth 
components. 
 
The authors consider four tax policies and their effects: taxation on income, consumption, 
wealth, and investment in R&D.   
  First, they analyze the effects of taxation on cyclical volatility. Cyclical volatility 
depends on three factors: the frequency of cycles, the amplitude of cycles and smoothness 
of the cycles. Taxation can both have stabilizing or destabilizing effects. Taxing R&D 
reduces innovation and subsequently the frequency of cycles too. Capital taxation 
increases volatility through its impact on amplitude and smoothness while wealth 
taxation has the opposite effect.   
 
Second, the authors analyze effect of taxation on welfare. In this case, both the long run – 
the permanent component – and the short run – cyclical fluctuations – should be factored 
in.  A natural question is whether there can be short run pains and long run gains. For 
instance, it seems that although capital taxation increases short run volatility, it also 
increases welfare. 
 
My main questions are the following: 
 
•   What is the link between volatility and growth? How much does reducing 
volatility reduce the engine of development - growing through cycles -?  
•   Can we apply the model to the data, for instance for US over the decades 1980-
2000 that have seen a reduction in aggregate output volatility? 
•   An empirical analysis will need to incorporate: 
–  Changes in tax rates 
–  Intensity of R&D 
–  Arrival rate of new innovation 
 
I also have some minor issues with the specificity of the innovation process. First, what 
happens if more innovation today increases the probability of innovation tomorrow? 
Second, how does the model translate into a multi-country world where we observe both 
innovation and imitations?. 
 Finally, I would like to suggest an alternative view based on my research on credit cycles 
in emerging economies (Ranciere, Tornell, Westermann (2003). The main question here 
is: Is it better to have volatility and high growth than no volatility and no growth. A 
contrasting example is India and Thailand. The latter experienced a boom-bust cycle 
punctuated by severe financial crisis and the former more stable financial conditions. 
Nevertheless, Thailand has grown on average much faster than India: 
 
 
Credit: Real Bank Credit Growth (source: IFS and authors caluclation) 
GDP per Capita: Real GDP per Capita (source: Worldbank Development Indicators) 
 
These findings are rationalized in a two-sector endogenous growth model with 
asymmetric financial opportunities. That is the coexistence of financially unconstrained 
firms in the tradable sector and financially constrained firms in the non-tradable sectors. 
In such an economy, the introduction of bailout guarantees funded by domestic taxation 
give rise to two equilibria: 
 





















Note: The values for 1980 are normalized to one.  
Under certain conditions, growth and welfare are higher in the risky equilibrium. The 
reason is the presence of financial bottlenecks in the constrained sector that limit the 
development of the economy as a whole. Bailout guarantees redistribute from the non-
constrained sector to the constrained sector for their mutual benefits.   
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It is common amonst macroeconomists to view aggregate investment ﬂuctuations as a
rational response to ﬂuctuating incentives, driven by exogenous movements in total factor
productivity. However, this approach raises a number of questions. Why treat investments
in physical capital as endogenous, while treating those in intangible capital as exogenous?
Relatedly, why would productivity changes exhibit such strong co—movement across diverse
sectors of the economy, and why are the short—run, empirical relationships between aggregate
investment and measures of investment incentives, such as Tobin’s Q, so weak? We address
these and other related issues using a model of “implementation cycles” that incorporates
physical capital. In doing so, we demonstrate the crucial role played by endogenous innovation
and incomplete contracting, inherent to the process of creative destruction.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Fluctuations in the aggregate investment rate are a central feature of the business cycle. As
Figure 1 illustrates, the rate of U.S. investment in ﬁxed, non—residential assets displays regular,
and recurring patterns of activity over time.1 According to Keynes (1936), investment ﬂuctua-
tions played a central causal role in driving business cycles. He argued that the co—movement
of investment across diverse sectors of the economy was exogenously driven by a kind of mass
psychology which he termed “animal spirits”.2 More recently, economists have attempted to un-
derstand movements in aggregate investment as an optimal response to measurable incentives. In
the canonical Real Business Cycle (RBC) model, for example, ﬂuctuations in aggregate invest-
ment are driven by exogenous ﬂuctuations in total factor productivity (TFP) that change the
incentives to produce investment goods relative to consumption goods. However, this increasingly
standard approach raises a number of conceptual and quantitative questions.
First, why treat investment in tangible, physical capital as an endogenous response to in-
centives, while implicitly treating shifts in the production function as exogenous? Many of these
shifts result from costly investments in intangible capital, which seem just as likely to respond en-
dogenously to incentives. For example, re—organization of ﬁrms may require a costly re—allocation
of managerial eﬀort that will only take place if the anticipated returns are suﬃciently high. Over
the past 15 years there have been considerable advances in understanding the potential and actual
role of endogenous innovation on long run growth, but this has had relatively little inﬂuence on
business cycle research.3
Second, why do these apparent shifts in TFP take place in such a clustered fashion across
diverse sectors of the economy? Assuming from the outset that TFP movements aﬀect all sectors
symmetrically seems no better on a conceptual level than directly assuming that investment co—
moves across sectors because of animal spirits.4 One possibility is that these shifts are the result
of general purpose technologies (GPTs) which aﬀect all sectors. However, there is little evidence
supporting this idea at business cycle frequencies.5 As Lucas (1981) reasons, while productivity
1The investment rate fell during all post—war, NBER—dated recessions (the shaded regions in Figure 1) and
typically rose during expansions. The only exceptions were around 1967 and 1987, which saw large declines in
investment but aggregate slowdowns that were not dated as NBER recessions.
2One modern incarnation of this idea is to model animal spirits as purely exogenous, but self—fulﬁlling changes
in expectations (see e.g. Farmer and Guo 1994). In this case, investment is optimal but the aggregate incentives
are stochastically driven by “sunspots”.
3O n ec l u et ot h ep o t e n t i a li m p o r t a n c eo fv i e w i n gt e c h n o l ogy shifts as, at least partially, endogenous comes from
the work of Hall (1988) who ﬁnds that the Solow residual is signiﬁcantly correlated with factors that do not seem
likely to have a direct impact on technology.
4The RBC literature generally takes this clustering of productivity improvements as given, and focuses on the
propagation mechanism.
5We discuss this literature in more detail in the following section.
1shocks may be important at the ﬁrm level, it is not immediately obvious why they would be
important for economy—wide aggregate output ﬂuctuations.
Thirdly, if investment really is optimally determined, why is the short—term empirical rela-
tionship between aggregate investment and contemporaneous measures of investment incentives
apparently so weak? In particular, while there is some evidence of a long run relationship, nei-
ther micro nor macro level empirical work has generally found a signiﬁcant short—run relationship
between investment and Tobin’s Q – the ratio of the equity value of ﬁrms, to the book value of
the capital stock.6 As is well known, one cannot infer from this that investment is sub—optimal
because Tobin’s Q need not reﬂect the marginal incentives to invest,7 a n db e c a u s ee q u i t yv a l u e s
are likely to include the values of intangible, as well as tangible, capital.8 But then the ques-
tion arises as to what kind of relationship we should expect to observe between investment and
measurable proxies of ﬁnancial incentives over the business cycle.
Figure 1 is suggestive of some kind of relationship. Figure 1(a) shows the investment rate
and Tobin’s Q for the US between 1953 and 2003. Figure 1(b) shows the rate of change in
the four—quarter moving average of each time series.9 In general there appears to be a lead—lag
relationship, with the investment rate most highly correlated with the value of Tobin’s Q three to
four quarters earlier. It is this observation that has led some investigators to specify an exogenous
“time—to—plan” period in their quantitative analyses (see Section 2). However, the relationship
is more complex than this. In particular, Tobin’s Q appears to lead investment especially during
the latter part of expansions and recessions, with Q falling several quarters before investment
declines and rising several quarters prior to expansions.10 During the early phases of expansions
and recessions the two series exhibit a contemporaneous correlation.
A ﬁnal conceptual issue is whether it is reasonable to view investment declines, and hence
recessions, as being driven by bad technology outcomes? The recent RBC literature has demon-
strated that, in the presence of capital and labor market rigidities, it is not necessary to have
negative shocks to TFP in order to generate downturns in output (see King and Rebelo, 2000).
However, the traditional Keynesian view that recessions largely result from sharp declines in ag-
gregate investment demand, driving production below capacity, seems consistent with the beliefs
of policy—makers and many in the private sector. The implications of such views seem worthwhile
to at least explore in a formal framework.
6First suggested by Tobin (1968) and Brainard and Tobin (1969). See Cabellero, 1999 for a recent survey.
7As shown by Abel (1979) and Hayahsi (1982), when there are adjustment costs, marginal and average Q need
not be equal.
8See Hall (2001b).
9Similar ﬁgures appear in Cabellero (1999).
10There are a number of rationalizations of this behavior in the literature. We discuss these in the next section.
234In this article, we take the view that in order to understand the relationships between aggre-
gate investment, productivity and the stockmarket over the business cycle, one must deal head-on
with the source and timing of productivity ﬂuctuations, the reasons for sectoral co—movement, and
the apparent delay in investment in response to incentives. Our starting point for thinking about
these issues is Shleifer’s (1986) model of “implementation cycles”. He shows that in the presence
of imperfect competition, the implementation of a productivity improvement by one ﬁrm may
increase the demand for anothers’ products by raising aggregate demand. This induces innova-
tors, who anticipate short-lived proﬁts due to imitation, to delay the implementation of their own
innovation until others implement, thereby generating self—enforcing booms in aggregate activity.
Though capable of generating both co—movement and delay in implementation, Shleifer’s model
cannot, however, serve as a framework for understanding investment cycles. This is because the
sectoral co—movement that he establishes is not robust to the introduction of capital or, in fact,
any storable commodity. Anticipating a boom, producers would produce early when wages are
low, store the output, and sell in the boom when prices are high, thus undermining the cycle.11
Francois and Lloyd-Ellis (2003) show how a similar process of endogenous clustering can arise
due to the process of “creative destruction” familiar from Schumpeterian endogenous growth
models. Like imitation, potential obsolescence limits incumbency and provides incentives to
cluster implementation. However, in their framework, where productive resources are needed to
generate new innovations, allowing for the possibility of storage does not rule out clustering, and
in fact yields a unique cyclical equilibrium.12 Moreover, because this costly innovation tends to
be bunched just before a boom, it causes a downturn in aggregate output (even if the measure of
GDP includes this investment).13 Because of its ability to accommodate storage, this framework
is more promising as a vehicle for understanding investment. However, the addition of physical
capital which is completely ﬂexible after being installed still undermines their cyclical equilibrium.
Full ﬂexibility of installed physical capital is, however, at odds with recent evidence on invest-
ment behavior. In particular, there is considerable direct evidence that many types of physical
investment are not reversible and feature inﬂexible characteristics once installed (see Ramey and
Shapiro, 2001, Kasahara, 2002). Doms and Dunne (1993) also document the considerable “lumpi-
ness” of plant level investments, while Cabellero and Engel (1998) demonstrate the high skewness
and kurtosis observed in aggregate investment data. Moreover, the variation in “shiftwork” over
11Shleifer’s model is also subject to a number of other criticisms including the fact that there are no downturns
and that there is a continuum of multiple cyclical equilibria, making the predictions of the model rather imprecise.
Moreover, while the timing of implementation booms is endogenous, the innovations themselves arise exogenously.
12Shleifer (1986) assumes that innovations arise exogenously. When innovation is endogenous, growth is inti-
mately related to the business cycle.
13Our interpretation of innovation is not R&D, but rather labour—intensive activities such as re—organization or
the development of new ideas. While capital—intensive R&D is often found to be mildly procyclical, Francois and
Lloyd—Ellis (2003), discuss evidence that other kinds of innovative activities are counter—cyclical.
5the business cycle (see Bresnahan and Ramey 1994, Hammermesh 1989 and Mayshar and Solon,
1993) is consistent with some degree of inﬂexibility in factor proportions, since it implies that
capital is being used less intensively during recessions than is optimal ex ante.
Here we introduce physical capital into the framework developed by Francois and Lloyd-Ellis
(2003) in order to understand the business—cycle relationships between investment, productivity
and the stockmarket.14 We model production in a way which captures, as simply as possible, the
inﬂexibility of installed capital relative to uninstalled capital. Speciﬁcally, we assume that, once
installed, capital becomes irreversible, lumpy and sector—speciﬁc. Moreover, we assume that while
the ratio of utilized capital to labor hours can be increased as output expands and more capital
is added, it cannot be adjusted as output contracts and no new capital is being added.15 Instead
we assume that capital utilization is variable, so that contractions are associated with under—
utilization. Our assumptions are similar in eﬀect to the assumption of “putty—clay” production
technology.16
Along the equilibrium growth path that we study, expansions are triggered by the imple-
mentation of accumulated productivity improvements. These improvements arrive stochastically
across sectors during the recession, gradually increasing ﬁrm values, so that Tobin’s Q starts to
rise prior to the boom. However, since ﬁrms optimally choose to delay implementation, invest-
ment lags behind the increase in Q. During the expansion, capital is accumulated continuously
and smoothly. At its end, the economy enters a recessionary phase where capital ceases to be
accumulated. As demand falls, the fact that the ratio of utilized capital to labor hours is ﬁxed
implies that producers continuously reduce capital utilization throughout the recession. This
anticipated decline in demand causes Tobin’s Q to fall during the preceding investment boom –
thus Q leads investment into the recession too.
Although our focus here is on the nature of investment cycles, our results are delivered in a
framework where the economy’s aggregate ﬂuctuations arise endogenously. There are no simple
causal relationships between the variables of interest studied here, instead all of these are general
equilibrium implications arising from the growth process. Expansions are “neoclassical”, supply—
side phenomena which directly raise both potential output, through the delayed implementation of
14Using the simpler model of Shleifer (1986) as a vehicle for this analysis will not work, even with inﬂexible
capital. Storage of any kind undermines the clustering of activity there. The endogenous innovation, present in
Francois and Lloyd-Ellis (2003), is a necessary part of the equilibrium.
15To ﬁx ideas, consider the example of a car manufacturer. As the demand for cars expands, it can add new
equipment to a given workforce working at maximum capacity, thereby raising the capital—labour ratio and in-
creasing labour productivity. However, as output contracts the manufacturer retains the installed capital (due to
irreversibility), but uses it less intensively and reduces the number of shifts in proportion, so that the ratio of
utilized capital to labour hours remains ﬁxed. The lumpiness assumption implies that the manufacturer cannot
rent out the capital to another car manfacturer during breaks between shifts.
16We discuss the relationship to that literature in Section 2.
6productivity improvements, and actual output through increased production labor, re—utilization
of installed capital and subsequent capital accumulation. Recessions are “Keynesian” demand—
side contractions during which actual output falls below its potential, investment slows, and
some capital resources are left under—utilized. These reductions in aggregate demand are an
equilibrium response to the anticipated future expansion, as eﬀort shifts into long—run growth
promoting activities, and out of current production.17
A key feature of our model is that the owners of physical capital and the owners of intangible
capital are distinct entities (e.g. banks and entrepreneurs). In our baseline model, we allow
capitalists to oﬀer a sequence of future prices per unit of utilized capital that they can commit to
ex ante. During expansions, threat of entry from replacement capitalists induces the incumbent
capitalist to oﬀer a capital price sequence whose present value is just suﬃcient to cover the cost
of the capital. However, during downturns, the competition faced by incumbent capitalists is
diminished and, if they could, they would raise their price above the competitive level that they
had originally oﬀered. By assuming that incumbent capitalist are committed to prices oﬀered
before the downturn occurs, we eﬀectively rule out such opportunistic behavior. In an extended
version of the model (Section 9) we show that the same outcomes can be supported through
endogenous, incomplete contracts.18
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 discusses the relationship between this paper and
others in the literature. Section 3 sets up the basic model and Section 4 posits and describes the
cyclical growth path. Section 5 develops the implications for the movement of key aggregates and
prices through the posited cycle. Section 6 sets up the key existence conditions and Section 7
characterizes the stationary cyclical growth path. Section 8 explores the main implications of the
cycle and Section 9 shows that our results are robust to allowing a greater range of contracting
possibilities. Section 10 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
17Here we are assuming that all labour is skilled and is mobile across sectors. As we discuss in our conclusion,
introducing unskilled labour with putty—clay production would also result in unemployment during recesions. A
fuller treatment of unemployment, job creation, and destruction at cyclical frequencies is contained in a companion
paper; Francois and Lloyd-Ellis (2004). That paper marries the Schumpeterian approach to productivity improve-
ments with eﬃciency wages and job creation and destruction at cyclical frequencies. That paper abstracts from
capital accumulation and investment at cyclical frequencies which are the focus here.
18The treatment of entrepreneurs and capital owners as distinct and subject to contracting limitations shares
some features with Caballero and Hammour (2004). They allow no contracting at all so that surpluses are divided
by Nash bargaining ex post. In contrast, we allow for some enforceable commitments — to price throughout,
and quantity in Section 9. The assumed limits in contracting between these parties are an important source of
ineﬃciency in both papers.
72 Relationship to the Previous Literature
A standard way to think about the relationship between investment and Tobin’s Q (common in
the RBC literature) is to abstract from issues regarding intangibles, but to assume that capital is
subject to quadratic costs of adjustment. The prediction of such a model is that investment should
exhibit a positive contemporaneous relationship with Tobin’s Q. Adding additional constraints
such as a “time to build” assumption helps to smooth out the response of investment to measured
incentives, but this alone cannot capture the observed delay of 3 to 4 quarters. In order to capture
the lead—lag relationship discussed above, Christiano and Todd (1996), Bernanke, Gertler and
Gilchrist (1999) and Christiano and Vigfusson (2001) also introduce a notion of “time to plan”
–aﬁxed time period between the date when the decision to invest more (less) is made and
the date when the actual funds are allocated.19 Although this “does the job” in some sense,
the assumption is somewhat ad hoc. Our approach oﬀers an alternative rationalization that
endogenizes the delay as a result of strategic timing decisions.
A second common approach to thinking about the relationship between Tobin’s Q and in-
vestment emphasizes the role of intangibles in aﬀecting the economy—wide value of ﬁrms. Hall
(2001b), Hobijn and Jovanovic(2001) and Laitner and Stolyarov (2003), for example, all empha-
size the long run implications of the IT revolution, the anticipation of which is dated to the early
1970’s. The idea is that the stock market moved immediately with the arrival of the informa-
tion, but investment was delayed until the 1990s.20 Laitner and Stolyarov (2003) emphasize the
capital and knowledge obsolescence caused by the arrival of such a general purpose technology
(GPT). However, while their framework is applicable to long—term cycles, there is little evidence
supporting the arrival of GPTs at business cycle frequencies (see Jovanovic and Lach, 1998, and
Andolfatto and Macdonald, 1998).21
Our model incorporates the role of both knowledge capital and adjustment costs in determining
the relationship between investment and Tobin’s Q over the business cycle. With endogenous in-
novation, of course, a component of ﬁrm values must reﬂect the returns to intangible investments.
In addition, our assumptions regarding capital can be viewed as reﬂecting a form of asymmetric
19A more subtle avenue is explored by Wen (1998) who shows that a time to build framework with short lags in
the production of capital can generate endogenously long lags in capital formation. This works through induced
increases in demand for investment goods that arise after the initial productivity shock. He demonstrates that
this induced demand channel increases the propagation of shocks and can quantitavely match seven year length
business cycles provided there exist other factors able to generate high elasticity in investment good production.
20Beaudry and Portier (2003) document a lead-lag relationship between stock market values and productivity
using post-war US data. The “news” shock which they identify – rising stock values but productivity increases
with a lag – is also consistent with the underlying process of innovation and implementation that we establish
here.
21Indeed, Laitner and Stolyarov (2003) cite evidence suggesting there have only been seven major technological
innovations of this kind identiﬁed in the last 200 years.
8adjustment costs (see also Cabellero, 1999). When expanding, capital adjustment is unimpeded
but, once installed, capital is prohibitively costly to adjust and cannot be converted into a con-
sumption good, nor into another capital good with diﬀerent capital-labor intensity. In fact, our
assumptions regarding the ex post inﬂexibility of capital are similar to those of the “putty-clay”
model (Johansen, 1959), except that here capital is not vintage—speciﬁca n di si n ﬁnitely lived.22
As in the putty-clay model, however, the irreversibility we assume implies a tight connection be-
tween changes in demand and changes in employment and capacity utilization. Our assumption
that investments are lumpy, in that they cannot be partly dismantled and used elsewhere is also
consistent with micro evidence (see Cooper, Haltiwanger and Power, 1999).
Most previous work on endogenous cycles and growth has been restricted to single sector
settings.23 These works cannot be translated readily into a multi-sector setting because they
include no force generating co-movement. One exception is the model developed by Matsuyama
(1999, 2001)24 who, like Shleifer (1986), emphasizes the role of short—lived monopoly power due
to exogenous imitation. The cycles that arise in his model do not depend on delay to generate
cyclical behavior, and are thus robust to capital accumulation through the cycle. However,
Matsuyama’s framework is more suited to understanding longer—term movements in the nature
of growth, rather than business cycle ﬂuctuations.25 In particular, there is no phase of his cycle




22Fuss (1977) and Gilchrist and Williams (2000) present evidence supporting a putty-clay view of capital.
23Jovanovic and Rob (1990), Cheng and Dinopolous (1992), Helpman and Trajtenberg (1998), Li (2000), Aghion
and Howitt (1998), Evans, Honkephoja and Romer (1998) and Walde (2001).
24Another exception is Francois and Shi (1999), but that model inherits the lack of robustness to storage in
Shleifer (1986).
25Indeed, Matsuyama is careful to apply his model to longer term issues such as the US productivty slowdown.
26Morover the innovative process is capital intensive, suggesting R&D plays a central role.
9Figure 1: The Structure of the Economy
The structure of the economy is illustrated in Figure 1. There is no aggregate uncertainty.
Time is continuous and indexed by t ≥ 0. The economy is closed and there is no government







where ρ denotes the rate of time preference and σ represents the inverse of the elasticity of







where w(t) denotes wage income, S(t) denotes the household’s stock of assets (ﬁrm shares and
capital) at time t and R(t) denotes the discount factor from time zero to t. The population is
normalized to unity and each household is endowed with one unit of labor hours, which it supplies
inelastically.
Final output can be used for the production of consumption, C(t), investment, ˙ K(t),o rc a n
be stored at an arbitrarily small ﬂow cost of ν>0 per unit time. It is produced by competitive
ﬁrms according to a Cobb—Douglas production function utilizing a continuum of intermediates,
xi, indexed by i ∈ [0,1]:






For simplicity we also assume that there is no physical depreciation. Intermediate i is purchased
from an intermediate producer at price pi. Intermediates are completely used up in production,
10but can be produced and stored for later use. Incumbent intermediate producers must therefore
decide whether to sell now, or store and sell later at the ﬂow storage cost ν.
Output of intermediate i depends upon the state of technology in sector i, Ai (t), the stock
of installed capital, Ki(t), the variable rate at which that capital is utilized, λi(t) ≤ 1,a n dl a b o r












if xi(t) <x i(z).
(4)
Here
z =a r gm a x
s<t
{xi(s)} (5)
is the date at which the last increment to capital was installed and {Ki(z),L i(z)} is the capital—
labor combination chosen at that date. Labor hours are perfectly mobile across sectors but,
installed capital, Ki(t), is sector—speciﬁc, irreversible and non-divisible, so that any part of it
that is not utilized cannot be used elsewhere (i.e. ˙ Ki ≥ 0). We denote the level of utilized capital
by Ku
i (t)=λ(t)Ki(t).
An implication of this structure is that during an expansion, when new capital is being built, a
ﬁrm’s ability to substitute between capital and labour is represented by Cobb—Douglas production
isoquants (curved in Figure 2). However during a contraction, when the ﬁrm produces below
capacity, its production possibilities are represented by Leontief production isoquants whose kink
points lie along a ray from the origin to the chosen point on the full-capacity isoquant. In such
a situation, the installed capital will optimally be used less intensively in proportion to the labor
hours allocated to production. One interpretation of this is that there are fewer shifts.
11Figure 2: Implications of Inﬂexibility of Installed Capital
3.1.1 Innovation
The innovation process is exactly as in the quality—ladder model of Grossman and Helpman
(1991). Competitive entrepreneurs in each sector allocate labor eﬀort to innovation, and ﬁnance
this by selling equity shares to households. The probability of success in instant t is δHi(t), where
δ is a parameter, and Hi represents the labor hours allocated to innovation in sector i.A te a c h
date, entrepreneurs decide whether or not to allocate labor hours to innovation, and if they do
so, how much. The aggregate labor hours allocated to innovation is given by H(t)=
R 1
0 Hi(t)dt.
New ideas and innovations dominate old ones by a factor eγ. Successful entrepreneurs must
choose whether or not to implement their innovation immediately or delay implementation until
a later date.27 Once they implement, the associated knowledge becomes publicly available, and
can be built upon by rivals. However, prior to implementation, the knowledge is privately held
by the entrepreneur.28 We let the indicator function Zi(t) take on the value 1 if there exists a
successful innovation in sector i which has not yet been implemented, and 0 otherwise. The set
of instants in which new ideas are implemented in sector i is denoted by Ωi.W el e tV I
i (t) denote
27We adopt a broad interpretation of innovation. Recently, Comin (2002) has estimated that the contribution of
measured R&D to productivity growth in the US is less that 1/2 of 1%. As he notes, a larger contribution is likely
to come from unpatented managerial and organizational innovations.
28Even for the case of intellectual property, Cohen, Nelson and Walsh (2000) show that ﬁrms make extensive use
of secrecy in protecting productivity improvements. Secrecy likely plays a more prominent role for entrepreneurial
innovations, which are the key here.
12the expected present value of proﬁts from implementing a success at time t,a n dV D
i (t) denote
that of delaying implementation from time t until the most proﬁtable future date.
3.1.2 The Market for Fixed Capital
Entrepreneurs cannot simply “sell” their idea to capital owners, but must be involved in its
implementation. We assume entrepreneurs have insuﬃcient wealth to purchase the capital stock
needed to implement, and hence must eﬀectively rent it from capital owners (e.g. banks). In the
basic version of our model, we assume that the capitalist is able to oﬀer a rental price sequence per
unit of utilized capital into the indeﬁnite future {qi(τ)}∞
τ=t. We assume that the price sequence
represents a binding commitment that cannot be adjusted ex post. Under such a price sequence







qi (τ)λi(τ)Ki(τ) − ˙ Ki(τ)
i
dτ. (6)
Since capital is sector speciﬁc, the price sequence that is oﬀered in equilibrium is determined
by the possibility of a “replacement capitalist” building an alternative capital stock to displace
that of the current capital owner within the sector (see Figure 1). If the threat of entry were
always suﬃcient to induce competitive pricing,29 there would be no need for long—term price
commitments. In the cyclical equilibrium that we study, however, the threat of entry is suﬃ-
cient to lead to competitive pricing only during expansions. During contractions, replacement
capitalists have reduced incentives for entry which, in the absence of price commitments, would
allow incumbent capitalists to price gouge. Anticipating this, entrepreneurs demand binding price
commitments from capital suppliers before entering the recession. A capital owner unwilling to
provide such a commitment will be passed over in favor of a replacement capitalist who is.
It may seem unusual to assume that capital owners charge a rental price per unit of utilized
rather than installed capital. This assumption simpliﬁes the exposition considerably, by allowing
us to decentralize the decisions of entrepreneurs and capital owners. In Section 9, we show that the
equilibrium price sequences can be replicated as part of an endogenous, incomplete contracting
equilibrium, in which contracts optimally specify the rental price of installed capital and the
utilization rate.
29In order to maintain competition in capital supply it will be assumed that, in the event of a competing capital
stock being built, ties in tended prices are always broken in favour of the entrant. Due to storage costs, entry of
replacement capital will imply scrapping of the pre-existing stock.
133.2 Deﬁnition of Equilibrium
Given initial state variables30 {Ai(0),Z i(0),K i (0)}1




ˆ pt(t), b qi(t), ˆ λi(t), ˆ xi(t). b Ki(t), b Li(t), b Hi(t), b Ai(t), b Zi(t), b V I
i (t), b V D




for each intermediate sector i, and
(2) economy wide sequences
n
b Y (t), b R(t), b w(t), b C (t), b S (t)
o
t∈[0,∞)
which satisfy the following conditions:
• Households allocate consumption over time to maximize equation (1) subject to the budget
constraint, equation (2). The ﬁrst—order conditions of the household’s optimization require that
b C(t)σ = b C(τ)σe
b R(t)−b R(τ)−ρ(t−τ) ∀ t,τ, (7)
and that the transversality condition holds
lim
τ→∞e−b R(τ)b S(τ)=0 (8)
• Final goods producers choose intermediates, xi, to minimize costs given prices pi, subject to






• Intermediate goods producers choose combinations of utilized capital Ku
i (t), and labour hours,
























• The unit elasticity of demand for intermediates implies that limit pricing at the unit cost of the








The resulting instantaneous proﬁt earned in each sector is given by
π(t)=( 1− e−(1−α)γ)Y (t). (12)
• Capital owners buy ﬁnal output in the form of new capital if and only if Ku
i (t)=Ki(t) and
˙ Ku
i (t) > 0 and rent it to intermediate producers.
30Without loss of generality, we assume no stored output at time 0.
14• Labor markets clear: Z 1
0
b Li(t)di + b H(t)=1 (13)
• Arbitrage trading in ﬁnancial markets implies that, for all assets that are held in strictly positive
amounts by households, the rate of return between time t and time s must equal
b R(s)−b R(t)
s−t .
• Free entry into innovation – entrepreneurs select the sector in which they innovate so as to
maximize the expected present value of the innovation, and
δ max[b V D
i (t), b V I
i (t)] ≤ b w(t), b Hi(t) ≥ 0 with at least one equality. (14)
• At instants where there is implementation, entrepreneurs with innovations must prefer to im-
plement rather than delay until a later date
b V I
i (t) ≥ b V D
i (t) ∀ t ∈ b Ωi. (15)
• At instants where there is no implementation, either there must be no innovations available to
implement, or entrepreneurs with innovations must prefer to delay rather than implement:
Either b Zi(t)=0 , (16)
or if b Zi(t)=1 , b V I
i (t) ≤ b V D
i (t) ∀ t/ ∈ b Ωi.
• Free entry into ﬁnal output production.
• Free entry of replacement capital: b V K
i (t) ≤ b Ki (t), where b V K
i is the value of capital determined
under the value maximizing sequence of price commitments.
4 T h eP o s i t e dC y c l i c a lG r o w t hP a t h
In this section, we informally posit a cyclical equilibrium growth path and the behavior of agents
in the economy. We then detail the implications for investment, consumption and innovation.31
In Section 5, we formally derive the implications of this behavior over each phase of the cycle,
and Section 6 then demonstrates the consistency of the posited behavior of entrepreneurs and
capitalists in an equilibrium steady state, and derives the conditions for existence.
Figures 3 and 4 depict the movement of key variables during the cycle. Cycles are indexed by
the subscript v, and feature a consistently recurring pattern through their phases. The vth cycle
features three distinct phases:
• The expansion is triggered by a productivity boom at time Tv−1 and continues through
subsequent capital accumulation, leading to continued growth in output, consumption and wages.
31There is a second equilibrium balanced growth path along which growth is constant and innovations are always
implemented immediately. We chracterize this “standard” growth path in Appendix B.
15Over this phase interest rates fall and investment declines. Since its productivity in manufacturing
is high, no labor is allocated to innovation. As capital accumulates the returns to physical
investment decline, while the return to innovation grows as the subsequent boom approaches.
Eventually innovation and reorganization re-commence, drawing labor hours from production.
Due to the rigidities of installed capital, the marginal product of capital drops to zero.
• The contraction thus starts with a collapse in ﬁxed capital formation at time TE
v .I n t e r m e d i -
ate producers experience a reduction in aggregate demand and cut back on the labour hours they
employ in production. This labour eﬀort is optimally re-allocated to relatively labor—intensive
innovation and re—organization. Successful entrepreneurs ﬁnd it optimal to delay implementa-
tion until the boom. Due to the rigidity of installed capital, labor’s departure from production
implies that capital is not fully utilized. Through the downturn the economy continues to con-
tract through declining consumption expenditure, capital utilization falls and innovation and
reorganization continue to increase.
• The boom occurs at an endogenously determined date, Tv, when the value of implementing
stored innovations ﬁrst exceeds the value of delaying their implementation. At that point, suc-
cessful entrepreneurs implement, starting the upswing once again. The returns to production rise
above those of innovation, drawing labor back into production. Returns to capital also rise with

































Figure 4: Evolution of Prices over the Cycle
4.1 Consumption
Since the discount factor jumps up at the boom, consumption exhibits a discontinuity during
implementation periods. The optimal evolution of consumption from the beginning of one cycle




= R0(Tv) − R0(Tv−1) − ρ(Tv − Tv−1). (17)
where the 0 subscript is used to denote values of variables the instant after the implementation
boom.32 Note that a suﬃcient condition for the boundedness of the consumer’s optimization
problem is that ln
C0(Tv)






<ρ ∀ v. (18)
T h ed i s c o u n tf a c t o ru s e dt od i s c o u n tf r o ms o m et i m et during the cycle to the beginning of
the next cycle is given by




32Formally, for any variable X(·),w ed e ﬁne X(t)=l i m τ→t− X(τ) and X0(t)=l i m τ→t+ X(τ).
174.2 Innovation and Implementation
Let Pi(s) denote the probability that, since time Tv−1, no entrepreneurial success has been made
in sector i by time s. It follows that the probability of there being no entrepreneurial success by
time Tv conditional on there having been none by time t,i sg i v e nb yPi(Tv)/Pi(t). Hence, the
value of an incumbent ﬁrm in a sector where no entrepreneurial success has occurred by time t












The ﬁrst term here represents the discounted proﬁt stream that accrues to the entrepreneur with
certainty during the current cycle, and the second term is the expected discounted value of being
an incumbent thereafter.
Lemma 1 In a cyclical equilibrium, successful entrepreneurs can credibly signal a success imme-
diately and all entrepreneurship in their sector will stop until the next round of implementation.
Unsuccessful entrepreneurs have no incentive to falsely announce success. As a result, an entre-
preneur’s signal is credible, and other entrepreneurs will exert their eﬀorts in sectors where they
have a better chance of becoming the dominant entrepreneur.
In the cyclical equilibrium, entrepreneurs’ conjectures ensure no more entrepreneurship in
a sector once a signal of success has been received, until after the next implementation. The










In the cyclical equilibrium, such delay is optimal; i.e. V D
i (t) >VI
i (t) throughout the contraction.
Successful entrepreneurs are happier to forego immediate proﬁts and delay implementation until
the boom in order to ensure a longer reign of incumbency. Since no implementation occurs during
the cycle, by delaying, the entrepreneur is assured of incumbency until at least Tv+1. Incumbency
beyond that time depends on the probability that there has not been another entrepreneurial
success in that sector up until then.33
The symmetry of sectors implies that entrepreneurial eﬀort is allocated evenly over all sectors
that have not yet experienced a success within the cycle. This clearly depends on some sectors
33A signal of further entrepreneurial success submitted by an incumbent is not credible in equilibrium because
incumbents have incentive to lie to protect their proﬁt stream. No such incentive exists for entrants since, without
as u c c e s s ,p r o ﬁts are zero. Note also that the reason for delay here diﬀers from Shleifer (1986) where the length of
incumbency is exogenously given.
18not having already received an entrepreneurial innovation, an equilibrium condition that will be











where e Hi(τ) denotes the quantity of labor that would be allocated to entrepreneurship if no
entrepreneurial success had occurred prior to time τ in sector i. The amount of entrepreneurship
varies over the cycle, but at the beginning of each cycle all industries are symmetric with respect
to this probability: Pi(Tv)=P(Tv) ∀i.
5 The Three Phases of the Cycle
5.1 The (Neoclassical) Expansion
During the expansion the economy’s dynamics are essentially identical to those of the Ramsey
model with no technological change:34











v−1K(t)α − C(t). (24)








where r(t)= ˙ R(t). As long as utilized capital is anticipated to grow, capitalists never acquire
more capital than is needed for production, so that Ku
i (t)=Ki(t). The existence of potential
replacement capitalists implies that capital owners cannot earn excess returns on marginal units,
so that qi (t)=q(t)=r(t). It follows that all ﬁrms choose the same capital—labour ratio





34Note that, unlike the Ramsey model, the rate of return on savings is not equal to the marginal product of
capital, but rather is a fraction e
−(1−α)γ of it. This reﬂects the entrepreneurial share of this marginal product
accruing as a monopoly rent.
19where






denotes the state of technology in use during the vth cycle. With all labour allocated to produc-




With technology ﬁxed during this phase, the price of capital declines and the wage rises in
proportion to the capital stock. Since the next implementation boom is some time away, the
present value of engaging in entrepreneurship initially falls below the wage, δV D(t) <w (t),
so that no labor is allocated to innovation or re—organization. During the expansion, δV D(t),
grows at the rate of interest and eventually equals w(t).35 At this point, if all workers were to
remain in production, returns to entrepreneurship would strictly dominate those in production.
As a result, labor hours are re—allocated from production and into innovation, which triggers the
contractionary phase.
5.2 The (Keynesian) Contraction
As labour is withdrawn from production, the ratio of utilized capital to labour hours and tech-
nology are both ﬁxed. Consequently, the marginal product of capital remains constant. A further
implication is that, through the contraction, the wage remains constant:
Lemma 2 : The wage for t ∈ [TE
v ,T v] is constant and determined by the level of technology and
the capital—labor ratio chosen at the last peak, K(TE
v ):36




Since there is free entry into entrepreneurship, w(t)=δV D(t), and so the value of entre-
preneurship, δV D(t), is also constant. Since the time until implementation for a successful en-
trepreneur is falling and there is no stream of proﬁts (because implementation is delayed), the
instantaneous interest rate necessarily equals zero. If it were not, entrepreneurial activity would








35We derive conditions which ensure this is the case subsequently.
36Since the labour force is normalized to unity, the capital—labour ratio equals the capital stock during the
expansion.
20Note that this zero interest rate is consistent with the fact there is now excess (under—utilized)
capital in the economy. Since marginal returns to new capital in this phase are zero, physical
investment ceases and the only investment is that in innovation, undertaken by entrepreneurs.
Lemma 3 : At TE
v , investment in physical capital falls discretely to zero and entrepreneurship
jumps discretely to H0(TE
v ) > 0.
A switch like this across types of investment is also a feature of the models of Matsuyama (1999,
2001) and Walde (2002). However, here factor intensity diﬀerences between innovation and pro-
duction lead to a protracted recession.
Although investment falls discretely at t = TE
v , consumption is constant across the transition
between phases because the discount factor does not change discretely. With the ﬁxed ratio
of utilized capital to labor hours, the decline in output due to the fall in investment demand
is proportional to the fraction of labor hours withdrawn from production. It follows that the
fraction of labor hours allocated to entrepreneurship at the start of the downturn, Hv = H0(TE
v ),




















Although consumption cannot fall discretely at TE
v , the zero interest rate implies that consump-








as resources ﬂow out of production and into entrepreneurship.
Since Y (t)=C (t), the growth rate in the hours allocated to production is also given by (31)
and so aggregate entrepreneurship at time t is given by




Note that due to the ﬁxed capital-labor ratio, as labor leaves current production, capital utilization






37Although r =0 , strict preference for zero storage results from the arbitrarily small storage costs.
215.2.1 The Rental Price of Capital during Downturns
In the absence of a capital price commitment, intermediate producers would be vulnerable to
an increasing rental price through the downturn. This is because replacement capital owners are
better oﬀ waiting until the boom, when capital will be relatively cheap, rather than displacing the
incumbent immediately and earning the rental rate for a relatively short time. To see this formally,
observe that, in order to forestall entry by a competing capitalist, the incumbent capitalist is
constrained to oﬀer a price sequence, q(τ) and induced capital utilization, λ(τ) which satisﬁes
V K (K(t),t) ≤ K(t), (34)
where V K (K(t),τ) denotes the value of the installed capital at time τ. During the downturn















However competition from potential replacement capitalists at the beginning of the next cycle





v ). Dividing by K(TE
v ) and re—arranging, using (33), yields







v )dτ ≤ 1 − e−β(Tv). (36)
The right hand side of this expression is constant throughout the downturn, but the left—hand side
decreases through the downturn for a given sequence {q(τ)}
Tv
τ=t. It follows that, in the absence
of a binding price commitment, the capitalist could raise q(τ) above what had previously been
oﬀered and still satisfy (36). Anticipating the potential for such price gouging, entrepreneurs
demand the commitment before TE
v , while the cost of replacement capital is still low. Any such
price commitment must satisfy (36) which will bind at t = TE
v :
Lemma 4 Any price commitment qc
i(τ) signed at some date t ∈ [Tv−1,TE







v )dτ =1− e−β(Tv) (37)
There are a number of price sequences qc(τ) that could satisfy this condition, however the
average level of prices satisfying it through t ∈ [Tv−1,TE



























v = Tv − TE
v . The capitalist could never be made better oﬀ by committing to a price
sequence that varies through the recession instead of the constant price qv.38
Given wv and qv, entrepreneurs choose a cost—minimizing ratio of utilized capital to labor
hours. Since this is constant through downturn, it follows that the installed capital—labour ratio










qv . Given the constant wage from (28) it then directly
follows that:
Proposition 2 Cost minimization ensures that capital is installed only up to the point at which





v )α−1 = q. (40)
Equating (39) and (40), substituting for 1 − Hv using (30), it follows that the capital—
















1 − e−(1−α)Γv . (41)






is also the capital stock at the beginning of the next boom
5.2.2 Does GDP really contract?
During this phase, Y (t) is not equal to real GDP because it does not include the contribution of
entrepreneurial inputs. This can easily be corrected as follows:
GDP = Y (t)+ ¯ wvH(t)
= π(t)+ ¯ wv (1 − H (t)) + ¯ qvKu (t)+ ¯ wvH (t)






Clearly, GDP contracts through this phase, because both proﬁts and payments to capital owners,
λ(t)¯ qv, fall. Thus, the recession is not a result of mis—measurement, or because innovative inputs
38Under any variable price sequence that averages to qv, entrepreneurs would have incentive to increase demand
for capital when q(τ) < qv, store that output not needed to meet the demand of the ﬁnal goods sector, and
correspondingly reduce production, and demand over those τ such that q (τ) > qv. By substituting capital demand
to times when the price is low, returns to the capital owner would fall.
23are not being counted. The reason is that, due to imperfect competition, wages are less than the
marginal product of labour. As labour hours are transferred to innovative activities, the marginal
cost in terms of output exceeds the marginal beneﬁt of innovation. In eﬀect, the transfer of labour
imposes a negative externality on intermediate producers and capital owners.
5.3 The (Schumpeterian) Boom






Productivity growth at the boom is given by Γv =( 1−P(Tv))γ,w h e r eP(Tv) is deﬁn e db y( 2 2 ) .
Substituting in the allocation of labor to entrepreneurship through the downturn given by (32)
and letting
∆E
v = Tv − TE
v , (43)
yields the following implication:
Proposition 3 : In an equilibrium where there is positive entrepreneurship only over the interval
(TE
v ,T v], the growth in productivity during the subsequent boom is given by
Γv = δγ∆E









Over the boom, the asset market must simultaneously ensure that entrepreneurs holding
innovations are willing to implement immediately (and no earlier) and that, for households,
holding equity in ﬁrms (weakly) dominates holding claims on alternative assets (particularly
stored intermediates). The following Proposition demonstrates that these conditions imply that
during the boom the discount factor must equal productivity growth:39
Proposition 4 Asset market clearing at the boom requires that
β(Tv)=( 1− α)Γv. (45)
39Shleifer’s (1986) model featured multiple expectations—driven steady state cycles. Such multiplicity cannot
occur here because, unlike Shleifer, the possibility of storage that we allow forces a tight relationship between Γv
and ∆
E
v as depicted in Proposition 3. Since Γv,∆
E
v pairs must satisfy this restriction as well, in general, multiple
solutions cannot be found.
24During the boom, β(Tv) equals the growth in ﬁrm values and wages grow in proportion to
productivity. Since, just before the boom, δV I(Tv)=w(Tv),ac o r o l l a r yi st h a t
δV I




The growth in output at the boom exceeds the growth in productivity for two reasons: ﬁrst
labor is re—allocated back into production, and second the previously under—utilized capital is now




of their peak levels, output growth through the boom is given by
∆lnY (Tv)=( 1 − α)Γv +( 1− α)∆lnL + α∆lnKu




v − ln(1 − Hv) (47)
It follows directly from Proposition 4 that growth in output exceeds the discount factor across
the boom. Since proﬁts are proportional to output, this explains why ﬁrms are willing to delay
implementation during the downturn.
The boom in output can be decomposed into a boom in consumption and investment. From





Notice that whether the growth in consumption exceeds the growth in productivity at the boom,
depends on the value of σ. In particular, if σ<1, consumption growth must exceed aggregate
productivity growth. Finally, since in the instant prior to the boom C (Tv)=Y (Tv),i tf o l l o w s
that the investment rate at the boom jumps to
˙ K0(Tv)
Y0(Tv)






6 Optimal Behavior During the Cycle
Optimal entrepreneurial behavior imposes the following requirements on our hypothesized equi-
librium cycle:
• Successful entrepreneurs at time t = Tv must prefer to implement immediately, rather than




25• Entrepreneurs who successfully innovate during the downturn must prefer to wait until the
beginning of the next cycle rather than implement earlier and sell at the limit price:
V I(t) <VD(t) ∀ t ∈ (TE
v ,T v) (E2)
• No entrepreneur wants to innovate during the slowdown of the cycle. Since in this phase of the
cycle δV D(t) <w (t), this condition requires that
δV I(t) <w (t) ∀ t ∈ (0,TE
v ) (E3)
• Finally, in constructing the equilibrium above, we have implicitly imposed the requirement that
the downturn is not long enough that all sectors innovate:
P(Tv) > 0. (E4)
Taken together conditions (E1) through (E4) are restrictions on entrepreneurial behavior that
must be satisﬁed for the cyclical growth path we have posited to be an equilibrium.
Figure 5 illustrates the evolution of the value functions and wages through the cycle. Following
the boom at Tv−1, δV I remains above δV D for a while so that if there were any new innovations,
immediate implementation would dominate delay. However, over this phase, the relative value of
labor in production, w, exceeds returns to entrepreneurship, so that no entrepreneurial successes
are available to implement. Throughout this expansionary phase, investment occurs so that the
wage continues to rise. At the same time, V D also rises as the next implementation period draws
closer. Throughout this phase V I declines as the duration of guaranteed positive proﬁts falls.
The end of the expansion corresponds to the commencement of entrepreneurship – when
the increasing value of delayed implementation eventually meets the opportunity cost of labor in
production, w = δV D. Since, during the contraction, interest rates are zero, V D remains constant
so that the wage must also be constant. Initially, V I continues to fall, but eventually rises again as
the probability of remaining the incumbent at the boom, given that an entrepreneurial success has
not arrived in one’s sector, increases. This increase in V I is the force that will eventually trigger
the next boom that ends the recession. It occurs when V I just exceeds V D and entrepreneurs
implement stored entrepreneurial successes, leading to an increase in productivity, a jump in











7 The Stationary Cyclical Growth Path
To allow a stationary representation, we normalize all aggregates by dividing by ¯ Av−1 and denote
the result with lower case variables. First recall from Proposition 1, that the dynamics of the
economy during the expansion are analogous to those in the Ramsey model without technological
change. Let cv = c(TE
v ) and kv = k(TE
v ) denote the normalized values of consumption and capital
at the peak of the vth expansion. Given initial values c0(Tv−1) and k0(Tv−1), and an expansion
length ∆X
v , it is possible to summarize the expansion as follows:
cv = f(c0(Tv−1),k 0(Tv−1),∆X
v ) (50)
kv = g(c0(Tv−1),k 0(Tv−1),∆X
v ), (51)
where f(·) and g(·) are well—deﬁned functions. Since capital accumulation stops in the recession,
and A rises by eΓv−1, it follows that
k0(Tv−1)=e−Γv−1kv−1. (52)
From (31), consumption declines by a factor e−
ρ
σ∆E
v−1 in the recession. When combined with its






















27Imposing stationarity, so that Γv = Γ,k v = k, cv = c, ∆E
v = ∆E and ∆X
v = ∆X for all v, on
the system described by (44), (41), (54), (55) and (46) yields a system of ﬁve equations in the
ﬁve unknowns that summarize the stationary cycle:
Proposition 5 The stationary cycle (Γ,k,c,∆E,∆X) satisﬁes the following system of equations:

































0(c,k,Γ,∆E,∆X)=( 1 − α)e−(1−α)γe−αΓkα (60)
where vI
0 = V I
0 (Tv)/ ¯ Av.
The stationary cycle can be understood heuristically from the phase diagram in Figure 6.






















Figure 6: Phase Diagram
28The economy does not evolve along the standard stable trajectory of the Ramsey model
terminating at the steady state, S. Instead, the evolution of the cycling economy during the
expansion is depicted by the path between A and B in the ﬁgure. Capital is accumulated starting
at the point k0 corresponding to point A in the diagram, according to (23) and (24). The point
k0 denotes the inherited capital stock at the boom. Accumulation ends at k
¡
TE¢
,a tw h i c hp o i n t
investment stops until the next cycle. Note that if allowed to continue along such a path the
economy would eventually violate transversality, but capital accumulation stops and consumption
declines so that the economy evolves from B to C through the downturn. During this phase, the
dynamics of the economy are no longer dictated by the Ramsey phase diagram. When this
phase ends, implementation of stored productivity improvements occurs at the next boom, and
¯ A increases, so that k fall discretely. If σ<1, consumption grows by more than productivity at
the boom, so that c rises discretely. The boom is therefore depicted by the dotted arrow back
to point A. At this point, investment in the expansionary phase recommences for the next cycle.
The connection between the two phases of the cycle arises due to the allocation of resources to
entrepreneurship. This allocation of resources will be reﬂected in the size of the increment to ¯ A,
Γ.
7.1 A Numerical Example
We numerically solve the model for various combinations of parameters and check the existence
conditions (E1)—(E4). We choose parameters to fall within reasonable bounds of known values,
and present a baseline case given in Table 1:







The parameters α and γ were chosen so as to obtain a labor share of 0.7, a capital share of 0.2 and
ap r o ﬁts h a r eo f0.1. These values correspond approximately to those estimated by Atkeson and
Kehoe (2002). The value of γ corresponds to a markup rate of around 15%. The intertemporal
elasticity of substitution 1
σ is slightly high, but in Appendix C, we provide simulation results for
various values below, including σ =1 .G i v e nσ =0 .79,w ec a l i b r a t e dδ and ρ so as to match a
long—run annual growth rate of 2.2% and an average risk—free real interest rate of 3.8%, values
29which correspond to annual data for the post—war US. The baseline case above yields a cycle
length of a little less than 4 years, Hv = .2044, and kv =7 .668. In this, and all simulations we
have computed, steady state values are unique.40
8I m p l i c a t i o n s
8.1 Tobin’s Q and Investment
Tobin’s Q is typically measured as the ratio of the value of ﬁrms to the book value of their capital





where Π(t) denotes the stock market value of the intangible capital tied up in ﬁrms, and recall
that V K(t) is the market value of their physical capital. Figure 7 illustrates the evolution of
Tobin’s Q, its tangible component (V K/K) and aggregate investment over the cycle.
During an expansion V K(t)=K(t) and, the value of intangible capital is equal to the value






Since V I(t) declines and K(t) grows during the expansion, Q(t) must decline.










v ) <K (TE
v ). (63)
Also some sectors experience innovations, so there exist terminal ﬁrms who are certain to be
made obsolete at the next round of innovation.A ta n yp o i n ti nt i m et h em e a s u r eo fs e c t o r si n
which no innovation has occurred is P(t), therefore the total value of ﬁrms on the stockmarket is
given by
Π(t)=( 1− P(t))[V T(t)+V D(t)] + P(t)V I(t), (64)
where V T(t) denotes the value of “terminal” ﬁrms who are certain to be made obsolete during
t h en e x tw a v eo fi m p l e m e n t a t i o n .T h ev a l u eo ft h e s eﬁrms can be written as




40Francois and Lloyd-Ellis (2003) explicitly establish uniqueness of the stationary cycle when capital accumulation
is not allowed. It seems likely that the introduction of capital would not lead to an additional stationary cycle
here, but we have not been able to establish this analytically.
30Substituting into (64) yields








Through the downturn, the value of intangible capital initially falls and then rises again as
the economy approaches the next boom.41 Immediately prior to the boom P(t)=P(Tv),s ot h a t








∀ t ∈ [TE
v ,T v). (67)
During the contraction, then, Q(t) initially declines as K(t) remains unchanged and the decline in
V k(t) dominates. However, eventually the growth in the value of intangible capital, ˆ Π(t), starts
to dominate as we approach the boom, so that Q(t) rises in anticipation. At the boom, since
the book value of capital remains unchanged, but the market value of physical capital grows by
af a c t o re(1−α)Γv,T o b i n ’ sQ rises rapidly.
Figure 7: Tobin’s Q and Investment
The qualitative behavior of Tobin’s Q in our model thus accords quite well with its aggregate
counterpart in US data. As illustrated in the introduction, Tobin’s Q tends to reach a peak
prior to the peak of expansions and then reaches a minimum before the end of the NBER—dated
recessions. The most rapid periods of growth in Tobin’s Q therefore start to occur before the end
of recessions and continue through the subsequent boom just as they do in our stationary cycle.
41This cyclical anticipation of future proﬁts implicit in aggregate stock prices accords well with the ﬁndings of
Hall (2001).
318.2 Additional Results
Although, our focus is on investment and the stockmarket, our model also endogenously generates
behavior of a number of key variables that are qualitatively consistent with the facts:
• Output growth is characterized by a three—stage process – Output grows rapidly at the boom,
at a lower rate during the subsequent expansion before turning negative. This is characterization
is consistent with time—series evidence provided by non—linear econometric models of output (e.g.
Dahl and Gonzalez—Rivera, 2003).
• Labour productivity is strongly pro—cyclical – During expansions, all labor is used in production
and capital is fully utilized, so that labor productivity rises though capital accumulation. In
contractions, labor is reallocated to innovative activities, capital utilization falls, and output
declines. If utilized capital and labor were correctly measured, labour productivity should remain
constant through the recession. If the re—allocation of labor were not fully measured, then it would
appear that labor is being hoarded (see Fay and Medoﬀ 1985),42 and measured labour productivity
would fall. This is consistent with the evidence of Fernald and Basu (1999), for example. Even
if labour re—allocations were correctly accounted for, measured productivity would still fall since
capital utilization is typically not well measured.
• Wages rise less than output during booms and expansions, and do not fall during contractions
– as a result, wages are inherently less procyclical than output, which again is consistent with
most evidence for the US. Since there are no aggregate employment ﬂuctuations in our model,
one must be careful in interpreting this implication. We discuss extensions of the model that
would allow for unemployment in our conclusion.
• Labor and capital inputs into consumption and investment sectors are both pro—cyclical – the
canonical RBC model implies that inputs into consumption are countercyclical (e.g. Christiano
and Fisher 1995). The allocation of labor to consumption good production can be inferred from
equation (48). As long as σ<1 consumption growth exceeds productivity growth so that the
allocation of labor and capital to consumption must rise at the boom. The reason labor in both
consumption and investment good production can rise is because of the endogenous shutting down
of entrepreneurship at the boom. This mechanism is similar to that generated by introducing
“homework” in Benhabib, Rogerson and Wright (1991).
• The term spread is small during expansions and high midway through contractions – we deﬁne
the term spread as the diﬀerence between a 30 year annualized interest rate and a 3 month interest
42Entrepreneurship is, at best, likely to be only partially measured in the data, since much of it involves activities
that will raise long-term ﬁrm proﬁts but have little directly recorded output value contemporaneously.
32rate. The cycle analyzed here exhibits a low value of the term spread through the expansion, and
a high value in the recession. The highest value occurs at the start of the recession then, towards
the end of the recession it tracks down as the three month rate starts to include the increased
discount over the boom. Similarly, at the start of the expansion the term spread is at its lowest
point, thus again providing a leading indication of the imminent contraction. Estrella and Mishkin
(1996) argue that the term spread is a superior predictor over other leading indicators at leads
f r o m2t o4q u a r t e r s .
9 Endogenous Incomplete Contracting
In describing the cyclical equilibrium above we have assumed that capital owners can oﬀer long
term commitments with respect to the rental price per unit of utilized capital. While it simpliﬁes
the exposition, this assumption is problematic for two reasons. First, one would normally expect
the rental price to be per unit of installed capital. Secondly, during the recession such price
commitments are clearly ex—post ineﬃcient – if a more productive technology has arrived in a
sector, would it not be Pareto improving to break the commitment so as to induce early entry
by new innovators who might fully utilize the capital? In this section, we relax the assumption
of price—commitment and instead only allow agents to write long term, enforceable supply con-
tracts. We show that the behavior described above can be derived as the equilibrium outcome of
constrained—eﬃcient contracting between agents. A key incompleteness in the contracting envi-
ronment arises as a natural consequence of the process of creative destruction – capital owners
cannot write contingent contracts regarding innovations that do not exist yet.
As with exogenous price commitments, prior to the peak of each cycle, capital owners compete
by oﬀering long term contracts. However, since entrepreneurs lose their productive advantage
when displaced by superior producers, they cannot make unconditional promises to purchase
capital into the indeﬁnite future. All such contracts are thus contingent upon the entrepreneur
continuing production. Note further that the existence of an exclusive contract over the supply
of capital in sector i, places the intermediate producer in that sector in a strong market position
relative to its rivals. In order to prevent ex—post price gouging by the intermediate goods producer,
the ﬁnal goods producer will also demand a contract over the supply of intermediate goods. Such
a contract will also be written prior to the peak, when there is still eﬀective competition from
the past incumbent.43
Intermediate Supply Contracts written at t specify future output, xi (τ), and prices,
43Though conceptually feasible, contracts written over the supply of labor and ﬁnal output are redundant in the
equilibria we study and will not be considered further.
33pi (τ),f o ra l lτ up to a chosen contract termination date, TX
i . Thus, such a contract is a tuple: n
{xi (τ),p i (τ)}τ∈[t,TX
i ] ,T X
i
o
. Since the productive advantage of an intermediate producer lasts
only until a superior technology is implemented in that sector, contracts allow the termination of
agreements before TX
i if shutting down production. Otherwise, the parties can break contracts
only by mutual agreement. The value of the arrangement to ﬁnal goods producers is denoted
V Y (t).
Lemma 5 Given a sequence of input prices w(t), q(t) for t ∈ [Tv−1,T v), an intermediate
supply contract specifying price and quantity sequences satisfying (11) and (9) for t ∈ [Tv−1,T v)







V Y (t) ≥ 0.
Capital Supply Contracts specify future binding levels of installed capital, Ki (τ), and an
eﬀective price for each unit of installed capital, λi(τ)qi (τ), for all τ up to a chosen contract termi-
nation date, TK
i . Thus a contract signed at time t is a tuple
n
{Ki (τ),λ i(τ)qi (τ)}τ∈[t,TK




Contracts can be altered under the same conditions as in intermediate supply contracts. In equi-




i (t), b V D
i (t)
i
+ b V K








The existence conditions (E1) through (E4) take as given that entrepreneurs do not produce
in excess of current demand and store their output until the boom. Provided that the incumbent
entrepreneur does not terminate the capital supply contract, (45) ensures that storage across the
boom is not optimal. However, since the capital utilization and rental price sequences that we
have derived previously imply that the capital stock is being under—utilized, it is possible that
just before the boom, a rival entrepreneur who has successfully innovated may be able to “buy
out” the contract and utilize all the capital, meeting the current demand for output and storing
the remainder until the boom.
This rival would not beneﬁt from taking over the capital contract of the incumbent under
identical terms. From (45), producing output and storing it until the boom is not optimal if he
must pay a constant amount ¯ q for capital. Moreover, under (E2) implementation and sale before
the boom is not optimal. However, the rival may be willing to take over the use rights if able
to pay qv for the amount K (t) in the incumbent’s contract, utilize extra units of idle capital at
some price e q<qv, and store. Clearly any e q>0 for the excess units would be amenable to the
capitalist. The most the rival will be willing to pay per period for the current capital is qvK(TE
v ),
34since e−β(Tv)q0(Tv)=qv. To buy out the contract, the rival must compensate the incumbent for
the loss of proﬁts sustained for the remainder of the cycle and must oﬀer the capitalist at least




v ) per period. It follows that















The following proposition provides a suﬃcient condition for this to hold throughout the downturn:
Proposition 6 Provided that
(1 − (1 − α)e−(1−α)γ)(1 − Hv)e−
ρ
σ∆E
v >α e −(1−α)γ (E5)
capital supply contracts specifying price and quantity sequences given by (69), (74), (33) and (40)
are undominated.
In eﬀect, condition (E5) explains how it is possible for there to be under—utilized capital
during a recession even though there exist rivals who could potentially use the capital stock more
proﬁtably. The reason is that the capital stock is “lumpy”, so that the rival cannot use part
of it while the incumbent continues to produce. For this reason, the rival must compensate the
incumbent for his proﬁt loss and this “endogenous” ﬁx e dc o s ti st o ol a r g ef o re n t r yt ob ep r o ﬁtable
under recessionary demand conditions. Entry does not become proﬁtable until the boom. There,
demand is high and entry costs low because the previous incumbent’s proﬁts do not need to be
compensated – they have already been destroyed by the implementation of a superior production
process. In our numerical simulations, we ﬁnd that (E5) is rarely binding, so it does not appear
to be a strong requirement for existence of the cyclical equilibrium.
In the absence of exogenous price commitment, the cyclical equilibrium is supported by limita-
tions on the contracting environment. The critical, and we think realistic, assumption is that only
future prices and quantities can be contracted ex ante. Allowing for a richer set of contracting
possibilities would overturn this result. For example, if the new incumbent entrepreneur (who ar-
rives probabilistically in the downturn) could somehow be party to the contract prior to time TE
v ,
then full utilization of the capital through the downturn could also be contracted ex ante. Such
a rich contracting environment, however, seems to require unrealistically complex and diﬃcult to
observe details to be enforceable between the parties. Thus endogenous under—utilization, which
corresponds to that observed in actual business cycles, arises here due to natural limitations in
contracting.
3510 Concluding Remarks
This article shows how the qualitative relationship between investment and Tobin’s Q over the US
business cycle, arises quite naturally in a model of endogenous cyclical growth. During recessions,
entrepreneurs delay the implementation of innovations, whose present value is reﬂected in stock
market values, until demand is high and the expected length of incumbency is maximized. Once
these innovations are implemented, the marginal product of capital jumps, inducing a prolonged
investment boom. During this period of high investment, the incentives to innovate are low and
subsequent booms are far away, so that the market value of existing ﬁrms starts to decline. This
decline anticipates the subsequent crash in investment, as resources are shifted out of current
production and into longer term activities.
In order to study these cycles in the rate of ﬁxed capital formation, we have extended the
existing literature on endogenous implementation cycles. The extension is non—trivial because the
introduction of physical capital into models like that of Shleifer (1986) undermines the existence
of cycles by allowing agents to store. In the presence of costly, endogenous innovation, however,
a unique cyclical equilibrium emerges which is robust to storage (and therefore the introduction
of capital).
Our model also generates movements in other aggregates over the cycle which are qualitatively
similar, in some respects, to those observed in US data. It should be reiterated that these results
arise in a framework where both the economy’s cyclical behavior and its growth path are fully
endogenized. Moreover, the framework we explore has remarkably few degrees of freedom; the
model is fully speciﬁed by ﬁve exogenous parameters: two summarizing household preferences,
two underlying the productivity of entrepreneurship, and one pinning down factor shares in
production.
We do not claim that the current framework is capable of providing a quantitative account
of the business cycle. However, in future work we will build on this parsimonious structure to
explore a number of key extensions:
• Aggregate uncertainty and stochastic cycle lengths – The length and other characteristics of
actual business cycles, vary from cycle to cycle and look rather diﬀerent from the deterministic
stationary equilibrium cycle described here. Introducing some degree of aggregate uncertainty
would help to address this. However, in order to develop such an extension we need to develop
a deeper understanding of the local transitional dynamics of the model. It turns out that these
dynamics are not as complex as one might expect at ﬁrst blush. The reason is that the path
back to the stationary cycle (at least locally) involves the accumulation of only one factor: either
physical capital or intangible. Although a full analysis of these local dynamics is beyond the
36scope of the current paper, we believe it is feasible.
• Unemployment – A natural way to introduce unemployment into the model is to allow for
unskilled labour which cannot be used in entrepreneurship and is not directly substitutable with
skilled labor in production. With putty—clay production, the marginal value of this unskilled
labor falls to zero during the downturn and some fraction of unskilled workers would become
unemployed (just like physical capital). In a competitive labor market, this would drive unskilled
wages down to their reservation level. However, in the presence of labor market imperfections,
such as eﬃciency wages and search frictions, the dynamics of unemployment and wages interact
with the process of creative destruction in a more complex manner. In further work we explore
these dynamics more fully.
• Government policy – The framework developed here (as well as its extensions) provide a
natural framework for thinking about counter—cyclical policy. First, the question arises as to
whether removing or reducing cycles is a valid policy objective at all. Francois and Lloyd—Ellis
(2003) show that switching from the cyclical equilibrium to a corresponding acyclical one would
reduce long—run growth but increase welfare. Similar results are likely to carry over to the
stationary cycle in the current model. A second issue is that of how to implement a counter—
cyclical policy. The recession here is Keynesian in that it is associated with deﬁcient demand,
and the government could intervene, for example, by raising demand for goods and services and
taxing savings. However, such a policy would eﬀectively channel resources away from innovative
activities and may dampen growth. On the other hand the anticipation of higher demand during
a downturn might stimulate innovation, so the overall eﬀect is unclear.
37Appendix A — Proofs
P r o o fo fL e m m a1We show: (1) that if a signal of success from a potential entrepreneur is
credible, other entrepreneurs stop innovation in that sector; (2) given (1) entrepreneurs have no
incentive to falsely claim success.
Part (1): If entrepreneur i0s signal of success is credible then all other entrepreneurs believe that i
has a productivity advantage which is eγ times better than the existing incumbent. If continuing
to innovate in that sector, another entrepreneur will, with positive probability, also develop a
productive advantage of eγ. Such an innovation yields expected proﬁt of 0, since, in developing
their improvement, they do not observe the non-implemented improvements of others, so that
both ﬁrms Bertrand compete with the same technology. Returns to attempting innovation in
another sector where there has been no signal of success, or from simply working in production,
w(t) > 0, are thus strictly higher.
Part (2): If success signals are credible, entrepreneurs know that upon success, further innovation
in their sector will cease from Part (1) by their sending of a costless signal. They are thus
indiﬀerent between falsely signalling success when it has not arrived, and sending no signal.
Thus, there exists a signalling equilibrium in which only successful entrepreneurs send a signal of
success.¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 :First note that in the absence of uncertainty or adjustment costs, and
as long as utilized capital is anticipated to grow, capital owners never acquire more capital than
is needed for production, so that
Ku
i (t)=Ki(t). (69)
Substituting into (6) and diﬀerentiating with respect to time yields
˙ V K
i (t)=r(t)V K
i (t) − qi (t)Ki (t)+ ˙ Ki (t)= ˙ Ki (t). (70)
Since, during this phase, V k
i (t)=Ki (t), it follows that qi (t)=q(t)=r(t) ∀ i. Combining (??)
with (9), (10) and (11), it follows that all ﬁrms choose the same capital—labour ratio. From the

















38which re-arranges to (73)
q(t)αw(t)1−α = αα(1 − α)1−αe−(1−α)γA
1−α
v−1. (73)
Thus, the input price index for t ∈ [Tv−1,TE
v ] is constant and uniquely determined by the level
of technology
Through this phase, capital is rented at a competitive price, i.e. its marginal product net of




Using this in the consumer’s Euler equation yields the equations in Proposition 1.¥
P r o o fo fL e m m a3 :Suppose instead that there exists an intermediate phase in which neither
capital is accumulated nor entrepreneurship occurs. Consider the ﬁrst instant of that phase. Since
in the instant prior to that capital was being accumulated, the marginal return to investment in
physical capital must exceed ρ. Since the marginal product of capital cannot jump downwards
discretely at full capital utilization, there are only two possibilities: either (1) r(TE
v )=ρ at
the start of the intermediate phase or (2) r(TE
v ) >ρat the start of the intermediate phase.
Situation (2) can be ruled out directly since, by assumption, in the intermediate phase there is
no entrepreneurship, and so it must be the case that r>ρand investment will occur. Situation
(1) occurs if the marginal return to capital converges continuously to r = ρ along the neoclassical
accumulation phase. But this corresponds exactly with the path of accumulation along the stable
trajectory of the Ramsey model which does not converge in ﬁnite time – this would then imply
an inﬁnite length to the capital accumulation phase.¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 :Long—run productivity growth is given by
Γv =( 1− P (Tv))γ (75)












Substitution into (75) and integrating gives (44).¥
Proof of Lemma 4: If V k
i (t) >K i (t) it is feasible for the the builder of a new capital stock
in sector i to commit to a price sequence qc
i (τ), which would be strictly preferred by the current
incumbent producer. A preferred sequence for the leading producer would be one in which prices
39were no higher than the contracted sequence above, but which had a strictly lower price in at
least one instant. This is feasible if V k
i (t) >K i (t). Finally, no new capitalist would enter oﬀering
a sequence V k
i (t) <K i (t), so that any equilibrium price sequence must at least satisfy (37).¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 : For an entrepreneur who is holding an innovation, V I(t) is the
value of implementing immediately. During the boom, for entrepreneurs to prefer to implement




Just prior to the boom, when the probability of displacement is negligible, the value of imple-
menting immediately must equal that of delaying until the boom:
δV I(Tv)=δV D(Tv)=w(Tv). (78)
From (77), the return to entrepreneurship at the boom is the value of immediate (rather than
delayed) incumbency. It follows that free entry into entrepreneurship at the boom requires that
δV I
0 (Tv) ≤ w0 (Tv). (79)
The opportunity cost of ﬁnancing entrepreneurship is the rate of return on shares in incumbent
ﬁrms in sectors where no innovation has occurred. Just prior to the boom, this is given by the








Note that since the short—term interest rate is zero over this phase, β(t)=β(Tv), ∀ t ∈ (TE
v ,T v).






=( 1− α)Γv. (81)
Free entry into entrepreneurship ensures that β(Tv) > (1 − α)Γv cannot obtain in equilibrium.
Provided that β(t) > 0, households will never choose to store ﬁnal output from within a cycle
to the beginning of the next either because it is dominated by the long—run rate of return on
claims to future proﬁts. However, the return on stored intermediate output in sectors with no
entrepreneurial successes is strictly positive, because of the increase in its price that occurs as a
result of the boom. If innovative activities are to be ﬁnanced at time t, it cannot be the case that
households are strictly better oﬀ buying claims to stored intermediate goods rather than holding
claims to ﬁrm proﬁts. In sectors with no entrepreneurial success, incumbent ﬁrms could sell such
40claims, use them to ﬁnance greater current production and then store the good to sell at the
beginning of the next boom when the price is higher. In this case, since the cost of production is
the same whether the good is stored or not, the rate of return on claims to stored intermediates
in sector i is logpi,v+1 /pi,v =( 1− α)Γv. It follows that the long run rate of return on claims to
ﬁrm proﬁts an instant prior to the boom must satisfy
β(Tv) ≥ (1 − α)Γv. (82)
Free—entry into arbitrage ensures that β(Tv) < (1 − α)Γv cannot obtain in equilibrium. Because
there is a risk of obsolescence, this condition implies that at any time prior to the boom the
expected rate of return on claims to stored intermediates is strictly less than β(t). Combining
(81) and (82) yields the condition in the statement of the Proposition.¥
Proof of Proposition 5: Substituting for 1 − Hv in Proposition 3 using (30), we can express

























Finally, asset market clearing over the boom (conditions (78) to (81)) imply:
δvI
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41P r o o fo fL e m m a5 :Due to the unit elasticity of ﬁnal producer demand, intermediate producing
entrepreneurs wish to set price as high as possible. Thus, contracting a lower price at any instant
is not optimal for the leader in i. Oﬀering a pc
i (t) >p i (t) i na n yi n s t a n tw o u l dl e a dt oab i db y
the previous incumbent that would be both feasible and preferred by the ﬁnal good producer.
Thus pc




i(t)for all t ∈ [Tv,T v+1).¥


























































v )dτ ≥ αe−(1−α)γ(Tv − t)
Since this holds with equality at t = Tv,as u ﬃc i e n tc o n d i t i o ni st h a tt h el e f th a n ds i d ed e c l i n e s
more rapidly with t than the right hand side. That is
(1 − (1 − α)e−(1−α)γ)(1 − Hv)e−
ρ
σ(t−TE
v ) >α e −(1−α)γ (90)
This will hold for all t if holds for t = Tv. Hence, condition (E4) follows.¥
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46Appendix B: The Acyclical Growth Path
Proposition 7 : If
(1 − e−(1−α)γ)γ(1 − σ)




then there exists an acyclical equilibrium with a constant growth rate given by
ga =m a x
"
[δ(1 − e−(1−α)γ) − ρ(1 − α)e−(1−α)γ]γ
1 − αe−(1−α)γ − γ (1 − σ)(1− α)e−(1−α)γ,0
#
. (92)






w(t)=( 1 − α)e−(1−α)γY (t). (94)
Since q(t)=r(t) > 0, accumulating capital dominates storage, so that:
˙ K(t)=Y (t) − C(t), (95)










Since, innovation occurs in every period, free entry into entrepreneurship implies that
δV I(t)=w(t). (98)
Along the balanced growth path, all aggregates grow at the rate g. From the Euler equation it
follows that
r(t)=ρ + σg. (99)
Diﬀerenting (94) and (98) w.r.t. to time, using these to substitute for
˙ V I(t)
V I(t) in (97), and using
(99) to substitute for r(t) and (12) to sustitute for π(t),w eg e t





(1 − α)e−(1−α)γ + g. (100)
Solving for g yields (92).¥
47Appendix C: Simulation Results
Table 2: Comparative Stationary Cycles
Parameters k(TE
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Table 2 lists the numerical implications for growth, cycle length and terminal values of capital
stocks for various combinations of parameter values, including the baseline case. A ﬁrst thing
to note is the extreme sensitivity of cycle length, ∆ = ∆X + ∆E, to changes in parameters. In
contrast, the long—run growth rate is much less sensitive to changes in parameters than along
the acyclical growth path. Generally, increases in parameters that directly raise the impact of
entrepreneurship, δ and γ, increase the growth rate, as in the acyclical steady state. Changes
in σ and ρ also have eﬀects similar to those present in the acyclical steady state. Additionally,
however, changes in these parameters alter cycle length in ways which counterveil, and sometimes
overshadow, the direct eﬀects. For example, increasing σ, lowering inter-temporal substitutability,
generally induces lower growth in the acyclical steady state because consumers are less willing to
delay consumption to the future. A similar eﬀect is present here. However, as the table shows,
this increase also raises cycle length and amplitude, inducing more entrepreneurship and a larger
boom. The net eﬀect, as the table shows, is an increase in growth rate for this conﬁguration.
Values of σ closer to 1 do not satisfy our existence conditions given the values of other
parameters assumed in the baseline case. However, if we allow δ to rise somewhat, higher values
of σ a r ec o n s i s t e n tw i t ht h ec y c l e( s e et h el a s tt w or o w so fT a b l e2 ) . I n t u i t i v e l y ,w i t hh i g h e r
entrepreneurial productivity, both the size of booms and the average growth rate tend to be
higher in equilibrium. As a result, households are willing to delay consumption enough even for
low elasticities of intertemporal substitution. As can be seen, the long—run growth rate in such
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